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Scholarly literature has emphasized the role of the regional security environment 
in driving nuclear proliferation following the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, few 
studies have examined regional nuclear dynamics. This dissertation investigates what 
drove proliferation trends over time in the Middle East, a conflict-ridden region. Over 
three time periods, representing the bipolar period (1973–1990), the unipolar period 
(1991–2003), and the multipolar period (2004–2013), did proliferation increase or 
decrease? And did system-level or regional-level factors drive the change? In contrast to 
mainstream arguments that nuclear proliferation was contained during the Cold War but 
could be expected to increase after its end, this research finds that nuclear proliferation in 
the Middle East increased during the Cold War period but decreased after its end. 
Specifically, superpower competition during the Cold War seemed to foster greater 
nuclear proliferation among client states. The reduction of great power competition 
following the end of the Cold War allowed the sole superpower, the United States, to 
better manage proliferation issues and strengthen existing or create new multilateral 
mechanisms to control these threats. In the recent, less structured multipolar environment, 
great powers came together to manage proliferation with their efforts bolstered by the 
nonproliferation regime. 
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 1 
I. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN THE REGIONAL CONTEXT 
The nuclear age began on July 16, 1945, at Alamogordo, New Mexico, with the 
first explosion of a nuclear weapon. Seeking to bring World War II to a quick end, the 
United States dropped a uranium-235 bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, on August 6 and a 
plutonium bomb on Nagasaki, Japan, on August 9, resulting in approximately 200,000 
deaths.1 
From the beginning, the United States was preoccupied with controlling the 
spread of nuclear weapons and discussed proposals with World War II allies for 
international control of nuclear technology, facilities, and materials. In the end, the 
United States acted unilaterally. The U.S. Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act in 
September 1945 that prohibited sharing nuclear technology with any state. Nevertheless, 
nuclear weapons technology spread. The Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons in 
1949. The United Kingdom conducted its first nuclear test in 1952. France followed with 
a nuclear test in 1960. China tested its first nuclear weapon in 1964. 
The United States decided to promote the peaceful use of nuclear technology. In a 
December 1953 speech, President Dwight Eisenhower launched the “Atoms for Peace” 
initiative and introduced the idea of creating an international agency that could help 
oversee the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes in other countries.2 This 
speech led to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957 
and the amendment of the Atomic Energy Act. After much negotiation, the establishment 
of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) followed in 1968. The treaty enshrined the 
right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology and a commitment from states possessing 
nuclear weapons to eventual disarmament. The NPT created the IAEA safeguards system 
to monitor compliance and created three categories of states—nuclear weapon states, 
                                                 
1 “70 Years after Nagasaki Bombing, Atomic Debate Yields Little Consensus,” New York Times, 
August 8, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/09/world/asia/on-70th-anniversary-of-nagasaki-
bombing-atomic-debate-yields-little-consensus.html. 
2 “Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Atoms for Peace Speech” (speech, New York, December 8, 1953), 
International Atomic Energy Agency, accessed May 21, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/about/history/atoms-
for-peace-speech.  
 2 
non-nuclear weapon states, and states that refused to be a part of the treaty. Through the 
prism of the NPT, any state acquiring nuclear weapons beyond the original five nuclear 
weapon states was considered an illicit nuclear power. 
These international regimes have not prevented states from pursuing nuclear 
weapons. Since 1945, 25 states attempted to obtain nuclear weapons, but they did not 
either acquire or keep them.3 Three additional states, India, Pakistan, and North Korea, 
eventually obtained nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Middle Eastern states, such as Egypt, 
have regularly accused Israel of acquiring nuclear weapons.4 Nevertheless, one could 
also say that nonproliferation efforts have been a wild success. Nuclear weapons 
technology has existed since 1945 and few states have obtained and kept nuclear 
weapons. States from various world regions have opted to forego the pursuit of nuclear 
weapons joining together to form nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs). Other regions, 
however, appear to be more prone to proliferation. 
A. UNDERSTANDING REGIONAL NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 
Why are some world regions rife with nuclear proliferation, while others have 
established nuclear-weapon-free zones? Why have some regions reversed a trajectory 
toward nuclear proliferation and others have not? From a conceptual or policy 
perspective, there has not been an adequate understanding as to why regions move toward 
or away from proliferation. Can one theory account for variations over time? Does one 
theory explain specific periods better than others? 
Studies on nuclear proliferation after the end of the bipolar-era of the Cold War, 
or the “second nuclear age,” have highlighted the importance of looking at nuclear issues 
                                                 
3 Ariel E. Levite, “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,” International Security 27, 
no. 3 (January 1, 2003): 62, https://doi.org/10.1162/01622880260553633. 
4 For example, see “Nasser Threatens Israel on A-Bomb,” New York Times, December 24, 1960. 
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in a regional context.5 Vipin Narang characterizes the second nuclear age as having “a 
growing number of regional nuclear powers, complicated multipolar nuclear interactions, 
and unstable conflict dynamics.”6 Paul Bracken states that “regional nuclear arms races, 
crises in the regions, and nuclear competition among major powers are likely parts of the 
second nuclear age.”7 If regional nuclear issues predominate in the second nuclear age, 
what is the most useful way to study them? 
To examine this question and to compare the various explanations, I take an 
approach that evaluates two levels of analysis—systemic and regional—to study a 
geographic region over time. Within these levels of analysis, I seek to determine which 
theories and variables provide the most explanatory power for horizontal nuclear 
proliferation in the regional context. I test a variable drawn from a theory within each of 
these levels of analysis to determine which variable and theory provide the most 
explanatory power for regional nuclear proliferation. 
System-level theories might help us understand why nuclear proliferation trends 
change over time. What system-level theories exist for regional nuclear proliferation? I 
review these kinds of theories in the first section. 
1. System-Level Theories 
How might systemic factors shape the regional context? Ashley Tellis, along with 
Alagappa and Narang, emphasize the effect on nuclear dynamics of the systemic shift 
                                                 
5 For example, see Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and 
International Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014); Paul Bracken, The Second 
Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2013); 
and Muthiah Alagappa, ed., The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia (Palo 
Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008). Also, this is the definition of the second nuclear age proposed 
in Colin S. Gray, The Second Nuclear Age (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Pub, 1999). For an alternative 
definition, see Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics : Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007) or Paul Bracken, “The Structure of the Second Nuclear 
Age,” Orbis 47, no. 3 (2003): 399–413, doi: 10.1016/S0030-4387(03)00042-5. 
6 Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, 311. 
7 Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age, 3. 
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from bipolarity to multipolarity.8 Looking at shifts in the international system may help 
explain regional nuclear proliferation over time. 
Kenneth Waltz’s theorizing about the effect of bipolarity versus multipolarity in 
the international system underpins this argument regarding system shifts. Waltz asserts 
that the international system changed from a multipolar system to a bipolar system, which 
was more stable, with the advent of the Cold War.9 This stability was due to four factors: 
“the absence of peripheries,” “the range and intensity of competition,” “the persistence of 
pressure and crisis,” and the superpowers’ “preponderant power.”10 He notes that the first 
three points “combine to produce an intense competition.”11 This superpower 
competition led the two superpowers to be involved all over the globe, sometimes in 
countries that otherwise might not have been deemed to be of strategic interest, such as 
U.S. involvement in Korea in the 1950s.12 During the Cold War, this international 
involvement, along with “preponderant power,” allowed the superpowers to maintain 
leverage over states that chose to align with them, to include the arena of nuclear 
proliferation.13 This line of thinking concludes that this level of external management of 
regional states and general system stability came to an end with bipolarity. 
As an example of superpower management, the United States worked to limit 
Iran’s nuclear acquisitions under the Shah in the mid- to late 1970s due to proliferation 
concerns.14 The United States also strongly pressured South Korea to curtail its nuclear 
                                                 
8 Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark, and Travis Tanner, Strategic Asia 2013–14: Asia in the 
Second Nuclear Age (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2013); Alagappa, The Long 
Shadow; Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era. 
9 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, First Edition (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 
71;Waltz characterized bipolarity as “a great gap between the power of two leading countries and the 
power of the next most considerable states” in “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” Daedalus 93, no. 3 (July 
1, 1964): 892. 
10 Waltz, “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” July 1, 1964, 886. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 882. 
13 Ibid., 888. 
14 William Burr, “A Brief History of U.S.-Iranian Nuclear Negotiations,” Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 65, no. 1 (January 1, 2009): 21–34, https://doi.org/10.2968/065001004. 
 5 
ambitions resulting in the country signing the NPT in 1975 and a U.S. security 
guarantee.15 
What followed bipolarity and what did that mean for global stability, security 
guarantees, and, consequently, nuclear proliferation? Benjamin Frankel predicts in a 1993 
article that superpower guarantees, “the most effective instrument to moderate the effects 
of systemic characteristics,” would be weakened leading to increased instability and 
insecurity in a more anarchical international system.16 This insecurity would cause more 
countries to seek nuclear weapons.17 John Mearsheimer assesses, also in a 1993 article, 
that the bipolarity of the Cold War era would revert back to multipolarity increasing 
global instability.18 To counteract the ill effects of multipolarity in Europe that led to 
two world wars, Mearsheimer advocates for ”carefully managed proliferation of nuclear 
weapons in Europe” to restore regional stability following this shift in the international 
system.19 Have there been signs of increasing nuclear proliferation since the end of the 
Cold War? Perhaps the surge of interest in nuclear power worldwide, suggesting a 
nuclear hedging strategy, is a sign of increasing regional insecurity.20 
In the transition from bipolarity to multipolarity, however, a number of scholars 
have advocated for the existence of a unipolar period in the international system. Waltz 
assesses that the international system would revert to multipolarity, accompanied by 
decreased stability, fairly quickly, but he himself acknowledges that a “unipolar moment” 
                                                 
15 “Profile for South Korea,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, accessed March 24, 2017, 
http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/south-korea/. 
16 Benjamin Frankel, “The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons 
Proliferation,” Security Studies 2, no. 3–4 (June 1, 1993): 37, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419309347519. 
17 Ibid. 
18 John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International 
Security 15, no. 1 (July 1, 1990): 6, https://doi.org/10.2307/2538981. 
19 Ibid., 54; This is a similar line of reasoning to the one put forth in Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Spread 
of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better,” The Adelphi Papers 21, no. 171 (September 1, 1981), 
doi:10.1080/05679328108457394. 
20 “Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries,” World Nuclear Association, October 2016, 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Others/Emerging-Nuclear-Energy-Countries/. 
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occurred after the Cold War.21 On one hand, Waltz argues that a unipolar system is less 
stable than either a bipolar or a multipolar one.22 On the other hand, William Wohlforth 
asserts in a 1993 article that the unipolar system with the United States as the sole 
superpower is both peaceful and durable owing to the distribution of material capabilities 
favoring the United States.23 In this sense, the United States as the sole superpower in the 
international system would still have the capability to manage regional security issues, to 
include nuclear proliferation, through guarantees and alliances, and its “preponderant 
power,” as it did in tandem with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. 
What signs exist in the regional nuclear realm of a unipolar period following the 
Cold War? Perhaps the best example is the destruction of Iraq’s nuclear program in 1991 
by the United States. While the purpose of the war was not to destroy Iraq’s nuclear 
program, it was a fortuitous side effect. Arguably, the United States could make the 
largely unilateral decision to invade Iraq, because the Soviet Union was not around to 
oppose it. 
What other theories might help provide system-level explanations for regional 
nuclear proliferation? Glenn Chafetz promotes the role of a security community to 
manage nuclear proliferation. He assesses that at the end of the Cold War there would be 
more threats of nuclear proliferation in “periphery” states, which have little to no 
experience with liberal democracy, and respond in a more traditional manner to threats.24 
On the other hand, the “core” makes up a pluralistic security community that “can 
dampen the urges to conflict and the danger of proliferation in much of the world.”25 
                                                 
21 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security 25, no. 1 (2000): 
30; The idea of a “unipolar moment” originated in Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” 
Foreign Affairs 70, no. 1 (January 1, 1990): 23–33, doi:10.2307/20044692. He asserted that the 
international system would quickly return to multipolarity and unipolarity would not be enduring. 
22 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Evaluating Theories,” American Political Science Review 91, no. 4 (December 
1, 1997): 915, https://doi.org/10.2307/2952173. 
23 William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security 24, no. 1 (1999): 
7–8. Wohlforth defines stability as peacefulness and durability. 
24 Glenn Chafetz, “The End of the Cold War and the Future of Nuclear Proliferation: An Alternative 
to the Neorealist Perspective,” Security Studies 2, no. 3–4 (June 1, 1993): 128, 139, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419309347522. 
25 Ibid., 146. 
 7 
Unfortunately, Chafetz wrote in 1993 before India emerged as a nuclear power. The case 
of India demonstrates that liberal democracies do exist outside of this core and they can 
become nuclear weapon states too. Dividing the world in this manner does not so easily 
explain proliferation tendencies. 
By contrast, Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald argue that system-level 
pressures to proliferate or not are largely socially constructed as a nuclear weapons taboo 
has led to the non-use of nuclear weapons.26 They fault realism and neoliberal 
institutionalism for being unable to explain at the system level where the nuclear taboo 
originated.27 Are NWFZs a manifestation of the non-use norm, i.e., since nuclear 
weapons cannot be used anyway why seek to develop them? The counterargument is that 
the states that pursue or have obtained nuclear weapons attach a significant value to them 
despite their non-use since 1945. 
Robert Keohane provides another possible approach to the nuclear proliferation 
question. He argues that hegemons establish international regimes for self-serving 
reasons, primarily to facilitate cooperation around issues important to them.28 The most 
powerful members of a regime will shape it largely out of self-interest.29 Norms, or 
standards of behavior, delineate what kind of behavior is acceptable in the context of the 
regime.30 He asserts that while a hegemon may decline, it does not necessarily translate 
to regime decline.31 The usefulness of the regime can continue. How might Keohane’s 
ideas apply to the nonproliferation regime? Might this international regime play a role in 
nuclear proliferation trends? 
                                                 
26 Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, “Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons 
Taboos,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. 
Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 114–52. 
27 Ibid., 123. 
28 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 49. 
29 Ibid., 63. 
30 Ibid., 57–58. 
31 Ibid., 107. 
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As demonstrated above, Waltz’s propositions on system stability and external 
management play a key role in realist assertions regarding nuclear proliferation. Given its 
importance in the proliferation literature, it is worth testing its explanatory power for 
regional proliferation. 
Regional dynamics might play a role in nuclear proliferation trends. A review of 
dynamics in various world regions in the second section highlights divergent outcomes. 
What might account for these differences? 
2. Regional Nuclear Trends 
In Latin America, Cuba hosted Soviet nuclear weapons on its soil resulting in the 
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Brazil put forward a proposal during this crisis to the United 
Nations General Assembly to establish a NWFZ in Latin America.32 Another version 
was proposed to the United Nations General Assembly by Mexico in 1963, and this 
version passed. The treaty entered into force in 1969. In terms of nuclear capabilities, 
Mexico began producing nuclear power in 1989.33 Also, Argentina and Brazil 
extensively developed their nuclear programs through the early 1990s to the point that the 
programs raised concerns regarding the states’ nuclear intentions.34 In the 1990s, 
however, both countries signed the NPT and the NWFZ treaty for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, the Treaty of Tlatelolco. This followed a transition to stronger civilian control 
over their nuclear programs. Cuba was the last country in the region to sign the treaty, 
which it did in 2002, making Latin America a model for NWFZs. 
The region of Europe has a diverse nuclear history. The United Kingdom and 
France are NPT-sanctioned nuclear weapon states. Ariel Levite notes that Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia pursued 
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nuclear weapons programs at some point, particularly at the beginning of the Cold War, 
and reversed course.35 Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands host U.S. nuclear 
weapons as North Atlantic Treaty Organization members.36 In terms of former Soviet 
bloc countries, Estonia hosted nuclear facilities and Poland hosted nuclear warheads. 
Belarus hosted a number of Soviet nuclear warheads during the Cold War.37 Georgia has 
Soviet-era nuclear reactors, nuclear research institutes, and radioactive waste.38 Ukraine 
hosted a significant Soviet-era nuclear arsenal, but, along with Belarus, opted to return 
them to Russia and sign the NPT.39 While the region has been largely pacific, Cold War-
like tensions returned to the region in 2014 when Russia intervened militarily in the 
Ukraine.40 
In Africa, South Africa acquired nuclear weapons in the 1980s before unilaterally 
ending the program in 1989.41 In Algeria, a combination of suspicions over the Es-Salam 
research reactor’s large cooling towers and the defenses surrounding the site, led to 
speculation that the country sought to develop a nuclear weapons program.42 
Subsequently, Algeria brought the facility under IAEA safeguards. Today, these states 
                                                 
35 Levite, “Never Say Never Again,” 62. 
36 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 2011,” 
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this study, Turkey, which also hosts U.S. nuclear weapons as a NATO member, is considered a part of the 
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are members of a NWFZ treaty, the Treaty of Pelindaba, which entered into force in 
2009, and encompasses the majority of African states.43 
In the Middle East, despite pursuit of nuclear weapons programs by Iraq and 
Libya and likely pursuit by Egypt, Iran, and Syria, none of these countries acquired 
nuclear weapons.44 While Egypt and Iran began calling for a NWFZ in 1974, no progress 
has been made toward establishing such a regional agreement.45 Israel holds out that in 
order to negotiate such an agreement the region’s Arab states must recognize Israel’s 
right to exist.46 Regional relations are characterized by mistrust and conflict; regional 
rivalry persists. Today, concerns regarding Iran have come to the fore as the country has 
advanced its nuclear program, at times hiding its activities from the international 
community. Negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program began in earnest in 2013 with the 
primary sticking point being Iran’s insistence on its right to a nuclear enrichment 
capability. The negotiating parties reached a landmark agreement in 2016. Finally, a 
nascent nuclear renaissance has resulted in numerous declarations by regional states to 
develop nuclear power. 
In South Asia, India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons and are party to an 
intense, ongoing rivalry. Neither state has ever signed the NPT. India conducted its first 
nuclear test in 1974 and formally acknowledged its status as a nuclear weapon state in 
1998.47 Pakistan began to develop its program in the mid-1970s and tested a nuclear 
device in 1998.48 Geopolitically, India sees Pakistan and China as security threats and the 
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focus of its nuclear arsenal.49 Pakistan, on the other hand, sees India as its nuclear rival 
and the focus of its nuclear arsenal.50 The tensions between India and Pakistan, 
particularly over the disputed Kashmir region, have led to international concern regarding 
a possible nuclear incident occurring in the region. 
Central Asia played a role, although likely unwillingly, in the Soviet Union’s 
nuclear program. This role consisted of hosting nuclear weapon test sites, nuclear-tipped 
missiles, uranium mining and milling complexes, or tactical nuclear weapons.51 Many of 
them suffered negative health and environmental consequences from their association 
with nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and materials. The countries of Central Asia 
relinquished their nuclear capabilities after the fall of the Soviet Union and moved toward 
banning nuclear weapons from their territory. In fact, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan joined together to create a NWFZ through the 
Treaty of Semipalatinsk. Treaty negotiations began in 1997 and the treaty entered into 
force in 2009.52 
In Northeast Asia, Japan pursued a nuclear weapons program during World War 
II and suffered U.S. nuclear weapons attacks at the end of the war.53 Another regional 
power, China, is an NPT-sanctioned nuclear weapon state that carried-out its first nuclear 
test in 1964. South Korea pursued a nuclear weapons program in the 1970s.54 Also, the 
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disputed territory of Taiwan sought to obtain nuclear weapons in the past.55 North Korea 
seems to have had a nuclear capability since the mid-2000s, but it is not an NPT-
sanctioned nuclear weapon state.56 Geopolitically, China appears to be challenging U.S. 
hegemony, regionally, if not internationally. Tensions periodically flare on the Korean 
peninsula leading to concerns of a nuclear incident initiated by a nuclear North Korea 
against a U.S.-backed South Korea. Thus, a rising China, of concern to both Russia and 
the United States, and U.S. deterrence commitments to Japan and South Korea suggest 
complex regional nuclear dynamics for the foreseeable future. 
In Southeast Asia, Indonesia considered a nuclear weapons program in the 1960s 
before deciding to join the nonproliferation regime.57 As members of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations, the countries of Southeast Asia, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, joined 
together to create a NWFZ through the Treaty of Bangkok. It entered into force in 1997. 
Nevertheless, allegations surfaced in 2010 that Myanmar was secretly pursuing a nuclear 
weapons program, an accusation that Myanmar vehemently denies.58 
The South Pacific region holds a unique place in nuclear history due to the 
nuclear weapons testing conducted in the region by the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and France.59 The testing began in 1946 with the United States and continued 
until early 1996 with France on their respective island territories in the region.60 Also, 
Australia served as a nuclear test site for the United Kingdom from the early 1950s to the 
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early 1960s.61 Until the early 1970s, Australia contemplated acquiring nuclear weapons, 
but decided against this and ratified the NPT in 1973.62 Ultimately, Australia, the Cook 
Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon 
Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu established a NWFZ through the Treaty of 
Rarotonga, which entered into force in 1986.63 
This overview of regional nuclear histories highlights how these regions have 
changed over time. Today, some regions are of great concern, such as Northeast Asia, 
South Asia, and the Middle East. Other regions were a source of angst to the international 
community in the past, but no longer are. Examples include Latin America when 
Argentina and Brazil were thought to be developing nuclear weapons programs, Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia after the fall of the Soviet Union, and Europe at the beginning of 
the Cold War. 
IAEA Director General Mohammad El Baradei acknowledged the importance of 
regional nuclear dynamics in his remarks on the anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 
2007. He stated that the treaty “set an important precedent in devaluing the role of 
nuclear weapons in its zone of application—thereby contributing to regional peace and 
security.”64 If regional nuclear dynamics could lead to a NWFZ, it would seem that the 
opposite could also occur. Regional nuclear dynamics could result in an increase in 
nuclear proliferation. For example, Alagappa notes that “there is no political and security 
counterpart to economic globalization. Political and security dynamics have become 
largely regional.”65 
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Regional-level theories might help us understand why nuclear proliferation trends 
change over time. What regional-level theories exist to explain nuclear proliferation 
trends? This third section discusses these theories. 
3. Regional-Level Theories 
A number of studies on nuclear proliferation have found support for the regional 
security environment as a proliferation driver. Kurt Campbell et al. conclude that the 
regional security environment is the primary reason states decide to pursue nuclear 
weapons.66 T. V. Paul asserts that a non-great-power state’s decision to acquire nuclear 
weapons “is determined largely by the level and type of security threats that it faces and 
the nature of interactions or conflict with its key adversaries and allies in its immediate 
geo-strategic environment.”67 He finds that there is a link between ending regional 
conflicts and proliferation reversal and, like Campbell, that nuclear choices are related to 
the regional security environment.68 In his study on the motivations for nuclear 
proliferation, Stephen Meyer finds that several variables related to regional rivalry—such 
as “nuclear threat,” “overwhelming conventional threat,” and “regional power 
status/pretensions”—have strong associated nuclear propensities.69 
Sonali Singh and Christopher Way, in a quantitative study, find that occurrences 
of rivalry and militarized disputes help explain state motivation to explore nuclear 
weapons development.70 Surprisingly, another quantitative study by Dong-Joon Jo and 
Erik Gartzke concludes that, in terms of motivations, “states facing threats from nuclear 
powers demonstrate a significantly lower propensity to pursue nuclear programs or 
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weapons proliferation.”71 Scott Sagan attributes this discrepancy to a problem in coding 
rules between Singh and Way’s study and Jo and Gartzke’s study.72 Still, the difference 
suggests that a correlation between the regional security environment and nuclear 
proliferation might not always be as straightforward an answer as scholars often suggest. 
What explains why Egypt never made more progress toward a nuclear weapons program 
given the regional security challenges it faced? 
On the other hand, a number of regional cases do seem to support the variable of 
regional rivalry. South Asia’s nuclear dynamic comes to mind. The security threat from 
India prompted Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons and to the extent that China plays a 
role in South Asia’s affairs, India’s rivalry with China helped drive its decision to pursue 
nuclear weapons.73 Other regional conflicts and rivalries where U.S. extended deterrence 
may hold nuclear proliferation in check include the relationship between China and Japan 
and between North Korea and South Korea.74 U.S. security guarantees to non-nuclear-
weapon states Japan and South Korea have helped limit nuclear proliferation in these 
countries. 
Another possible explanation lies with regional organizations. What role do they 
play at the regional level? Do these organizations shape states preferences or do they 
merely reflect existing interests? Martha Finnemore argues for the former, but Zachary 
Davis asserts the latter. While both discuss international-level organizations in their 
respective works, the lessons they draw may apply to regional level organizations as well. 
Finnemore claims that the norms embodied in international organizations teach states 
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what their interests and preferences should be.75 Davis notes that nuclear regimes, such 
as the NPT, fill a security need as states pursue their overarching goal of survival in a 
self-help world.76 Supporting Davis’s argument, it would seem that the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization has played a role in satisfying security needs in Europe and stopping 
European states from creating their own nuclear deterrents. 
Do regional organizations even if they are not focused on nuclear issues impact 
regional nuclear proliferation? Etel Solingen notes that the Arab League has not played 
any role in stopping nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.77 The Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations, however, played a key role in bringing together the Southeast 
Asian states to create a NWFZ. 
What about NWFZs as regional organizations? Do they satisfy a security need by 
assuring regional states that they do not need to be concerned about nuclear proliferation 
in their neighborhood? Or does a region already need to be largely pacific in order for its 
states to come together to create a NWFZ? The answer is not clear. Ultimately, regional 
organizations appear to have mixed results regarding their impact on nuclear 
proliferation. 
With the recent emphasis in nuclear proliferation literature on examining nuclear 
proliferation in a regional context, this dissertation will examine T.V. Paul’s assertions 
regarding the nuclear behavior of non-great-power states. How has the regional security 
environment affected nuclear trends? What role does the security environment play in 
whether there is an increase or decrease in regional nuclear proliferation? 
National-level theories might provide insight into the drivers of nuclear 
proliferation trends? What national-level theories exist to help explain changes over 
time? This fourth section discusses these theories. 
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4. National-Level Theories 
How do national-level issues impact regional nuclear proliferation? Given that 
nuclear weapons have thankfully not been used in an attack since 1945, is their power 
more symbolic if they are used for deterrence purposes or as a measure of prestige or 
status? Richard Betts writes in a 1977 article that “those states that are emerging as 
dominant regional power centers with plausible pretensions to being great powers,” are 
most likely to be motivated by status and prestige.78 If status and prestige figure 
prominently at the regional level, how do nuclear weapons play a role in a country’s 
identity? 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “national identity” as “a sense of a nation 
as a cohesive whole, as represented by (the maintenance of) distinctive traditions, culture, 
linguistic or political features, etc.” Can nuclear proliferation become a distinct feature of 
a state’s national identity? Can it become a distinct feature of a region? Jacques Hymans 
in his work on nuclear proliferation psychology defines a concept he calls a “national 
identity conception,” “an individual’s sense of what the nation stands for and of how high 
it naturally stands, in comparison to others in the international arena.”79 If the right to 
nuclear enrichment has been engrained in a country’s self-image, as has possibly been the 
case in Iran, how does that affect regional proliferation? If a rejection of all things nuclear 
has been engrained in a country’s self-image, as has perhaps occurred in Kazakhstan, 
how does that affect regional proliferation? Does national identity have an impact beyond 
the country it is rooted in? Does it contribute to a regional identity? 
Hymans’s focus is on the individual level, but Peter Lavoy finds that it is 
domestic elites that play a critical role in the decision to “go nuclear.”80 Lavoy notes that 
states are more likely to go nuclear when domestic elites “emphasize the country’s 
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insecurity or poor international standing to popularize the myth that nuclear weapons will 
provide military security and political power.”81 It builds on Jack Snyder’s idea that the 
overexpansion of great powers has roots in “strategic myths and domestic politics.”82 
Lavoy’s theory links regional competition (i.e., the country’s poor international standing) 
and domestic concerns (i.e., improving military security and political power). Lavoy’s 
argument indicates that domestic elites seek to deceive or manipulate the populace as 
they push for a nuclear capability. Although, it is possible that domestic elites’ beliefs 
represent a widely held perspective within the broader population and there is domestic 
support for the nuclear policies that a government pursues. For example, in 2014, Iran’s 
population seemed to be solidly against dismantling half of Iran’s centrifuges, a critical 
part of limiting possible future nuclear proliferation, as part of a nuclear agreement.83 
Further, the idea of an Iranian nuclear capability predates the current regime. Vali Nasr 
points out that “the Shah thought Iran would need nuclear know-how—just short of an 
arsenal—in order to emerge as a great power and assert hegemony over its neighborhood. 
Iran’s rulers today may rail against the Shah, but they have bought into his ambitions 
lock, stock, and barrel.”84 
In addition to the theories of Hymans and Lavoy, what other theories might 
explain national-level drivers for regional proliferation? In Solingen’s work on nuclear 
proliferation in the Middle East and Northeast Asia, she finds that domestic political 
actors, specifically liberalizing coalitions, shifted nuclear policy towards more 
cooperative nuclear postures whereas nationalist-confessional coalitions resisted this 
shift.85 Solingen’s theory attributes shifts in nuclear policy to specific types of domestic 
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political coalitions. Like Hymans and Lavoy, she assigns agency on nuclear issues to a 
country’s leadership. She concludes that the trend in Northeast Asia is toward 
denuclearization while the trend in the Middle East is toward nuclearization.86 This is 
counterintuitive given the overall nuclear complexities in Northeast Asia seem to be 
greater than those in the Middle East. 
But while Solingen’s work focuses on regional nuclear dynamics, like this 
dissertation, she investigates internal domestic factors driving nuclear proliferation. This 
dissertation seeks instead to test the comparative explanatory power of regional and 
international variables. Thus, her work is not discussed at length in this research project. 
Maria Rost Rublee takes a norms-based approach to understanding nuclear 
proliferation that also focuses on the prominent role of domestic elites. She argues that 
norms, in the form of the domestic social environment, shape states preferences regarding 
nuclear weapons.87 International, regional, and domestic factors create this social 
environment. She asserts that a state’s social environment must be considered in addition 
to its security environment when seeking the reason why domestic elites decide against 
pursuing a nuclear weapons program.88 In Rublee’s account, leadership preferences are 
shaped by norms rather than coalition type or the psychological profile of a leader as in 
Solingen or Hymans’s accounts respectively. 
As demonstrated by this review of national-level proliferation theories, this level 
of analysis provides a rich, detailed account of motivations for nuclear proliferation. The 
advantage of a detailed account converts to a challenge, however, when integrating 
national-level analysis with system and regional-level analysis to examine region-wide 
trends. In light of this challenge, this study will focus on the system and regional-levels 
of analysis to explain regional nuclear proliferation over time. 
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Whether the regional trend is toward nuclearization or denuclearization, which 
variables might best explain regional nuclear dynamics over time? In essence, what 
drives regional nuclear proliferation trends? This dissertation pursues a possible 
explanation. It takes a regional approach to the study of nuclear proliferation, defined 
here as progress toward weapons-relevant nuclear capabilities, by looking at one 
geographic area, the Middle East. The rationale for choosing this region is discussed in 
the section on methodology. 
5. The Literature on Middle East Nuclear Dynamics 
A number of studies have been conducted on nuclear proliferation in the Middle 
East. A study on Middle East nuclear proliferation from 1992 by Kenneth Timmerman 
focuses on the international networks that supplied nuclear technology to Iran, Syria, and 
Libya.89 While this study highlights the weaknesses of export controls, it does not get at 
the question of motivations or what drove these countries to set-up the supply networks in 
the first place. As Steven Meyer notes “nuclear weapons do not generate spontaneously 
from stockpiles of fissile material.”90 Understanding the motivation to acquire a nuclear 
weapon is critical.91 
A study from 1997 by Shay Feldman centers on the future for nuclear arms 
control in the Middle East with a primary focus on the Arab-Israeli security dynamic 
prompted by advancement in the Arab-Israeli peace process, the Middle East Arms 
Control and Regional Security talks, and the unfavorable consequences of nuclear spread 
in the region.92 He finds rapid nuclear proliferation unlikely along with the establishment 
of a NWFZ, absent a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace agreement.93 Feldman focuses 
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primarily on the mechanisms for improving arms control efforts in the Middle East rather 
than regional nuclear trends and what might drive them. 
Gawdat Bahgat examines why states in the Middle East have started and stopped 
pursuing nuclear weapons. He considers “globalization and technological imperative,” 
“leadership/cognitive and psychological approaches,” an “internal dynamics and 
domestic politics model,” “national pride and prestige,” and security as motivations for 
pursuing nuclear weapons.94 Then, he looks at “change in the economic and political 
orientations,” “the international nonproliferation regime,” and “U.S. policy” for reasons 
why states end nuclear pursuits.95 Bahgat concludes that states make nuclear decisions by 
continually conducting risk assessments, variables of both supply and demand must be 
considered, nuclear decisions are made for multiple reasons, and sources of insecurity are 
varied.96 This study takes a multi-causal approach to the issue of Middle East nuclear 
proliferation and the results are specific to each country. 
The International Institute for Strategic Studies produced an assessment in 2008 
regarding the likelihood for a nuclear cascade in the Middle East given the recent 
announcements of many Middle Eastern countries to develop nuclear power programs.97 
The study particularly looks at the relationship between Iran’s continued nuclear efforts 
and these announcements. It includes an overview of the region’s nuclear programs, 
capabilities, and nuclear policies along with an assessment regarding what the nuclear 
renaissance means for the region and broader security interests.98 Like Timmerman’s 
study, it is primarily focused on supply-side issues related to nuclear proliferation. 
Mehran Kamrava’s edited volume from 2012 is built around several themes: the 
impact of domestic political systems, disparate approaches to regional nuclear issues by 
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outside powers, and the region’s nuclear future.99 The research finds roles for: 1) the 
nature of a country’s relationship with the international community 2) the influence of 
extra-regional powers and 3) leadership decisions regarding energy needs, threats, status, 
and hedging.100 As it is an edited volume, it consists of a collection of essays by experts 
on Middle East nuclear issues. Contributors include scholars previously mentioned such 
as Solingen, Rublee, and Bahgat. While the wide spectrum of contributors allow for the 
application of various theoretical approaches, it does not allow for a cohesive 
methodological approach to the region. 
Another volume, edited by James Russell, looks at the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction in the region, including nuclear weapons.101 While the contributors do 
not examine the case studies with a common theoretical lens, they do all consider 
regional security dynamics, and counterproliferation policy options, and how their 
findings can inform future policy decision.102 In addition, this book includes an 
examination of the proliferation challenge posed by non-state actors with a chapter on the 
A.Q. Khan network. It concludes with recommendations on how to apply ideas from the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction program, carried out by the United States, Russia, and the 
newly independent states after the fall of the Soviet Union, to the region. 
The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to outlining the dissertation’s research 
design. This portion includes a discussion of the methodology, case studies, and 
hypotheses. It continues with an overview of the dissertation’s organization with an 
outline of the chapters and finishes with a concluding section that provides a summary of 
the dissertation’s findings. 
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B. METHODOLOGY 
Rather than studying the region through a series of case studies on individual 
countries, this dissertation takes the region as the unit of analysis and applies selected 
variables from two levels of analysis to the region in order to test each variable. The case 
studies consist of three consecutive time periods that are divided according to structural 
changes in the international system—a bipolar period, a unipolar period, and a multipolar 
period. The three periods are from 1973 to 1990, 1991 to 2003, and 2004 to 2013. The 
first time period is from the timeframe of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War to the end of the 
Cold War in 1990. Conditions of international bipolarity characterize this time period. 
The second time period begins with the First Gulf War in 1991 and extends to the Second 
Gulf War in 2003—a unipolar period following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Finally, 
the third time period starts after the Second Gulf War in 2004 and extends to the nuclear 
negotiations between China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States, known as the P5+1, and Iran that began in 2013. In the early 2000s, several 
changes occurred in military spending that seemed to indicate a possible shift to a 
multipolar system. Russia began to increase its military expenditures again after 
experiencing a decrease throughout the 1990s.103 In addition, China overtook Russia in 
terms of its military expenditures in the late 1990s.104 The 2003 Gulf War, which saw 
few states join the U.S. military coalition, seems to provide a marker for declining U.S. 
influence and the emergence of a new multipolar system. 
The first variable is superpower external management drawn from Kenneth 
Waltz’s theory regarding balance of power and the international system. Waltz argued 
that, under bipolarity, international involvement and “preponderant power” during the 
Cold War led to superpower management of regional states.105 After the Cold War, this 
level of external management and general system stability came to an end. Referring to 
unipolarity, Waltz wrote that “unbalanced power leaves weaker states feeling uneasy and 
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gives them reason to strengthen their positions.”106 Further, Waltz assessed that while a 
multipolar international system was less stable, a unipolar system was least stable.107 
While Waltz did not say what affect a unipolar international system would have on the 
spread of nuclear weapons, he did predict in 1981 that additional states would gradually 
obtain them.108 Non-great power states would be motivated by self-defense, regional 
competition and rivalry, a cost-savings over conventional weapons, a desire to acquire an 
offensive capability, and international prestige.109 
At the systemic level, this dissertation tests the variable of superpower external 
management based on Waltz’s propositions regarding external management and shifts in 
the international system. External management includes extended deterrence and great-
power tradeoffs, which are enabled by the distribution of capabilities.110 
 Hypothesis 1: Regional nuclear proliferation does not increase during the 
first time period due to the external management of the region during the 
Cold War. 
 Hypothesis 2: Regional nuclear proliferation could increase during the 
second time period following the Cold War as a shift to a less stable 
unipolar international system occurs. 
 Hypothesis 3: Regional nuclear proliferation should increase during the 
third time period as a transition to a multipolar international system occurs 
and regional powers play more prominent roles. 
To test these hypotheses, this dissertation asks the following questions regarding 
each time period: 
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 What broad changes occurred in the international system impacting each 
time period? 
 How did these changes impact the states in the region and their 
relationship with the superpowers in regards to nuclear issues? 
 What evidence is there of superpower control over an increase or decrease 
in regional proliferation? 
 Are there any linkages between changes in the international system and 
nuclear supply availability? 
This variable is deemed critical if recurring nuclear events in the region during the 
time period demonstrate a causal link between external management and nuclear 
proliferation trends. For example, does the empirical evidence demonstrate that the 
relationships of the Soviet Union and the United States with their respective regional 
allies prevented an increase in regional nuclear proliferation in a bipolar international 
system? 
At the regional level, T.V. Paul provides a useful theory in Power versus 
Prudence: Why Nations Forego Nuclear Weapons.111 Paul argues that non-great-state 
powers, such as those states that populate the Middle East, make decisions to obtain 
nuclear weapons or not based primarily on the regional security environment.112 Looking 
at regions, Paul further refines his theory by describing regions as zones of high, 
moderate, or low conflict.113 According to Paul, the Middle East is a high-conflict zone, 
defined as “a high-threat environment characterized by protracted conflicts and enduring 
rivalries among two or more significant actors in the zone.”114 Thus, states in the Middle 
East have a high incentive to acquire nuclear weapons.115 If a state in a high-conflict 
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region does not pursue nuclear weapons, it is because of a “countervailing deterrent 
capability, provided either by an ally or by the state’s own capability, such as chemical 
weapons or conventional superiority, that can somewhat neutralize the nuclear capability 
of the adversary.”116 
Thus, at the regional level, this dissertation tests the variable of the intensity of 
regional conflict and rivalry. This variable is taken from Paul’s theory regarding 
proliferation among non-great-power states. A regional rivalry is determined by 
examining factors such as a state’s military and economic role in the region, its pursuit of 
prestige, and leadership statements regarding rival states. 
 Hypothesis 1: Regional nuclear proliferation increases during the first time 
period due to the intensity of regional conflict and rivalry leading to a 
high-threat security environment. Proliferation is only mitigated if a state 
receives security guarantees or finds a different deterrent.  
 Hypothesis 2: Regional nuclear proliferation does not increase during the 
second time period due to a reduction in the intensity of regional conflict 
and rivalry in the region.  
 Hypothesis 3: Regional nuclear proliferation should increase during the 
third time period due to a resurgence of regional conflict and rivalry. 
Proliferation is only mitigated if a state receives security guarantees or 
finds a different deterrent. 
To measure this variable, this dissertation asks the following series of questions 
regarding each time period: 
 What was the nature of the regional security environment during each time 
period? What ongoing conflicts and rivalries were occurring? 
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 How did the intensity of conflicts and rivalries increase or decrease? Did a 
rivalry intensify to the point that a state believed that it confronted an 
existential threat? 
 What security guarantees were in place for regional states? Were any other 
means of deterrence in place that might have replaced the need for a 
nuclear deterrent? 
This variable is deemed critical if recurring nuclear events in the region 
demonstrate a causal link between regional conflict and rivalry and nuclear proliferation. 
For example, what role did Syria’s rival with regional states play in Syrian nuclear 
activities in the second time period, such as the construction of the Dayr Al Hajar 
reactor? Did this variable play a more important role in this time period? A distinguishing 
characteristic between whether the driver for nuclear proliferation was external 
management or regional conflict and rivalry was multiple states driving the security 
environment rather than the presence or absence of superpower management. 
The heart of the dissertation research consists of three, consecutive time periods, 
which together span forty years of modern Middle East history. The study examines the 
time periods using the sets of questions centered on the two variables previously 
elaborated on. The time periods span the bipolar system of the Cold War to the unipolar 
system that emerged after the fall of the Soviet Union to a multipolar system as other 
states more readily challenge U.S. hegemony. During these periods, progress towards 
nuclear weapons—fissile material, nuclear warheads, or delivery systems—is examined. 
To determine whether progress was made, I weigh state-level nuclear behavior and 
acquisition activities along with leadership pronouncements. 
Among various world regions, the Middle East region serves as a good unit of 
analysis for several reasons. First, high levels of conflict and rivalry characterize the 
region making it a likely candidate for observing the effects of the regional security 
environment on nuclear proliferation trends. Second, throughout the structural changes 
that have occurred in the international system since the beginning of the nuclear age, 
bipolarity to unipolarity to multipolarity, superpowers and great powers have been 
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involved deeply in the region. Thus, history provides numerous examples of regional 
efforts by external managers. 
Of note, this dissertation focuses on the Middle East region bounded by Libya to 
the west, Iran to the east, Turkey to the north, and Yemen to the south. While Libya is 
often included with North Africa rather than the Middle East, the dynamics surrounding 
its nuclear program seem to be more closely linked to the Middle East region. For 
example, one of Muamar Qaddafi’s stated motivations for pursuing a nuclear weapons 
program was to further his leadership in the Arab world. The Middle Eastern countries 
studied were Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, and the United Arab 
Emirates. Finally, various academics such as Ethel Solingen, Gawdat Bahgat, Shyam 
Bhatia, and Avner Cohen have written on the topic of Israel’s possible pursuit of nuclear 
weapons in the 1960s.117 As the time period of the 1960s is not a part of any of the three 
time periods that are the focus of this dissertation, this material is not reviewed here.  
Choosing these three time periods in Middle East nuclear history as case studies, 
allows for the study to test how the regional nuclear environment changed as the structure 
of the international system changed along with the role of the two proposed variables in 
each case study. Thus, it seeks to critique two theories of proliferation rather than create a 
theory of proliferation. This approach to analyzing nuclear dynamics in the Middle East 
can be characterized as a theory-testing dissertation, an ideal-type proposed by Steven 
Van Evera.118 
While this dissertation focuses on theory-testing, in terms of the advantages of 
this kind of qualitative study using a series of case studies, Alexander George and 
Andrew Bennett note that case studies are especially useful for theory development and 
testing hypotheses due to “their potential for achieving high conceptual validity; their 
strong procedures for fostering new hypotheses; their value as a means to closely 
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examine the hypothesized role of causal mechanisms in the context of individual cases; 
and their capacity for addressing causal complexity.”119 
The three cases chosen demonstrate the range of variation at the systemic level 
since the beginning of the nuclear age—bipolarity, unipolarity, and multipolarity. John 
Gerring describes this technique of case selection as a “diverse” case selection and notes 
that it is helpful for hypothesis testing.120 He states that this approach benefits a research 
project by “introducing variation on the key variables of interest.”121 
The dissertation’s case studies are constructed using primary and secondary 
sources on the topic of Middle East security and nuclear proliferation. The secondary 
sources primarily consist of academic and published authoritative works. As suitable, 
primary sources from unclassified or declassified documents and reports in U.S. national 
security academic collections are utilized. Thus, the case studies are constructed and 
subsequent judgments made based on information available in the unclassified realm. In 
addition, it is important to note the impossibility of complete certainty regarding the 
motivations to pursue nuclear weapons. This is especially the case in the Middle East 
given the lack of government transparency. Quotes from foreign leaders are included in 
the narrative to help shed light on their thinking regarding nuclear issues. Nevertheless, 
extensive unclassified and declassified studies and analyses produced by the U.S. 
government over time regarding the Middle East region help compensate for this 
knowledge gap. 
C. OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH PROJECT 
This dissertation is organized as follows. This first chapter has provided an 
overview of scholarly works relevant to the study of regional nuclear proliferation and 
has compared nuclear trends in world regions. It then transitions to a discussion of the 
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research project’s methodology and an overview of how the study will proceed. The 
second, third, and fourth chapters consist of the three case studies spanning a total of 
forty years in recent Middle East history. The two selected variables are applied to each 
time period. The second chapter focuses on the bipolar era of the Cold War from 1973 to 
1990. The third chapter focuses on the so-called unipolar period when the United States 
was the largely uncontested global hegemon. This period spans 1991 through 2003. The 
fourth chapter covers the multipolar era from 2004 to 2013. 
The fifth chapter compares the case studies in order to assess the relative weight 
of the variables over time. It includes a discussion of how the findings might be applied 
to other regions. The concluding chapter examines possible future regional proliferation 
trends before turning to future research opportunities. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This theory-testing dissertation seeks to contribute to the literature on nuclear 
proliferation in the Middle East and in a regional context. Its goal is to shed light on what 
drives nuclear proliferation dynamics over time in a region as a whole. Specifically, it 
asks if one theory can account for variations over time in the Middle East and if one 
theory can explain specific periods better than another. 
Given the level of conflict and rivalry in the Middle East, I expected to find the 
regional security environment driving nuclear proliferation trends over time. Through this 
research, I discovered how important external managers are in driving regional nuclear 
trends. The United States as a superpower played a critical role in the bipolar period 
seeking to enforce and close loopholes in a nonproliferation regime that included the 
NPT, the IAEA, and other multilateral regimes. Nevertheless, it often fell short and the 
region saw a shift toward increased nuclear proliferation driven by the regional security 
environment. 
The structural shift to a unipolar system gave the United States, the global 
hegemon, more operational space to reinforce and strengthen the nonproliferation regime. 
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Nonproliferation efforts were more effective in the unipolar period than the bipolar 
period leading to a regional decrease in nuclear proliferation.122 
A nonproliferation regime strengthened during the unipolar period continued to 
influence nuclear proliferation trends in the multipolar period resulting in a further 
decrease in regional proliferation. In addition, the multipolar period saw the beginnings 
of post-hegemonic cooperation as described by Keohane in After Hegemony. 
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II. COMPETING NUCLEAR AMBITIONS IN THE MIDDLE 
EAST: 1973–1990 
During the bipolar period, a time of increased stability in the international system, 
my international level hypothesis forecast a decrease in nuclear proliferation, defined as 
progress toward weapons-relevant nuclear capabilities. The regional level hypothesis 
predicted an increase in nuclear proliferation during this time of heightened conflict and 
rivalry in the region. I discovered that nuclear proliferation did increase during this time 
period. 
Kenneth Waltz, on one hand, would predict that with stability in the international 
system during the bipolar period and superpower efforts to control their client states in 
the region, nuclear proliferation should decrease. On the other hand, T.V. Paul would 
assert that nuclear proliferation should increase driven by the tumultuous regional 
security environment. While Egyptian efforts to acquire a nuclear arsenal diminished, 
nuclear proliferation in the region increased overall because Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Saudi 
Arabia made progress toward weapons-relevant nuclear capabilities. This overall increase 
in regional proliferation behavior occurred within the context of a bipolar international 
system, which contradicts conventional wisdom. Even though there should have been a 
good deal of superpower management in a bipolar setting, there was enough wiggle room 
for regional states that wished to pursue nuclear weapons to do so. The evidence 
presented here shows that the superpowers had little control over whether their client 
states decided to proliferate. These regional actors were free to make their own 
calculations regarding nuclear proliferation independently. Regional conflict and rivalry, 
rather than Cold War dynamics or superpower influence, probably played a determining 
role in the regional trend toward increased nuclear proliferation. 
This first chapter spans the time period of 1973 through 1990. The period’s 
beginning is marked by the near nuclear crisis between the United States and the Soviet 
Union during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The conclusion of the Cold War marks the 
period’s end. 
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This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section tells the history of the 
states that have attempted or might have made an attempt from 1973 through 1990 to 
acquire nuclear weapons. The states that figure prominently in this history are Egypt, 
Iran, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. This 
section describes the domestic political setting for each country to provide context for 
each country’s nuclear decision-making. Because the three major elements of a nuclear 
program are fissile material, a delivery system, and a nuclear warhead, the chapter 
focuses on national efforts to build these nuclear components.123 
The second section uses ideas from Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International 
Politics to assess the degree to which the superpowers acted as international managers, 
constraining the nuclear ambitions of regional states. It also incorporates the competing 
hypothesis of regional security dynamics described by T.V. Paul, which suggests that 
regional actors respond to regional threats, not superpower preferences, when it comes to 
their proliferation policies. This chapter will identify and evaluate the factors that drove 
regional nuclear behavior throughout the time period.124  
A. REGIONAL NUCLEAR HISTORY 
During this time period, the United States and the Soviet Union were immersed in 
the Cold War. In fact, the superpowers nearly came into conflict as the United States 
escalated its defense posture during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, placing U.S. nuclear 
forces on alert. At that time, Egypt, Iraq, and Libya were client states of the Soviet Union 
and Iran was a client state of the United States. By the mid- to late 1980s, the United 
States had a better relationship with Egypt and Iraq and a difficult relationship with Iran. 
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Nevertheless, Iran, Iraq, and Libya all pursued nuclear weapons programs during this 
period. 
On the systemic level, what was the impact of Cold War relations on nuclear 
proliferation in the Middle East? What does the historical record say about how the 
superpowers viewed their respective interests and roles in the region in regard to nuclear 
proliferation? How much leverage did they have over the acquisition of nuclear 
capabilities by Middle Eastern states? How did the superpowers function as external 
managers? 
On a regional level, security tensions characterized the relationships between 
many of the states in the Middle East. Iran and Saudi Arabia strove for regional 
hegemony in the early 1970s after the exit of Great Britain from the Persian Gulf region. 
The British announced their withdrawal in 1968, motivated by a desire to save resources 
and to promote internal political reform for the Gulf States, and concluded their effort by 
the end of 1971.125 
Egypt and Syria attacked Israel in 1973. Israel struggled with its neighbors for 
recognition as a state and for territory. Syria and Iran interfered in Lebanon’s civil war 
that stretched from 1975 until the end of the 1980s. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 beginning 
a nearly decade-long, bloody war between the two countries. Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Saudi 
Arabia, and Syria strove to be recognized as leaders in the Arab world, if not the Middle 
East writ large. Iran and Turkey sought a leadership role in the Middle East. 
What was the impact of these rivalries on the Middle East? How did these states 
view their interests and roles in regard to nuclear proliferation? What drove nuclear 
proliferation in the region? What part did regional conflict and rivalry play in the pursuit 
of nuclear capabilities? 
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1. Egypt  
Egypt began the time period locked in conflict with its regional rival Israel. 
Egypt’s loss to Israel in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the subsequent 1979 peace 
agreement resulted in a reduction of tensions and a shift in the country’s nuclear efforts. 
By the early 1980s, Egypt was focusing on civilian applications for its nuclear program. 
Nevertheless, it continued to build its ballistic missile capabilities. 
a. Political Context 
Egypt saw itself as a major player in the Arab world, if not the leader of the Arab 
states from the 1950s through the 1970s. At the height of its Pan-Arab leadership under 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser from 1956 to 1970, Egypt and Syria joined briefly to 
become the United Arab Republic from 1958 to 1961. Nasser pushed forward his brand 
of socialist, Arab-nationalist thinking, which came to be known as Nasserism. He 
nationalized various Egyptian assets and began major public works such as the Aswan 
High Dam. 
During this time, a strong rivalry ensued between Egypt and Israel. The two 
countries fought wars in 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973. Although, the 1973 war caused a 
sea change in Egypt’s approach to its rivalry with Israel. Egypt and Syria attacked Israel 
on October 6, 1973, in an effort to regain land lost in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. After the 
tide of the 1973 war turned against Egypt, it sought assistance from its superpower ally, 
the Soviet Union, and Israel turned to its superpower ally, the United States.126 The 
situation between the Soviet Union and the United States escalated to the point that on 
October 25, as Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein noted, the United States put 
its nuclear forces on alert at the level of DEFCON III.127 After a tense standoff, the crisis 
was resolved that same day between all four parties through adoption of United Nations 
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(UN) Security Council resolution 340, but it had brought the two superpowers to the 
brink of a nuclear confrontation.128  
This period of history provides insight into the level of control leveraged by the 
superpowers over their client states. How did the superpowers get into the conflict in the 
first place? Yevgeny Primakov, a Soviet Middle East expert at the time, recalled this 
incident and complained that “it is often said that the two sides in the Middle East 
conflict were caught in the vicelike grip of the two superpowers. It was, however, the 
other way around. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had any decisive means 
to control the course of events; both found themselves at the mercy of an escalating crisis 
in the region.”129 From the American perspective, a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate 
from March 1970 summarized the dynamic between Cairo and Moscow: “In the last 
analysis, [the Soviets] cannot control Cairo’s behavior on questions the Egyptians 
consider vital.”130 In May 1973, the U.S. State Department surmised that Egyptian 
President Anwar Sadat believed that initiating hostilities would force the superpowers to 
intervene, thereby ending the negotiating stalemate with Israel over Egypt’s territories 
lost in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.131 The client states seemed to draw the superpowers 
into acting on their behalf. 
Egypt experienced significant losses during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and 
decided to come to the peace table, but the rest of the Arab world strongly opposed Egypt 
making peace with Israel. In 1978, the United States led Egypt and Israel to participate in 
the Camp David Accords and to sign a historic peace agreement in 1979. The Arab states 
argued, however, that negotiations should have occurred in a regional, multilateral 
context rather than a bilateral one. Syria’s president Hafez al-Assad stated that “Sadat, by 
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journeying to Israel, had recognized Israel and a unified Jerusalem as its capital, had 
broken Arab solidarity, and had dealt separately on regional affairs he had no right to 
discuss with the Israelis on his own.”132 In retaliation, Egypt’s membership in the Arab 
League was terminated and the Arab states cut diplomatic ties with Egypt. Egypt lost its 
political stature as a regional leader and countries such as Iraq, Libya, and Syria looked 
for ways to fill the political vacuum. 
Nevertheless, Egypt undoubtedly gained from the peace deal. Egypt expert Robert 
Einhorn noted that to offset economic retribution by the Arab states, the United States 
committed to significant financial assistance for Egypt as part of the peace agreement.133 
Egypt also gained exponentially in terms of increased political and military ties with the 
United States. The agreement resulted in a stronger bilateral relationship between Egypt 
and the United States.134 This U.S. assistance provided a strategic boost to Egypt as 
Sadat worked to open up the country through economic and political reforms, undoing 
some of Nasser’s socialist political efforts. 
b. Nuclear Program 
The origin of Egypt’s nuclear efforts, like that of many regional states, was in the 
“Atoms for Peace” program. Egypt’s nuclear program was initiated by U.S. President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower following his 1953 speech to the UN General Assembly on the 
use of nuclear technology for peace and development.135 The Egyptians embraced 
nuclear technology and established the Egyptian Atomic Energy Commission in 1955.136 
Through the lens of Pan-Arabism, Egypt seemed to view expertise in and 
acquisition of nuclear technology as part of the trappings of regional leadership and 
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pursued a civilian nuclear program while keeping open the option for a military program. 
Furthermore, Egypt appeared to be motivated by its regional rivalry with Israel. For 
example, according to the New York Times, Nasser commented in 1960, in regards to his 
assessment about a possible Israeli nuclear program that “this will be the beginning of 
war between us and Israel.”137  
The Soviet Union supplied Egypt’s first reactor, the Experimental Training 
Research Reactor Number One light water reactor, and its fuel load of 3.2 kilograms of 
ten percent enriched uranium.138 Construction began on the research reactor at Inshas in 
1958 and it went critical in 1961.139 The small amount of plutonium generated by the 
reactor did not seem to pose a proliferation concern and the facility was subject to 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards beginning in 1981.140 
The program entered its most active phase in the early 1960s. According to 
Einhorn, in this time period, the country “boosted its budget for nuclear programs, 
stepped up its efforts to recruit and train nuclear scientists, approached a wide range of 
countries for assistance, examined prospects for mining thorium and uranium in Egypt, 
and explored elements of the nuclear fuel cycle that could eventually enable it to produce 
fissile material.”141 For example, the International Institute for Strategic Studies wrote 
that Egyptian Atomic Energy Commission head, Salah Hedayat, sought to acquire heavy-
water reactors capable of producing plutonium.142 In addition, Barbara Gregory noted 
that Egypt sought nuclear technology transfers from the Soviet Union, China, and India 
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from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, although these supplier countries did not provide 
assistance.143 
Despite Egypt’s efforts, the country did not acquire a nuclear weapon. James 
Walsh found that while Egypt worked to acquire nuclear weapons in the 1950s and 
1960s, it did not commit the resources achieving this goal would have required.144 
Nasser never created a budget dedicated to advancing Egypt’s nuclear weapons 
efforts.145 Walsh quoted Nasser confidante Hassan El-Badri: “According to Badri, the 
Egyptian President concluded that Egypt could go nuclear, but only ‘if the national 
budget is cut in half to devote to the bomb.’ Badri believed that Nasser wanted nuclear 
weapons, but was unwilling to inflict further economic hardship on his people.”146 It 
seemed that in Nasser’s cost-benefit analysis of the country’s nuclear program, the 
program was too costly. 
Egypt appeared to turn away from a military nuclear program more definitively in 
the 1970s. Egypt’s defeat by Israel in 1973 left it further humiliated but also realistic 
about its chances of reclaiming territory lost in the 1967 conflict. As Egypt sought to 
make peace with Israel, it made concessions on its nuclear program. Maria Rost Rublee 
assessed that Sadat used Egypt’s nuclear program as a bargaining tool with the United 
States; he promised to ratify the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) that Egypt 
signed in 1968 and relinquish the country’s nuclear weapons goal.147 In 1974, Egypt, 
with Iran’s support, put forth a plan for a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the 
Middle East. This proposal was the first of its kind in the region.  
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President Sadat began to take steps to build Egypt’s nuclear power program in the 
mid-1970s. First, U.S. President Richard M. Nixon and Sadat signed a bilateral 
cooperation agreement between the two countries in 1974.148 It specified future nuclear 
cooperation negotiations after which the United States would provide eight reactors and 
fuel to build Egypt’s nuclear energy program.149 Sadat established Egypt’s Nuclear 
Power Plants Authority in 1976. Egypt continued efforts to establish a nuclear energy 
program in the 1980s, but it was not successful in acquiring a nuclear power reactor.150 
Egypt ratified the NPT and the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in 1981.151 
These actions permitted Egypt to receive help from the IAEA for nuclear power and 
moved it further away from nuclear weapons development.152 In 1981, Egypt signed 
nuclear agreements with the United States and West Germany seeking to acquire nuclear 
power reactors, but Egypt was unsuccessful at obtaining the reactors.153 In fact, during 
the 1970s and 1980s, Egypt made numerous attempts to set up a nuclear power 
infrastructure, but agreements for power reactors ultimately fell through or were 
cancelled.154 
In addition to Egypt’s work to establish a nuclear power program, the country 
pursued the acquisition of nuclear technology. In the early 1980s, Egypt established a 
nuclear waste management facility and a hot cell complex at Inshas, according to the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies.155 Gregory noted that there was periodic 
reporting on Egyptian efforts to mine uranium domestically throughout the 1980s and 
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Egypt acquired a fuel fabrication facility in the late 1980s.156 Shay Feldman highlighted 
that, through 1986, Egypt held multiple nuclear conferences and training events, boasted 
about 500 nuclear technicians working in-country, and churned out graduate students in 
the nuclear sciences.157 According to Gregory, these pursuits gave the appearance that 
Egypt was seeking to develop expertise on the nuclear fuel cycle even if it was not 
pursuing a nuclear weapon outright.158 They likewise supported an image of Egypt as a 
leader in the Arab world. 
The 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster dampened Egyptian interest in nuclear 
power. In 1992, when asked about nuclear power plants, Egyptian President Hosni 
Mubarak stated, “If we set up a network of three or four stations, we would start with $2 
billion, but this figure would reach $5-6 billion by the time it was finished; that is, the 
final figure would be between $18-20 billion.”159 Economic concerns about the cost of 
building up Egypt’s nuclear infrastructure began to cast a shadow on the country’s 
nuclear energy plans. 
Finally, in 1990, Egypt expanded its position from calling for the region to be free 
from nuclear weapons to calling for the region to be free of weapons of mass destruction. 
In November 1990, Nabil Fahmy, an Egyptian diplomat posted to the UN in New York, 
cited the region’s ongoing conflicts as a rationale for the Egyptian proposal. He 
highlighted the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iraq-Iran conflict, and Iraq’s recent occupation 
of Kuwait.160 A subsequent UN NPT Review Conference called for a weapons-of-mass-
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destruction free zone in the region.161 The proposed region would stretch from “Libya in 
the west, to Iran in the east, and from Syria in the north to Yemen in the south.”162 
Discussions of allowed delivery systems in the region and the verification process for 
enforcing such a treaty were not finalized.163 Nevertheless, Egypt continued to play a 
role with the UN and the IAEA to advance a NWFZ and a weapons–of-mass-destruction 
free zone in the Middle East.164 
In tandem with Egypt’s nuclear efforts, the country pursued a ballistic missile 
capability beginning in the 1950s. Joseph Bermudez asserted that the goal of this program 
was the indigenous development of ballistic missiles and a satellite launch vehicle.165 He 
concluded, however, that the program never produced the desired missiles due to 
technical and program management issues.166 According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, 
in the early 1970s, the Soviet Union agreed to supply Egypt with short-range ballistic 
missiles, Scud-B missiles.167 Bermudez further noted that, in the early 1980s, Egypt 
entered into a partnership with North Korea to produce a Scud-B missile indigenously.168  
Egypt’s effort to acquire a medium-range ballistic missile capability began in 
1984 with an agreement with Argentina for the Condor II project.169 Bermudez assessed 
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that the effort was spurred by a desire to improve Egypt’s military capability after the 
1973 Arab-Israeli War and Libya’s similar effort to obtain and produce ballistic 
missiles.170 Egypt had also taken note of how Iraq used its missile capabilities to gain a 
cease-fire favorable to its interests during the Iran-Iraq War.171 Egypt and Iraq both 
signed an agreement with Argentina for this ballistic missile development project, but 
under pressure from the West, the cooperation ended before the end of the decade 
without either country acquiring the missile capability, according to Bermudez.172 
Notably, once the Missile Technology Control Regime, a U.S.-initiated institution, was 
established, the Condor II project was one of its first targets.173 Nevertheless, Bermudez 
surmised that the project did leave Egypt with significant expertise in missile 
technology.174 
c. Nuclear Trends 
Egypt may have been eager to obtain nuclear weapons capability in the 1960s and 
perhaps in the early 1970s, by 1981, its focus had switched to nuclear power and the 
country had joined the nonproliferation regime. After the 1973 war and the 1979 peace 
agreement, Egypt did not seem to make the pursuit of nuclear weapons a priority. In fact, 
Leonard Spector wrote in 1990 that, since 1981, “Egypt’s nuclear intentions have 
appeared to be entirely peaceful.”175 Nevertheless, given Egypt’s nuclear infrastructure, 
the country would likely be able to create a weapon if it acquired fissile material, 
according to Frank Barnaby.176 Egypt did, however, appear to augment its short-range 
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ballistic missile arsenal. The country also undertook a serious effort to acquire medium-
range ballistic missiles with the Condor II program. 
What drove Egypt’s nuclear behavior? Looking at the regional context, Egypt’s 
rivalry with Israel appeared to drive its security policy. The country seemed to be 
motivated to pursue nuclear weapons due to this rivalry with a neighboring state, but 
Egypt’s nuclear efforts drew to an end in the 1970s. The historical account suggests that a 
large reason for Egypt deciding to forfeit its nuclear ambitions was pressure from the 
United States following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. This would indicate that superpower 
external management played a key role in ending Egypt’s drive for nuclear weapons. 
Further, it seems probable that Egypt might have obtained medium-range ballistic 
missiles through the Condor II program if not for the constraining effects of U.S. pressure 
and the Missile Technology Control Regime. 
2. Iran 
Iran sought to assert itself as a regional hegemon following the exit of the British 
from the Persian Gulf, vying with Saudi Arabia for the role. Domestic turmoil rocked the 
country, however, with its 1979 revolution. An anti-Western government came to power 
and began to export its Islamic revolution in the region. Revolutionary activities included 
supporting Shia militants, namely Hezbollah, in the Levant.177 The Iran-Iraq War, which 
posed an existential threat to Iran, began in 1980 and ended in 1988. 
Iran, led by Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, began the time period seeking to 
build its nuclear capability while publicly disavowing interest in a nuclear weapons 
program. After the country’s 1979 revolution, the nuclear program, associated by the new 
leadership with Western influence, was swept aside. The threat posed by Iraq during the 
Iran-Iraq War, however, led to a more pragmatic view of nuclear weapons capabilities. 
The program was restarted in the early 1980s, with a military focus, and Iran continued to 
build its nuclear weapons capability throughout the time period. The war also 
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demonstrated to Iran the importance of ballistic missiles. China and North Korea worked 
with Iran to advance its missile program.  
a. Political Context 
The Shah envisioned his country as the regional hegemon following the British 
withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1968. The Shah believed Iran should assume the role 
of the “guardian in the Persian Gulf region” and pursued U.S. support for this role.178 
Furthermore, Iran enjoyed close ties with the United States and the country was an eager 
consumer of U.S. military equipment and technology. By 1970, the United States had 
formulated a “twin pillars” strategy whereby it would rely on both Iran and Saudi Arabia 
to facilitate regional stability.179 In fact, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Iran was a 
regional leader in gross domestic product output and defense spending along with Saudi 
Arabia. Privately, however, at that time, the U.S. Department of State acknowledged 
Iran’s regional dominance and assessed that Iran would emerge as the strongest 
power.180 
Comments by the Shah at a 1975 meeting with U.S. President Gerald R. Ford 
illustrated how Iran saw its regional position. The Shah noted good relations between Iran 
and Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia and stated that Iran had resolved its differences with 
Iraq.181 He opined that Saudi Arabia’s military was not very good.182 He dismissed 
Libya as unimportant and referred to Libyan President Muammar Qadaffi as “a nut” who 
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was “making trouble.”183 Finally, he expressed concern about the security situation 
between India and Pakistan, and, referring to Pakistan, stated, “We should give them the 
ability to defend themselves.”184 The Shah portrayed Iran as being at the center of 
regional affairs and the promotion of regional security. 
As the decade advanced, domestic stability decreased. In 1979, the Shah fled the 
country and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned to Iran from Paris, France. Iran’s 
Islamic Revolution commenced and Khomeini became the country’s leader. The U.S.-
Iranian relationship spiraled downward. The lowest point was the Iran hostage crisis 
beginning in November of that year when Iranian protestors broke into the U.S. Embassy 
in Tehran and took embassy employees hostage.185 More than 50 Americans were held 
captive for 444 days before they were finally released on January 20, 1981.186 
The country focused on exporting its Islamic Revolution to places like Lebanon, 
sending its Revolutionary Guards to work alongside Shia militants, namely Hezbollah.187 
Iran used Lebanon as a hub for its third country revolutionary activities.188 This singular 
focus on revolutionary activities was soon interrupted, however, when the country was 
attacked by Iraq. 
Saddam Hussein launched the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, posing an existential threat 
to Iran. Iran had few friends following the 1979 revolution and finding ways to 
strengthen its military capabilities proved a challenge. In addition to the United States, 
Iran had a poor relationship with the Soviet Union in the 1980s because of the Soviet 
Union’s disapproval of Iran’s continuation of the Iran-Iraq War.189 In fact, according to 
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John Parker, relations with the Soviet Union only improved in the late 1980s after the 
Soviets left Afghanistan and Khomeini wrote a letter to Mikhail Gorbachev.190 As the 
war with Iraq dragged on, Iran found friends such as Syria and Libya and attempted to 
compensate for its lack of allies and military shortcomings with self-reliance. After eight 
years, the war drew to a close. Nevertheless, Iran’s feeling of vulnerability from being 
attacked by Iraq and having few allies seemed to linger. 
b. Nuclear Program 
Iran established its nuclear program in 1957 in response to the “Atoms for Peace” 
initiative.191 Iran began to construct the Tehran Research Reactor, a light water research 
reactor, in 1960 and it went critical in 1967.192 The reactor was supplied by the United 
States and subject to IAEA safeguards.193 The United States also transferred uranium and 
plutonium to Iran for use with the reactor, with the final shipment occurring in 1976.194 
Iran signed the NPT after its creation in 1968 and ratified it several years later. 
Iran’s actions and statements regarding nuclear capabilities in the early 1970s led 
to questions regarding Iran’s intentions. By 1973, the Shah had plans to acquire a 
significant nuclear power capability—20 nuclear power plants to generate 23,000 MWs 
of electricity.195 Iran established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran in 1974. The 
Shah made a controversial statement to the French newspaper Le Monde in February 
1974 that “one day ‘sooner than is believed,’ Iran would be ‘in possession of a nuclear 
bomb.’”196 Iranian officials quickly refuted this statement. On June 23, 1974, the Shah 
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made a similar statement to French weekly Les Informations.197 This was on the same 
day that India announced that it might test a hydrogen device.198 Again, the Shah quickly 
retracted the statement, reiterating that he sought a NWFZ in the Middle East.199 Iran had 
joined Egypt in calling for a NWFZ in 1974. In 1975, when asked if any Iranian 
institutions might push for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, the Shah responded: “I not 
only make the decisions, I do the thinking.” He continued, “I believe it will not be 
different when I am not here and there is another king.”200 In 1974, the U.S. intelligence 
community assessed that by the mid-1980s, “if Iran has a full-fledged nuclear power 
industry and all the facilities necessary for nuclear weapons, and if other countries have 
proceeded with weapons development, we have no doubt that Iran will follow suit.”201 
U.S. policy toward Iran focused on negotiations for the export of nuclear reactors 
in the mid-1970s during the Gerald R. Ford administration. According to William Burr, 
the negotiations became particularly heated over the subject of Iran’s desired capabilities 
for the reprocessing of spent fuel.202 Burr noted that Iran wished to have a national 
reprocessing capability while the United States insisted on a U.S. role in the reprocessing 
of spent nuclear fuel.203 After India’s nuclear test in 1974 that took the international 
community by surprise, the United States began to closely scrutinize activities at 
commercial nuclear reactors, especially the use of spent fuel.204 By 1978, Iran had 
accepted a U.S. veto over the reprocessing or enrichment of nuclear material of U.S. 
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origin.205 The negotiations concluded with an agreement for the sale of eight nuclear 
reactors to Iran by the United States.206 
Iran also looked to other countries for nuclear power technology. Two European 
companies had already signed contracts to construct four nuclear power plants in Iran. 
Iran signed a contract with a West German company for two nuclear power plants at 
Bushehr in 1976.207 The country also finalized an agreement with a French company for 
two plants at Darkhovin in 1977.208 
Nuclear efforts in Iran were stymied, however, due to the country’s Islamic 
revolution. As the internal political and economic situation in Iran declined in the lead-up 
to the revolution, nuclear activity in Iran ground to a halt in 1978 due to major reductions 
in government spending.209 Iran’s nuclear efforts temporarily halted altogether in 1979 
after the Shah fled Iran and the new revolutionary regime dismissed the country’s need 
for a nuclear program.210 The Ayatollahs rejected all things deemed “western” to include 
the country’s nascent nuclear program. The leader of Iran’s revolution, Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini, declared after coming to power, “We will not play the policeman of 
the Persian Gulf.”211 The French had not yet initiated the work on their promised 
reactors, but the two German reactors were over halfway completed.212 The plants under 
construction were not finished and the nuclear agreement with the United States was 
never signed.213 Iran lost a significant share of the human capital in its nuclear program 
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after the fall of the Shah. Many Iranian scientists departed and while Atomic Energy 
Organization of Iran employees had numbered 4,500 before the revolution, by 1988 there 
were only 800.214 Nevertheless, the U.S. intelligence community assessed that the 
progress made under the Shah provided Iran with a baseline nuclear capability.215 
Additionally, Shyam Bhatia noted that Iran maintained a 15 percent share of the 
Namibian Rossing uranium mine.216 
Khomeini quickly reversed course on the nuclear issue after Iraq invaded Iran in 
September of 1980, posing an existential threat to Iran. In fact, in a 1988 letter, written a 
year before his death, Khomeini cited the need for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons to 
prosecute the war against Iraq.217 As Iran turned its resources to self-defense, its 
leadership focused on the country’s nuclear program and how to restart it. According to 
the U.S. intelligence community, Iran opened up negotiations with West German and 
French suppliers in 1982.218 The most progress had been made on one of the Bushehr 
reactors and Iran sought out foreign assistance to complete it.219 According to the 
Nuclear Threat Initiative, work on the Bushehr reactor restarted in 1984.220 Iran worked 
steadily to obtain expertise and capability in the nuclear arena. The challenge was finding 
foreign partners. 
Iran found willing partners in China and Pakistan. China, which had not yet 
signed the NPT, assisted Iran with its nuclear program from the mid-1980s through the 
mid-1990s. John Garver noted that, under a 1985 agreement, China partnered with Iran to 
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create the Esfahan Nuclear Research Center, a facility undeclared to the IAEA until 
1992.221 The White House provided information to the U.S. House of Representatives 
that China’s support included “cooperation on uranium geology and exploration, training 
for Iranian personnel, and supply of several small research reactors and related laboratory 
facilities.”222 According to this same report, China provided Iran with an electromagnetic 
separation machine.223 China began construction on four nuclear reactors for Iran 
between 1988 and 1990 and they all went critical between 1992 and 1995.224 In 1990, 
China trained Iranian personnel on nuclear issues.225 Pressured by the United States, 
China finally admitted to the sale of nuclear technology to Iran in 1990.226 
Iran also benefited from Pakistan’s nuclear expertise. The Nuclear Threat 
Initiative noted that Iran signed an agreement in 1987 for Pakistan to train Iran’s 
personnel.227 In addition, according to an IAEA report and David Albright, Iran secretly 
acquired P-1 centrifuge parts and designs through the A.Q. Khan network in 1987.228 
Further, Garver assessed that Chinese engineers may have helped Iran to further develop 
and integrate the parts and designs provided by A.Q. Khan.229 The Iran-Iraq War ended 
in 1988, but Iran continued to forge ahead with its nuclear program secretly. 
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In terms of delivery systems, Iran’s supplier changed from the United States to 
China after the 1979 revolution. According to Mohamed Kadry Said, Iran had received 
its first ballistic missiles from the United States as U.S.-provided MGM-52 Lance short-
range ballistic missiles arrived in 1974.230 After 1979, China worked with Iran on its 
delivery systems. The International Institute for Strategic Studies noted that China helped 
Iran develop a rocket capability in the middle of the Iran-Iraq War—the Oghab with a 40 
km range and the Iran-130 with a 130 km range.231 A 1988 U.S. Department of State 
report stated that China provided weapons to both sides in the Iran-Iraq War and became 
Iran’s most important weapons supplier by 1987.232 
In the mid- to late 1980s, additional countries assisted Iran to acquire missiles. 
Between 1985 and 1988, first Libya and Syria and then North Korea provided liquid-
fueled Scud-B missiles to Iran, according to the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies.233 These missile acquisitions would allow Iran to respond to Iraqi missile 
attacks. The institute’s report further stated that North Korea later helped Iran develop the 
capability to produce Scud-B missiles, renamed Shahab-1 missiles, and Scud-C missiles, 
renamed Shahab-2 missiles.234 The Arms Control Association noted that the Shahab-1 
had a range of 300 kilometers and the Shahab-2 had a range of 550 kilometers.235 
c. Nuclear Trends 
Two shifts occurred in Iran’s nuclear program over this time period. Iran’s 
possible pursuit of nuclear weapons through the 1970s appeared to end with the fall of 
the Shah in 1979. It then began again in 1982 after the start of the Iran-Iraq War. In the 
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mid-1970s, a deal for the United States to provide Iran with nuclear power reactors came 
under additional U.S. scrutiny after the peaceful nuclear explosion carried out by India 
and subsequent U.S. efforts to establish the Nuclear Suppliers Group. These U.S. power 
reactors were not delivered. Iran then advanced its ability to acquire fissile material in the 
1980s through nuclear technology transfers from China and the A.Q. Khan network. 
During the 1980s, Iran also began to build an indigenous missile program with the 
assistance of North Korea. 
What drove Iran’s nuclear behavior? In the regional context, Iran advanced its 
nuclear capabilities in the 1980s due to an existential threat from Iraq. The Shah 
envisioned Iran as a regional power and a nuclear capability as a part of that identity. 
When the Shah was overthrown, however, Iran’s new leader discarded the Shah’s nuclear 
initiatives. Khomeini scorned the identity of Iran as a regional power in league with a 
superpower, the United States. For him, rejecting Iran’s nuclear program, which was 
western technology, was synonymous with rejecting the United States. Khomeini quickly 
reversed course, however, when faced with the threat posed by Iraq during the Iran-Iraq 
War. Pragmatic Iranian leaders came to realize that nuclear weapons could serve an 
important purpose for the country. 
3. Iraq 
Iraq desired to secure a position as the regional hegemon. After Iran’s 1979 
revolution, Iraq’s leadership perceived that its neighbor Iran was militarily weak and 
launched an attack against Iran in 1980. Iraq had the upper hand. The country had a 
stronger military and it received support from both the United States and the Soviet 
Union. Iraq was not able to convert those advantages to military success, however, and 
the war ended without a clear winner eight years later. In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait 
resulting in a military response from a U.S.-led coalition, the First Gulf War. 
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Iraq’s leadership started pursuing a nuclear weapons capability in the 1970s.236 
Israel bombed Iraq’s nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1981 just before it went critical.237 This 
bombing raid appeared to bolster Iraq’s determination and Iraq continued its nuclear 
program, but covertly. It relied on electromagnetic isotope selection technology to 
advance its nuclear weapons program. Iraq made significant progress toward a nuclear 
weapons capability through 1990. In tandem with its nuclear efforts, Iraq aggressively 
worked to expand its ballistic missile capabilities. 
a. Political Context 
The Iraqi Ba’ath Party came into power in 1968 led by Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr. A 
period of economic and political stability followed with Iraq modernizing its business, 
education, and technology sectors. In 1973, this era of modernization was in full swing. 
Saddam Hussein replaced Al-Bakr as president in 1979. Hussein continued to lead Iraq’s 
modernization and vied for leadership of the Arab world with regional states. 
Iraq faced political challenges on the domestic front. The Iraqi population 
primarily consisted of Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, and Sunni Kurds. Hussein’s regime, 
however, was dominated by Sunni Arabs and repressed the Shia Arabs and the Kurds. 
The Iraqi Kurds, led by Mustafa Barzani, rebelled against Baghdad’s rule throughout the 
1960s and then again in the 1980s led by Masud Barzani and Jalal Talabani. During the 
1980s, Hussein attacked the Kurds with chemical weapons. 
In terms of the regional environment, Iraq’s political relations were characterized 
primarily by disputes over border issues with Kuwait and Iran. Hussein also used the 
issue of Israel to bolster Iraq’s regional standing. The Duelfer Report noted that Hussein 
believed he had a “divine mission to liberate Jerusalem,” but this was also a strategy to 
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gain support from regional states.238 Otherwise, Syria, rather than Israel, appeared to be 
Iraq’s adversary in the Levant.239 
As Hussein sought to improve Iraq’s regional standing, he saw a weakness in his 
neighbor Iran after the 1979 revolution and decided to attack in September 1980. Iraq’s 
military capabilities were greater than Iran’s capabilities. Iraq was also supported by both 
the United States and the Soviet Union. Iran fought back hard, however, and Hussein 
made some poor strategic decisions. One of them was to prolong the war in order to 
acquire more territory in the mid-1980s. Iraq emerged from the war in 1988 without a 
clear victory, debts, and a battered population. 
Following the Iran-Iraq War, the United States sought to expand relations with 
Iraq as it saw the potential for Iraq to play a regional leadership role and be a trade 
partner. For example, the U.S. Department of State assessed that Iraq could be “a 
prominent member in a loose alignment of conservative Arab states featuring Egypt, 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.”240 While the United States would not support Iraqi 
hegemony in the Gulf, it favored a role for Iraq that involved promoting regional stability 
and containing Iran.241 The U.S. Department of Agriculture viewed Iraq as a good 
customer for U.S. agricultural products.242 
In the international context, the United States saw the warming of U.S.-Iraq 
relations in the late 1980s as a way to draw Iraq away from the Soviets since Iraq would 
not need a constant supply of basic Soviet weaponry following the Iran-Iraq War.243 
According to Lawrence Freedman, “the first indication of the administration’s reappraisal 
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came in May 1982, when Iraq was taken off the list of countries supporting terrorism. 
With Syria, Libya, and South Yemen, it had been a founding member on the list. As it 
was removed, Iran was added.”244 
The United States’ favorable view of Iraq changed quickly, however, when 
Saddam Hussein made the decision to invade Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Perhaps 
Hussein reasoned that acquiring Kuwait could help solve some of the country’s post-war 
financial problems. Iraq also launched some missiles at Saudi Arabia and its other 
neighbors in the process. While Iraq was the favored party to win in the Iran-Iraq War, 
this was not the case regarding the invasion of Kuwait. The Gulf countries strongly 
opposed Iraq’s actions and sought U.S. assistance in 1990 to force Iraq to return to its 
own national boundaries. 
b. Nuclear Program 
Iraq began its nuclear program in the 1950s assisted by the Soviet Union. Iraq 
founded the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission in 1956. In 1962, Iraq began construction 
on its first, Soviet-supplied nuclear research reactor, the IRT-5000.245 It went critical in 
1967 and was subject to IAEA safeguards. Nevertheless, some reluctance accompanied 
this transfer of nuclear technology from the Soviet Union to Iraq. Former Soviet Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs official Oleg Grinevsky recalls Nikita Khrushchev’s response when 
briefed regarding the bilateral agreement with Iraq to provide a small nuclear reactor in 
1959. Khrushchev stated, “First we have the Chinese asking for bombs, now we have 
Arabs asking the same. We will get the [sic] headache after all. We will cooperate, but 
we will not give any bombs!”246 It seemed the Soviet Union was willing to share nuclear 
technology with the Middle East, but was also keen to ensure that not enough capability 
was provided to construct a nuclear weapon. 
                                                 
244 Lawrence Freedman, A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East, Reprint Edition 
(New York: Public Affairs, 2009), 160. 
245 Research Reactor Database. 
246 Valery Yaremenko, “Storm in Babylon,” trans. Dmitry Sudakov, Pravda, March 10, 2003, 
http://www.pravdareport.com/world/ussr/10-03-2003/1941-iraq-0/. 
 58 
European states made additional nuclear agreements with Iraq in the 1970s. 
Ronald Chesser asserted that, in 1976, Iraq brokered a deal with France for two more 
light water reactors.247 In 1979, an Italian company sold facilities for fuel manufacturing 
and plutonium separation to Iraq, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative.248 
Iraqi interest in acquiring nuclear weapons began in the early 1970s. The Iraqi 
government formulated a plan to pursue nuclear weapons in 1971 when Hussein was 
Vice-President of Iraq, according to the Duelfer Report.249 Furthermore, Hussein 
continued to have a close relationship with the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission because 
he served as its president from 1973 to 1979.250 The U.S. intelligence community wrote 
that by the mid-1970s, he had expressed interest in acquiring an “Arab bomb.”251 U.S. 
intelligence assessed in 1979 that Iraq’s driving motivation for nuclear weapons was to 
establish itself as a regional power.252 And, although the temporary termination of Iran’s 
nuclear program after Iran’s revolution benefited Iraq, it still perceived Iran to be a threat 
to its regional security interests in the future, according to U.S. intelligence.253 Iraq 
continued its acquisition of nuclear capabilities during the Iran-Iraq War. Chesser noted 
that in the early 1980s, two French-supplied reactors, Tammuz-1 and Tammuz-2, were 
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built.254 Iran attacked Iraq’s nuclear complex twice during the war and succeeded in 
damaging, but not destroying it. 
Israel’s concern over the Iraqi nuclear program seemed to increase with progress 
on the nuclear reactors. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
Israel made the decision to destroy Tammuz-1 at Osirak in a bombing raid conducted on 
June 7, 1981 before the reactor became critical.255 The attack caused a political backlash 
in the Arab World. In addition, the United States government made a statement that next 
day noting that “available evidence suggests U.S.-provided equipment was employed in 
possible violation of the applicable agreement under which it was sold to Israel.”256 
According to the U.S. National Security Council, a subsequently drafted legal document 
discussed the suspension of the sales of F-16s to Israel, the aircraft used in the attack.257 
Nevertheless, the deliveries were not permanently suspended.  
How did Iraq react to this incident? A U.S. Interagency Intelligence Assessment 
noted that while Hussein did criticize the United States for giving military hardware to 
Israel, “he did not repeat even standard criticisms of the United States in his first public 
speech after the raid” and that “this restraint may reflect his continuing determination to 
balance his relations with the superpowers.”258 According to U.S. intelligence, Iraq 
requested that France rebuild the reactor, which the French government initially agreed to 
do.259 The U.S. intelligence report further noted that France did not follow through on 
the agreement and only conducted some site cleanup.260 
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In terms of regional relations following the Osirak attack, Hussein gauged his 
reaction to improve his position in relation to the Iran-Iraq War primarily and to create a 
united Arab front against Israel secondarily.261 U.S. intelligence judged that Hussein 
tried “to use the heightened anti-Israeli sentiment to improve Iraq’s ties with Syria and 
Libya, Iran’s principal Arab backers. He would like to end Libyan and Syrian military aid 
to Iran, to create a solid Arab front against Tehran, and to put pressure on Tehran to 
negotiate an end to the war.”262 In terms of regional rivals, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, 
Iran, and Turkey, were likely relieved the Osirak nuclear reactor was destroyed.263 
Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia publicly supported Iraq and offered to provide funds to help 
rebuild the reactor.264 
Following the attack on its nuclear facilities, Iraq began to clandestinely pursue a 
nuclear weapons capability with new fervor. Iraq had explored electromagnetic isotope 
separation previously in 1980 and, following Israel’s attack on its facilities, Iraq decided 
to rely on electromagnetic isotope separation for uranium enrichment, according to the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies.265 In addition, Tammuz-2 went critical in 
1987 and was subject to IAEA safeguards.266 In 1987, Iraq arranged for a company from 
Yugoslavia to construct a facility to generate 15 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium per 
year and decided to build a second electromagnetic isotope separation.267 The Nuclear 
Threat Initiative highlighted that, in 1988, Iraq pursued gas centrifuges for uranium 
enrichment aided by West Germany rather than continue with gaseous diffusion.268 Iraq 
also continued to work on nuclear design and assembly. The Duelfer Report noted a 
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conversation with Iraqi Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan where he stated that 
Hussein had become “very concerned about Iran’s nuclear weapons program late in the 
Iran-Iraq War and accelerated Iraq’s nuclear weapons research in response” and “by 
January 1991, Iraq was within a few years of producing a nuclear weapon.”269 
The United States seemed to be aware that Iraq was pursuing a nuclear weapons 
capability, but believed that those aspirations could be contained and that the greater U.S. 
strategic interest was served by maintaining a relationship with Iraq. For example, in 
1989, the U.S. State Department lamented U.S. inability to completely block Iraq’s 
nuclear development work while emphasizing the importance of trade restrictions to 
make some progress toward this goal.270 The United States, however, underestimated 
Saddam’s motivation for acquiring a nuclear weapon. The Duelfer Report noted that 
Hussein believed nuclear weapons were critical for Iraq’s survival.271 Ethel Solingen 
assessed that, if Iraq had not invaded Kuwait, Iraq likely would have acquired nuclear 
weapons.272 
Iraq worked throughout this time period on improving its delivery capabilities. 
Iraq acquired its first Scud-B missiles from the Soviet Union, according to the Nuclear 
Threat Initiative.273 This same report also noted that, during the early part of the Iran-
Iraq War, Iraq altered the Scud-B missile to produce the Al-Hussein missile with a range 
of over 600 km, putting Tehran within reach.274 Bermudez stated that, in 1984, Egypt 
and Iraq signed an agreement with Argentina to develop a medium-range ballistic missile 
system, the Condor II project, but ended this cooperation before the end of the decade 
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without either country acquiring the missile.275 The United Nations Monitoring, 
Verification, and Inspection Commission reported that, by 1989, Iraq had begun to test a 
missile, named Al-Abid, designed to be a space launch vehicle.276 For Hussein, ballistic 
missiles were a key part of the nation’s military capabilities. According to the Duelfer 
Report, he believed they played a crucial role in bringing an end to the Iran-Iraq War 
after the volley of missiles launched by Iraq in the 1988 “War of the Cities.”277 
c. Nuclear Trends 
Iraq began a quest for the “Arab bomb” in the 1970s. That quest turned 
clandestine and intensely practical with the pursuit of electromagnetic isotope separation 
capabilities after Israel bombed the Osirak reactor in 1981. Towards the end of the Iran-
Iraq War, Iraq’s program shifted forward once again due to concerns about the Iranian 
threat. Thus, for Iraq there seemed to have been three shifts forward toward an increased 
nuclear weapons capability. During this time period, Iraq advanced its ability to produce 
fissile material. The country also made progress in extending the range of its ballistic 
missiles, a possible delivery system. A possible source of technology for a medium-range 
ballistic missile, the Condor II program, however, came to a halt. The end of this program 
was due largely to U.S. pressure on Argentina following the creation of the Missile 
Technology Control Regime. 
What drove Iraq’s nuclear behavior? The first shift forward in its nuclear program 
seemed to be driven by a desire for regional primacy and the second and third shifts 
appeared to be in response to Iraq’s rivalry with Iran. The decisions regarding developing 
Iraq’s nuclear program were based on its perception of the regional security environment. 
As Hussein surveyed possible threats to Iraq, Iran was always viewed as the greatest 
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threat, not Israel. Hussein did not view the United States as its enemy and even at times 
desired better relations between the two countries.278 
4. Libya 
Libya approached regional politics with revolutionary fervor and sought to be a 
regional leader. Libya supported the Palestine Liberation Organization and the 
revolutionary regime in Iran. The country earned the ire of the United States and the West 
by sponsoring terrorism against Western targets in the 1980s. As the decade drew to a 
close, however, Libya worked to distance itself from international terrorism. Libya also 
pursued a nuclear weapons capability beginning in 1973, if not earlier. Libya persistently 
worked to augment its nuclear program throughout the time period. While the United 
States was aware of Libya’s program and took steps to constrain Libya’s nuclear efforts, 
Libya was able to continue advancing its nuclear capabilities. Libya also labored to 
expand its ballistic missile capabilities. 
a. Political Context 
Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi came to power in 1969. He quickly began to 
transform the country based on his vision of socialism. Gawdat Bahgat described 
Qaddafi’s beliefs as follows: 1) “the Arab nation was underdeveloped due to the long 
reign of the Turks that was followed by European occupation” and 2) imperialists 
“created Israel in the midst of the Arab world to divert the region’s resources and keep it 
weak and divided.”279 Based on this vision, Qaddafi sought to lead and unify the Arab 
world. 
Despite Qaddafi’s vision for a unified Arab world, Libya often clashed with 
regional states. Periodic altercations occurred between Libya and its neighbors, 
particularly with Chad and Egypt. A 1977 border conflict between Libya and Egypt led to 
a break in relations until 1989. Libya strongly criticized Egypt for making peace with 
Israel in 1979. In addition to vying with Iraq for regional leadership, relations between 
                                                 
278 Ibid., 31. 
279 Bahgat, Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, 134. 
 64 
Iraq and Libya took a downturn when Libya provided aid and support to Iran during the 
Iran-Iraq War. 
Libya had a history of supporting the Iranian revolutionary regime. Saud Zahed 
observed that when Qaddafi came to power, “he joined the Arab leaders’ alliance that 
comprised Jamal Abdul Nasser, Yasser Arafat, Ali Nasser Muhammad and Hafez al-
Assad, against Iran’s King Mohamed Reza Pahlavi, the last pro-western king who was 
accused of supporting Israel.”280 Then Libya quickly acknowledged the Khomeini 
government when the Shah fled. 
Libya was a fervent supporter of revolutionary causes. Libya’s foreign policy 
supported the Palestinian cause and decried Israel’s existence.281 It supported the 
Palestine Liberation Organization and the Irish Republican Army among others. This led 
to Libya’s active involvement in state-sponsored terrorism in the 1980s. Libya was 
implicated in a 1986 discotheque bombing in West Berlin in which U.S. citizens were 
killed; in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland; and in the 
1989 bombing of a French flight over Niger.282 
In terms of Libya’s relations with the United States, the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli 
was attacked and set on fire in 1979. It was subsequently closed in 1980. The United 
States added Libya to its list of State Sponsors of Terrorism in 1979. The United States 
initially sought to distance itself from Libya both politically and economically. As 
Libya’s terrorist attacks escalated, however, the United States conducted counter-attacks. 
U.S. and Libyan forces clashed in the Gulf of Sidra multiple times throughout the early to 
mid-1980s. In 1986, the United States directly attacked selected targets within Libya.283 
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Despite pressure from the United States, Libya appeared to have desired improved 
relations with the United States. In an October 3, 1979 memorandum for U.S. President 
Jimmy Carter, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher noted that Secretary of 
State Cyrus Vance had met that day with Libyan Foreign Minister Ali Abd-al-Salam Al-
Turayki.284 Christopher related that, in the Turayki meeting, “the main thrust of his 
presentation was a Libyan desire for improved bilateral relations.”285 On the other hand, 
Secretary Vance cited “Libyan support for terrorist movements and hostility to the effort 
to achieve a Middle East settlement as the primary causes of U.S.-Libyan differences.”286 
Meanwhile, Libya’s relationship with the Soviet Union improved from the early 1970s 
onward. Qaddafi stated in 1987 that he would allow the Soviet Union to base nuclear 
missiles in Libya and that he would join the Warsaw Pact.287 
In the late 1980s, Qaddafi began to pursue a less combative foreign policy. In 
1989, Libya sought to improve relations with its neighbors by joining the Arab Maghreb 
Union, reopening its border with Egypt after over a decade, and signing a peace accord 
with Chad.288 It also worked to distance itself from international terrorism in order to 
improve its relationship with the United States.289 
b. Nuclear Program 
Libya signed the NPT in 1968 and ratified the treaty in 1975. Unlike Egypt, Iraq, 
and Iran, Libya did not begin its pursuit of nuclear technology until the early 1970s. From 
nearly the beginning of its nuclear program, however, Libya pursued a nuclear weapons 
capability. According to U.S. intelligence, Libya sought to purchase nuclear weapons 
from China in 1973 and 1976, but was unsuccessful in persuading the Chinese to sell the 
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weapons.290 According to the former Indian Ambassador to the United States, Abid 
Hussain, Libya sought to procure nuclear weapons technology from India in the late 
1970s.291 Libya also tried to obtain research reactors from the United States and France 
in the 1970s with no success.292 U.S. intelligence noted that, between 1978 and 1982, 
Libya reached out to Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Finland, India, Italy, Pakistan, 
Romania, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Yugoslavia requesting 
either nuclear technology or other support.293 In some cases, Libya reached out to these 
countries more than once with requests.294 This was in addition to support from the 
Soviet Union.295 According to Bhatia, Libya failed to acquire uranium enrichment 
technology in the 1970s.296 
Libya did reap some results from its international outreach. Libya’s improving 
relationship with the Soviet Union allowed Libya to begin acquiring nuclear technology 
from the superpower.297 The Congressional Research Service noted that Argentina 
signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Libya in 1974 and provided training and 
equipment for mining and processing uranium.298 In addition, India provided educational 
opportunities in the field of civilian nuclear technology for Libyan students in 1978.299 
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Libya broke ties and stopped oil exports to India, however, when India would not provide 
nuclear technology exploitable for weapons purposes.300 According to the Congressional 
Research Service, rumors also circulated that Libya and Pakistan had a secret nuclear 
agreement whereby Libya would fund Pakistan’s nuclear program in exchange for the 
first nuclear weapon created.301 
Libya did acquire a substantial amount of yellowcake. The IAEA reported that 
between 1978 and 1983, Libya imported 2,263 tons of yellowcake equaling 1,587 tons of 
uranium.302 According to the IAEA, one thousand tons was declared to the IAEA and 
Libya stated that the remainder was acquired prior to the Safeguards Agreement entering 
into force.303 Wyn Bowen noted that there was speculation as to whether Libya sent 
some of this uranium to Pakistan.304 
The Soviet Union eventually provided a nuclear research reactor. The superpower 
had insisted that Libya both ratify the NPT and enter into the Safeguards Agreement 
before it would provide a research reactor.305 In fact, the Soviet Union had insisted that 
Libya sign the NPT before it would agree to provide the country with facilities for 
nuclear research.306 In 1980, the country’s Safeguards Agreement entered into force. 
Libya began construction of the Soviet-provided IRT-1 in 1980, a light water research 
reactor, and it went critical in 1981 and was placed under IAEA safeguards.307 Libya 
also constructed a critical facility for core modeling for the IRT-1 reactor, which was 
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placed under safeguards as well.308 The International Institute for Strategic Studies 
reported that Libya sought to use this Soviet reactor to produce plutonium and did so in 
small amounts in the 1980s.309 
Qaddafi’s rhetoric and Libya’s sponsorship of terrorism led the United States to 
see Libya as a threat to regional stability. The resulting pressure from the United States 
caused other countries to reconsider working with Libya and its nuclear program, 
complicating Libya’s efforts to acquire a nuclear capability. In 1981, a Senior 
Interagency Group convened by the U.S. State Department proposed: working to stop 
Libya’s “assassination and intimidation campaigns;” coordinating with possible nuclear 
suppliers to block Libya from acquiring nuclear weapons; forbidding U.S. universities to 
provide the country with any nuclear training; reducing or ending any international 
military assistance and training to Libya; and having the U.S. Sixth Fleet conduct 
exercises in the eastern Mediterranean.310 
Throughout the 1980s, Libya continued its attempts to advance its nuclear 
program. These efforts were later reported on by the IAEA. In the early 1980s, Libya 
worked to develop a capability for uranium gas centrifuge enrichment with foreign 
assistance, but was unsuccessful.311 By 1981, Libya sought to acquire a uranium 
conversion facility.312 Between 1983 and 1989, Libya used the Tajura Nuclear Research 
Center to conduct covert uranium enrichment tests.313 A pilot scale facility for uranium 
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conversion arrived from Japan in 1986.314 Between 1984 and 1990, Libya conducted 
experiments to make fission product radioisotopes.315 Libya conceded that it was able to 
extract a small amount of plutonium during this process.316 Libya imported uranium 
hexafluoride and uranium compounds in 1985, but did not declare them to the IAEA.317 
Also in 1985, Libya exported 100 kg of yellowcake to the Soviet Union and then received 
about 39 kg of uranium hexafluoride, 6 kg of uranium dioxide, and 5 kg of uranium 
tetrafluoride that same year likely for a uranium conversion facility.318 
In 1981, Libya started negotiations with Belgium regarding a nuclear cooperation 
agreement, according to U.S. intelligence.319 U.S. intelligence further noted that, as of 
February 1985, Libya still hoped the Belgian Government would ratify a negotiated 
nuclear cooperation agreement, which would give Libya a general agreement so that it 
could also negotiate for equipment and training.320 Primarily due to pressure from the 
United States, this agreement did not go through. 
In addition, Libya began pursuing a nuclear power capability in the 1970s and 
continued through the 1980s.321 As of 1985, however, six years of Libyan negotiations 
with the Soviets for two 440-MW nuclear power reactors had not resulted in an 
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agreement because of financial obstacles, among other challenges, according to U.S. 
intelligence.322 
From Qaddafi’s statements, it was clear that he believed the Arab World, and 
Libya in particular, should possess nuclear weapons. Qaddafi spoke out forcefully in 
1987, saying “if there is going to be a game using atomic bombs, then it should not be 
played against the Arab nation. The Arabs should have it, but we undertake not to drop it 
on anyone. However, if someone is going to drop one on us, or if someone is going to 
threaten our existence and independence even without the use of an atomic weapon, then 
we should drop it on them. This is an essential defensive weapon.”323 
Libya’s nuclear program was on the radar of the U.S. foreign policy community, 
but the United States doubted that Libya would make significant progress. During the 
mid-1980s, the United States was aware that Libya desired a nuclear weapon, but U.S. 
intelligence believed that weak leadership and planning, and political and financial 
obstacles would get in the way of Libyan efforts to acquire nuclear facilities.324 U.S. 
intelligence further assessed that Libya’s lack of skilled scientists and engineers was an 
obstacle to progress in its nuclear program and resulted in an overreliance on foreign 
suppliers for progress.325 Underscoring this assessment, U.S. intelligence judged in 1985 
that the research center at Tajura was in operation, but essentially run by Soviet 
specialists and not Libyans.326 
In terms of delivery systems, Libya worked to acquire ballistic missiles in the 
1970s and 1980s. The Nuclear Threat Initiative noted that the Soviet Union provided 
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Libya with short-range Scud-B and Frog-7 missiles in the mid-1970s.327 According to 
Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar, Libya also approached the Soviet Union and China 
to request additional missiles, but was rebuffed.328 They reported that Libya sought SS-
21 and SS-23 missiles from the former and CSS-2, M-9, and M-11 missiles from the 
latter.329 Moreover, they noted that Libya tried to develop its own missile, the Al Fatah, 
indigenously.330 For its missile development efforts, Libya used what remained of a 
missile development project run by the West German company Orbital Transport and 
Rockets, which had ended in 1981 without producing the desired missiles.331 Thus, 
Libya was unsuccessful in its efforts to develop the Al Fatah missile. 
c. Nuclear Trends 
Libya made continual efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability from 1973 
to 1990 beginning with a request to purchase nuclear weapons from China in 1973. 
Qaddafi’s motivation did not diminish throughout this period. In 1990, Qaddafi remained 
fixated on acquiring a nuclear weapon. Spector quoted from a 1990 speech by Qaddafi in 
which he stated: “The world has a nuclear bomb; we should have a nuclear bomb.”332 
Qaddafi worked to obtain nuclear technology to produce fissile material and a delivery 
system and, as a country, Libya made some progress toward these goals. 
What drove Libya’s nuclear behavior? In the regional context, Qaddafi sought to 
build a nuclear program to elevate Libya’s status in the Arab world. Like Nasser, Qaddafi 
desired to lead and unify the Arab world, especially after Egypt’s 1979 peace agreement 
with Israel. Qaddafi believed Libya was in competition with Egypt and Iraq for regional 
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leadership. Qaddafi’s statements indicated that he aspired to acquire a nuclear weapon for 
the Arab world. Denigrating Israel and elevating the Palestinian cause and other 
revolutionary causes were tactics to place Qaddafi at the center of regional politics. 
Qaddafi believed that nuclear weapons would help Libya to achieve these goals. Libya 
also was enmeshed in regional conflict and rivalry in the Middle East—with Egypt, Iraq, 
and Israel. These two motives were entwined. Qaddafi saw nuclear weapons as a way to 
be a leader in the Arab world and come out ahead of the country’s rivals. 
5. Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia viewed itself as a close U.S. ally in the Middle East during the Cold 
War with a prominent regional leadership role. Saudi leadership continually sought to 
balance its security interests. Tensions arose in the country’s relationship with Iran 
several times during the 1980s. Saudi Arabia’s concerns regarding Iraq overtook its 
worries over Iran, however, with Iraq’s invasion of fellow Gulf State Kuwait in 1990. 
Saudi Arabia’s secret acquisition of CSS-2 missiles from China in 1987, as reported by 
U.S. intelligence, demonstrated that it might take daring steps to protect its security 
interests in times of perceived vulnerability.333 
a. Political Context  
Saudi Arabia sought to balance the demands of its alliance with the United States 
with its domestic and regional goals. Saudi Arabia saw itself as a bulwark against 
communism in the region as a U.S. ally during the Cold War. For example, Saudi Arabia 
suggested that the Kingdom bore some responsibility for Egypt’s 1972 decision to send 
the Soviet military advisors back to Moscow.334 Saudi Arabia’s overarching security 
goal, however, was maintaining the stability of the House of Saud. William B. Quandt 
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summarized the approach of the Saudi leadership to regional events during this timeframe 
as follows: 
Because of their belief that domestic developments can be seriously 
affected by events in the Middle East, the Saudis are extremely attentive to 
the shifts of power and opinion around them. If they believe they can 
shape those events by drawing on their own resources, they will go to 
considerable lengths to do so. When the source of danger is beyond their 
reach – for example, Israel or the Soviet Union – they will urge the United 
States to act. When all else fails, they will try to remain uninvolved in 
regional turmoil, adapting as needed to the ebb and flow of events.335 
From 1973 to 1990, Saudi leadership was confronted with a number of security 
challenges in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia found itself on the opposite side of the 
United States during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. William Quandt asserted that Saudi 
Arabia sent troops to Syria during the conflict and made offers to Egypt and Syria of 
economic assistance.336 According to Quandt, the country also leveraged its power 
against the United States by stopping oil shipments and reducing its production.337 Saudi 
leadership was disappointed in 1977 when Egypt and Israel began direct peace talks, 
brushing aside Saudi Arabia’s plan that involved a united front of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, 
and the Palestine Liberation Organization.338 Instead, the U.S.-brokered peace agreement 
ended up separating Egypt from the rest of the Arab world in terms of its stance against 
Israel and its statehood. 
Saudi Arabia also was confronted with security challenges closer to its own 
borders. Insecurity reigned between North Yemen and South Yemen. When a conflict 
broke out between them in 1972, North Yemen received support from Saudi Arabia and 
South Yemen received support from the Soviet Union.339 Relations remained tense until 
the two Yemens united in 1990. 
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The country cast a wary eye toward Iran as the 1979 revolution threatened to spill 
revolutionary fervor beyond Iran’s borders. Khomeini had stated that Iran intended to 
export its revolution to the Gulf monarchies.340 Preoccupied with Iran’s possible 
domestic meddling and activities targeting the Kingdom’s small Shia population, Saudi 
Arabia made the decision to side with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. Saudi Arabia 
assisted Iraq both logistically and financially.341 During the war, the tense relationship 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran worsened after Saudi Arabia shot down two Iranian 
fighter planes over the Gulf.342 Simmering tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran came 
to a head in 1988 when Saudi Arabia broke-off its relations with Iran. It followed a 1987 
stampede in Mecca during Hajj that resulted in the deaths of 400 pilgrims that Saudi 
Arabia blamed on Iran.343 Saudi Arabia was further provoked by Iranian attacks against 
Saudi targets.344 Prior to this break in relations, Saudi Arabia had been trying to improve 
its relationship with Iran for three years.345 Relations would not be restored until 1991. 
 Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States responded to regional instability by forming the 
Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981. It was originally planned as the current Gulf 
Cooperation Council member states plus Syria and Egypt. Saudi Arabia remained 
concerned, however, regarding Syria and Egypt’s hegemonic intentions.346 
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In the early 1990s, Saudi relations with Iraq and Iran flip-flopped. Saudi-Iraqi 
relations deteriorated and Saudi-Iranian relations improved after Iraq invaded Kuwait.347 
To add to Saudi grievances over the invasion, Iraq hit Saudi Arabia with short-range 
ballistic missiles and cruise missiles when it invaded Kuwait.348 
 Saudi Arabia maintained an important security relationship with Pakistan. Saudi 
Arabia turned to Pakistan after the turmoil it experienced in the 1970s. Thomas Lippman 
noted that, after 1979, the year of the Iranian Revolution and Egypt’s peace treaty with 
Israel, “a small contingent of Pakistani troops was deployed to Saudi Arabia. . . . The 
troops remained until 1987, when oil prices hit historic lows and the Saudis could no 
longer afford them.”349 Furthermore, U.S. intelligence assessed that as of 1988, Pakistan, 
along with Egypt and Syria, had received indirect funding for their nuclear programs 
from Saudi Arabia.350 
How did the Saudi leadership handle these regional security issues during the 
1970s and 1980s? Saudi Arabia used the money from its oil industry to try to influence 
regional events so that the outcome would be favorable for the Kingdom.351 Saudi 
Arabia did not hesitate to use this tactic, whether the focus was to fund North Yemen 
during its war with South Yemen, the Arab side of the Arab-Israeli conflict, or the Iraqis 
during the Iran-Iraq War. 
b. Nuclear Program 
As Saudi Arabia confronted regional instability in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
country worked to develop its nuclear program. Saudi Arabia established the King 
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Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology in 1977.352 According to the organization’s 
website, its purpose was to “coordinate the activities of government institutions and 
scientific research centers in accordance with the requirements of the development of the 
Kingdom.”353 The organization was also charged with developing policy in science and 
technology and recruiting personnel to work there.354 Nuclear research fell under the 
mandate of the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology.355 
Saudi scientists began conducting research on the application of nuclear 
technology for electricity generation and desalination.356 The IAEA worked with Saudi 
Arabia on a nuclear energy planning project in the late 1970s.357 In the 1980s, Saudi 
scientists looked at possible site locations for nuclear power plants and continued to study 
the feasibility of using nuclear power for desalination and electricity generation.358 Also, 
according to U.S. intelligence, as of 1988, Saudi Arabia had reached out to France, the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden, Italy, West Germany, India, Brazil, 
and Taiwan regarding the purchase of nuclear facilities.359 
Saudi Arabia created the Atomic Energy Research Institute as a part of the King 
Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology in 1988 to conduct nuclear research.360 
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Research at the institute focused on isotopes, nuclear reactors, and nuclear materials 
among other topics.361 
In terms of the leadership of Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program, U.S. intelligence 
assessed in 1988 that Saudi King Fahd bid Abdulaziz al Saud was responsible for making 
decisions on nuclear power development for Saudi Arabia, but relied on his advisors 
regarding technical matters.362 It further noted that the King Abdulaziz City for Science 
and Technology Executive Director Salih Abd al-Rahman was Saudi Arabia’s leading 
expert on nuclear issues and that he favored the development of nuclear power, but not 
nuclear weapons.363 
Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program remained fairly noncontroversial. What alarmed 
the international community was the Kingdom’s ballistic missile acquisition in 1987. 
U.S. intelligence noted that Saudi Arabia obtained 40 intermediate-range ballistic 
missiles, CSS-2 missiles, from China.364 Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta reported in 
the Washington Post that the sale was negotiated in 1985, in the middle of the Iran-Iraq 
War and as other regional states were stockpiling missiles.365 The CSS-2 missiles could 
carry a 200 kg high-explosive warhead.366 The missiles were considered too inaccurate 
to use with conventional warheads. According to Robert Shuey and Shirley Kan, the 
missiles had a range of 2,800 km putting Iran, Iraq, and Israel within reach.367 Israel 
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subsequently threatened a preemptive strike against the CSS-2s.368 Shuey and Kan noted 
that Riyadh held out Iran out as the reason it had acquired the missiles.369 Following the 
1988 break in relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, when asked if Saudi Arabia might 
use its Chinese intermediate-range missiles against Iran, Youssef M. Ibrahims reported 
for the New York Times that King Fahd replied: “If we are obliged, we will have no 
alternative. Our spirit of tolerance should not motivate the Iranians to believe we are so 
weak. We hope Iran will not stir up trouble because we do not want it to test the ability of 
our people to defend themselves.”370 
Saudi Arabia’s missile acquisition heightened concern in the U.S. Congress 
regarding the regional missile proliferation trend.371 In particular, the U.S. Congress 
expressed concern that China might sell ballistic missiles to Libya.372 Nevertheless, the 
regional context at the time of the missile acquisition was important to bear in mind. 
Ibrahim Al-Marashi noted that missile proliferation was occurring in Egypt, Iran, Iraq, 
Israel, Libya, Syria, and Yemen.373 These missiles also served a possible future purpose. 
Thomas Lippman asserted that if Saudi Arabia ever obtained nuclear warheads, the CSS-
2s could be used as a delivery system.374 
The ballistic missile acquisition also alarmed Egypt. In 1988, the U.S. State 
Department had to assure Egyptian officials regarding Saudi Arabia’s acquisition of the 
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CSS-2 missiles.375 They relayed Chinese assurances that China had not provided nuclear 
weapons to any country and that the CSS-2 missiles were only equipped with 
conventional warheads.376 
Following the CSS-2 missile acquisition, Saudi Arabia acceded to the NPT in 
1988. What drove this choice? Why would Saudi Arabia relinquish the option of a 
nuclear weapons capability given the surrounding regional threats? Lippman assessed 
that Saudi Arabia made this decision in order to appease the United States as “penance 
for a transgression against an indispensable patron.”377 
c. Nuclear Trends 
In spite of Saudi Arabia’s efforts to establish its nuclear infrastructure, significant 
progress in this arena did not occur from 1973 to 1990. In 1988, U.S. intelligence 
assessed that the “lack of human resources and of an organizational framework [were] 
likely to preclude development of a full-fledged program without a great deal of help 
from outsiders.”378 The Kingdom did not take significant steps to acquire nuclear 
technology and equipment that might enable it to obtain a baseline nuclear capability and 
arm the ballistic missiles. There was also no evidence that the Saudis had acquired 
nuclear warheads by other means. 
What drove Saudi nuclear behavior during this period? According to the 
information in this section, in the regional context, Saudi Arabia was not directly 
threatened, but the fact that it was located in a conflict-filled region seemed to have had 
an impact. Threats from Iran and Iraq at different times were of particular concern. On 
one hand, Saudi Arabia did not do much to develop its nuclear capability despite its oil 
wealth. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia opted to acquire intermediate-range ballistic 
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missiles from China, even though it was closely allied with the United States. Also, it 
would have been possible to outfit these missiles with nuclear warheads. Surrounding 
states such as Egypt had to be assured that they were not equipped with warheads. Given 
the regional threats, it would have made more sense for Saudi Arabia to acquire short-
range ballistic missiles. This choice in ballistic missiles might be interpreted as a signal 
by Saudi Arabia that it could acquire nuclear weapons if it chose to do so. Perhaps Saudi 
leadership also assessed that it was an acquisition that its superpower ally, the United 
States, might tolerate. 
6. Syria 
Syria looked for ways to bolster its role as a regional leader. Its alliance with the 
Soviet Union provided access to weapons to equip its military. The country built 
relationships with militant groups in the Levant combatting Israel. Syria solidified a 
relationship with Iran by siding with the revolutionary regime during the Iran-Iraq War. 
After the end of the Cold War, support from the Soviet Union declined. In the early 
1980s, Syria worked to launch a civilian nuclear program, but it made little progress due 
to financial issues or U.S. efforts to thwart its progress. The country was able, however, 
to expand its ballistic missile program. 
a. Political Context 
During this time period, Syria sought to maintain domestic stability and pursue a 
leadership role in the Middle East. Syria used its regional leadership efforts to bolster 
how the national government was viewed at home. The country’s leadership challenges 
stemmed from the fact that Alawi Muslims dominated the government while the majority 
of the population was Sunni Muslim. As Hazem Kandil wrote, “the Syrian regime 
perceives foreign policy, for the most part, as a tool for offsetting the domestic crisis of 
legitimacy it has been suffering from.”379 What actions did Syria take in pursuit of these 
goals? 
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An important aspect of Syrian national identity was its advocacy of Pan-Arabism 
and its opposition to Israel. Syria briefly united with Egypt in 1958 to become the United 
Arab Republic. With an eye to recapturing the Golan Heights, Syria joined the Egypt-led 
Arab coalition that attacked Israel in 1973. In 1978, Syria’s president Hafez al-Assad 
blamed Egypt’s negotiations with Israel for the lack of a Middle East peace agreement. 
Syria, on the other hand, despite a shared border, never made peace with Israel and never 
recognized it as a state. Hafez al-Assad desired to be equal to Israel militarily. 
Consequently, between 1967 and 1973, the Syrian army grew from 50,000 to 225,000, 
reaching 350,000 by the 1990s.380 This continued opposition to Israel and embrace of the 
Arab cause bolstered the Syrian government’s legitimacy.381 
Raymond Hinnebusch wrote that Hafez also used “a nationalist foreign policy and 
Syria’s status as a front line state bordering Israel to get aid from the Arab Gulf States 
and cheap arms from the Soviet Union.”382 Between the superpowers, Syria had closest 
ties with the Soviet Union. From the 1970s through the mid-1980s, Syria received most 
of its military equipment from the Soviet Union.383 In addition, Leonid Brezhnev 
provided 13,000 military advisors to Syria after signing a treaty between the two 
countries in 1980.384 Saudi Arabia provided another source of support. The country 
provided U.S. $1.6 billion per year to Syria in the 1970s.385 Then in the 1980s, Saudi 
Arabia backed Syria’s interests in Lebanon in a quid pro quo arrangement involving 
Saudi economic pursuits.386 
 To strengthen its asymmetric military capability and influence regional issues, 
Syria supported various terrorist groups, mostly groups targeting Israel. They included 
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Lebanese Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine.387 Consequently, Syria was placed on the U.S. State 
Department’s State Sponsors of Terrorism list in 1979. Syria also built a close 
relationship with Iran, another state sponsor of terrorism. The foundation for this 
relationship was laid when Syria quickly sided with Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. In the 
1980s, Syria assisted Iran by airlifting weapons along with food and medicine to Iran.388 
Syria’s relationships with the superpowers changed with the decline of the Soviet 
Union in the late 1980s. On one hand, Syria lost its relative ease of access to modern 
weaponry from the Soviets.389 On the other hand, Syria’s relations with the United States 
warmed toward the end of the Cold War. It even joined the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq 
in 1990 after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. 
b. Nuclear Program 
Syria began its nuclear program later than some other states in the region. In 
1968, Syria signed the NPT and, in 1969, it was ratified.390 However, the Syrian Atomic 
Energy Commission, which the Soviet Union helped organize, did not come into 
existence until 1976–1977.391 Soon after, Syria began to examine the possibilities for 
nuclear power resulting in plans to construct six reactors.392 
Syria’s nuclear efforts were plagued with setbacks. While Syria solicited bids for 
its nuclear power project from foreign firms in the early 1980s, the resulting contract with 
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Sofratome of France did not progress to construction due to Syria’s inability to pay for 
the reactor in cash.393 In 1985, Syria and the Soviet Union signed a bilateral agreement, 
the Soviet-Syrian Atomic Energy Agreement, which resulted in planning for a research 
reactor.394 This deal also fell apart because of financial issues.395 This lack of 
momentum led to the 1988 assessment by U.S. intelligence that the program was “beset 
with financial and technical problems and lacks trained personnel.”396 This was despite 
the fact that, according to U.S. intelligence, Austria, Brazil, France, India, Italy, Poland, 
the Soviet Union, Sudan, Turkey, the United States, and West Germany all provided 
training for Syrian nuclear personnel.397 
In 1990, Argentina agreed to supply an isotope-production reactor along with fuel 
for the reactor, according to Richard Kessler.398 In addition, the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies noted that Argentina would provide a radiological protection center and 
a hot cell for radioisotope production.399 The United States and Israel both expressed 
concern regarding the agreement, however, and, pressured by these two countries, 
Argentina did not go through with the sale.400 
While Syria had little success in building its nuclear program during the 1970s 
and 1980s, it bolstered its missile capabilities with the aid of the Soviet Union and North 
Korea. Expanding its missile arsenal gave Syria a way to increase its nonconventional 
capabilities in its military rivalry with Israel. It was a way that Syria could continue to 
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show regional leadership and mitigate its security concerns. Syria obtained Frog-7 short-
range ballistic missiles in 1973 from the Soviet Union and immediately used them in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative.401 It obtained more 
accurate Scud-B missiles in 1974 from the Soviet Union and later on from North 
Korea.402 
In the early 1980s, Syria acquired Scud-C missiles from the Soviet Union and 
North Korea.403 The U.S. Department of State noted that North Korea also helped Syria 
acquire the capability to produce scuds on its own.404 Syria obtained SS-21 missiles from 
the Soviet Union in 1983.405 Thomas Friedman reported that Syria sought to acquire SS-
23 missiles from the Soviet Union in 1987, but was unsuccessful.406 In 1988, the U.S. 
Congress was deeply concerned that China was considering selling M-9 ballistic missiles 
to Syria.407 China asserted, however, that it never transferred these missiles to Syria, 
according to the U.S. Department of State.408 
c. Nuclear Trends 
Syria made little progress toward improving its nuclear capability during this 
period due to financial reasons and international opposition to its plans, such as U.S. and 
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Israeli opposition to its deal with Argentina. The Assad regime found a way, however, to 
bolster its defenses against Israel and pursue regional leadership. It did so through 
strengthening its short-range ballistic missile capabilities and supporting anti-Israel 
militant groups. Syria was able to find support for its missile program from the Soviet 
Union and North Korea. Demonstrating its military capabilities within the region served 
as a way to improve the regime’s standing domestically. 
What drove Syria’s nuclear behavior? In the regional context, Syria’s main 
security concern was Israel. It seemed plausible that Syria would have aggressively 
pursued a nuclear weapons capability if such a goal were within reach. Syria had little 
success building a nuclear program, however, due to its own financial and technical 
limitations and third country opposition to its efforts. External management seemed to 
play a marginal role in constraining Syria’s nuclear efforts. 
7. Turkey 
Turkey, as the heart of the former Ottoman Empire, used to rule much of the 
modern Middle East. The country viewed itself as both a part of Europe and the Middle 
East. Turkey has been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization since 1952 
and consequently was protected under the organization’s nuclear umbrella. Its security 
concerns have been primarily domestic; it has battled an insurgency since 1974. Since a 
few years after Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the country has 
pursued a civilian nuclear program. It established two nuclear reactors in the 1970s and 
1980s. 
a. Political Context 
Turkey was the center of the former Ottoman Empire, encompassing much of the 
Middle East, prior to World War I. After the war, Great Britain, France, and Russia 
subsequently divided the region into spheres of influence. After World War I, Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk founded the Turkish Republic, establishing a democratic, secular, and 
modern state. He became its first president in 1923. 
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Turkey sought to stay neutral in World War II, but was eventually drawn in on the 
side of Allies in 1945, the year that the war ended. After World War II, Turkey continued 
its close relationship with Europe and became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization in 1952. A primary reason it joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
was to be protected against Soviet claims over Turkish territory. Turkey’s geographic 
position, abutting the Soviet Union directly, gave it a critical role in the organization 
during the Cold War. The country served as the alliance’s southern flank. Turkey also 
hosted U.S. nuclear weapons on its soil throughout the Cold War. 
Turkey’s first military coup occurred in 1960. The country’s military traditionally 
played a strong role in the country’s governance. Turkey’s military viewed itself as the 
defenders of the republic’s secular, democratic, and western leaning government. It 
sought to suppress any Islamist political tendencies in Turkey. The military intervened 
three times before 1991 in the name of stability. In addition to the 1960 military coup, 
Turkey’s military overturned a civilian government in 1971 and 1980. 
Another challenge for the Turkish military was confronting the insurgency waged 
by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. Abdula Ocalan formed the Kurdistan Workers’ Party in 
1974 in order to fight on behalf of the oppressed Kurdish minority in Turkey. It began 
armed combat against the Turkish state in 1978. The insurgency evolved into the largest 
domestic security threat to the country. Turkey’s military continued to battle the 
insurgents throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The fight against the Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party in Turkey led to intermittent conflicts with Iraq, Iran, and Syria due to cross-border 
security issues involving the Kurdish populations in those countries. 
Given Turkey’s history, it had a mixed relationship with the Middle East during 
this period, straddling the European and Asian continents. Turkey did not share a 
language or ethnicity with the rest of the Arab world. Like the Arab Middle East, 
however, Turkey was predominantly Sunni Muslim. Also, Turkey quickly recognized the 
state of Israel after its founding. Thus, while Turkey sought to be a regional leader within 
its former empire, it avoided becoming deeply ensconced in regional disputes. 
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b. Nuclear Program 
Turkey began working on a civilian nuclear program soon after the “Atoms for 
Peace” program was launched. The Turkish Atomic Energy Authority was established in 
1956, in a similar timeframe to the beginning of the nuclear programs in other Middle 
Eastern countries. In 1959, Turkey began construction of the Turkish Research Reactor-1, 
a light water research reactor supplied by the United States.409 The reactor’s highly 
enriched uranium fuel was provided by the United States as well.410 The Cekmece 
Nuclear Research and Training Center was set up in 1961 and housed the Turkish 
Research Reactor-1. The reactor went critical in 1962, but was shut down in 1977 to be 
upgraded.411 In 1966, the Ankara Nuclear Research and Training Center was created. 
Turkey then began to explore the possibility of using nuclear power for electricity 
production. The project did not move forward due to the political unrest and the 1971 
military coup in Turkey during this period.412 The country signed the NPT in 1969 and 
ratified it in 1980. Mustafa Kibaroglu explained the lag in ratification as mostly due to 
the interest of Iran, Iraq, and Syria in nuclear weapons in the 1970s and that “the Turkish 
military might not have wanted to give the impression, by means of a hasty ratification, 
that Turkey would definitely forgo the nuclear option.”413 
As Turkey battled the Kurdistan Workers’ Party domestically and suffered 
through chaos in the national political scene, Turkey sought to advance its civilian 
nuclear capabilities. The Turkish Research Reactor-1 was upgraded to become the 
Turkish Research Reactor-2.414 It was constructed in 1978 and went critical in 1981 and 
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subject to IAEA safeguards.415 The ITU-Triga Mark II Training and Research Reactor, a 
reactor also supplied by the United States, was constructed in 1975 and went critical in 
1979.416 It was subject to IAEA safeguards as well.417 In addition, Turkey sought to 
move forward again with the acquisition of a nuclear power plant in the late 1970s.418 
This effort was cut short by the Turkish military coup of 1980.419 After Turkey’s second 
research reactor, the Turkish Research Reactor-2, went critical in 1981, Turkey again 
tried to create its nuclear energy infrastructure.420 The renewed effort involved the 
construction of a nuclear power plant on the Mediterranean coast’s Akkuyu Bay, but the 
project was beset with financial and technical issues.421 
In the late 1980s, Turkey signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Argentina 
to work together to build power reactors and conduct nuclear research.422 According to 
Mustafa Kibaroglu, the agreement was of concern to the United States for two reasons: 1) 
a planned 25MWe research reactor, which could be used for plutonium production and 2) 
a possible close relationship between Turkey and Pakistan.423 Kibaroglu noted that 
rumors had persisted regarding possible, illicit nuclear-related shipments between 
Pakistan and Turkey.424 In 1991, upon the urging of the United States and other 
countries, the joint project with Argentina ended.425 
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While Turkey lacked an indigenous nuclear weapons capability, the country 
hosted U.S. nuclear weapons on its soil beginning in the Cold War.426 At its peak in 
1971, the number of tactical nuclear weapons that the United States had positioned in 
Europe was 7,300, with Turkey receiving a share.427 The overall number of U.S. tactical 
nuclear weapons on the continent was reduced significantly between the beginning and 
the end of the 1980s, particularly after 1986.428 During this time period, Turkey itself did 
not possess ballistic missiles.429 This would not occur until the mid-1990s.430 
c. Nuclear Trends 
Turkey did not significantly increase its capabilities in nuclear technology and 
equipment despite its interest in nuclear power. It made halting progress at best during 
this time period. Nevertheless, Turkey maintained a nuclear weapons capability on its soil 
due to its North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership. 
What drove Turkey’s nuclear behavior? Turkey did not seem to be driven to 
acquire a nuclear weapons capability, in contrast to several other regional states. Turkey 
did not face significant security threats from regional states. Its greatest perceived threat, 
a domestic insurgency, could not be resolved by using nuclear weapons. Further, the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization covered Turkey under its nuclear umbrella. The 
country consistently pursued nuclear power initiatives, but fell short on financing and 
organization to achieve its goals. This leads to the question of how driven Turkey might 
have been to advance its nuclear capabilities. Perhaps this motivation was lacking. 
8. United Arab Emirates 
The United Arab Emirates strengthened its relationship with the United States at 
the beginning of the period following the exit of Great Britain from the Persian Gulf. 
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Regionally, the country supported traditional Arab issues and joined the Gulf 
Cooperation Council. While the United Arab Emirates did not make significant progress 
on its nuclear program, it did acquire short-range ballistic missiles from North Korea in 
the late 1980s. 
a. Political Context 
The British military withdrew from the Persian Gulf region in 1971 and seven 
emirates united to form the United Arab Emirates. They consisted of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, 
Ajman, Fujairah, Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, and Umm al-Quwain. Like Saudi Arabia, it 
had abundant oil and natural gas reserves. Abu Dhabi and Dubai were the wealthiest and 
most powerful states. The country’s president was the ruler of Abu Dhabi and the prime 
minister was the ruler of Dubai. Decision-making was left to the leadership of the 
country—the leaders of the seven emirates. Abdul-Monem Al-Mashat described the 
leadership dynamic as “based on the delegation of power to this small number of 
individuals in return for generous economic and social rewards including free modern 
public services such as education, health care, public transportation, etcetera.”431 
The United Arab Emirates identified with the Arab world and was especially 
close to the other Gulf States. In 1981, it joined the Gulf Cooperation Council in response 
to regional security issues such as Iran’s revolution and the Iran-Iraq War.432 The United 
Arab Emirates also consistently supported Arab issues. It opposed Israel and supported 
the Palestinian cause. According to Abdul-Monem al-Mashat, it supported Egypt and 
Syria in the 1973 war against Israel and cut oil to the United States due to its support for 
Israel.433 The founder of the United Arab Emirates Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan 
was quoted in an Arabic-language publication regarding this issue. He stated: “Oil is one 
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of the weapons of the battle and it is not more precious than Arab blood. We try to utilize 
it in favor of the battle. We will use all weapons in the battle.”434 
The United Arab Emirates supported Iraq against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. 
The United Arab Emirates had an ongoing territorial dispute with Iran during this 
timeframe. Iran took three islands in the Persian Gulf in 1971, Greater Tunbs, Lesser 
Tunbs, and Abu Musa, which were claimed by United Arab Emirates. The United Arab 
Emirates continued to contest this action. 
The United Arab Emirates had a very close relationship with Great Britain as the 
great power administered the region until the early 1970s. After Great Britain’s 
withdrawal, the United Arab Emirates strengthened its relationship with the United 
States. The relationship grew even closer as Iraq threatened the Gulf States in 1990 and 
subsequently occupied Kuwait. The United Arab Emirates conducted joint exercises with 
the U.S. military in July 1990.435 
b. Nuclear Program 
The United Arab Emirates demonstrated an interest in nuclear energy beginning 
in the late 1970s, but it did not advance that interest during this period.436 In terms of the 
steps it did take, the United Arab Emirates joined the IAEA in 1976. Also, Al Ain 
University, located in the emirate of Abu Dhabi, hosted a Nuclear Engineering Institute 
from which it could undertake nuclear-related research.437 On a more nefarious front, the 
A.Q. Khan network, Iraq, and Iran used Dubai as a hub for proliferation-related activities, 
according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies.438 
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In terms of delivery systems, like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates decided 
to purchase missiles in the late 1980s. According to U.S. intelligence, the emirate of 
Dubai purchased between 18 and 24 Scud-B missiles from North Korea.439 Unlike Saudi 
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates purchased short-range ballistic missiles rather than 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The United Arab Emirates purchased these missiles 
after Iraq and Iran showered one another with missiles during the Iran-Iraq War. It may 
also have been in response to the acquisitions of other regional states, such as Syria and 
Egypt, which continued to build their missile arsenals, as discussed in previous sections. 
c. Nuclear Trends 
While the United Arab Emirates, with its oil revenues, undoubtedly had the 
capital to pursue a nuclear program and a larger missile arsenal, it did not. Rather it 
limited itself to acquiring two dozen or so missiles from North Korea. Given the ongoing 
conflicts at the time, it is possible the United Arab Emirates wished to at least 
demonstrate that it could acquire such capabilities if it chose to do so. 
What drove the country’s nuclear behavior? The United Arab Emirates had a 
tradition of relying heavily on Great Britain for security assurances. After the early 
1970s, the country seemed to have transferred this reliance to the United States. Despite 
regional threats of Iran and Iraq, the country did not advance its nuclear program. Its 
close relationship with the United States seemed to have helped mitigate the security 
concerns arising from residing in a tumultuous region. 
9. Analysis 
This chapter has examined the nuclear trends that occurred from 1973 through 
1991 and the political contexts in which those trends took place. From this review of 
nuclear history, it appears that Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Saudi Arabia moved toward nuclear 
proliferation while Egypt turned away from nuclear proliferation. The remaining 
countries, Syria, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, did not make significant strides 
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toward or away from nuclear weapons. A summary of the nuclear trends is included in 
Table 1. Thus, what drove the variation in nuclear proliferation behavior for the region? 
Table 1.   Summary of Regional Nuclear Trends from 1973 through 1990 
 
 
B. VARIATIONS IN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION BEHAVIOR: TESTING 
TWO THEORIES 
Which theory better explains nuclear behavior during this first time period? The 
first hypothesis is taken from Kenneth Waltz’s propositions regarding external 
management and shifts in the international system.440 The second hypothesis is taken 
from T.V. Paul’s proposal on proliferation among non-great-power states. 
The first hypothesis based on Waltz’s work is: Regional nuclear proliferation 
should not increase due to the external management of the region by the superpowers 
during the Cold War. The alternate hypothesis based on Paul’s work is: Regional nuclear 
proliferation should increase due to the intensity of regional conflict and rivalry leading 
to a high-threat security environment. Proliferation is only mitigated if a state receives 
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security guarantees or finds a different deterrent. Is there a causal link between external 
management and no increase in nuclear proliferation or a causal link between regional 
conflict and rivalry and an increase in nuclear proliferation? In particular, are multiple 
regional states driving nuclear proliferation or is it the presence or absence of superpower 
management? 
1. Testing Two Theories 
The first hypothesis taken from Waltz’s work was not confirmed in this first case 
study. While the second hypothesis, taken from Paul’s work, seems to provide a superior 
explanation for the events that transpired in the Middle East. Nuclear proliferation 
increased from 1973 to 1990. Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Saudi Arabia all increased their 
nuclear proliferation efforts causing increased movement toward regional nuclear 
proliferation. Only Egypt ended its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Thus, an overall regional 
trend of increased nuclear proliferation characterized this time period. 
The empirical evidence presented here indicates that regional conflict and rivalry 
drove nuclear proliferation trends from 1973 to 1990, despite the presence of a bipolar 
international system. Egypt’s shift away from the pursuit of nuclear weapons occurred 
after its defeat by Israel in 1973. It was after this defeat that Egypt put forward a plan for 
a NWFZ in the Middle East. The superpowers helped end a conflict that Egypt and Israel 
had initiated. Egypt was defeated in a war that it had started. Egypt continued the shift 
away from nuclear weapons by ratifying the NPT and the IAEA Comprehensive 
Safeguards Agreement in 1981, after it had signed a peace agreement with Israel in 1979. 
These actions coincide with the reduction of the threat from Israel and what seems to be a 
subsequent decision by Egypt to no longer seek a nuclear weapons capability. The rivalry 
with Israel diminished. 
As for the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union played key roles 
in ending the 1973 conflict and the United States led the Camp David Accords in 1978. 
The United States provided significant financial aid following the signing of the peace 
agreement. Thus, external management played a critical role in transforming the regional 
security dynamic. In this context, Egypt’s proposal of a regional NWFZ in 1974 and the 
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NPT ratification and signing the Safeguards Agreement in 1981 were strategic decisions 
vis-à-vis its rivalry with Israel and its quest for a regional leadership role within 
parameters acceptable to the superpowers. 
When Egypt suffered its 1973 defeat, both Iraq and Libya saw an opening to 
increase their regional power. Egypt had traditionally played a strong leadership role in 
the Arab world. When Egypt signed a peace agreement with Israel brokered by the 
United States, it left a leadership vacuum. Egypt was no longer confronting Israel as 
forcefully. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by either Libya or Iraq would have served 
the dual purpose of elevating the country’s leadership status in the Arab world and 
making it much more competitive militarily.  
At this time, Iraq and Libya were client states of the Soviet Union. While it did 
supply the first nuclear reactor and Scud-B missiles to Iraq, the Soviet Union was clear 
that it did not want Iraq to acquire a nuclear weapon. Iraq’s nuclear program shifted 
forward again after the 1981 attack on Iraq’s nuclear reactor at Osirak. The bombing led 
Iraq to intensify its efforts and aggressively pursue a covert nuclear capability using 
electromagnetic isotope separation, a uranium enrichment technology that would be 
easier to conceal. Iraq obtained additional nuclear technology in the 1980s from France, 
Yugoslavia, and West Germany. Iraq received military assistance from the United States 
and the Soviet Union during the Iran-Iraq War. 
After the war, the United States sought to build bilateral relations with Iraq in 
order to turn it away from the Soviet Union. While the United States recognized the need 
to restrict the import of technology and equipment that could be used to build Iraq’s 
capability, it misjudged how much progress had been made in Iraq’s pursuit of a nuclear 
weapon and delivery system. This miscalculation would only be discovered later. In this 
case as well, external management by the Soviet Union or the United States was not 
sufficient to deter Iraq’s significant progress toward a nuclear weapon despite the fact 
that Waltz would predict that in a bipolar period the superpowers exert control over their 
client states. 
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In terms of a regional driver for Iraq’s nuclear proliferation, Iraq was deeply 
concerned about the threat posed by Iran and Iran’s nuclear activities. The Duelfer Report 
makes it clear that Iran was Iraq’s chief security concern and the driver behind nuclear 
proliferation, especially in the mid- to late 1980s, to the point that Iraq was several years 
away from a nuclear weapon. The desire for Pan-Arab leadership and a reaction to 
Israel’s emergence as a regional power seem to serve as a greater motivation for Iraq’s 
nuclear efforts in the 1970s. 
Libya tried to obtain nuclear technology and even weapons in the 1970s from 
various countries around the globe. It succeeded in obtaining some training, equipment, 
and yellowcake in the late 1970s and a research reactor from the Soviet Union in 1980. 
The Soviet Union insisted, however, that Libya ratify the NPT and the Safeguards 
Agreement prior to acquiring the reactor. Libya continued its pursuit of nuclear 
technology and equipment throughout the 1980s. In particular, Libya pushed for a nuclear 
cooperation agreement with Belgium. Pressure from the United States stopped this 
agreement from being finalized. Also, negotiations with the Soviet Union for two nuclear 
power reactors fell through in 1985. The Soviet Union greatly assisted Libya, however, in 
the running of its Tajura facility. 
From these data points, it seems that both the Soviet Union and the United States 
were involved with monitoring Libya and seeking to deter it acquiring a nuclear weapon. 
Nevertheless, Libya made progress in a covert manner. For example, in the 1980s, Libya 
secretly conducted uranium conversion experiments and experiments to create fission 
product radioisotopes from which it obtained some plutonium. The extent of Libya’s 
efforts would not become known until the 2000s. 
In terms of Libya’s regional security concerns, unlike Iraq and Iran, Libya did not 
face an existential threat. Libya was driven to pursue nuclear weapons by its rivalries 
within the Arab world. In particular, Libya vied with Egypt and Iraq for regional 
leadership. For Libya, a component of regional leadership was standing up to Israel.  
In the case of Iran, the Shah built-up Iran’s nuclear infrastructure in the 1970s and 
was possibly interested in acquiring a nuclear weapon. This coincided with the time that 
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Iran was seeking to establish itself as a regional hegemon after the departure of the 
British. The United States had played a key role in helping Iran establish a baseline 
nuclear capability under the Shah, an ally. Nevertheless, the United States had scrutinized 
Iranian requests for nuclear reactors and Iran’s wish to have the indigenous capability to 
reprocess spent fuel. Iran’s nuclear program stopped temporarily with the fall of the Shah 
in 1979. 
The course of Iran’s nuclear program was reversed in 1982 after Iraq attacked the 
country and the Iran-Iraq War ensued. The existential threat posed by Iraq drove Iran’s 
nuclear proliferation throughout the 1980s. After the Iranian Revolution, Iran had a more 
challenging time finding foreign partners to help it re-establish its nuclear program. Iran 
turned to China and the A.Q. Khan network throughout the 1980s for the provision of 
training and technology for its nuclear program. China, along with Libya, Syria, and 
North Korea, also aided Iran in developing its delivery systems in the 1980s. The Soviet 
Union began to assist Iran further with its delivery systems only in the late 1980s. The 
progress made by Iran during this time period was due to assistance from partners who 
were willing to aid it behind the backs of the superpowers. 
In the case of Saudi Arabia, while the country did not pursue nuclear weapons, it 
secretly acquired intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China that might have been 
armed with nuclear warheads.441 In the regional context, Saudi Arabia faced multiple 
nuclear weapons programs and missile proliferation efforts. Saudi Arabia procured these 
missiles despite being a close ally of the United States. Once the news broke of Saudi 
Arabia’s acquisition of the missiles, questions emerged from regional states like Egypt 
whether the missiles were equipped with nuclear weapons. The United States was put in 
the difficult position of having to assure its allies regarding Saudi Arabia’s nuclear 
intentions. This case provides another data point regarding lack of superpower control 
over client states during the bipolar period in regards to proliferation activities. 
The United States and the Soviet Union sought to deter regional states from 
proliferating. While the Soviet Union, and in some instances the United States, provided 
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nuclear assistance to states, the superpowers simultaneously sought to limit an increase in 
regional nuclear capability. In fact, the Soviet Union and the United States were in 
agreement that no country in the region should be able to acquire nuclear weapons. 
Regardless of the superpowers’ efforts, regional states pursued nuclear weapons and 
made advances toward that goal between 1973 and 1990. 
Two key reasons underlie why the superpowers were not able to manage the 
region during this time period. First, countries like China and Pakistan assisted Middle 
Eastern states in their nuclear proliferation efforts and China, Argentina, and North Korea 
assisted states in their missile proliferation efforts. For example, China found eager 
consumers for nuclear goods in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Iran and, in turn, was happy to 
serve as a supplier.442 As knowledge of and experience with nuclear technology spread, 
it became more challenging for the superpowers to control the nuclear supply chain. 
Countries that deemed it in their interest to promote the spread of nuclear technology 
found ways to do so. 
Second, the superpowers did not have sufficient knowledge regarding the nuclear 
programs of Iran, Iraq, and Libya. This led them to misjudge the extent of the progress 
made by these countries. Iraq’s efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon before the First Gulf 
War placed it within several years of accomplishing this goal. What did the superpowers 
miss? The A.Q. Khan network’s assistance to Iran advanced Iran’s nuclear program 
unbeknownst to the superpowers. Iraq chose a uranium enrichment technology, 
electromagnetic isotope separation, which it believed would escape the attention of the 
superpowers. Iraq wagered correctly. Libya, despite scrutiny, successfully concealed its 
enrichment activities from the United States and the Soviet Union. Saudi Arabia 
surprised the United States with its acquisition of desired missile technology from China. 
For this time period, Paul’s theory provides greater explanatory power for the 
region’s nuclear proliferation trends. The hypothesis built from Paul’s theory predicted 
the outcome of this period. Specific to Paul’s theory, two significant conflict dyads are 
present: 1) Iraq and Iran and 2) Egypt and Israel. Of the countries examined in this 
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chapter, Iraq and Iran both pursued nuclear weapons and Egypt did as well prior to the 
end of its hostilities with Israel. While Libya was not a part of a significant dyad, Libya’s 
rivalry with its Arab counterparts and with Israel were the main drivers of its nuclear 
program. Faced with the regional rivalry, Saudi Arabia opted to acquire intermediate-
range ballistic missiles. Finally, as will be shown in the next section, Paul’s analytical 
construct holds true for this time period. 
In a broad sense, Paul’s theory says that regional conflict and rivalry correlates 
with nuclear proliferation. However, he also provides specific measures in his analytical 
construct by which to assess a region’s propensity for nuclear proliferation. The next part 
of this section will apply Paul’s analytical construct to the Middle East from 1973 to 
1990. 
2. Analyzing T. V. Paul’s Data 
After examining different ways of looking at conflict and rivalry, Paul provides a 
summary of indicators found in conflict situations.443 He notes that “they are at least five 
militarized interstate disputes in a twenty-year period, with one or more possibly leading 
to war, lack of membership in common alliances, and very low levels of economic 
interaction.”444 Paul summarizes his analytical construct by using the measurements of 
“militarized interstate disputes/crises” and “economic interdependence” to create the 
ideal types of high, moderate, and low-conflict regions.445 As conflict and crisis 
decrease, interdependence increases and a region moves away from being a high-conflict 
zone and toward being a moderate-conflict or low-conflict zone.446 This sub-section 
examines the data on militarized interstate disputes, regional alliances, and economic 
interdependence. 
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a. Militarized Interstate Disputes 
Paul notes that “the conflict level in a zone may be measured with the following 
indicators: severity, intensity, duration, and scope of conflicts involving key states, 
especially the significant dyads in the region, in terms of militarized interstate disputes 
and crises.”447 He uses the definition by Charles Gochman and Zeev Maoz of militarized 
interstate disputes, which is “a set of interactions between or among states involving 
threats to use military force, displays of military force, or actual uses of military force. To 
be included, these acts must be explicit, overt, nonaccidental, and government 
sanctioned.”448 This section examines the militarized interstate disputes data from 
Gochman and Maoz’s Correlates of War Project as referenced by Paul.449 The 
militarized interstate disputes data demonstrates that the Middle East region was a high-
conflict zone during this time period. 
The number of militarized interstate disputes occurring between 1973 and 1990 in 
the region were as follows: Bahrain, 5; Egypt, 25; Iran, 84; Iraq, 56; Israel, 36; Jordan, 5; 
Kuwait, 13; Lebanon, 5; Libya, 32; Oman, 7; Qatar, 4; Saudi Arabia, 14; Syria, 22; 
Turkey, 28; United Arab Emirates, 4; and Yemen, 11.450 The leading states with 
militarized interstate disputes are Iran and Iraq followed by Israel, Libya, Turkey, Egypt, 
and Syria. Over this time period, there are clearly more than five militarized interstate 
disputes in a twenty-year period. There are two sets of significant dyads during this time 
period: 1) Egypt and Israel and 2) Iraq and Iran. War occurred between both sets. This 
data confirms the applicability of Paul’s characterization of the region as a high-conflict 
zone. 
                                                 
447 Ibid., 19. 
448 Charles S. Gochman and Zeev Maoz, “Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1976: Procedures, 
Patterns, and Insights,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 28, no. 4 (December 1, 1984): 587, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/173983. 
449 Glenn Palmer et al., 2015, “The MID4 Data Set: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description,” in 
Conflict Management and Peace Science, Forthcoming, http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/MIDs. 
450 Ibid. 
 101 
b. Economic Interdependence 
Regarding this second variable, Paul notes that “high levels of economic 
interdependence characterize a zone of low conflict.”451 Conversely, according to Paul, 
economic issues do not predominate in interstate relations in zones of high conflict, like 
the Middle East.452 Economic interdependence is “measured in terms of trade among the 
regional states as a percentage of overall imports and exports.”453 How did the Middle 
East measure-up in terms of economic interdependence, characterized by trade levels 
within the region over time? 
This section examines regional trade data on import and export relationships 
between each state and the rest of the region in Figure 1 and Figure 2 using data from the 
International Monetary Fund.454 This percentage is acquired using the total U.S. dollar 
amount of trade between each state and the rest of the regional states and the total U.S. 
dollar amount of trade between each state and the rest of the world.  
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Figure 1.  Regional Trade Integration, 1973 to 1990: Exports455 
Regional export relationships from 1973 to 1990 averaged above 10 percent of 
trade for Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates.  
                                                 
455 Source: Data derived from International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics. 
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Figure 2.  Regional Trade Integration, 1973 to 1990: Imports456 
Regional import relationships from 1973 to 1990 averaged above 10 percent of 
trade for only Syria and Turkey. For the remaining countries, regional import 
relationships consisted of less than 10 percent of trade. Taken together, these statistics 
demonstrate the lack of economic integration in the region. 
c. Regional Organizations and Alliances 
Paul also highlights security interdependence in that states belong to regional 
alliances or economic cooperation organizations. Their level of involvement correlates 
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with whether they are in a zone of high, moderate, or low conflict.457 In the latter, states 
are active members and become increasingly less so as the level of conflict increases.458 
As Paul predicts, a survey of the alliances in the Middle East finds that the states were not 
well integrated or deeply involved in regional alliances. 
For this section, the regional organizations and alliances that were included had to 
meet the criteria of having existed between 1973 and 1990 and primarily involved 
regional states. For example, an agreement between Libya and Chad would not have been 
included as Chad is an African state. 
The regional alliances that were in place for all or part of this time period include 
the Arab League and its accompanying Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic 
Cooperation between the States of the Arab League, the Central Treaty Organization or 
Baghdad Pact, the Council of Arab Economic Unity, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the 
Arab Cooperation Council, and the Economic Cooperation Organization, which replaced 
Regional Cooperation for Development. 
The Arab League was formed in 1945 to cooperate on “matters of economics, 
communication, culture, nationality, social welfare, and health.”459 The League was 
sponsored by Great Britain. From the Middle East region as bounded by this study, its 
original members were Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, and Yemen, 
but by 1990 Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates were 
also members with most of them joining in the early 1970s. Additionally, the Treaty of 
Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation between the States of the Arab League was 
created in 1950 committing members to defend fellow members against acts of 
aggression and also promote economic cooperation.460 
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The Central Treaty Organization or Baghdad Pact was in place from 1955 to 
1979. Great Britain and the United States wished for the member states to serve as a 
buffer between the Soviet Union and the Middle East.461 Its members were labeled the 
“northern tier” countries and included Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan. The Central 
Treaty Organization evolved from the 1955 Baghdad Pact, after Iraq withdrew from the 
pact in 1959. The organization was disbanded entirely after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. 
Libya and Syria declared a union of their two countries in September 1980, 
following the 1979 peace agreement between Israel and Egypt. It was reportedly done in 
the name of pan-Arabism and as a response to feelings of insecurity following the Camp 
David Accords.462 The union, however, did not materialize. 
The Gulf Cooperation Council was formed in May 1981. It was a trade bloc of all 
of the Gulf States except for Yemen. The Council was created after the beginning of the 
Iran-Iraq War, by Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates. These states claimed that it was in response to a fear of Iran.463 
The Arab Cooperation Council was formed in 1989 by Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and 
the Yemen Arab Republic to promote economic integration.464 Syria was not included 
due to the hostility between Iraq and Syria following the Iran-Iraq War.465 The Council 
did not last long; it ended after the First Gulf War in 1991. 
The Economic Cooperation Organization, founded in 1985, includes Turkey, 
Pakistan, and Iran. It succeeded the Regional Cooperation for Development organization 
that was in place from 1964 to 1979. Regional Cooperation for Development provided a 
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forum for these three Muslim countries to meet and cooperate outside of the Central 
Treaty Organization.466 Reaching eastward, the Economic Cooperation Organization 
added Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Kazakhstan as members in 1992. 
Of these regional alliance efforts, the only long-lasting alliances were the Arab 
League and its accompanying Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation, the 
Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Economic Cooperation Organization. The latter 
included only Turkey and Iran, former “northern tier” states, from the region. The Gulf 
Cooperation Council promoted economic cooperation among the Gulf States. The 
alliance that encompassed the greatest number of countries in the Middle East was the 
Arab League. It was regularly criticized, however, for being dysfunctional and 
ineffective. It also did not include several important regional non-Arab states – Iran, 
Turkey, and Israel. 
In sum, the data on militarized interstate disputes, economic interdependence, and 
regional alliances is consistent with how Paul would characterize a high-conflict zone. 
Paul predicts that states will seek to proliferate in a high-conflict zone and this is what 
happened in the Middle East in this first case study. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Returning to the question asked at the beginning of this chapter, were the security 
dynamics between regional states driving nuclear proliferation or was it the presence or 
absence of superpower management? Looking at the proliferation drivers during this time 
period, it becomes clear that regional security dynamics drove nuclear outcomes. Iran, 
Iraq, Libya, and Saudi Arabia moved toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons and 
Egypt moved away. The overall regional trend was toward nuclear proliferation. 
First, Iran moved toward a nuclear weapons capability during this time period. 
Iran built its initial nuclear infrastructure under the Shah and it grew until the country’s 
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1979 revolution. Questions remain as to his true intentions for the program. Statements 
made to the press in the 1970s indicated that the Shah might have considered acquiring 
nuclear weapons. The Shah was motivated by the goal of being a regional power. Iran’s 
program moved forward again during the Iran-Iraq War as the country faced an 
existential threat. Iran restarted its nuclear program in 1982. It worked to develop nuclear 
weapons in earnest in the mid to late 1980s as it began to secretly acquire centrifuge parts 
and designs from the A.Q. Khan network. 
Second, Iraq sought to acquire nuclear weapons during this time period. It was 
motivated by regional rivalry with its Arab competitors—Egypt, Libya, and Syria—and 
Israel. Iran was another source of regional rivalry. Over the course of the Iran-Iraq War, 
the latter became the primary reason for pursuit of nuclear weapons. Saddam Hussein 
increased his efforts substantially after the attack on the Osirak reactor. He also sought to 
use the event politically to attack Iran’s regional supporters. The program accelerated 
toward the end of the war as Iraq worried about Iran’s progress. This nearly put Iraq 
within reach of acquiring a nuclear weapon. 
Third, Libya methodically pursued a nuclear weapons capability from the 1970s 
through the 1990s. Libya also was driven by regional rivalry. It sought to lead the Arab 
world to contain Israel. While Libya did not face an existential threat from its neighbors, 
Qaddafi was highly motivated to have his country be the one that acquired the “Arab 
bomb.” 
Fourth, Saudi Arabia took a step toward acquiring a nuclear weapons capability 
by secretly obtaining intermediate-range ballistic missiles that could have been equipped 
with nuclear warheads. Faced with nuclear and missile proliferation in the region, Saudi 
Arabia took steps to improve its security situation. The country did this despite being a 
close Cold War ally of the United States. 
Finally, Egypt decreased its nuclear proliferation ambitions after the 1973 Arab-
Israeli conflict and the resulting peace agreement. The intensity of regional conflict and 
rivalry with its neighbor Israel dissipated along with its nuclear weapons ambitions. The 
United States played a significant role in bringing the peace agreement into place leading 
 108 
to a decrease in Egypt’s threat perception and to Egypt’s integration into the 
nonproliferation regime. The remaining countries, Turkey, Syria, and the United Arab 
Emirates, did not make significant strides toward a nuclear weapons capability during 
this time period. 
While both the United States and the Soviet Union were involved in regional 
relations, and at times deeply involved, the evidence points to regional security dynamics 
as the driver for the increase in nuclear proliferation. Both the United States and the 
Soviet Union worked to constrain regional nuclear proliferation. The United States, in 
particular, worked on the nuclear supply side to reduce access to nuclear material and on 
the demand side to assuage regional security concerns for countries that seemed to have 
proliferation intentions. For its part, the Soviet Union sought to manage proliferation 
through insisting on NPT membership and IAEA safeguards as a prerequisite for 
providing nuclear energy technology. 
The presence or absence of external management by the superpowers, however, 
did not account for the overall regional outcome from 1973 to 1990. The superpowers 
wanted to deter states from acquiring nuclear weapons, but regional nuclear proliferation 
proceeded despite the superpowers’ efforts. The superpowers also underestimated the 
level these countries had reached in their proliferation efforts. Further, their management 
efforts do not explain the shifts or movement toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons. 
The superpowers were not able to halt or reverse the overall trend of increasing levels of 




III. NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: 1991–2003 
Under unipolarity, a time of increased instability in the international system, my 
international level hypothesis predicted an increase in nuclear proliferation. My regional 
level hypothesis forecast a downward trend in nuclear proliferation as regional conflict 
and rivalry eased following the Cold War. I found, however, that levels of conflict and 
rivalry did not decrease during this period while regional nuclear proliferation did 
decrease. By the end of this period, Iraq and Libya’s nuclear weapons programs had been 
brought to a halt and Iran had scaled back its coordinated military nuclear program. I also 
discovered that superpower external management drove this trend. 
Kenneth Waltz predicted that unipolarity brought instability to the international 
system. Instability and security concerns incentivize states to pursue the ultimate 
deterrent, nuclear weapons. Thus, one would expect an overall increase in regional 
proliferation. This, however, was not the case. On balance, regional proliferation 
decreased. At the beginning of the time period, Iran, Iraq, and Libya seemed to be 
seeking nuclear weapons. Syria appeared to be pursuing a covert nuclear weapons 
capability in the late 1990s. By the end of 2003, however, the programs of Iraq and Libya 
had come to an end. Only the programs of Iran and Syria remained and Iran seemed to 
have temporarily halted its coordinated military nuclear program. In addition, Saudi 
Arabia took no additional steps toward a nuclear weapons capability. 
This is important because it shows that despite concerns by theorists, such as 
Benjamin Frankel, regarding an increase in nuclear proliferation after the Cold War, the 
end of bipolarity saw a decrease in nuclear proliferation in one of the most conflict prone 
regions in the world.467 And this decrease can be attributed to a less permissive 
environment for nuclear proliferators under a unipolar international system led by the 
United States. As the sole superpower, the United States had greater freedom to apply 
pressure and even force to countries that it believed to be pursuing nuclear weapons. 
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This chapter explores regional nuclear trends from 1991 through 2003. The First 
Gulf War marks the period’s beginning and the Second Gulf War marks its end. Given 
the Soviet Union’s disintegration in December 1991, this time period is characterized by 
a unipolar international system dominated by the United States. 
The first section explores the history of Middle East states that have attempted or 
might have made an attempt to acquire nuclear weapons from 1991 through 2003. They 
include the following: Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, and the 
United Arab Emirates. It discusses the political context for each country and any efforts 
to acquire the three major elements for a nuclear program – fissile material, a delivery 
system, and a nuclear warhead.468 
The second section uses concepts from Waltz’s Theory of International Politics to 
identify to what extent the United States, as the sole superpower, served as an 
international manager to curtail regional nuclear ambitions. It also examines the 
hypothesis of regional security dynamics as discussed by T.V. Paul in Power Versus 
Prudence to assess to what extent nuclear behavior is shaped by regional threats, not 
superpower preference. 
A. REGIONAL NUCLEAR HISTORY 
As the sole superpower, the United States led a coalition in January 1991 to 
reverse the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. While not the original intention of the United States, 
this First Gulf War and its after effects essentially demolished Iraq’s nuclear program. 
The United States closely followed developments in Iran and Libya’s nuclear programs 
throughout the time period, enacting sanctions against both countries in 1996. On the 
other hand, the former Soviet Union, now the Russian Federation, initially reduced its 
nuclear and ballistic missile cooperation with regional states before increasing 
cooperation toward the end of the time period. Even as Russia shared nuclear technology, 
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the country’s leadership vowed to the international community that the recipients would 
not acquire a nuclear weapon. In March 2003, Iraq faced another military coalition led by 
the United States. This same year Libya publicly renounced its entire nuclear program 
and opened its nuclear sites for inspection. Finally, Iran also temporarily limited some of 
its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons in late 2003. 
On an international level, what was the impact of this unipolar period on nuclear 
proliferation trends in the Middle East? What does the historical record say about how the 
United States, as the sole superpower, viewed its interests and role in the region in regard 
to nuclear issues? How much control did the United States leverage over the acquisition 
of nuclear capabilities by Middle Eastern states? How did the United States function as 
an external manager? 
On a regional level, security tensions were reduced from the first time period of 
1973 to 1990, but were still present. Iran covertly pursued a nuclear weapons program. 
The Gulf States nervously eyed Iraq’s intentions towards Kuwait and its neighbors and 
scrutinized Iran’s intentions. Turkey watched its southern border with Iraq as the Iraqi 
Kurds’ autonomy grew following the implementation of a “no-fly zone” in 1991 in 
northern Iraq. Iran and Iraq continued to view each other with mutual suspicion and 
deemed the other as the greatest security threat they faced. The United States tightened 
sanctions on Libya throughout the 1990s. While the First Intifada between Israel and the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization ended in 1993 with the signing of the Oslo Accords, 
tensions in the Levant persisted. Syria continued its proxy war directed at Israel and its 
interference in Lebanon’s internal affairs. Syria also began to cooperate secretly with 
North Korea on nuclear issues. Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan network continued and expanded 
covert relationships with Iran and Libya. Meanwhile, Egypt sought to regain a regional 
leadership role through pushing forward a nonproliferation agenda that would pressure 
Israel to join the nonproliferation regime. 
What was the impact of these regional rivalries on the Middle East? How did 
these states view their interests and roles in regards to nuclear proliferation? What drove 
regional nuclear behavior? This chapter begins with an examination of the political 
background and nuclear developments for Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
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Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates from 1991 to 2003. The second part of the chapter 
encompasses an analysis of which theory provides greater explanatory power for the 
regional nuclear trend. Is the trend better explained by looking at the regional security 
environment or superpower external management? 
1. Egypt 
Egypt suffered from significant political and economic turmoil during this period. 
The government focused on halting domestic attacks by Islamic militants along with 
economic restructuring. Egypt continued to confront Israel in international settings. 
Otherwise, the country made limited advances in its civilian nuclear program and did not 
advance a nuclear weapons program. 
a. Political Context 
Egypt’s regional stature had improved by the 1990s, following the hit it had taken 
after signing the 1979 peace agreement with Israel. It was in good standing with most of 
the states in the Middle East, especially following its active role in the First Gulf War 
liberating Kuwait. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak joined the U.S.-led coalition and 
encouraged other Arab states to do the same. 
Further, Egypt’s economic outlook became brighter. Egypt had come through a 
tough decade economically in the 1980s when the United States sought coalition partners 
to remove Iraq from Kuwait. In 1989, Egypt owed about U.S. $50 billion to its 
creditors.469 After the First Gulf War, the United States and its allies met in May 1991 to 
discuss debt forgiveness and financial assistance for Egypt. They decided on a measure to 
cut Egypt’s debts in half to about U.S. $25 billion.470 As a precursor to this debt 
forgiveness, Egypt signed an agreement with the International Monetary Fund to 
restructure its economy. Egypt continued to be the second-largest recipient of foreign aid 
from the United States. 
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At the same time, Egypt’s domestic security situation had grown worse. This time 
of economic restructuring by Mubarak coincided with an increase in domestic terrorist 
attacks by Islamic extremists. From 1992 through 1997, there were 1,442 deaths from 
these attacks, over 10 times the number of deaths in the 1970s and 1980s.471 The most 
violent period was from 1993 to 1995, and, according to Michelle Dunne and Scott 
Williamson, involved “near-daily attacks that included assassinations of government 
officials and police officers, shootings of tourists, and small bombings.”472 In the worst 
attack, Islamic militants conducted what was described as a massacre at the Hatshepsut 
Temple archaeological site near Luxor. The militants shot and killed over 60 people who 
were mostly foreign tourists. 
A political and economic storm ensued. Mubarak turned to his security services to 
help suppress the Islamist insurgency. Political freedoms were reduced as the security 
services sought to grapple with the violence enveloping the country. In turn, Egyptian 
government security efforts against Islamist groups weakened the government’s 
economic endeavors as income gaps exacerbated by the reforms reinforced the Islamists’ 
cause.473  
Within the region, Egypt generally was seen as a moderate power that maintained 
good relations with most of the regional states. Egypt maintained friendly relations with 
its neighbor Libya. It supported efforts to broker a peace agreement between Israel and 
the Palestine Liberation Organization to include playing an important role in the 1991 
Madrid Conference. Syrian-Egyptian relations had been amicable since re-establishing 
diplomatic relations in 1989. Egypt’s ties with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States remained 
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friendly. One reason for this was that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States had forgiven 
Egypt’s debts of U.S. $6 billion in 1990.474  
Egypt’s relations with Iran and Iraq remained cool. Diplomatic relations with Iraq 
suffered when Egypt decided to join the 1991 U.S.-led coalition against Iraq and strained 
relations persisted throughout the 1990s. Also, Egypt’s relationship with Iran remained 
limited. Iran held a grudge against Egypt for a number of reasons. They included making 
peace with Israel in 1979; allowing the Shah to stay in Egypt until 1980 where he died 
and was buried; and supporting Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War.  
Overall, Egypt maintained a strong domestic focus over this time period because 
it was preoccupied with internal security threats. Egypt also continued to benefit from its 
close ties with the sole superpower, the United States. While Egypt maintained a cordial 
relationship with Russia, the ties between Egypt and the United States were stronger.  
b. Nuclear Program 
During this period, Egypt worked to expand its work in nuclear research, but 
made limited progress. In 1992, Egypt purchased a 22MWt light water research reactor, 
the Experimental Training Research Reactor Number Two, from the Argentinian state-
controlled nuclear company, Investigaciones Aplicadas, also known by its acronym 
INVAP.475 The reactor operated on 19.75 percent enriched uranium.476 It reached 
criticality in 1997 and was placed under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
safeguards.477 The Atomic Energy Authority of Egypt operated the reactor, which was 
used for neutron research and radiography.478 It was also used for medical and nuclear 
solid-state research, condensed matter research, and nuclear engineering experiments.479 
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Egypt also undertook unreported nuclear activities throughout the 1990s. The 
IAEA reported that Egypt conducted experiments “involving the irradiation of small 
amounts of natural uranium in its reactors to test the production of fission product 
isotopes for medical purposes” between 1990 and 2003 and did not advise the IAEA.480 
In addition, according to the IAEA, Egypt revealed that the laboratories in the Nuclear 
Chemistry Building where the irradiated targets were dissolved had not been reported to 
the IAEA.481 These activities and the presence of the facilities did not come to light until 
2004. The IAEA noted that Egypt claimed the failure to report was due to a 
misunderstanding regarding its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement, especially in 
regards to research using only small amounts of nuclear material.482 
In the early 2000s, Egypt entered into a series of nuclear cooperation agreements, 
according to Robert Einhorn. They were with Russia, South Korea, and China; although 
by late 2003 it was not clear what Egypt had derived from these agreements.483 The 
agreements may have resulted in assistance with: operating an electronic accelerator, 
radioisotope production, and uranium mining.484 
Regionally, Egypt worked to incorporate its nonproliferation agenda into the 
broader issue of peace in the Middle East. Egypt played a strong supporting role in the 
Madrid Conference in 1991, which sought to resolve the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The conference was attended by Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria along with a group 
consisting of Jordanian and Palestinian delegates and was sponsored by the United States 
and the Soviet Union.485 Longer-term outcomes of the conference included the Oslo 
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Accord between Israel and Palestine in 1993 and an Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement in 
1994.486 
On the nuclear front, another outcome of the 1991 Madrid Conference was the 
creation of the Arms Control and Regional Security group. Its purpose was to serve as a 
forum to advance regional security issues and met six times.487 Progress was stifled, 
however, due to a conflict between Egypt and Israel as to how the group should proceed 
to address regional security issues, particularly regarding when to hold talks about a 
weapons-of–mass-destruction free zone.488 The group held no further meetings after 
1995.489 
Egypt looked for other ways to pressure Israel. Egypt continued to push for a 
weapons–of-mass-destruction free zone in the Middle East. It also threatened to withhold 
its support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 
permanence at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference given Israel’s non-
signatory status of the treaty.490 In further protest, Egypt withheld either signing or 
ratification of a number of nonproliferation treaties such as the Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention, 
and the Pelindaba Treaty.491  
While Egypt made only limited progress in expanding its nuclear capabilities, it 
successfully acquired additional ballistic missiles, especially short-range ballistic 
missiles, throughout the 1990s.492 According to the U.S. intelligence community, as of 
1998, Egypt sought to acquire the ability to produce Scud-B, Scud-C, and two-stage 
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Vector short-range ballistic missiles along with medium-range ballistic missiles.493 North 
Korea and Russia assisted Egypt in these efforts. U.S. intelligence reported that, in the 
mid-1990s, North Korea and Russia provided Egypt with ballistic missile equipment for 
its Scud program.494 U.S. intelligence further noted that North Korea, in particular, 
maintained a long-standing relationship with Egypt focused on missile development.495 
The country may have aided Egypt in establishing a capability to manufacture Scud-C 
missiles, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative.496 Arms Control Today wrote that 
the United States remained particularly concerned regarding North Korean missile-
related transfers to Egypt.497 
c. Nuclear Trends 
Egypt did not increase its nuclear capability significantly from 1991 through 
2003. In fact, it seemed to further concede to the nonproliferation regime by eventually 
giving its support to making the NPT permanent in 1995 and by actively participating in 
the Arms Control and Regional Security working group. While Egypt continued to have a 
very active missile program, it did not move forward with the other elements for a 
nuclear weapons program. 
Egypt did maintain some level of latent nuclear capability throughout this period. 
In fact, its civilian nuclear program was one of the most sophisticated programs in the 
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region.498 Furthermore, occasional statements by Egyptian leadership reinforced the idea 
of a purposeful latent nuclear capability. For example, Al-Hayat newspaper quoted 
Mubarak as stating in 1998, “We do not think now of entering the nuclear club because 
we do not want war . . . .We are not in a hurry. We have a nuclear reactor at Inshas, and 
we have very capable experts. If the time comes when we need nuclear weapons, we will 
not hesitate.”499 
What drove Egypt’s nuclear behavior? In the regional context, Libya continued to 
pursue nuclear weapons and Iraq persisted in its efforts to maintain some semblance of a 
nuclear weapons program. Iran also worked to expand its nuclear capabilities. 
Nevertheless, Egypt did not reconstitute its weapons program. Rather, Egypt continued to 
benefit from a close relationship with the United States to include significant financial 
aid. Given the U.S. opposition to an Egyptian nuclear program, cost-benefit analysis 
probably led Cairo to believe that it did not make sense for Egypt to pursue such a 
program. In other words, the incentives from the bipolar period to forego a nuclear 
weapons program remained. 
2. Iran 
Iran continued to be heavily involved in regional conflict in the effort to export its 
Islamic revolution. This activity included supporting terrorist attacks in Latin America, 
Europe, and the Middle East. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against 
the United States, shifting regional political dynamics favored Iran as U.S.-led coalitions 
launched military offensives against the governments in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Meanwhile, Iran steadily advanced its nuclear capabilities assisted by China, Russia, and 
the A.Q. Khan network. North Korea worked with Iran to develop its delivery systems.  
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a. Political Context 
Iran began the 1990s recuperating from losses suffered in the previous decade. 
The Iran-Iraq War heavily damaged both Iran’s human and material capabilities and Iran 
began to rearm itself.500 The war also left Iran with a strong sense of vulnerability. Few 
countries had sided with Iran, other than Libya and Syria. Nearly all of Iran’s neighbors 
and the superpowers had sided with Iraq. Iran had also undergone a leadership change. 
Iran’s Supreme Leader and founder of the Islamic Republic, Ruhollah Khomeini, died in 
1989. Ali Khamenei replaced Khomeini, but he was said to have weaker religious 
credentials and less charisma. Thus, Iran began the time period seeking to re-establish its 
place in the region and the world. 
Iran’s continued reliance on asymmetric capabilities to accomplish its security 
goals also characterized the 1990s, particularly during the tenure of Iranian President 
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a conservative politician. During this time period, agents 
alleged to be backed by Iran carried out multiple terrorist attacks in the region and the 
world. According to the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Congress, they included a 
suicide bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 1992, the 
assassination of four Kurdish dissidents in Berlin, Germany, in 1992, the bombing of a 
Jewish community center in Buenos Aires in 1994, and the bombing of Khobar Towers, 
used to house U.S. Air Force personnel in Saudi Arabia in 1996.501 These attacks 
reversed any goodwill Iran had gained by helping to negotiate the freedom of U.S. 
hostage Terry Anderson, an Associated Press reporter, from his Shia militant captors in 
Lebanon in 1991.502 
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Following the Khobar Towers attack, the United States took a strong stance 
against Iran’s asymmetric activities. U.S. President Bill Clinton signed the Iran-Libya 
Sanctions Act into law, which imposed sanctions against companies investing heavily in 
Libya or Iran. A statement from the White House asserted that “the United States 
Government strongly objects to the unacceptable behavior of Iran and Libya, particularly 
each regime’s support of international terrorism and pursuit of weapons of mass 
destruction.”503 
Iran also sought to expand its influence in the Levant and in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict by providing support to Hezbollah and other Shia militant groups in Lebanon.504 
The country maintained close ties with its ally Syria. In the Gulf, Iran worked to 
influence Shia populations, primarily in Bahrain, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Finally, Iran 
incensed the United Arab Emirates in 1992 when it took full control over the disputed 
island of Abu Musa in the Persian Gulf.505 
Close to home, Iran kept a wary eye on its neighbors Iraq and Afghanistan. While 
the First Gulf War diminished the threat from Iraq, Iraq remained determined to rebuild 
its nuclear program, as discussed in the next section. On Iran’s back door in Afghanistan, 
the Taliban that came to power in 1996 in Afghanistan were no friends of Iran. Iran allied 
with the Taliban’s opponents, the Northern Alliance. Clashes between Iran or Iran-
sponsored groups and the Taliban continued between 1996 and 2001. Tensions peaked in 
the 1997–1998 timeframe due to the following incidents: 1) the Taliban closed the 
Iranian Embassy in Kabul in 1997 and accused Iran of interference; and 2) in 1998, 
following a battle between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance where Iran had 
provided support to the latter, the Taliban killed 2,000 male members of the Hazara, 
Tajik, and Uzbek communities and kidnapped and killed eight Iranian diplomats in 
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Mazar-i-Sharif.506 As a result, Iran began massing troops along its border with 
Afghanistan.507 With the United Nations (UN) interceding, Iran decided against invading 
its neighbor.508 Iran continued to provide support to the Northern Alliance against the 
Taliban government in Afghanistan. 
The political climate in Iran shifted in the mid-1990s and Iran improved its 
regional relations. Mohammad Khatami, a reformist, assumed the presidency in 1997. 
Khatami strove to open up Iran politically and called for a “dialogue of civilizations.”509 
Vali Nasr wrote that, under Khatami, Iran focused on “a pragmatic diplomacy 
emphasizing trade, reconciliation with erstwhile foes such as Saudi Arabia, and mutual 
security compacts.”510 For example, Iran sought to better bilateral relations with Russia 
and the Gulf States. Khatami met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow in 
May 2001 and signed a security cooperation agreement.511 It was the first broad 
cooperative agreement between Russia and Iran since Iran’s 1979 revolution.512 The 
attendance of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz and Kuwaiti Emir Shaykh 
Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah at the 1997 Organization of the Islamic Conference signaled 
improved relations between Iran and both of these countries.513 
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Iran also moved to improve relations with the United States. In a 1998 interview 
with CNN News, Khatami called for opening a dialogue between the United States and 
Iran.514 The United States sought to reciprocate. This led to U.S. Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright responding in 2000 by: 1) acknowledging errors such as U.S. support 
for the 1953 coup that overthrew democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammed 
Mosaddeq and 2) ending some economic sanctions against Iran.515 Later, when Al-Qaeda 
terrorists attacked the United States on September 11, 2001, the press widely reported 
that both Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Khatami condemned the terrorist 
attacks against the United States. 
After the September 11 attacks, the United States partnered with the Northern 
Alliance, Iran’s ally, to oust the Taliban from power. This decision meant the tide in 
Afghanistan was turning in Iran’s favor. Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei approved 
official outreach to the United States.516 Iran offered tactical support and to facilitate 
support to the Northern Alliance.517 Furthermore, Iran supported the Bonn process that 
would establish the new Afghan government after the fall of the Taliban.518 Iran’s 
goodwill toward the United States ended in 2002, however, when it was named as one of 
the three members of the “Axis of Evil” during the State of the Union address by U.S. 
President George W. Bush.519 
In spite of the 2002 speech, Iran allegedly reached out to U.S. leadership in early 
2003—the same timeframe as the beginning of the Second Gulf War. Flynn Everett, a 
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former National Security Council official for the Bush Administration, stated that Iran’s 
Foreign Ministry had sent “a detailed proposal for comprehensive negotiations to resolve 
bilateral differences” and “acknowledged that Iran would have to address concerns about 
its weapons program and support for anti-Israeli terrorist organizations” in 2003.520 The 
letter reportedly was sent through the Swiss and poorly received in Washington.521 
The United States also began to focus on removing Iran’s mortal enemy in 
Baghdad, Iraq, the regime of Saddam Hussein. Geopolitically, regional events were 
favoring Iran, although the U.S. military’s eventual occupation of Iraq remained a 
strategic threat. 
b. Nuclear Program 
While Iran continued its asymmetric warfare against the United States, Israel, and 
other targets in the early 1990s, it aggressively expanded its nuclear and missile 
programs. As early as March 1992, Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates stated 
in congressional testimony that Iran was seeking nuclear weapons.522 As of 1996, the 
U.S. intelligence community believed that Iran was “one of the most active countries 
seeking to acquire WMD and ACW technology from abroad.”523 This language was used 
consistently to describe Iran in congressionally mandated weapons of mass destruction 
reports provided by U.S. intelligence from late 1996 through mid-2001. In late 2001, the 
language was even stronger. It changed to “Iran is vigorously pursuing programs to 
produce indigenous WMD—nuclear, chemical, and biological—and their delivery 
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systems as well as ACW.”524 Further, the 2001 report reiterated that Iran was pursuing 
nuclear weapons.525 
Based on the language in the reports, there appeared to be little doubt within the 
U.S. intelligence community regarding Iran’s nuclear intentions. This language regarding 
U.S. certainty about Iran’s pursuit of a clandestine weapons program continued through 
the end of the reporting series in December 2003.526 While U.S. intelligence seemed to 
believe that Iran likely was pursuing nuclear weapons throughout the 1990s, by late 2001, 
it appeared to be convinced that this was the case. While these unclassified reports to 
Congress indicated that the nuclear programs of Libya and Iraq were on Washington’s 
radar, Iran appeared to be of highest concern in terms of its actual acquisition activities. 
What happened in Iran from 1991 through 2003 to warrant this level of attention and 
concern from the United States? The story involves Iran and its suppliers – entities in 
China, Russia, and Pakistan among others. 
China was a consistent nuclear supplier for Iran through the mid-1990s. China 
helped Iran build four new nuclear research reactors.527 Construction of the Esfahan 
Nuclear Technology Center Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor began in 1988 and it 
started operating in 1992.528 The Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center Graphite Sub-
Critical Reactor was constructed in 1991.529 The Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center 
Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor was constructed in 1991 and reached criticality in 
1995.530 The Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center Miniature Neutron Sources Reactor, 
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another light water research reactor, was constructed in 1991 and reached criticality in 
1994.531 These reactors were operated by the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center and 
placed under IAEA Safeguards.532 In addition, Iran and China signed a ten-year nuclear 
agreement in 1990.533 Under this agreement, China trained nuclear technicians and 
engineers and provided two “mini” research reactors for its Esfahan nuclear site.534 In 
1991, China agreed to finish building the nuclear power plant in Bushehr, according to 
John Garver.535 Garver further noted that China sent 1,600 kg of uranium products to 
Iran that enabled Iran to familiarize itself with the nuclear fuel cycle.536 
China’s assistance to Iran raised concerns within the U.S. government. In 1991, a 
U.S. Senate letter to the U.S. Secretary of State expressed apprehension about China 
helping Iran’s nuclear weapons development.537 It stated “China has reportedly provided 
Iran with equipment, including calutron devices, capable of making fissile material.”538 
In fact, according to Garver, in 2003, China would admit to providing Iran with a 
calutron in 1989 and a 27-KW reactor in 1991.539 
The United States began confronting China regarding its role as a nuclear supplier 
for Iran. Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar wrote that in 1992, the United States was 
able to convince China to forego selling a research reactor to Iran that would produce 
plutonium.540 They additionally noted that in 1992, China said it would provide Iran with 
two 300-MW electric nuclear power reactors, but the sale was suspended in 1995, 
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possibly due to U.S. pressure.541 Garver added that China entered into negotiations with 
Iran to provide a 25 to 30-MW heavy-water reactor in 1992, but an agreement was never 
concluded, also possibly as a result of U.S. pressure.542 
The United States continued to make headway in persuading China to end nuclear 
cooperation with Iran. Garver outlined these efforts noting that, in 1996, Iran advised the 
IAEA of a sales agreement for a uranium hexafluoride conversion plant from China.543 
He asserted that the United States began government-to-government talks with China to 
halt this sale, and, as a result, the United States and China came to an agreement in 
October 1997 regarding China’s nuclear cooperation with Iran.544 As part of this 
agreement, China agreed not to sell “nuclear power plants, a uranium hexafluoride plant, 
heavy-water reactors, or a heavy-water production plant to Iran,” according to Garver.545 
U.S. intelligence reported that China agreed to forego future nuclear cooperation efforts 
with Iran, but insisted on finishing two tasks it had already started working on—a 
zirconium production facility and a nuclear research reactor.546 In addition, according to 
U.S. intelligence, new regulations governing the export of dual-use nuclear equipment 
were created and implemented in China in 1998.547 Nevertheless, Chinese compliance 
was not perfect. U.S. intelligence noted in 2002 that Iran continued to take advantage of 
“specialized weapons services and lower prices that China and North Korea offered.”548 
As the United States gained ground in its efforts to reduce Chinese cooperation 
with Iran, Russia increased its assistance to Iran. This post-Soviet Union relationship 
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began in 1992 when Iran signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia.549 In 
1995, after China demurred to complete construction of the Bushehr power plant, Russia 
announced that it would finish the project.550 Garver noted that after the suspended sale 
of a heavy-water reactor in 1995, Iran moved ahead in 1996 to build the heavy-water 
Arak reactor assisted by Russia.551 U.S. intelligence assessed that Russian entities 
worked with Iran on various nuclear projects including selling laboratory equipment and 
building a 1,000 MW nuclear power reactor located in Bushehr.552 U.S. intelligence 
further noted that while Russia insisted that the nuclear technology it was sharing was not 
useful militarily, the United States remained concerned that it would help Iran develop 
nuclear weapons.553 John Parker asserted that proliferation to Iran became worse in the 
mid-1990s despite the efforts of the Yeltsin administration to improve export controls.554 
He attributed this to the efforts of Viktor Mikhaylov, the head of the Russia’s Ministry of 
Atomic Energy, who used the Bushehr project as a cover for sales of hazardous 
equipment to Iran.555 
By the late 1990s, Russia’s nuclear cooperation with Iran had begun to wane.556 
Under pressure from the United States, a new export control law passed in the Duma in 
1999.557 The weakness of the law, however, was that it was not properly enforced and 
economic hardship motivated companies to circumvent the controls.558 Frustrated over 
these remaining gaps in the nuclear supply chain, in 1999, the United States put sanctions 
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in place against Russian companies involved with assistance to Iran’s nuclear and missile 
programs.559 In spite of the sanctions, Russia continued to fail to enforce all of its export 
controls for Iran and Iran continued to develop its nuclear capabilities, according to U.S. 
intelligence.560 U.S. intelligence further noted that, in 1999, the Ministry of Atomic 
Energy contracted with Iran to provide Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation 
equipment, in spite of U.S. protests.561 U.S. intelligence assessed that the equipment 
could allow Iran to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.562 Iran 
conducted laser enrichment experiments between late 2002 and early 2003, utilized 22 
kilograms of natural uranium metal, and yielded a few milligrams of reactor-grade 
enriched uranium, according to Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar.563 They noted that 
the uranium used for these experiments likely came from Russia in 1993 and had not 
been declared; however, Iran claimed that these experiments ended in 2003.564 
What drove the Russia-Iran relationship? Parker assessed that, “at its core, the 
Russian impulse to sell Iran conventional arms and to contract to build the Bushehr 
nuclear power plant was commercial.”565 Commercial interests and the ability to 
withstand U.S. pressure allowed Russia, along with China, to become an important 
nuclear supplier to Iran. 
In addition, Iran attempted to exploit the disorder following the break-up of the 
Soviet Union to acquire nuclear technology. In 1996, U.S. intelligence assessed that Iran 
sought “to develop the capability to produce both plutonium and highly enriched 
uranium” and “launched a parallel effort to purchase fissile material, mainly from sources 
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in the former Soviet Union.”566 As supporting evidence, U.S. intelligence cited two 
examples: 
Iranian agents have contacted officials at nuclear facilities in Kazakhstan 
on several occasions, attempting to acquire nuclear-related materials. For 
example, in 1992, Iran unsuccessfully approached the Ulba Metallurgical 
Plant to obtain enriched uranium.567 
In 1993, three Iranians believed to have had connections to Iran’s 
intelligence service, were arrested in Turkey while seeking to acquire 
nuclear material from smugglers from the former Soviet Union.568 
Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan network proved to be another important nuclear supplier to 
Iran. Iran claimed that in 1993 it received an offer from the network for 500 P-1 
centrifuges and P-2 centrifuge drawings, according to David Albright.569 Albright noted 
that Iran received the P-1 centrifuges along with design documents at a meeting in Dubai 
in 1993 or 1994.570 Albright also asserted that, in 1996, Iran received a set of P-2 
centrifuge drawings from the network.571 Iran insisted that it then went on to 
manufacture all P-2 components in country and did not import them, according to 
Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar.572 They assessed that the technology provided by 
A.Q. Khan in the 1990s helped Iran leapfrog forward in its work on uranium 
centrifuges.573 Incidentally, according to Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar, Iran had 
sought to acquire a whole centrifuge facility from Russia in a similar timeframe, but had 
not been successful due to U.S. pressure on Russia.574 Albright asserted that, in 2002, 
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Iran constructed and tested P-2 centrifuges based on the designs obtained in 1996.575 
This led the U.S. intelligence community to assess in late 2003 that Iran had benefited 
greatly from the A.Q. Khan network’s assistance as it developed its nuclear program.576 
The network proved to be a nuclear supplier that operated under the radar of the 
international community allowing Iran to advance its nuclear program. 
Separately, Iran received assistance from Argentina. In 1992, the United States 
halted a deal between Argentina and Iran.577 According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, 
the deal would have provided for facilities for heavy-water production and uranium 
enrichment.578 In addition, Argentine company INVAP converted the Tehran Research 
Reactor to operate on low enriched uranium rather than highly enriched uranium and it 
began operating on low enriched uranium in 1993.579 
Throughout this time period, the United States worked to halt Iran’s acquisition of 
nuclear technology. In 1996, U.S. intelligence assessed that “numerous interdiction 
efforts by the U.S. government have interfered with Iranian attempts to purchase arms 
and WMD-related goods, but Iran’s acquisition efforts remain unrelenting.”580 Further, 
U.S. intelligence had reason to believe that Iran had created a network of military and 
civilian organizations to assist its weapons development efforts.581 
In 2002, the international political climate surrounding Iran’s nuclear program 
grew worse for Iran. In August 2002, the Iranian dissident group the Mujahedeen-e Khalq 
announced that Iran was constructing facilities for nuclear fuel and heavy water 
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production.582 According to U.S. intelligence, satellite imagery showed that the latter 
was a Natanz-based facility for uranium enrichment.583 After the Mujahedeen-e Khalq’s 
outing of the secret facility, Iran announced to the IAEA that it planned to develop the 
entire fuel cycle and the IAEA requested access to the Natanz facility to look for possible 
safeguards violations.584 In late 2002, the U.S. intelligence noted: 
Although Iran claimed that its nascent enrichment plant is to produce fuel 
for Bushehr and other future power reactors, we remained convinced that 
Iran’s true purpose was to develop fissile material production capabilities 
for nuclear weapons. Even if Iran allowed intrusive IAEA safeguards 
inspections at Natanz, there is a serious risk that Iran could use technology 
developed there to build a separate covert facility. Although Iran claimed 
its heavy water plant was for peaceful purposes, Iran has no large heavy 
water reactors for which it would need such amounts of heavy water. We 
believe Iran was pursuing the heavy water option in hopes of eventually 
building a heavy water reactor to produce plutonium for nuclear 
weapons.585 
The IAEA Director General Mohammed El-Baradei visited Natanz in February 
2003 and El-Baradei found that Iran had indeed committed safeguards violations. The 
findings from the visit showed 1) Iran had acquired natural uranium in 1991 that had 
gone unreported; 2) the Kalaye Electric Company workshop had been used to produce 
centrifuge components; and 3) there remained a number of additional questions regarding 
Iran’s centrifuge program, laser program, and heavy water program.586 Also, Iran had not 
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been cooperative in allowing the IAEA to inspect the Kalaye Electric Company 
workshop.587 
Additional information regarding Iran’s program surfaced. Cirincione, Wolfsthal, 
and Rajkumar describe it in Deadly Arsenals. Environmental samples taken from Natanz 
in early 2003 before the facility was to officially become operational revealed highly 
enriched uranium particles.588 Iran denied that uranium had already entered the facility 
and claimed that the presence of highly enriched uranium was due to contaminated 
centrifuge parts obtained from Pakistan.589 Iran did concede, however, that “a small 
number of gas centrifuges were tested with uranium gas at the [Kalaye Electric 
Company] site between 1998 and 2002,” while claiming that the enrichment had not 
exceeded 1.2 percent uranium-235.590 Iran also admitted that it created “a small amount 
of plutonium outside of safeguards” and that it occurred “at the U.S.-supplied TRR 
between 1988 and 1998 when Iran irradiated depleted uranium dioxide (UO2) targets 
using materials previously exempted from safeguards in 1978 and later declared lost as 
waste.”591 
In June 2003, Iran began testing at the pilot plant at Natanz with uranium 
hexafluoride. By late 2003, Iran had nearly put into place a 164-machine cascade, 
according to Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar.592 In addition, the IAEA later 
received reports that Iran was working on a “green salt” project, a uranium conversion 
method, in addition to “high explosives (including the development of exploding 
bridgewire detonators); and re-engineering of the payload chamber of the Shahab 3 
missile re-entry vehicle” during 2002 and 2003.593 
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U.S. intelligence noted its own concern in 2003 that Iran seemed to be pursuing 
both the highly enriched uranium and plutonium paths to nuclear weapons acquisition.594 
U.S. intelligence expressed particular concern regarding the uranium centrifuges found at 
Natanz and Iran’s efforts to acquire a heavy water research reactor.595 
The IAEA and the U.S. intelligence community reported that Iran halted the 
country’s coordinated military nuclear program toward the end of 2003. The IAEA noted 
that “before the end of 2003, an organizational structure was in place in Iran suitable for 
the coordination of a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear 
explosive device. Although some activities took place after 2003, they were not a part of 
a coordinated effort.”596 The U.S. intelligence community assessed that “Iranian military 
entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons until fall 
2003.”597 Nuclear weapons-related development occurred after 2003, but both the IAEA 
and U.S. intelligence made clear that Iran halted this coordinated military approach 
toward the end of 2003.598 Further, the U.S. intelligence community judged with “high 
confidence” that this was due to “increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting 
from exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear work.”599 
After the revelations regarding Natanz, the United Kingdom, France, and 
Germany joined together to persuade Iran to end its suspect nuclear activities. During an 
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October 2003 joint visit by each country’s foreign minister to Iran, they requested that 
Iran: 1) “suspend uranium enrichment,” 2) “detail the full scope of its nuclear program 
and facilities,” and 3) “sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Additional 
Protocol.”600 During the visit, Iran agreed to these requirements. By December 2003, 
Iran had completed all three actions, although it only signed but did not ratify the 
Additional Protocol. This agreement helped mitigate the outcry over the IAEA’s 
November 2003 report on Iran that described the extensive safeguard breaches 
discovered over the course of the year.601 
In terms of Iran’s delivery systems, U.S. intelligence assessed that North Korea, 
China, and Russia provided Iran with ballistic missile technology and equipment during 
this period.602 In 1992, Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates noted in testimony 
to the U.S. Congress that following the Iran-Iraq War, Iran looked to North Korea for 
Scuds and to China for cruise and ballistic missiles.603 In addition, according to Garver, 
throughout the 1990s, missile experts from China and North Korea worked alongside Iran 
to help develop the country’s missile program, particularly the Shahab-3.604  
A 1997 U.S. intelligence report noted that Iran’s goal was to be “self-sufficient in 
the production of medium-range ballistic missiles” as Iran was already able to 
manufacture short-range Scud missiles with the assistance of North Korea.605 U.S. 
intelligence reported that Iran conducted a Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile flight 
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test in July 1998 and was already producing them.606 In mid-1999, U.S. intelligence 
assessed that Iran’s Shahab-3 missile had “emergency operational capability,” meaning 
that a limited number could be deployed and used if needed.607 In addition, U.S. 
intelligence noted in 1998, Iran “acknowledged the development of the Shahab-4, 
originally calling it a more capable ballistic missile than the Shahab-3, but later 
categorizing it as solely a space launch vehicle with no military applications.”608 Finally, 
as of mid-1999, plans for a Shahab-5, a possible intermediate-range ballistic missile, had 
also been discussed, according to U.S. intelligence.609 
In 2002, the United States placed sanctions on five Chinese companies for their 
role in helping Iran build the Shahab-3.610 North Korea had initially provided Iran with 
ballistic missiles during the Iran-Iraq War, but ballistic missile exports and technical 
cooperation continued throughout the 1990s, according to Paul Kerr, Steven Hildreth, and 
Mary Beth Nikitin.611 The United States imposed sanctions on North Korea in 1996 for 
transferring missile technology to Iran.612 
Also, from the mid-1990s, Iran and Russia worked closely together on Iran’s 
ballistic missile development. The U.S. intelligence community testified to Congress in 
2000 that “assistance by Russian entities has helped Iran save years in its development of 
the Shahab-3” and “Russian assistance also is playing a crucial role in Iran’s ability to 
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develop more sophisticated and longer-range missiles.”613 Consequently, the United 
States placed trade restrictions on a handful of Russian aerospace companies.614 
Russia began to be more cautious about sharing its missile technology with Iran 
after the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998.615 Parker noted that in an interview 
with former Russian Security Council official Vladimir Lebedev in 2000, Lebedev 
claimed that Russia did complain to Iran that “the Shahab-3 posed a security threat to 
Russia,” but that the Iranians “continued to steal Russian know-how and materials” and 
Moscow “continued to catch and punish them.”616 
As a result of Iran’s efforts and the assistance from various suppliers, as of late 
2000, Iran had one of the biggest ballistic missile programs in the Middle East, according 
to U.S. intelligence.617 Furthermore, the intelligence community reported that the 
missiles could reach Iraq and other Persian Gulf countries and Iran was working to 
deploy the 1,300 km-range Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile allowing it to reach 
Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.618 U.S. intelligence assessed that as of mid-2003, its 
missile inventory included some medium-range ballistic missiles and several hundred 
short-range ballistic missiles, to include the solid-propellant Fateh-110.619 
Finally, the IAEA reported that work was allegedly done from 2002 to 2003 as 
Project 111 and involved studies “to examine how to integrate a new spherical payload 
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into the existing payload chamber which would be mounted in the re-entry vehicle of the 
Shahab-3 missile.”620 
c. Nuclear Trends 
Until late 2003, Iran steadily increased its nuclear capabilities and seemed to be 
doing so with the aim of acquiring nuclear weapons. There was a persistent drive for 
nuclear capabilities until the early 2000s. Iran worked with state and non-state actors in 
both an overt and covert fashion to build its nuclear program. Iran only slowed its overall 
nuclear efforts in 2003 upon the discovery of the Natanz facility. It was also in this 
timeframe that a U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq. 
What drove Iran’s nuclear behavior? In the regional context, Iran continued to 
face the possibility of existential threats, particularly from Iraq. Iran may have also 
perceived an opportunity to achieve regional hegemony, particularly as Iraq became even 
weaker in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Iran continued to confront Israel through low-
intensity conflict rather than a direct military challenge. Nevertheless, it was not apparent 
that a possible threat from Israel drove Iran’s nuclear activities. Ray Takeyh asserted that 
“however disturbing the Zionist threat may be to Iranian clerics, it does not drive 
Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.”621 From the information examined here, it was 
clear, however, that the United States was aware throughout this period that Iran was 
pursuing nuclear weapons and the superpower sought to constrain Iran’s acquisition 
efforts. The unraveling of the A.Q. Khan network in the early 2000s and the exposure of 
the Natanz facilities likely were most damaging to Iran’s efforts. The country appeared to 
halt its coordinated military nuclear program in 2003. 
3. Iraq 
The First Gulf War marked the beginning of a major regional power shift. The 
United States forced Iraq out of Kuwait. The subsequent findings regarding Iraq’s nuclear 
                                                 
620 International Atomic Energy Agency, Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards 
Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” 
November 8, 2011, 11. 
621 Takeyh, “Iran at the Strategic Crossroads,” 53–54. 
 138 
weapons program began more than a decade long effort to halt Iraq’s nuclear endeavors 
and culminated in the Second Gulf War. During the 1990s, Iraq became weaker militarily 
and economically. By the end of the time period, a regional political shift had begun to 
occur whereby Iraq had receded politically and Iran had become more dominant. 
a. Political Context 
As in Iran, Iraq’s economy was in shambles following the Iran-Iraq War. Iraq 
looked for ways to improve its financial situation. It sought debt relief from its Gulf 
neighbors, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in particular, and a reduction of or adherence to 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries production quotas to boost oil prices, in 
hopes that rising prices would also lift Iraq’s economy.622 Iraq became upset with 
Kuwait when it did not agree to forgive Iraq’s debts, maintained or exceeded its 
production quotas, and started slant drilling into the Iraqi side of the Rumaila oil field, 
which the two countries shared.623 Iraq also claimed that Kuwait historically had been a 
part of Iraq. Iraq decided to deal with these issues by invading Kuwait on August 2, 1990. 
In response, the United Nations (UN) Security Council passed resolution 661 on August 
6, 1990, imposing sanctions on Iraq for the invasion. 
Iraq’s actions caused a shift in regional alliances. Within the Arab League, 
countries that opposed Iraq’s invasion included Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates.624 Prior to the invasion, Iraq had 
maintained good relations with both Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Jordan and the Palestine 
Liberation Organization were sympathetic to Iraq’s position.625 Yemen, Sudan, and 
                                                 
622 Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or 
Division?, Revised edition (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2005), 84–85. 
623 Ibid., 85. 
624 John Kifner, “Confrontation in the Gulf; Badly Divided Arab League Votes To Return 





Libya opposed the use of Saudi territory by U.S. forces to launch an operation against 
Iraq.626 
The Persian Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, were eager to have Iraq removed 
from Kuwait. As Sean Foley wrote, “the United States and its allies had the resources to 
evict Iraq from Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states did everything to 
make that possible.”627 These efforts included housing soldiers and allowing the United 
States and other coalition members to use Saudi airfields and the largest Emirati port.628 
The First Gulf War began on January 17, 1991. After the beginning of this war, 
Iraq launched Scud missiles against Saudi Arabia and Israel. The U.S.-led coalition 
worked quickly and, despite Iraq possessing the world’s fourth-largest army, the war was 
over in a matter of weeks. The United States declared an end to hostilities on February 
28. 
While Iraq suffered a crushing defeat, the conflict left the Iraqi military relatively 
intact. After the war, Saddam Hussein faced popular uprisings by the Kurds in the north 
and the Shia in the south. These groups perceived that they were supported by the United 
States.629 He then turned what was left of the Iraqi military against these two populations 
in order to regain control of the country. In response to these attacks, the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and France imposed a no-fly zone above the 36th parallel to protect 
the Kurds and below the 32nd parallel to protect the Shia. 
The international community continued to monitor Iraq following the war. The 
UN Security Council passed resolution 687 in April 1991 that mandated Iraq relinquish 
all weapons of mass destruction and established the UN Special Commission on Iraq to 
                                                 
626 Ibid. 
627 Sean Foley, The Arab Gulf States: Beyond Oil and Islam (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2010), 97. 
628 Ibid. 
629 Anderson and Stansfield, The Future of Iraq, 88. 
 140 
monitor the dismantlement of Iraq’s program.630 Also, resolution 661 was kept in place 
in order to use the economic sanctions to encourage Iraqi cooperation in regard to 
resolution 687. Efforts to pressure Iraq to fully comply with resolution 687 continued 
until the beginning of the Second Gulf War in 2003. 
Iraq’s regional relations deteriorated significantly with its invasion of Kuwait: 
Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, and the United Arab 
Emirates sided with the U.S.-led coalition.631 Jordan was the only Arab state to remain 
friendly with Iraq. Further, Iran and Israel already had poor relations with Iraq. Iraq was 
nearly completely isolated. A possible competitor for regional hegemony had been 
destroyed largely to the benefit of Iran and the Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia. What 
the region gained was the increased regional presence of the sole superpower. As Liam 
Anderson and Gareth Stansfield noted, “a devastating military defeat by coalition forces 
in 1991 and over 12 years of stringent economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations 
destroyed the state of Iraq from the inside out. By March 2003, when Saddam once again 
defiantly confronted a massively superior coalition of the willing, he was presiding over a 
failed state.”632 
b. Nuclear Program 
Nearly all of Iraq’s important nuclear facilities were bombed during the First Gulf 
War. The Duelfer Report noted that this included the buildings at Al-Tuwaitha, the 
electromagnetic isotope separator enrichment plants at Al-Tarmiya and Al-Sharqat, the 
yellowcake recovery plant at Al-Qa’im, and the feed material plant at Mosul.633 The site 
Iraq had chosen for nuclear weapons development, Al-Atheer, was damaged during the 
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bombing, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies.634 Nevertheless, 
the sites for centrifuge research and production at Al-Rashdiya and Al-Furat, 
respectively, were not found or bombed.635 
Following the war, what remained of Iraq’s program was dismantled. UN 
Security Council resolution 687, passed in April 1991, gave the IAEA the mandate to 
dismantle Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. The UN Special Commission on Iraq handled 
this task. In addition, resolution 707 banned “nuclear activities of any kind, except for use 
of isotopes for medical, agricultural or industrial purposes” until Iraq fully complied with 
resolutions 687, paragraphs 12 and 13, and 707.636 Garry Dillon, an IAEA official who 
worked on this issue in Iraq, noted that thirty inspection campaigns by the IAEA occurred 
between May 1991 and October 1997 during which the IAEA oversaw the destruction 
and disablement of nuclear facilities and removed all weapons-usable nuclear material 
from Iraq.637 Al-Tuwaitha and Al-Qa’Qaa, the latter a facility for producing explosives, 
were monitored by the IAEA until 1998 and inspectors dismantled any nuclear-related 
items.638 The Al-Atheer nuclear complex was where most of Iraq’s nuclear weapons 
work occurred and, by 1998, the IAEA had destroyed the main buildings at Al-Atheer 
and eliminated the nuclear-related equipment placed there.639 
The extent of Iraq’s progress alarmed the international community. In 1997, 
IAEA Director General Hans Blix noted the impact of the 1991 Iraq War and the 
discoveries about Iraq’s nuclear program that followed. He stated that “the ‘shock’ of 
Iraq as a result of its clandestine enrichment program and its advanced work on 
                                                 
634 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the 
Shadow of Iran, 89. 
635 Iraq Survey Group, “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD 
[The Duelfer Report, Volume II of III; ‘Nuclear’; Includes Annexes; Part 2 of 2],” 4. 
636 United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 707 (1991)” (New York: United Nations Security 
Council, August 15, 1991), 4, http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/707.pdf. 
637 Gary B. Dillon, “The IAEA in Iraq: Past Activities and Findings,” IAEA Bulletin 44, no. 2 (2002): 
13. 
638 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the 
Shadow of Iran, 91. 
639 Ibid., 90. 
 142 
weaponization prompted broad recognition of the limitations of the safeguards system, 
which at that time, was geared to declared sites.”640 Further, since the “shock” of Iraq, he 
noted there had been a “sea change in IAEA safeguards.”641 He cited “the agency’s use 
of environmental sampling in about forty places in Iraq as a key means to provide 
enhanced assurance about its nuclear activities.”642 
Iraq was not fully cooperative with dismantlement efforts. Directly after the 1991 
war, Iraq sought to hide its clandestine program from inspectors. Upon the seizure of 
electromagnetic isotope separator components in mid-1991 and nuclear documents in 
September 1991, Iraqi officials became more forthcoming regarding the program.643 The 
IAEA acquired another treasure trove of documents in August 1995 when Saddam 
Hussein’s son-in-law, Hussein Kamel, who had played an important role in Iraq’s nuclear 
program, defected.644 Kamel provided the IAEA with more documents on Iraq’s 
centrifuge and nuclear programs.645 
By the mid-1990s, Hussein began to look for ways to rebuild Iraq’s nuclear 
program. Iraq’s Oil for Food Program, created in 1995, allowed Iraq to exchange its oil 
for food and basic necessities for the Iraqi population who were suffering under the 
economic sanctions imposed in conjunction with the First Gulf War. Once money 
became available as a result of the program, Iraq began to fund projects that had some 
applicability to nuclear weapons research, according to the Duelfer Report.646 In 
addition, Iraq’s ministers were ordered to safeguard the country’s technical 
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capabilities.647 This included expanding technical research and improving the welfare of 
Iraq’s nuclear experts.648 In fact, the Duelfer Report found that Hussein indicated that 
once sanctions ended, Iraq would continue developing its nuclear program to reestablish 
the regional “strategic balance.”649 
Despite Iraq’s efforts to maintain or rebuild aspects of its nuclear program, the 
country met with little success. In its reports to Congress in 1996 and 1997, U.S. 
intelligence found that Iraq had acquired some dual-use equipment, but no equipment that 
was directly related to weapons of mass destruction.650 In 1997, Blix reported to the UN 
Security Council that Iraq had not been able to produce a nuclear weapon nor did it even 
have the capability to produce nuclear material for such a weapon.651 According to 
Dillon, for its part, as of late 1998 when the UN and the IAEA lost access to Iraq, the 
IAEA  
was satisfied that there were no indications of Iraq having: produced a 
nuclear weapon; produced more than a few grams of weapon-usable 
nuclear material (HEU or separated plutonium) through its indigenous 
processes; otherwise acquired weapons-usable nuclear material; or 
retained any physical capability for the production of amounts of 
weapons-usable nuclear material of any practical significance.652  
In addition, all of the reactor fuel that Iraq might have used for its “crash 
program,” had been removed by the IAEA from Iraq.653 
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While taking covert steps to reconstitute its nuclear program, Iraq sought to 
improve its relationship with the United States in the mid- to late 1990s. Charles Duelfer 
shared that “between 1994 and 1998, both he and UNSCOM Executive Chairman Rolf 
Ekeus were approached multiple times by senior Iraqis with the message that Baghdad 
wanted a dialogue with the United States, and that Iraq was in a position to be 
Washington’s ‘best friend in the region bar none.’”654 Hussein himself stated in a 
custodial debriefing that “he wanted to develop better relations with the U.S. over the 
latter part of the 1990s,” but that “he was not given a chance because the U.S. refused to 
listen to anything Iraq had to say,” according to the Duelfer Report.655 
By late 1998, Iraq had become very uncooperative with IAEA inspectors. Iraq did 
not allow UN inspections after Operation Desert Fox in December and took down the 
UN’s video monitoring system.656 UN Security Council resolution 1284, established in 
December 1999, set up the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection 
Committee to monitor Iraq’s possible WMD efforts, but Iraq continued to refuse to allow 
the UN to conduct inspections.657 The IAEA had created an Iraq Action Team in 1997 to 
pursue inspections, but it was not permitted to carry out inspections either.658 Thus, from 
1999 through 2002, neither the UN nor the IAEA had access to Iraq to conduct 
inspections and, thus, were handicapped in their analysis of Iraq’s nuclear program. 
U.S. intelligence continued to report to Congress regarding its assessment of the 
situation in Iraq. As of 2000, the U.S. intelligence community assessed that Iraq 
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“probably continued low-level theoretical R&D associated with its nuclear program,” but 
acquiring “a sufficient source of fissile material” remained a challenge.659 Concerns were 
further raised in September 2000 when Saddam Hussein “publicly exhorted his ‘Nuclear 
Mujahidin’ to ‘defeat the enemy.’”660 In the early 2000s, before the 2003 U.S.-led 
invasion of Iraq, U.S. intelligence provided Congress with its assessment regarding Iraq’s 
capabilities. It noted the following: 
 Saddam Hussein still wished to obtain nuclear weapons.661 
 Iraq’s efforts to acquire “high-strength aluminum tubes” were of 
concern.662 
 Some analysts believed that the aluminum tubes were for Iraq’s nuclear 
program and some believed they were for conventional weapons.663 
 A majority of analysts believed that Iraq sought to rebuild its nuclear 
program.664 
 In order to rebuild its nuclear program, Iraq retained its “nuclear scientists 
and technicians, its program documentation, and sufficient dual-use 
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manufacturing capabilities to support a reconstituted nuclear weapons 
program.”665 
 Iraq’s greatest challenge in its pursuit of a nuclear weapon would be 
obtaining fissile material. And Iraq would not “produce indigenously 
enough weapons-grade material for a deliverable nuclear device until the 
last half of this decade.”666 
In late 2002, Iraq allowed the UN and IAEA inspectors back inside the country, 
but it was too little too late for U.S. policymakers. While the inspectors quickly returned 
to work collecting information regarding Iraq’s nuclear activities, Washington was 
convinced that Iraq’s nuclear program posed a significant threat. The United States led a 
coalition that invaded Iraq again on March 20, 2003. 
Due to the political firestorm in the United States regarding the rationale for the 
invasion of Iraq, the Duelfer Report was commissioned. This report, which was published 
in 2004, found that, in terms of actual nuclear capability, Hussein aspired to have a 
nuclear program, but Iraq’s nuclear capability had been destroyed during and after the 
1991 war. The report “uncovered no indication that Iraq had resumed fissile material or 
nuclear weapon research and development activities since 1991.”667 It was clear that 
Hussein wished to reconstitute the country’s nuclear program and to signal to the region 
and the world that he was doing so. It was less clear how capable he was of 
accomplishing the former goal given how much of the country’s nuclear infrastructure 
had been dismantled in the 1991 to 1998 timeframe. The 1991 Gulf War and the ensuing 
inspections regime accomplished what the 1981 bombing of the Osirak reactor did not 
achieve—the end of Iraq’s nuclear program. 
In further damage to Iraq’s nuclear program, after the U.S.-led military action, 
looting of Iraq’s nuclear facilities occurred in early 2003. This included the possible loss 
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of 10 kg of uranium compounds.668 Also, a large number of its nuclear scientists fled the 
country or were killed.669 
Regarding delivery systems, Iraq worked to expand its ballistic missile capability 
even after the First Gulf War. During the war, Iraq launched 90 Scud missiles at Israel, 
Saudi Arabia, and U.S.-led coalition forces.670 And Iraq continued ballistic missile 
development after the war.671 According to the Duelfer Report, Iraq was primarily 
concerned about Iran’s capabilities as it developed its missile program. The report noted 
that captured documents revealed that Iraq’s National Security Committee advised in 
2001 that “Iran would remain Iraq’s foremost enemy and that the Iranians would rely 
heavily on missiles in a future war.”672 The Duelfer Report also judged that the 
aluminum tubes that helped provide a rational for invading Iraq in 2003 were linked to 
Iraq’s missile program (not its centrifuge program). The report noted that “Baghdad’s 
interest in high-strength, high-specification aluminum tubes . . . is best explained by its 
efforts to produce 81-mm rockets” and Iraq did not seem to be interested in them for a 
nuclear end use.673 
As part of its missile program, Iraq worked to develop both liquid-propellant and 
solid-propellant missiles with an extended range despite monitoring and sanctions. The 
UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Committee reported that by late 1998, Iraq 
was developing the Al-Nidaa missile with a range of 70 km, the Al-Ubour missile with a 
range of 70–80 km, the Ababil-100 / Al-Fatah missile with a range of 144 km, and the 
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Al-Raad missile, which was like a Frog missile.674 U.S. intelligence indicated that Iraq 
was developing the Al Samoud liquid-propellant missile with a range of less than 150 
km.675 Through the late 1990s, U.S. intelligence remained concerned that the technology 
for these short-range missiles could also be used for missiles with a longer reach once 
Iraq was under less scrutiny or no longer under sanctions.676 U.S. intelligence noted with 
suspicion in 1999 that the “personnel previously involved with the Condor II/Badr-2000 
missile—which was largely destroyed during the Gulf War and eliminated by 
UNSCOM—are working on the Ababil-100 program.”677 
After Operation Desert Fox in 1998 and Iraq’s subsequent termination of UN and 
IAEA inspections, U.S. intelligence reported that Iraq began to rebuild several facilities 
for missile production.678 In late 2001, U.S. intelligence expressed concern regarding two 
new buildings at the Al-Mamoun plant for mixing solid-propellant, originally intended to 
be the construction site for the Badr-2000 or Condor solid-propellant missiles.679 U.S. 
intelligence believed that the best explanation for the size of these buildings and the way 
they were constructed was to produce longer-range missiles, especially because of the 
                                                 
674 United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission, “The Development of 
Iraq’s Missile Capabilities” (United Nations, November 26, 2003), 15, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/documents/quarterly_reports/s-2003-1135.pdf. 
675 Director of Central Intelligence, “Report of Proliferation-Related Acquisition in 1997.” 
676 Ibid.; Director of Central Intelligence, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of 
Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, July-Dec 
1999.” 
677 Director of Central Intelligence, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of 
Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, January–
June 1999.” 
678 Director of Central Intelligence, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of 
Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, January–
June 2000.” 
679 Director of Central Intelligence, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of 
Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, July–
December 2001.” 
 149 
reconstruction of casting pits.680 As of 2003, however, the UN Monitoring, Verification, 
and Inspection Committee had destroyed the casting pits.681 
By the early 2000s, Iraq appeared to be extending the range of its missiles. U.S. 
intelligence noted that four Al-Samoud transporter-erector-launchers with airframes and 
two Ababil-100 transporter-erector-launchers and airframes made an appearance at a 
parade in Iraq in late December 2000.682 The UN Monitoring, Verification, and 
Inspection Committee reported that Iraq had begun producing the Al-Samoud 2 in 
2002.683 By June 2002, the U.S. intelligence community had assessed that the Al-
Samoud 2, the successor of the Al-Samoud missile, and the Ababil-100 had both gone 
beyond the range of 150 km permitted by the UN.684 As of late 2002, U.S. intelligence 
had information that Iraq may have “pursued a longer-range liquid-propellant missile 
capable of flying beyond 1,200 km.”685 In February 2003, the UN Monitoring, 
Verification, and Inspection Committee declared the Al-Samoud 2 prohibited due to an 
operational range in excess of 150 km and supervised its destruction.686 The Committee 
still lacked the necessary information for it to make the determination whether the 
Ababil-100 operated within the allowed 150 km range.687 In sum, Iraq moved forward as 
aggressively as it could under sanctions to expand its ballistic missile capabilities. 
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c. Nuclear Trends 
During this period, two shifts occurred in Iraq’s nuclear program. First, Iraq lost 
most of its nuclear infrastructure as a result of the First Gulf War. This war and the 
inspections regime that followed essentially ended the program. Then, even as IAEA and 
UN inspections continued, Hussein sought to move Iraq’s nuclear program forward 
beginning in 1995. After the implementation of the “Oil for Food” program, Hussein 
sought to redirect money toward nuclear research.688 The latter shift demonstrated a 
lingering intent that did not translate into an improved nuclear capability as the United 
States led an effort to block Iraq’s every attempt to move its nuclear program forward. 
What drove Iraq’s behavior? The investigations following the 2003 Gulf War 
made it clear that Hussein tried to play a game of hedging with the international 
community from 1991 through 2003. Iraq’s nuclear weapons capability was at its peak 
just before the 1991 Gulf War and declined throughout the period. In the face of this 
decline, Hussein sought to convince the world that Iraq had a greater nuclear capability 
than it did. Hussein strongly believed in the power of nuclear weapons and the power of 
the idea of nuclear weapons. He seemed to think that even the perception of a nuclear 
capability without the actual capability was much better than acknowledging the lack 
thereof. The Duelfer Report summarized the rationale for this hedging: 
The Iran-Iraq War and the ongoing suppression of internal unrest taught 
Saddam the importance of WMD to the dominance and survival of the 
Regime. Following the destruction of much of the Iraqi WMD 
infrastructure during Desert Storm, however, the threats to the Regime 
remained; especially his perception of the overarching danger from Iran. 
In order to counter these threats, Saddam continued with his public posture 
of retaining the WMD capability.689 
Looking at Iraq’s activities in a regional context, the Duelfer Report made clear 
that Iraq continued to be preoccupied with the threat from Iran even until the Second Gulf 
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War in 2003. According to the report, Hussein’s former Vice President Taha Yassin 
Ramadan stated that “Saddam judged Israel to be a lesser adversary than Iran because 
Israel could not invade Iraq.”690 Iraq’s hedging occurred as it was being stripped of its 
nuclear capabilities, which likely left it feeling vulnerable to its greatest security threat, 
Iran. 
While Iraq surely realized that the United States posed the most significant 
potential threat throughout the period, according to the Duelfer Report, Hussein believed 
it unlikely the superpower would invade Iraq.691 Furthermore, the Iraqi regime sought to 
improve the relationship with the United States as evidenced by the outreach to the Iraq 
Survey Group and UN Special Commission on Iraq leadership between 1994 and 1998. It 
seemed to be an effort by Hussein to re-establish Iraq as a regional hegemon. 
Nevertheless, it was the efforts of the United States over this period that resulted in the 
elimination of Iraq’s nuclear capabilities. 
4. Libya 
In the early 1990s, Libya faced pressure to move away from its past state-
sponsorship of terrorism. U.S. and UN sanctions weakened the country’s economy and 
further isolated the regime. In addition, throughout the 1990s, Libya sought to expand its 
nuclear program, especially through collaboration with the A.Q. Khan network. This 
continued until early 2003 when Libya began negotiations with the United States and the 
United Kingdom for an end to Libya’s nuclear program. 
a. Political Context 
While Libya had sought to mend relations with its neighbors and the West at the 
end of the 1980s, the 1990s began with punishment for Libya for its past terrorist 
activities. Libya was indicted in both the United States and the United Kingdom for its 
role in the December 1988 terrorist attack against the Pan Am Flight over Lockerbie, 
Scotland. In January 1992, the UN Security Council passed resolution 731, which 
                                                 
690 Ibid., 31. 
691 Ibid. 
 152 
condemned the downing of the Pan Am Flight over Lockerbie and of the Union 
Transports de Aeriens Flight 772 over Niger.692 The UN Security Council expressed 
concern over the fact that Libyan officials were implicated in the attacks and requested 
that Libya support information requests by France, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States regarding the incidents.693 In March 1992, the UN Security Council passed 
resolution 748, which called for all states to deny permission for Libyan aircraft to 
operate on their soil and to prohibit arms sales and technical assistance to Libya.694 
Resolution 883, passed in November 1993, froze the assets of the Libyan government and 
its officials along with the assets of Libyan commercial enterprises.695 The resolution 
also tightened resolution 748, seeking to make it more effective in its targeting of Libyan 
airlines.696 
In 1996, the United States expanded economic sanctions against Libya. The U.S. 
Congress passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. The purpose of the legislation was to 
punish Libya for its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and support for international 
terrorism by applying economic sanctions against companies doing business in Libya and 
Iran. The sanctions had the effect of limiting Libya’s oil production capabilities.697 Wyn 
Bowen assessed that “the combination of significantly lower oil revenues and the 
inability to expand oil production due to the embargoes, contributed to a general 
economic malaise.”698 
On the domestic front, Libya found itself confronting militant Islamists by the 
mid-1990s. Luis Martinez attributed the growth of this Islamist movement to poor 
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economic conditions and a decrease in government control.699 In fact, Libya’s leader 
Muammar Qaddafi was nearly assassinated by a militant group operating in Benghazi in 
1998.700 Bowen added that domestic support for these groups resulted from “the 
combined effect of sanctions, international isolation and the state’s failure to manage the 
economy.”701 
It was at this difficult time for Libya that the country began to move toward 
greater openness. The Washington Post quoted Arab diplomats as stating in 1999 that 
Libya was demonstrating a “less ideological and more pragmatic policy.”702 In 1999, the 
Bill Clinton administration began secret discussions with Qaddafi regarding what Libya 
would have to do to have sanctions removed, according to Barbara Slavin.703 Martin 
Indyk, who was then serving as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs at 
the U.S. State Department, noted that Libya’s offer to relinquish its nuclear program 
occurred in May 1999.704 He argued that Libya’s decision was prompted by a motivation 
to end “sanctions that prevented Libya importing oilfield technology” in order to increase 
oil production.705 Qaddafi appeared to be anxious to have sanctions removed in whatever 
way possible, to include relinquishing Libya’s nuclear program. 
Qaddafi took steps to satisfy international demands. He handed two Libyan 
suspects in the Lockerbie bombing over to a Scottish court for trial and the UN sanctions 
were suspended in 1999.706 Most European countries restored relations with Libya once 
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these sanctions ended.707 Furthermore, after the Lockerbie issue was settled, regional 
states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates sought to rebuild trade 
relations with Libya.708 In August 2003, Libya accepted responsibility for the Lockerbie 
bombing. The United States did not restore relations with Libya until after 2003.  
b. Nuclear Program 
Libya took steps to develop a nuclear weapons program throughout nearly the 
entire time period. In the early 1990s, Libya’s efforts met with mixed results. For 
example, the Nuclear Threat Initiative noted that after the fall of the Soviet Union, Libya 
tried without success to recruit nuclear experts from Russia to work on the country’s 
nuclear program.709 Also, according to Albright, Libya ordered P-1 centrifuges from the 
A.Q. Khan network in the early 1990s, but they could not be delivered after the UN 
Security Council placed an air and arms embargo on Libya in 1992.710 In addition, 
around 1992, a German engineer, who had worked to develop uranium gas centrifuge 
equipment at the Tajura Nuclear Research Center beginning in the early 1980s, left 
without creating a working centrifuge.711 
In the mid-1990s, Libya began a concerted effort to expand its nuclear program 
with the assistance of the A.Q. Khan network. Libyan authorities informed the IAEA in 
2004 that “Libya made a strategic decision to reinvigorate its nuclear activities, including 
gas centrifuge uranium equipment” in 1995.712 Accordingly, Libya made major 
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purchases of centrifuges and components from the A.Q. Khan network beginning in 1997 
and continuing until 2003, noted Albright.713 In fact, the IAEA reported that the network 
provided 20 P-1 centrifuges already assembled and the components for 200 P-1 
centrifuges in 1997.714 The IAEA further asserted that, in September 2000, Libya 
ordered 10,000 P-2 centrifuges from A.Q. Khan and components for these centrifuges 
began arriving in December 2002.715 Libya’s deal with the A.Q. Khan network included 
P-1 and P-2 centrifuge blueprints, according to Albright.716 In addition, Albright noted 
that the country ordered a gas centrifuge plant from the network.717 Further, Libya 
advised the IAEA that it had obtained a machine shop to begin domestic production of 
the centrifuges.718 
In tandem with Libya’s cooperation with the A.Q. Khan network, Libya began to 
cooperate with Russia. In 1998, it signed a contract with Russia for a partial overhaul of 
the Tajura Nuclear Research Center, according to Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and 
Rajkumar.719 In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Russia and Libya held discussions about 
assisting Libya with the research center and the construction of a power reactor.720 
Libya seemed to advance its nuclear capabilities quickly in the early 2000s 
following the end of UN sanctions. The IAEA reported that, in October 2000, one of the 
twenty pre-assembled centrifuges acquired from A.Q. Khan was installed at Libya’s Al-
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Hashan site and successfully tested.721 Its report noted that Libya claimed no nuclear 
material was used while testing centrifuges.722 Libya started to put in P-1 centrifuge 
cascades at Al-Hashan in late 2000 and the cascades were partially assembled by April 
2002, according to the IAEA.723 
Curiously, Libya was working to both develop its nuclear infrastructure and 
normalize its relationship with the United States and the West. For example, the Nuclear 
Threat Initiative noted that Qaddafi called for Arab states to develop a nuclear weapon in 
1996.724 Libya, however, also signed the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, the 
Treaty of Pelindaba, in 1996. The IAEA reported that, in 1998, Libya moved its pilot 
scale uranium conversion facility, acquired from the Japanese in 1984, out of storage and 
partly assembled the facility.725 While Libya signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
in 2001, it also received two tons of uranium hexafluoride from possibly Pakistan or 
North Korea.726 Libya received the blueprint for a nuclear weapon from the A.Q. Khan 
network in late 2001 or early 2002.727 Libya stated to the IAEA, however, that it did not 
have the personnel skilled to develop a nuclear weapon.728 In February 2002, Libya 
conducted cold testing of the pilot uranium conversion facility from Japan, according to 
the IAEA.729 In March 2002, Qaddafi asserted in a televised speech: “We demanded the 
dismantling of the weapons of mass destruction that the Israelis have; we must continue 
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to demand that. Otherwise, the Arabs will have the right to possess that weapon.”730 In 
April 2002, however, the centrifuge equipment at Al-Hashan was taken apart and moved 
to Al-Fallah where most of the equipment remained in storage at the time of the February 
2004 IAEA report.731 The U.S. intelligence community’s 2001 report to Congress 
summarized this bifurcated approach well. It noted that Libya had sought to expand its 
nuclear weapons program even as it pursued a rapprochement with the West.732 Like 
Iraq, Libya was reaching out to the United States while it worked to strengthen its nuclear 
weapons capabilities. 
Libya began to move more definitively toward denuclearization in 2003. In 
March, after first reaching out to British intelligence, Libya began negotiating with the 
United States and the United Kingdom regarding the dismantlement of its nuclear 
program, according to the Arms Control Association.733 The IAEA reported that it was 
during this timeframe that Libya took apart the pilot uranium conversion facility received 
from the Japanese and moved it to Salah Eddin.734 The negotiations stretched from 
March to December and Libya publicly renounced its program in December 2003. 
According to U.S. intelligence, “the Libyans made significant disclosures about their 
nuclear, chemical, and missile-related activities.”735 U.S. intelligence further noted that 
American and British experts visited Libya twice toward the end of the year and were 
“shown covert facilities and equipment and were told of years of Libyan efforts to 
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develop weapons capabilities.”736 But, in a step backward for Libya’s efforts to convince 
the West of its desire to end its nuclear program, the IAEA reported that, in October 
2003, a ship called the BBC China carrying centrifuge equipment and destined for Libya 
was seized in the Mediterranean.737 It was not clear if this interdiction should have been 
attributed to the Proliferation Security Initiative launched by the United States in May 
2003 or ongoing efforts to unravel the A.Q. Khan network. 
On December 19, 2003, Libya abandoned its weapons of mass destruction 
programs and Missile Technology Control Regime class missiles.738 U.S. intelligence 
reported that Libya admitted to “nuclear fuel cycle projects that were ultimately intended 
to support a nuclear weapons program, including uranium processing and 
enrichment.”739 In addition, Libya promised to adhere to IAEA Safeguards as well as the 
Additional Protocol and to end its nuclear weapons program.740 Finally, U.S. intelligence 
highlighted Libya admitted that the A.Q. Khan network had provided extensive nuclear 
assistance.741 
The timeframe for Libya deciding to end its nuclear program had led to an 
alternate and more prevalent argument that the ending was directly related to security 
concerns resulting from the 2003 Gulf War. For example, Bahgat argued that the U.S. 
termination of Hussein’s rule in Iraq motivated Qaddafi to end Libya’s program.742 If 
Indyk was correct that Libya reached out with an offer to end its nuclear program in 
1999, the Second Gulf War would not be the driving force behind Libya’s decision. 
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In regard to delivery systems, Libya aggressively worked to expand its missile 
program, primarily consisting of Scud-B missiles, with the goal of developing a medium-
range ballistic missile or “extended-range scud” capability, according to U.S. 
intelligence.743 And Bermudez noted that, throughout the 1990s, Libya pursued 
acquisitions despite the arms embargo.744 Libya looked to various suppliers. Nuclear 
Threat Initiative wrote that interdiction operations netted missile parts en route to Libya 
from suppliers in Germany, Iran, North Korea, and Taiwan.745 In 1996, the U.S. 
intelligence community reported to Congress that Libya sought “ballistic missile-related 
equipment, materials, and technology from Europe, the CIS, and the Far East.”746 
Despite Libya’s efforts, these interdictions combined with the effects of the UN embargo 
restricted Libya’s missile acquisitions.747 
Libya reinvigorated its procurement efforts in the early 2000s.748 U.S. 
intelligence reported that the suspension of UN sanctions in 1999 was key to allowing 
Libya to move forward with missile development once again.749 When Libya renounced 
its weapons of mass destruction programs and Missile Technology Control Regime class 
missiles in December 2003, however, it “provided extensive information on its Scud 
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missile inventory, its efforts to develop longer-range missiles, and the assistance it 
obtained from North Korea and other sources.”750 
c. Nuclear Trends 
Libya pursued nuclear weapons until 2003 while enduring punishing economic 
sanctions. Libya showed a clear motivation to acquire a nuclear weapon. It admitted to 
acquiring components for a centrifuge enrichment capability along with nuclear weapons 
designs. The country went to significant lengths to acquire the technology to extend its 
missile capability. 
What drove Libya’s nuclear behavior? In the regional context, threats persisted. 
Iraq and Iran continued to pursue nuclear weapons. Israel’s military power had not 
diminished. Three shifts occurred in Libya’s nuclear program from 1991 to 2003. First, 
Libya continued its pursuit of nuclear capabilities at the beginning of the period and 
increased its efforts in 1995. Second, Libya reinvigorated both its nuclear and missile 
efforts in the early 2000s after sanctions ended. Third, in 2003, Libya voluntarily 
renounced its nuclear program. The Libyan case contrasts with Iraq, where the United 
States ended its program by force and UN sanctions and inspections kept it from being 
reconstituted. 
The United States applied constant pressure on Libya due to its nuclear program 
and sponsorship of terrorism throughout the 1990s. U.S. and UN sanctions hindered 
Libya’s nuclear efforts. While the United States was unaware of the magnitude of Libya’s 
covert activities, it shined an international spotlight on the country and its nuclear and 
missile efforts. Libya expert Wyn Bowen assessed that: 
The Libyan case demonstrates that by means of a combination of targeted 
sanctions, political and diplomatic isolation, export controls and 
intelligence sharing on nuclear-related shipments and activities, the 
international community can make the acquisition of nuclear weapons 
prohibitively costly, in economic and political terms, and in the right 
                                                 
750 “Profile for Libya—Missile”; Director of Central Intelligence, “Unclassified Report to Congress 
on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional 
Munitions, July–December 2003.” 
 161 
context can prompt a unilateral decision to relinquish the pursuit of such 
weapons.751 
After over a decade of diplomatic and economic pressure on Libya, there seemed 
to be no way forward for the country without complying with international demands. The 
United States was the driving force behind those demands. 
5. Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia strengthened its security relationship with the United States 
beginning with the First Gulf War. The country was not prepared to repel Iraq’s invasion 
of Kuwait on its own. Throughout the 1990s, the United States and Saudi Arabia 
expanded military relations. On the nuclear front, Saudi Arabia did not significantly 
advance its civilian or military nuclear capabilities. The only concern emerged when a 
rumor circulated regarding possible acquisition by Saudi Arabia of a nuclear deterrent 
from Pakistan. 
a. Political Context 
Shifting political alliances characterized the beginning of the 1990s for Saudi 
Arabia. Saudi Arabia had supported Iraq against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War of the 
1980s, but Iraq’s 1991 invasion of Kuwait alarmed Saudi Arabia. In addition, Iraq 
launched Scud missiles at Saudi Arabia. In response, Saudi Arabia mobilized regional 
states against Iraq and reached out to the United States for military assistance. Iraq had 
the strongest army in the Middle East at the time and Saudi Arabia welcomed assistance 
to confront Iraq. The United States, which also had a strategic interest in the stability of 
the Arabian Peninsula, stepped in to help its Gulf allies. This action exemplified Saudi 
Arabia’s approach to handling large regional security issues. Bahgat Korany and Moataz 
Fattah noted that Saudi Arabia governed by relying on “the ulama for domestic control 
and legitimacy” and on “the U.S. for international security.”752 
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Catering to its domestic audience, the Saudi rulers received the blessing from the 
ulama to have the U.S. military on Saudi soil. The U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia 
was controversial because Saudi Arabia hosts Islam’s holy sites of Mecca and Medina 
and Saudi Arabia worked to mitigate the backlash from the U.S. military presence on its 
soil. Saudi Arabia shielded itself from some criticism by receiving troops from Egypt, 
Syria, and Morocco along with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Senegal, and Afghanistan during 
the First Gulf War.753 
A U.S.-led coalition quickly ejected Iraq from Kuwait. After the conflict, the Gulf 
States solidified their relationship with the United States and Saudi Arabia expanded its 
military relationship with the superpower.754 Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States 
looked to the United States to ensure their security and provide conventional military 
equipment. Foley wrote that they “continued to make significant arms purchases after the 
war. . . . These costs, however, were seemingly worth the investment to the Gulf States. 
U.S. power had freed Kuwait and protected the regional states from a very real threat in 
1991 as well as from Iraq and Iran in subsequent years.”755 Throughout the 1990s and 
early 2000s, this close security relationship between the United States and its Gulf state 
allies, especially Saudi Arabia, continued. 
Tensions arose between Saudi Arabia and the United States after the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, in New York City and Washington, DC. Fifteen of the 
nineteen terrorists were from Saudi Arabia. Further, the mastermind of the attacks Osama 
Bin Laden, a Saudi citizen, had spoken out publicly against the presence of U.S. troops 
on Saudi soil since the early 1990s.756 These tensions, however, did not permanently 
disrupt relations between the two countries. In fact, Saudi Arabia sought to cooperate 
with the United States in its “war on terror” that followed the 2001 attacks. 
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Regionally, Saudi Arabia’s historical friendships and enmities continued. Saudi 
Arabia refused to recognize the state of Israel. It worried about the military capabilities of 
Iran and Iraq. It maintained cordial relationships with Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. 
Finally, it served as a regional leader for the Gulf States, intervening in domestic disputes 
when it deemed necessary, especially Yemen’s civil strife. 
b. Nuclear Program 
Saudi Arabia took small steps to build its knowledge of nuclear technology from 
1991 to 2003. For example, in the early 1990s, it undertook a study on power plant 
equipment.757 It did not make any significant progress, however, and Saudi Arabia’s 
nuclear intentions were not called into question. 
This changed in the late 1990s and early 2000s, however, when rumors circulated 
regarding a nuclear relationship between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The country’s 
defense minister aroused suspicion when he traveled to Pakistan’s nuclear research center 
in 1999 and 2002.758 A British newspaper reported in September 2003 that Saudi Arabia 
was considering policy options of acquiring “a nuclear capability as a deterrent,” relying 
on “an alliance with an existing nuclear power that would offer protection,” or trying “to 
reach a regional agreement on having a nuclear-free Middle East.”759 Another newspaper 
alleged in November 2003 that Pakistan had agreed to provide Saudi Arabia with a 
nuclear bomb, if Saudi Arabia requested it.760 Saudi Arabia denied the allegations and no 
further evidence emerged to substantiate these claims. 
In addition, Saudi Arabia voiced its concerns regarding the nonproliferation 
regime. During the negotiations leading up to the 1995 indefinite extension of the NPT, 
Saudi Arabia protested Israel’s non-signatory status. While Saudi Arabia did eventually 
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support the NPT extension, it did not sign the Additional Safeguards agreement or the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Thomas Lippman assessed that Saudi Arabia’s actions 
regarding the NPT extension likely served as a protest.761 
Saudi Arabia continued its complaints in international venues about Israel. In 
1999, Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United Nations Fawzi Shobokshi made a 
strongly worded statement regarding the country’s dissatisfaction with the lack of 
advancement of nonproliferation objectives in the Middle East. Shobokshi noted that 
while many regions around the world are achieving success in establishing 
nuclear free zones as a result of the cooperation and recognition of the 
need for peaceful co-existence among their countries, we find that the 
international and regional efforts to make the Middle East a nuclear free 
zone are fruitless. This is the result of the refusal of one country, namely 
Israel, to cooperate with these efforts.762 
In terms of delivery systems, Saudi Arabia still maintained the CSS-2 missiles it 
had acquired in the late 1980s, but it did not acquire more missiles. Furthermore, it seems 
unlikely that China would have risked its nuclear cooperation agreement with the United 
States in order to upgrade Saudi Arabia’s old missiles with nuclear warheads.763 
c. Nuclear Trends 
Saudi Arabia’s nuclear capabilities—in terms of fissile material, a delivery 
system, or a warhead—did not increase over this period. They did not advance beyond 
the 1987 acquisition of intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The one question regarding 
Saudi Arabia’s regional nuclear intentions stemmed from the alleged Saudi-Pakistani 
discussions about assistance with a nuclear deterrent. If there was truth in the rumors, it 
might have indicated that Saudi Arabia had greater security concerns than were 
outwardly apparent. If the rumors were not true, it might have signaled that Saudi Arabia 
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felt secure within the regional dynamic, bolstered by U.S. assistance. Regardless of 
possible intentions, Saudi Arabia did not seem to advance its nuclear capabilities. 
What drove Saudi Arabia’s nuclear behavior? In the regional context, was Israel 
Saudi Arabia’s primary security concern? Lippman argued that Saudi statements about 
Israel were “rhetorical folderol.”764 Also, one can quickly point to several neighboring 
states that had sought to improve nuclear capabilities and ballistic missile arsenals over 
the period, namely Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Syria. Saudi Arabia was not on good terms with 
any of these countries. Further, both Iraq and Iran had posed a direct threat to the 
Kingdom. Saudi Arabia had a number of regional motivations to secure the ultimate 
deterrent. The fact that it did not advance its nuclear capabilities during this period speaks 
to the power of U.S. influence. 
6. Syria 
Syria improved its relationship with the United States after the end of the Cold 
War through supporting the First Gulf War and participating in the Madrid Conference. 
By the end of the period, however, Syria’s relationship with the United States and 
neighboring states had deteriorated again. In regards to its nuclear program, Syria began 
to work on a secret nuclear project aided by North Korea in the mid-1990s. Syria also 
improved its missile capabilities. 
a. Political Context 
International and domestic shifts caused Syria to seek to redefine itself in the 
Middle East during the 1990s and into the 2000s. While Syria had traditionally been 
aligned with the Soviet Union, it joined the U.S.-led coalition in the First Gulf War to 
drive Iraq from Kuwait. An improved relationship with the United States benefited Syria 
as its traditional ally and primary weapons supplier, the Soviet Union, dissolved in 
December 1991. 
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After the end of the First Gulf War, Syria agreed to participate in Arab-Israeli 
peace talks – an initiative led by U.S. President George H. W. Bush. This led to the 
Madrid Conference held in October 1991 attended by Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and 
a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.765 The United States and the Soviet Union led the 
conference. Israel and Syria held bilateral talks in Washington, DC, after the conference. 
The two countries continued peace talks in 1994 at the Wye Plantation in Maryland, but 
broke them off in 1996.766 It was remarkable that Syria was willing to hold talks with 
Israel, given its strong stance against relations between Middle Eastern states and Israel. 
Raymond Hinnebusch explains Syria’s behavior by noting: 
In parallel with the fall of Syria’s Soviet patron and the 1990s peace 
process, external aid declined and the Ba’ath’s nationalist policy now 
collided with the imperative to access inward investment as a substitute 
for aid. This contradiction was buffered by revenues from Syria’s own 
modest oil reserves, but these were also expected to decline in the 2000s; 
in the meantime, Syria pursued, under U.S. auspices, the possibility of a 
peace settlement with Israel that would satisfy nationalist legitimacy yet 
open the door to foreign aid and investment.767 
Furthermore, Hinnebusch states that “the peace process was paralleled by a fall in 
military spending from about 18 percent of GNP between 1976 and 1988 to 7 percent in 
the 1990s.”768 Thus, it seems that economic motivations drove Syria’s newly found 
efforts to cooperate. 
Syria continued its willingness to dialogue with Israel even as Syrian president 
Hafez al-Assad’s health deteriorated. Israel and Syria resumed peace talks in January 
2000 in West Virginia hosted by the United States. Possibly Assad sought to complete an 
agreement before his son, Bashar, took power.769 The two countries did not return for 
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further talks, however, and the elderly president died in June 2000. His son assumed 
power after him. 
Syria’s relationship with the United States remained stable under Bashar al-Assad 
at the beginning of the decade. He cooperated with the United States after the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001. Syria also continued its policy of being the first line of 
Arab defense against Israel, angering the Israelis. The tide turned in terms of the U.S.-
Syrian relationship in 2003, when Syria decided not to join the U.S.-led coalition against 
Iraq. 
In terms of other regional relations, Syria remained closest to Iran, which it had 
supported during the Iran-Iraq War. Syria’s relationships with the Arab Gulf states and 
Jordan improved after the First Gulf War when it joined the U.S.-led coalition to expel 
Iraq from Kuwait’s borders; however, relations with Iraq, Egypt, and Turkey remained 
poor. Also, Syria continued interfering in Lebanese politics. 
b. Nuclear Program 
Syria sought to advance its nuclear capabilities without its benefactor, the Soviet 
Union, in the early 1990s. In 1991, a 1985 Syrian-Soviet agreement to build a research 
reactor ended because of a financial disagreement.770 Nevertheless, Syria continued to 
pursue the acquisition of a nuclear reactor.771 First, the country expressed interest in 
buying a research reactor from India.772 It was China, however, that began to construct a 
research reactor, the SRR-1—a miniature neutron-source reactor—at Dayr Al Hajar and 
provided reactor fuel.773 This light-water research reactor went critical in 1996. While 
the reactor could not produce fissile material, it was used for training and research.774 
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Syria turned to another nuclear supplier in the mid- to late 1990s. In 1997, Syria 
and North Korea began to cooperate on nuclear issues. The U.S. intelligence community 
indicated that “cooperation between North Korean nuclear-related personalities and 
entities and high-level Syrian officials began probably as early as 1997, which . . . puts it 
into the Hafez al-Assad regime in terms of the original decision to begin this 
cooperation.”775 U.S. intelligence acquired information beginning in 2001 regarding 
interactions “between North Korean nuclear entities and high-level Syrian officials.”776 
U.S. intelligence noted additional interactions in 2003 and judged that they were likely 
related to nuclear proliferation.777 
While Syria appeared to cooperate clandestinely with North Korea, it claimed it 
did not receive nuclear material from another illicit supplier—the A.Q. Khan network. 
A.Q. Khan came to Syria to give lectures on nuclear issues in late 1997 and 1998, 
according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies.778 Syria asserted, however, 
that it did not make any nuclear supply agreements with Khan.779 
Russia began providing assistance to Syria in the late 1990s. The two countries 
signed a nuclear agreement in 1999.780 It involved plans for a desalination plant and a 
light-water reactor, but, as of 2003, little progress had been made.781 In January 2000, 
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Russia approved a program for cooperation with Syria on civil nuclear power.782 In 
March 2003, Russia agreed to construct a desalination plant in Syria.783 Meanwhile, the 
U.S. intelligence community expressed concern that Russian nuclear assistance would 
allow Syria to build indigenous nuclear capabilities.784 
As part of Syria’s traditional role of confronting Israel, Syria fought against the 
indefinite extension of the NPT in 1994 due to Israel’s non-signatory status. The NPT 
extension passed in 1995 after a resolution on the Middle East was included backing the 
creation of a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the region. In 2003, Syria, as a 
non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, unsuccessfully pushed for a UN 
resolution for all regional states to join the NPT.785 
During this period, Syria continued to expand its missile program and capabilities. 
The Wisconsin Project noted that, in 1994, Syria tested a North Korean Scud-C missile, 
and, in 1996, Syria reportedly tested a 600 km range Scud-C.786 Demonstrating advances 
in its missile program, Syria successfully test fired a Scud-D missile in 2000, according 
to the Wisconsin Project.787  
Syria conducted this work with third country assistance, especially from North 
Korea and Iran. From 1997 through the early 2000s, Iran assisted Syria with solid-
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propellant missile development.788 Russia, China, and North Korea helped Syria with 
liquid-propellant missile development.789 As of 2008, North Korea had provided 
upwards of 60 Scud-C missiles since 1991 and 50 Scud-D missiles along with seven 
transporter erector launches in 2000, according to the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies.790 In late 2002 and into 2003, North Korea and Iran may have been helping 
Syria to develop Scud-D missiles.791 
c. Nuclear Trends 
By the end of 2003, Syria had begun to expand its nuclear program through covert 
cooperation with North Korea. This cooperation appeared to begin in 1997. The two 
countries further advanced their nuclear cooperation in 2001 after Bashar Al-Assad came 
to power following his father’s death. Syria also worked with Iran, North Korea, China, 
and Russia to improve its delivery systems. Thus, Syria’s program seemed to shift 
forward twice during this period as it took steps to acquire more advanced nuclear 
technology and delivery systems. 
What drove Syria’s nuclear behavior during this period? Given Syria’s weak 
economy, limited infrastructure, and lack of specialists in the nuclear field, it seemed 
unlikely that Syria would seek to develop nuclear weapons.792 In the regional context, 
Syria was a minor power in a region filled with turmoil and it continued to have an 
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ongoing conflict with Israel. Regional conflict and rivalry seemed to spur Syria toward 
nuclear proliferation. This motivation was complemented by access to nuclear suppliers 
willing to provide covert assistance. 
7. Turkey 
During this period, Turkey remained focused on a domestic threat, the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party insurgency. Any cross-border issues with its neighbors often were related 
to fighting this insurgency. Otherwise, it generally had few conflicts with regional states. 
The country’s defense establishment maintained a Western focus and aspired to become a 
member of the European Union. On the nuclear front, Turkey sought to move forward 
with constructing nuclear power plants, but was stymied by various technical and 
financial issues.  
a. Political Context 
In the 1990s and early 2000s, Turkey’s security concerns were driven by the 
threat from an internal Kurdistan Workers’ Party insurgency and the two wars involving 
its southern neighbor Iraq. These two issues were tied together. In addition to the general 
instability resulting from U.S.-led military actions in Iraq, the no-fly zone in northern Iraq 
to protect Iraq’s Kurdish population was a cause for concern in Turkey. Its anxiety 
stemmed from the fact that increased autonomy for Iraq’s Kurds might make Turkey’s 
Kurdish population push for more independence. Furthermore, Turkey’s Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party insurgency was a source of conflict with its neighbors, particularly Iran 
and Syria, due to cross-border issues involving Kurdish populations in these countries.793 
For example, a war nearly began between Turkey and Syria over Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party leader Abdullah Ocalan’s presence in Syria.794 
In terms of other regional relations, Turkey maintained good relationships with 
Israel, Egypt, the Gulf States, and the countries in the Levant, with the exception of Syria 
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due to the Kurdish issue. Despite some border tensions, Turkey and Iran remained trading 
partners. By the early 2000s, Iran was sending natural gas to Turkey via a newly 
constructed Iran-Turkey pipeline. 
In terms of its relationship with the United States, Turkey had been a close U.S. 
ally dating back to the end of World War II. As in other Middle Eastern countries, 
however, there was strong domestic opposition in Turkey to the war. This led to 
complications regarding U.S. use of Turkish territory for the war and the United States 
relied on other regional states for assistance in this regard. 
During this period, the country also struggled to maintain the secular identity 
enshrined by its founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. While Turkey had historical ties to the 
Middle East and was a Muslim country, Turkey’s leadership identified the country with 
secularism and the West. Also, Turkey continued negotiations to join the European 
Union. The 1997 political coup in Turkey served as an example of this political struggle. 
Described as a “post-modern” coup, Turkish military leadership forced Prime Minister 
Necmettin Erbakan from power without taking any military action.795 The military 
claimed that it carried out the coup in order to curb the influence of Islamist political 
figures and promote a secular government. Furthermore, Turkey’s Defense White Paper 
written in 2000 promoted a Western and secular vision of Turkey. It stated that Turkey 
“with a great majority of its population being Muslim, has adopted the western 
civilization as a model to be implemented from the date of its establishment until the 
present, condemns all religious fundamentalist currents, from whichever religion they 
originate.”796 The paper offered that Turkey was a model to “moderate Islamic countries 
and the Central Asian Republics” and that Turkey would “continue to form the greatest 
obstacle for the export of the religious fundamentalism movement to Europe.”797 Finally, 
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Turkey described itself as “a reliable ally of NATO and a candidate member of the 
EU.”798 
Regionally, Turkey faced few threats from other Middle Eastern states during this 
period. Its military remained oriented to combating an internal insurgency. The political 
conflicts within Turkey’s government highlighted the dual identity of the country as both 
a Muslim, Middle Eastern country and a proud North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
member with a European orientation. Nevertheless, the country seemed to begin to tilt 
toward the Middle East and away from the West following the end of the Cold War. 
b. Nuclear Program 
Turkey remained committed to acquiring nuclear power. It made assessments in 
the early 1990s as to future energy needs and the results of the analysis called for about 
35 nuclear power plants.799 Turkey pushed forward its plan for nuclear power again in 
the late 1990s. Turkey solicited bids for a nuclear power plant at Akkuyu Bay, but the 
initiative ended in 2000 due to financial issues. Then, in 2002, the AK Party (the Justice 
and Development Party), a conservative party with Islamist roots, led by Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan came to power in Turkey. As part of its platform, it “reintroduced the issue of 
nuclear power as one of the major energy sources to reduce supply security risks caused 
by the dominance of imported fuels, and to ensure diversity in power generation.”800 
After entering office, Erdogan continued to pursue a nuclear power option as part of 
Turkey’s energy policy. 
Meanwhile, in 1994, Turkey partially converted its research reactor, Turkish 
Reactor 2, to run on low enriched uranium fuel. In order to conduct a safety review, the 
reactor was shut down in 1995 and resumed operations in 1998.801 An earthquake shook 
the region in 1999 prompting additional reviews, although the reactor was not 
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damaged.802 The earthquake prompted a technical cooperation project between IAEA 
and the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority. The organizations assessed that the reactor 
would not likely be harmed in the event of another earthquake.803 The Turkish Reactor 2 
remained in operation. 
While Turkey worked to expand its nuclear infrastructure, Turkey’s nuclear role 
in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shifted in 1995. Robert Norris and Hans 
Kristensen noted that all of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s B61 bombs in 
Turkey were removed from Akinci and Balikesir Air Bases and consolidated at Incirlik 
Air Base.804 According to retired Turkish Air Force commander General Ergin Celasin,  
nuclear weapons that reportedly remain in Turkey cannot be linked to the 
Turkish military” and the Air Force’s “role in NATO’s nuclear 
contingency plans has come to an end with the withdrawal of nuclear 
weapons in the 1990s from the Air Force units that were deployed in 
several air bases in Turkey.805  
Norris and Kristensen assert that since this withdrawal of weapons, “the number 
of ‘Turkish’ bombs at Incirlik AB has probably been reduced to 10–20 weapons to 
correspond to the inventories at other national bases” in Europe.806 As of 2001, the base 
hosted 90 weapons, however, it was not clear that Turkey maintained an operational link 
to the weapons past the mid-1990s due to questions regarding whether Turkey’s F-16s 
were equipped to carry the weapons.807 Norris and Kristensen wrote that a U.S. Air 
Force nuclear-capable fighter wing was not permanently based at Incirlik.808 According 
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to Benjamin Loehrke and Alexandra Bell, this meant that, in a crisis, aircraft from other 
U.S. bases would have to deliver any Turkey-based U.S. nuclear weapons.809 
Turkey had been an active participant in the nonproliferation regime. In the mid-
1990s, Turkey became a signatory to several nonproliferation regime treaties. It signed 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996 and ratified it in 2000. Turkey joined the 
Missile Technology Control Regime in 1997. It was the only country in the Middle East 
region to have acceded to the regime. Finally, it joined the Zangger Committee on 
nuclear exports in 1999. But, juxtaposed against these actions were remarks like those of 
a former Turkish transport minister, who, according to Al-Hayat, noted in 2000 that 
Turkey’s “possession of the nuclear bomb will strengthen our security and enhance our 
deterrence amid this nuclear environment.”810 
In terms of delivery systems, Turkey began acquiring a ballistic missile capability 
in the late 1990s. According to Michael Barletta, it signed a contract in December 1995 
for 120 Army Tactical Missile System missiles from the United States.811 The missile 
had a range of 165 km, however, and could not be used to carry nuclear warheads.812 
Turkey turned to China for additional short-range ballistic missiles. The Nuclear Threat 
Initiative quoted Duncan Lennox as stating that Turkey produced the J-600T Yildirim I 
and the J-600T Yildirim II with China’s assistance in the late 1990s.813 
c. Nuclear Trends 
Turkey did not advance toward an indigenous nuclear weapons capability during 
this period. In addition, according to the sources discussed here, it seems that the 
operational link between the U.S. nuclear weapons stored at Incirlik and Turkey’s 
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military likely ended in the mid-1990s. Furthermore, Turkey joined multiple 
nonproliferation treaties in the 1990s, further integrating itself into the nonproliferation 
regime. 
What drove Turkey’s nuclear behavior? In the regional context, Turkey’s 
neighbors, Iran and Iraq, pursued nuclear weapons along with Libya. Turkey also faced 
periodic altercations with Iran, Iraq, and Syria related to the Kurdish issue. There are 
three reasons why Turkey likely did not pursue a nuclear weapons capability. First, 
Turkey’s greatest perceived threat remained domestic. Its military’s primary focus was 
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. Second, despite a reported operational planning shift for 
the delivery of U.S. nuclear weapons based in Turkey, Turkey did remain under the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization nuclear umbrella. Third, it would have been hard to 
imagine a scenario where Turkey would risk support from the United States and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization to pursue nuclear weapons. 
8. United Arab Emirates 
The United Arab Emirates faced various regional threats during this period. Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait was the most threatening and it motivated the United Arab Emirates 
to build a strong security relationship with the United States. Despite the challenges of 
regional conflict, the country did not increase its nuclear capabilities during this period in 
a significant way. 
a. Political Context 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait marked a tumultuous beginning to the 1990s for the 
United Arab Emirates. The country supported the U.S.-led coalition that forced Iraq out 
of Kuwait in 1991. In order to assist the superpower, the United Arab Emirates offered up 
the Jebel Ali port in Dubai, which had the depth to host an aircraft carrier.814 The port 
quickly gained in importance for the U.S. Navy.815 Following the First Gulf War, the 
United Arab Emirates did not re-establish diplomatic relations with Iraq until 1998. 
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Iran posed another significant threat to the country. The two countries had a long-
running territorial dispute over three islands strategically located in the Persian Gulf—
Abu Musa Island and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs Islands. In 1992, Iran upset the 
United Arab Emirates by taking over Abu Musa Island. Iran installed its military on the 
island and held military exercises.816 In addition, Iran refused to discuss its seizure of the 
island.817 
In order to help mitigate regional threats, including those posed by Iraq and Iran, 
the country forged close security ties with the United States.818 In 1994, the United Arab 
Emirates and the United States signed a defense agreement.819 As part of this agreement, 
the United States used the airbase at Al Dhafra for aerial operations.820 Nevertheless, the 
United Arab Emirates did not support the U.S.-led coalition in the 2003 Second Gulf 
War. 
Strengthened by its security relationship with the United States, the country began 
to play a greater regional role by the end of the period. For example, the United Arab 
Emirates provided military equipment to Lebanon and Yemen to assist with internal 
security issues in the early 2000s.821 
b. Nuclear Program 
During this period, the United Arab Emirates signaled its adherence to the 
nonproliferation regime and did not launch new efforts to build its nuclear infrastructure. 
In 1995, the Emirates became a signatory to the NPT. In addition, the country signed the 
accompanying Safeguards Agreement in 2002. This agreement entered into force in 
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2003. The Emirates continued a number of ongoing technical cooperation projects with 
the IAEA. 
The country did inadvertently play a role in proliferation activities during this 
period. The A.Q. Khan network hosted several meetings in Dubai, the country’s business 
hub, according to Feroz Khan.822 The meetings were between representatives of the A.Q. 
Khan network and Iran.823 After these events, the country took measures to improve its 
export controls.824  
Finally, the United Arab Emirates made no advances in terms of delivery systems. 
There seemed to be no indication that the country acquired additional ballistic missiles. 
c. Nuclear Trends 
The United Arab Emirates did not make progress toward weapons-relevant 
nuclear capabilities from 1991 to 2003. It did not take steps toward acquiring fissile 
material, a nuclear warhead, or a delivery vehicle. This occurred despite significant 
security threats to the Emirates from neighboring countries Iraq and Iran. 
What drove the United Arab Emirates’ nuclear behavior? In the regional context, 
Iran, Iraq, and Libya sought to advance their nuclear capabilities and Iran and Iraq might 
have been perceived as a direct threat given their proximity. Nevertheless, the Emirates’ 
close relationship with the United States helped it to mitigate security concerns. In 
regards to the threat from Iraq, the Emirates actively supported the United States in its 
efforts to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991. The military-to-military aspect of the 
bilateral relationship continued to grow throughout the period. 
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Nuclear proliferation efforts of two countries ended between 1991 and 2003—
Iraq and Libya. Iraq’s attempts to acquire a nuclear weapon were blocked by the First 
Gulf War and subsequent dismantlement of its nuclear program. Libya’s pursuit of a 
nuclear weapon halted in 2003. By the end of 2003, the nuclear programs of both 
countries had terminated. 
Nuclear proliferation activities in Iran and Syria continued beyond 2003. Iran’s 
program continued throughout the period and the country increased its nuclear capability. 
The U.S. intelligence community’s unclassified reports to Congress submitted from 1996 
through 2003 expressed serious concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear activities throughout 
the 1990s, more so than regarding the activities of Iraq and Libya. The Duelfer Report, 
which concluded that Iraq’s program had effectively been terminated following the 1991 
Iraq War, validated this focus. In addition, Syria acquired a nuclear reactor with the 
assistance of China and began cooperating secretly with North Korea to acquire nuclear 
technology. 
What explains the overall decrease in nuclear proliferation behavior for the region 
from 1991 to 2003? This period stands in contrast to the previous period where nuclear 
proliferation increased. Given ongoing regional conflict and rivalry and a shift in the 
international system to a unipolar period, it would seem that nuclear proliferation should 




Table 2.   Summary of Regional Nuclear Trends from 1991 through 2003 
Egypt 
No increase or decrease in nuclear proliferation. 
Iran 
Iran increased its nuclear capabilities from 1991 through 2002. In 2003, Iran halted its 
coordinated military nuclear program after revelations regarding its nuclear program by 
an opposition group. While Iran was driven to proliferate due to it rivalry with Iraq, its 
decision to halt its military program was due to superpower management. 
Iraq 
While Iraq sought to maintain its capacity for a nuclear weapons program, its overall 
capabilities decreased as a result of the First Gulf War in 1991 and the subsequent 
further dismantling of its program. This outcome was due to superpower management. 
Libya 
Libya increased its nuclear capabilities through the time period before announcing the 
end of the program in 2003. This outcome was due to external management. 
Saudi Arabia 
No increase or decrease in nuclear proliferation. 
 Syria 
Syria began discussions regarding a nuclear reactor in 1997 and began more serious 
work in 2001. Syria’s efforts were driven by regional rivalry. 
Turkey 
No increase or decrease in nuclear proliferation. 
United Arab Emirates 
No increase or decrease in nuclear proliferation. 
 
B. VARIATIONS IN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION BEHAVIOR: TESTING 
TWO THEORIES 
Which theory better explains nuclear behavior during the second period? The first 
hypothesis based on Waltz’s work is: Regional nuclear proliferation could increase 
during the second time period following the Cold War as a shift to a less stable unipolar 
international system occurs. The second hypothesis based on Paul’s work is: Regional 
nuclear proliferation does not increase during the second time period due to a reduction in 
the intensity of regional conflict and rivalry in the region. Nevertheless, I found that there 
was no reduction in the intensity of regional conflict and rivalry in the region. Thus, was 
there a causal link between external management and an increase in nuclear proliferation 
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or a causal link between regional conflict and rivalry and an increase in nuclear 
proliferation? Were multiple regional states driving nuclear proliferation trends or was it 
the presence or absence of superpower management? 
1. Testing Two Theories 
The first hypothesis predicted nuclear proliferation could increase and the second 
hypothesis originally suggested it would not. Initially, Paul’s theory appeared to best 
explain nuclear behavior during the period as the regional trend was toward a decrease in 
nuclear proliferation, but it did not. First, the region can still be described as a high-
conflict zone. Regional nuclear proliferation decreased in spite of the persistence of 
conflict and rivalry. Second, the regional nuclear history shows that in a unipolar system, 
the sole superpower had greater latitude to combat nuclear proliferation and its external 
management efforts drove nuclear behavior. 
External management efforts provide a better explanation for regional nuclear 
behavior, but not in the way that Waltz might initially suggest. Waltz argued that, under 
bipolarity, international involvement and “preponderant power” during the Cold War led 
to superpower management of regional states.825 After the Cold War, this level of 
external management and general system stability ended. My research finds, however, 
that nuclear proliferation increased in the bipolar period and decreased in the unipolar 
period. A less permissive environment for nuclear proliferation spread existed during the 
unipolar period. 
A closer look at Waltz’s statements regarding preponderant power under 
unipolarity help explain these research results. First, with the end of the Soviet Union, the 
United States was “no longer held in check by any other country or combination of 
countries.”826 Second, writing in 2000, Waltz reminded us that the United States was 
“not just the dominant power in the world,” but it was “a liberal dominant power.”827 
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And this shaped the kinds of causes that the United States would expend its power and 
influence on. In this case, the United States pushed a nonproliferation agenda and 
reinforced the nonproliferation regime. It valued this agenda above selling nuclear 
technology. Russia, for example, seemed to be more driven by economic interests. Third, 
Waltz noted that the United States thought “of itself as acting for the sake of peace, 
justice, and well-being in the world,” but that these terms “were defined to the liking of 
the powerful.”828 Limiting the spread of nuclear proliferation and expanding the 
nonproliferation regime were urgent tasks for the United States and it had a free hand to 
determine how to best accomplish these goals in the unipolar period. For example, Russia 
did not stand in the way of the United States as it led a coalition against Iraq in 1991 and 
2003. 
The United States as the sole superpower had greater latitude to pursue its 
interests in the international system. It did not have to concern itself with losing client 
states to another superpower or with superpower competition within the region. After the 
surprise of the extent of Iraq’s nuclear capability in 1991, U.S. attention turned sharply to 
the issue of nonproliferation. The discovery of the lack of knowledge regarding Iraq’s 
progress in its nuclear program prompted a higher level of scrutiny of potential 
proliferators than there had been during the bipolar period. U.S. policymakers expressed 
great interest regarding the state of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems 
around the globe. The biannual reports on weapons of mass destruction requested by the 
U.S. Congress from the intelligence community and produced through the early 2000s 
bear witness to this interest. 
Greater freedom of action allowed the United States to be able to pressure more 
effectively state nuclear suppliers such as China or pursue non-state nuclear suppliers 
such as the A.Q. Khan network. By the early 2000s, the United States had begun to 
unravel this network.829 The United States also used economic sanctions as a tool to 
pressure possible proliferators. It was able to push through effective international 
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sanctions on Iraq, Iran, and Libya. These sanctions played an important role in limiting 
their nuclear efforts. 
In Iraq, the United States forcefully ended the Iraqi nuclear program during the 
First Gulf War in 1991. UN dismantlement efforts, close monitoring, and UN sanctions 
following the war blocked Iraq from resuming its efforts. The Duelfer Report made it 
clear that Saddam Hussein unsuccessfully sought to maintain as much of the country’s 
physical and intellectual nuclear capabilities as possible under sanctions. By 2003, Iraq’s 
nuclear program was in shambles due to the destruction of nuclear facilities during the 
First Gulf War, the inspection regimen carried out in the early to mid-1990s, and 
sanctions levied against the country. 
Libya worked to increase its nuclear capabilities at the beginning of the period. 
Nevertheless, the U.S.-led efforts to pressure Libya regarding its nuclear activities, 
especially through economic sanctions, seemed to have led Libya to reach out with an 
offer to give up its nuclear weapons program as early as 1999. Libya announced the end 
of its program in 2003. This outcome was driven by the United States. 
Iran consistently worked to strengthen its nuclear weapons program until the early 
2000s. After clandestine components of its program were revealed in the 2002 to 2003 
timeframe, Iran opted to scale back its nuclear program. The IAEA and the U.S. 
intelligence community reported that Iran had an organized military nuclear program 
until around 2003.830 Subsequently, Iran continued to develop its nuclear capabilities, but 
in a more ad hoc manner. 
Syria began to make plans with North Korea for a secret nuclear reactor 
beginning in 1997.831 Additional interactions between Syrian and North Korean officials 
in 2001 and 2003 were likely related to nuclear proliferation.832 Working clandestinely 
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with North Korea, this nuclear effort remained under the radar of the United States until 
the early 2000s.833 
Why does the alternate hypothesis taken from Paul’s work not provide sufficient 
explanatory power for regional nuclear trends? The evidence does not support the idea 
that the regional security environment drove proliferation trends in the Middle East. 
There were still an average of more than five militarized interstate disputes in a twenty-
year time period, part of Paul’s definition for a high-conflict zone. The conflict dyad of 
Iraq and Iran persisted even though the 1980s war had ended. Tension continued between 
the states of the Levant, particularly between Israel, Syria, and Lebanon, but did not 
break out into all-out war. The Gulf States, threatened by Iraq, invited the United States 
to intervene resulting in the First Gulf War. Thus, the Gulf States did not have to directly 
confront Iraq. Finally, both a strengthened autonomous Kurdish region and general 
instability due to the Iraq wars threatened Turkey, but did not result in outright inter-state 
war. 
The regional trend away from an increase in nuclear proliferation was due to U.S. 
pressure and action. The historical evidence seems to indicate that without U.S. efforts, 
these countries’ nuclear programs would likely have continued to move forward. The 
United States, however, inserted itself more forcefully in the regional security equation. 
The decrease in regional nuclear proliferation during this time period can be attributed to 
the unbounded actions of the sole superpower with a strong nonproliferation agenda. 
2. Analyzing T.V. Paul’s Data 
This final section closely examines the data Paul used to support his theory. It 
includes an overview of the data on militarized interstate disputes, economic 
interdependence measured by regional trade, and the strength of regional organizations 
and alliances. 
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a. Militarized Interstate Disputes 
First, the number of militarized interstate disputes occurring between 1991 and 
2003 in the region were as follows: Bahrain, 3; Egypt, 7; Iran, 25; Iraq, 30; Israel, 9; 
Jordan, 3; Kuwait, 11; Lebanon, 1; Libya, 2; Oman, 3; Qatar, 4; Saudi Arabia, 8; Syria, 
10; Turkey, 40; the United Arab Emirates, 7; and Yemen, 5.834 The leading states with 
militarized interstate disputes for this period were Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. There were 
more than an average of five militarized interstate disputes in a twenty-year period for the 
region. There was an average of nearly 13 militarized interstate disputes per year. This 
stands in contrast to the period from 1973 to 1990 when there was an average of nearly 
20 militarized interstate disputes per year. In terms of significant conflict dyads, Iraq and 
Iran continued to be rivals. While Turkey had a high number of militarized interstate 
disputes, approximately 25 percent of Turkey’s militarized interstate disputes were 
related to its internal Kurdish insurgency issue rather than a conflict of pure interstate 
origin. While the number of militarized interstate disputes decreased, the number that 
occurred remained characteristic of a high-conflict zone. 
b. Economic Interdependence 
Turning to Paul’s second variable, regional economic interdependence continued 
to be low during this period.835 On a country-by-country level, Figure 3 and Figure 4 
make it clear which states were more regionally integrated for this period in terms of their 
import and export relationships. 
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Figure 3.  Regional Trade Integration, 1991 to 2003: Exports836 
Regional export relationships from 1991 to 2003 averaged above 10 percent for 
Iran, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates. An increase in 
regional export integration occurred from the first period. 
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Figure 4.  Regional Trade Integration, 1991 to 2003: Imports837 
Regional import relationships from 1991 to 2003 averaged above 10 percent for 
Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. For the remaining countries, including large economies 
like Saudi Arabia’s, regional import relationships consisted of less than 10 percent of 
overall imports. A slight decrease occurred in regional import trade from the first period. 
Taking import and export data together, it appears that regional trade levels remained 
low. 
c. Regional Organizations and Alliances 
In terms of regional interdependence for this period, a survey of the regional 
organizations and alliances in the Middle East finds that they did not play a strong role in 
                                                 
837 Source: Data derived from International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics. 
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Middle East relations. The possible exception to this was the Gulf Defense Pact signed in 
2000, which reinforced the Gulf Cooperation Council. As noted in the first case study, 
according to Paul, a state’s level of involvement correlates with whether they are in a 
zone of high, moderate, or low conflict.838 In the latter, states are active members and 
become increasingly less so as the level of conflict increases.839 
For this section, the regional organizations and alliances that were included had to 
meet the criteria of having existed between 1991 and 2003 and primarily involve regional 
states. The regional alliances that were in place for all or a part of this time period 
included the following: 1) the Arab League and its accompanying Treaty of Joint Defense 
and Economic Cooperation between the States of the Arab League; 2) the Council of 
Arab Economic Unity, supported by the Arab League; 3) the Gulf Cooperation Council; 
4) the Arab Cooperation Council; and 5) the Economic Cooperation Organization. 
The Arab League’s members consisted of Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Libya, Oman, the Palestinian Territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United 
Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Other extra-regional states included Algeria, Comoros, 
Djibouti, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, and Tunisia. The League continued to be 
criticized for its lack of accomplishments during this period. In particular, it was divided 
over how to respond to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Farah Dakhlal lah argued that 
the Arab League’s performance during this period was dismal on four 
counts: 1) it failed to successfully resolve the Iraq-Kuwait dispute which 
eventually led to the invasion; 2) it failed to broker an agreement between 
Iraq and Kuwait after the invasion (which could have prevented foreign 
intervention); 3) it was visibly split into pro-Iraqi and anti-Iraqi camps; 
and 4) it was used to legitimize the foreign intervention that eventually 
occurred.840 
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Further, the League held no more than two summits during this period—once in 
1990 and once in 1996.841 The League, however, united behind several issues in the early 
2000s. It put forward a serious Arab Peace Initiative in 2002. Then, in 2003, the League 
voted for U.S. and British soldiers to leave Iraq. 
The League’s Council of Arab Economic Unity created the Greater Arab Free 
Trade Area in 1997 in order to increase economic integration within the trade bloc. The 
bloc’s members included Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Morocco, Oman, the Palestinian Territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, 
the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. The trade bloc appeared to lead to an overall 
increase in regional trade.842 
The Gulf Cooperation Council continued to consist of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates during this period. In 1994, the 
organization decided to remove the secondary and tertiary trade embargo against Israel 
and maintain only the primary boycott.843 The Arab League had kept the boycott in place 
since Israel’s founding in 1948 and criticized the decision by this sub-regional 
organization to break ranks with the greater Arab world. In addition, these Gulf countries 
signed a defense pact in 2000. 
In 1992, the Economic Cooperation Organization added Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan to its membership of 
Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran. This organization, thus, took a decided pivot to the east, 
expanding toward Central Asia rather than the Middle East. 
Finally, the short-lived Arab Cooperation Council, which included Egypt, Iraq, 
Jordan, and North Yemen, ended in 1991 when its charter expired and was not renewed. 
The Council had sought to expand political and economic cooperation between its 
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members, but they were at odds regarding the organization’s regional role.844 Namely, 
Iraq wished for it to have a political focus and Egypt desired an economic focus.845 
Along with the Arab Maghreb Union, the founding of the Council had been a response to 
the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council in the 1980s. 
This data on militarized interstate disputes, economic interdependence, and 
regional alliances remained consistent with how Paul would characterize a high-conflict 
zone. There was a slight decrease in the number of militarized interstate disputes from the 
previous time period, but the decrease was not significant enough to characterize the 
region as a moderate-conflict zone. Also, regional trade and alliance organizations 
remained relatively weak. 
C. CONCLUSION 
By the end of 2003, nuclear proliferation efforts in the Middle East had decreased. 
This occurred despite the fact that the region continued to be classified as a high-conflict 
zone according to T.V. Paul’s criteria. The United States, as the sole superpower, was the 
driving force behind this regional shift. In 1991, Iran, Iraq, and Libya had been pursuing 
nuclear weapons. By the end of the period, nuclear proliferation continued in Iran and 
now Syria, but had ended in Iraq and Libya. Iran also appeared to have ended its 
coordinated military nuclear program. This counterintuitive nuclear trend demonstrated 
that a less permissive environment for nuclear proliferation existed during the unipolar 
period than the bipolar period. 
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IV. REGIONAL HEGEMONY AND NUCLEAR 
PROLIFERATION: 2004–2013 
In the setting of a multipolar international system, a time of increased instability, 
my international level hypothesis predicted an increase in nuclear proliferation, defined 
as progress toward weapons-relevant nuclear capabilities. The regional level hypothesis 
also projected greater nuclear proliferation in a time of rivalry and conflict in the Middle 
East. Contrary to both of these hypotheses, my research found that nuclear proliferation 
decreased from 2004 through 2013. Furthermore, it indicated that great power 
management of regional nuclear issues drove this outcome in the multipolar period and 
post-hegemonic nonproliferation cooperation bolstered these management efforts. 
Kenneth Waltz would predict that with instability on a systemic level, nuclear 
proliferation should increase. T.V. Paul would predict that with high levels of conflict 
and rivalry, nuclear proliferation should increase. The empirical evidence shows that it 
did not. At the beginning of the period, Iran and Syria possessed clandestine nuclear 
programs. Syria’s nascent efforts ended with an attack on its secret nuclear reactor in 
2007. By 2013, only Iran remained as a possible nuclear proliferator and negotiations 
were underway to reduce that possibility. Despite Saudi Arabia’s concern about Iran’s 
nuclear program, the Kingdom did not appear to have acquired nuclear capabilities to 
compete with its regional opponent. 
In addition, numerous regional states expressed interest in the mid-2000s in 
launching nuclear power programs; a nuclear renaissance seemed to be underway. Ten 
countries approached the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) interested in 
developing nuclear power: Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.846 This led to fears that the nuclear 
power plans doubled as a hedging strategy, spurred by concerns about Iran’s nuclear 
program. By 2013, however, only the United Arab Emirates had begun construction of a 
nuclear power plant with the accompanying physical and legal infrastructure in place. 
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But, the United Arab Emirates had agreed not to undertake domestic enrichment and 
reprocessing and put measures in place to prohibit this from ever taking place. Despite 
declared interest in building nuclear power programs, regional efforts fell short of an 
advance toward weapons-relevant nuclear capabilities. 
While the international system became a multipolar system, several factors 
contributed to this downward trend. First, limiting nuclear proliferation continued to 
serve great power interests. A strengthened nonproliferation regime after the unipolar 
period aided great power efforts. Second, post-hegemonic cooperation in the context of 
the nonproliferation regime began to emerge. This was exemplified by the Iran 
negotiations initiated by Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. 
This chapter investigates the regional nuclear trends from 2004 to 2013. The 
United States’ post-Second Gulf War reconstruction efforts in Iraq mark the beginning of 
the period. The election of Hassan Ruhani as president of Iran and the beginning of the 
nuclear negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran mark its end. 
As in prior chapters, the first section of this chapter tells the history of the states 
that have attempted or might have made an attempt from 2004 through 2013 to acquire 
nuclear weapons. These states include Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. This section describes the political setting for 
each country to provide context for each country’s nuclear decision-making. Because the 
three major elements of a nuclear program are fissile material, a delivery system, and a 
nuclear warhead, the section also focuses on national efforts to build these nuclear 
components. 
The second section uses ideas from Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International 
Politics to assess the degree to which the superpowers acted as international managers, 
constraining the nuclear ambitions of regional states. It also incorporates the competing 
hypothesis of regional security dynamics as described by T.V. Paul, which suggests that 
regional actors respond to regional threats, not superpower preferences, when it comes to 
their proliferation policies. This chapter will identify and assess the factors that drove 
nuclear behavior in the Middle East during this period. 
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A. REGIONAL NUCLEAR HISTORY 
Under multipolarity, the United States continued to have an active role in the 
Middle East. Nevertheless, other great powers began to play prominent roles in the region 
as well. The U.S.-led coalition, primarily consisting of the United Kingdom and 
Australia, occupied Iraq after the Second Gulf War. Members of the coalition withdrew 
their troops gradually until the United States removed the last of its troops in December 
2011. The United States and the United Kingdom worked together to dismantle Libya’s 
nuclear program. Further, joint cooperation on sanctions between the United States, 
France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Russia, and China brought Iran to the negotiating 
table by 2013. 
On the systemic level, what was the impact of an emerging multipolar 
international system on nuclear proliferation trends in the Middle East? What does the 
historical record say about how the United States or other great powers viewed their 
interests and roles in the region in regards to nuclear issues? How much leverage did they 
have over the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by Middle Eastern states? How did the 
great powers function as external managers? 
On a regional level, high levels of conflict and rivalry continued to characterize 
interstate relations. There had been significant opposition to the U.S.-led Second Gulf 
War. Instability resulting from the conflict affected the states surrounding Iraq. Turkey 
expressed concern regarding the growing strength of the autonomous Kurdish region in 
northern Iraq. Iran interfered in Iraqi internal politics seeking to sway political outcomes 
in its favor. Syria allowed Al-Qaeda in Iraq to freely traverse its borders to escape U.S. 
military pressure in Iraq. In the Levant, war broke out between Lebanese Hezbollah and 
Israel in 2006. Israel emerged as the victor, but Hezbollah also won a victory in that it 
provided a higher level of resistance than expected. 
Then, in late 2010, political protests began to erupt across the region beginning in 
Tunisia. Protests subsequently sprang up in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen in January 2011; 
Libya, Bahrain, and Morocco in February 2011; and Syria in March 2011. The protest 
movement was labeled the “Arab Spring,” in hopes that the countries’ regimes would 
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become more democratic. The period has become known simply as the “Arab 
Uprising.”847 The protests resulted in regime change in Egypt and Libya, civil war in 
Syria and Yemen, and political settlements in Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. 
Regional powers worked to sway Arab Uprising outcomes. Hearkening back to Malcolm 
Kerr’s work The Arab Cold War, there was discussion regarding a new “Arab Cold 
War.”848 
Furthermore, a power shift occurred during this period. The Gulf States began to 
play a more prominent role in regional politics, choosing sides in the Arab Uprising and 
providing them with military and / or economic support. Curtis Ryan assessed this was 
because the region’s customary centers of power consisting of Egypt, Iraq, and Syria had 
diminished their roles in terms of regional security.849 Iran continued its policy of 
supporting its interests in Syria and among Shia opposition groups in the region. Iran also 
often chose sides during the Arab Uprising – the opposite side of the Gulf States. 
What was the impact of these regional rivalries on the Middle East? How did 
these states view their interests and roles in regards to nuclear proliferation? What drove 
nuclear proliferation in the region? To answer these questions, I first turn to Egypt. 
1. Egypt 
At the beginning of the period, Egypt played a traditional leadership role in the 
region, for example, by advocating for a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. By 
2011, however, Egypt was roiled by domestic strife as the Arab Uprising took root in the 
country. Egypt no longer held as prominent of a role in regional politics. The Gulf States, 
led by Saudi Arabia, had begun to play a greater role in intra-regional politics. This 
included seeking to influence domestic political outcomes in Egypt in the timeframe 
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surrounding the Arab Uprising. Despite the ongoing conflict, Egypt did not increase its 
nuclear capabilities. This occurred despite the calls by Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood for a 
nuclear deterrent and the push for a nuclear power program by the Egyptian government. 
a. Political Context 
Egypt continued to maintain a strong regional leadership role at the beginning of 
the period. Egypt, along with the Arab League, did not support the 2003 U.S.-led 
invasion of Iraq. This contrasted with the First Gulf War in 1991 where nearly the entire 
region supported the U.S.-led intervention. In regards to the Arab-Palestinian conflict, 
Egypt hosted Arab-Israeli negotiations at the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit in 2005 where the 
Al Aqsa Intifada formally ended. 
In terms of Egypt’s internal economic issues, Egypt’s economic outlook was 
favorable. Debt forgiveness and economic reforms from the 1990s had begun to pay 
dividends. Also, efforts to augment investment in the country resulted in GDP increases 
from 2004 to 2006.850 It concluded a free trade agreement with Turkey in 2005. During 
this timeframe, Egypt also worked with its neighbor Libya on oil and gas infrastructure 
development. 
 Regional and domestic political challenges increased in the mid-2000s. On a 
regional level, Egypt supported the Palestinian Authority, while Iran supported Hamas – 
the Palestinian opposition to the Palestinian Authority that had ties to the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Egypt had temporarily improved relations with Iran around 2007, but they 
deteriorated again during the 2008 to 2009 Gaza War. Given the Egyptian government’s 
opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood domestically, it made sense that neither would it 
support a Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated group. 
In addition, Egypt faced regional criticism for its lack of democracy. In 2007, the 
Qatari government, known to favor the Muslim Brotherhood, hosted a democracy 
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conference and invited members of the Egyptian political opposition.851 Conference 
attendees strongly criticized the Egyptian government.852 This was an initial indicator of 
Gulf State involvement in Egypt’s internal affairs. 
Domestically, Egypt continued to face opposition from Islamist parties and 
political groups, especially the banned Muslim Brotherhood. They called for greater 
democratization and participation in Egyptian politics. Richard Norton posited that 
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak believed all Islamist groups were a political threat, 
even the more peaceful ones.853 But, in 2005, Mubarak began to work towards 
competitive elections for the presidency along with constitutional reform that would limit 
the power of the presidency and expand the role of the legislature, urged by Egypt’s ally 
the United States.854 In the first elections in late 2005, Muslim Brotherhood politicians 
running as independents won over 20 percent of the parliamentary seats of the lower 
house.855 
Opposition groups continued to agitate against the Mubarak government. Egypt’s 
population joined the Arab Uprising movement in January 2011. Under pressure from the 
United States, Mubarak elected to step down from power in February. The Egyptian 
government removed the ban from Muslim Brotherhood participation in politics and the 
group formed the Freedom and Justice Party. Presidential elections were held in May 
2012. Mohamed Morsi, the Freedom and Justice Party candidate, was declared the 
winner in June 2012. 
Under Morsi, Egypt moved closer to Turkey, Qatar, and Iran. Turkey offered 
assistance to the opposition during Egypt’s Arab Uprising and then quickly began to 
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work with the new Muslim Brotherhood-led government.856 The new government 
viewed Turkey as a regional democracy to emulate.857 Morsi visited Tehran in August 
2012 – a first presidential visit since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The new government 
admired Iran’s opposition to Israel and the West.858 Nevertheless, Iran and Egypt were 
divided regarding Syria’s uprising. Morsi threw his support behind Syria’s Sunni rebels 
and criticized the Iran-backed Syrian government in his speech at the Non-Aligned 
Movement summit held in August 2012 in Tehran.859 But, Iranian President Mahmud 
Ahmadinejad still conducted a state visit to Egypt in early 2013. Finally, given Qatar’s 
support to the Muslim Brotherhood, ties between Qatar and Egypt also grew stronger 
under Morsi. 
Morsi used his Islamist political capital to negotiate a ceasefire between Hamas 
and Israel in late 2012, for which he received praise from U.S. President Barack 
Obama.860 Reflecting on Morsi’s foreign policy efforts, Nabeel Khoury argued that 
Egypt approached its foreign policy in a practical manner despite the fact that a Muslim 
Brotherhood party had come to power.861 For example, Morsi’s first state visits were to 
Saudi Arabia, China, and Iran. 
Morsi’s presidency came to an abrupt end, however, on July 3, 2013, following an 
eruption of protests similar to those of January 2011. The Egyptian military, led by 
Defense Minister Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, declared that it was suspending the constitution 
and put an interim government in place in order to restore stability and security. Morsi 
and a number of Muslim Brotherhood leaders were put in jail. The military also arrested 
employees of the Qatar-based Al Jazeera Network along with other Islamist media 
                                                 
856 Khoury, “The Arab Cold War Revisited: The Regional Impact of the Arab Uprising.” 
857 Elizabeth Iskander Monier and Annette Ranko, “The Fall of the Muslim Brotherhood: 
Implications for Egypt,” Middle East Policy 20, no. Winter 2013, No. 4 (n.d.), 
http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/fall-muslim-brotherhood-implications-egypt. 
858 Ibid. 
859 Barbara Slavin, “Egypt’s Morsi Upsets Iran,” Al-Monitor, August 30, 2012, http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2012/al-monitor/egypts-morsi-upsets-iran.html. 
860 Norton, “The Awakened Arab World and Its New Landscape,” 69. 
861 Khoury, “The Arab Cold War Revisited: The Regional Impact of the Arab Uprising.” 
 198 
personalities.862 Elizabeth Monier and Annette Ranko attributed the protests and unrest 
in Egypt to the Muslim Brotherhood’s failure to improve democracy and social justice 
and failure to turn away from authoritarianism.863 By the end of 2013, calls were 
mounting for Sisi to run for president and presidential elections were set for 2014. 
After the coup, Egypt’s old allies quickly returned to assist the Egyptian 
government, except for the United States. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and 
Kuwait offered U.S. $12 billion worth of aid to Egypt. Monier and Ranko wrote that the 
Gulf States were particularly concerned about a possible rise in transnational Islamism 
like the Muslim Brotherhood.864 Oz Hassan added that the Egyptian military aligned 
itself with Saudi Arabia due to a shared interest in economic stability and maintaining the 
status quo.865 The United States suspended its military aid to Egypt, citing its displeasure 
with the coup that overthrew a democratically elected president.866 
Heightened conflict characterized this period in Egypt. Domestic unrest in 
particular threatened the country’s stability. Shifting regional alliances also typified 
Egyptian foreign relations. 
b. Nuclear Program 
Despite a rather tumultuous period in Egypt’s history, Egyptian nuclear 
capabilities showed little sign of change. Its nuclear program initially came under 
international scrutiny in 2004 as the IAEA found that it had failed to report nuclear 
activities between 1990 and 2003.867 But Egypt fully cooperated with the IAEA 
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investigation. In 2005, the agency judged that Egypt had failed to report the following: 1) 
an “initial inventory of imported UF4, imported and domestically produced uranium 
metal, imported thorium compounds, small quantities of domestically produced UO2, 
UO3, and UF4, and a number of unirradiated low enriched and natural uranium fuel rods”; 
2) “uranyl nitrate and scrap UO2 pellets, and their use for acceptance testing of the 
Hydrometallurgy Pilot Plant”; 3) “the irradiation of small amounts of natural uranium and 
thorium and their subsequent dissolution in the Nuclear Chemistry Building laboratories, 
including the production and transfer of waste”; and 4) “initial design information for the 
Hydrometallurgy Pilot Plant and the Radioisotope Production Facility, and modified 
design information for the two reactors.”868 Egypt responded to the IAEA by claiming “a 
lack of clarity about its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement, particularly as 
regards small quantities of nuclear material used in research and development 
activities.”869 
After the investigation, concern regarding Egypt’s nuclear program came to an 
end. Egypt nuclear expert Jim Walsh assessed that Egypt’s full cooperation with the 
investigation indicated that it was not interested in acquiring nuclear weapons.870 He 
wrote that “while concealment activities may not be certain evidence of possession, in 
general, the more cooperative a country is with the IAEA, the greater confidence one 
should have in its nuclear policy.”871 
Meanwhile, Egypt continued its efforts to put political pressure on Israel during 
the 2005 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference for its refusal to 
sign the NPT. Because of Egypt’s labors, the conference concluded without a consensus 
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document.872 At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, Egypt won another victory in 
regional politics. It was able to negotiate for a conference on a nuclear-weapon-free zone 
(NWFZ) and include language that Israel disagreed with in the consensus document.873 
Egypt continued to push for a NWFZ in the region through 2013.874 
Egypt’s leadership joined other regional leaders in 2006 in calling for a nuclear 
power program. President Mubarak’s son, Gamal, made the initial proposal in September 
at a National Democratic Party conference. Gamal stated that “it is time for Egypt to put 
forth, and the party will put forth, this proposal for discussion about its future energy 
policies, the issue of alternative energy, including nuclear energy, as one of the 
alternatives.”875 
Meanwhile, Muslim Brotherhood politicians called for Egypt to acquire a nuclear 
weapon. Ibrahim Said quoted Muslim Brotherhood politician Hamdi Hassan saying in 
2006: “We [Egyptians] are ready to starve in order to own a nuclear weapon that will 
represent a real deterrent and will be decisive in the Arab-Israeli conflict.”876 The 
Muslim Brotherhood heavily criticized the Mubarak government’s advocacy of a 
weapons-of-mass-destruction free zone.877 It was also in disagreement with the Mubarak 
government’s stance against Iran’s nuclear program.878 The group pushed the 
government to restart Egypt’s nuclear weapons program.879 Finally, Sheikh Yousuf Al-
Qaradhawi, an Egyptian based in Qatar who was viewed as a religious leader for the 
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Muslim Brotherhood supported its position. He advocated in 2009 for the Islamic world 
to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent, but not use them.880 Overall, the Muslim 
Brotherhood openly supported the idea of a nuclear deterrent for Egypt.881 
Egypt sought to move forward through 2013 with plans for nuclear power; it 
showed no sign of a bid to restart its nuclear weapons program. Notwithstanding earlier 
calls by the Muslim Brotherhood for a nuclear deterrent, Morsi adhered to a more staid 
approach to the country’s nuclear program when he was in power. To manage its nuclear 
energy initiative, the Higher Council for Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy was established 
in 2007. In 2008, Egypt and Russia signed a nuclear cooperation agreement. In 2009, 
Egypt contracted with an Australian engineering firm Worley Parsons to conduct site 
selection for a nuclear power plant and provide training and services.882 In 2010, the 
Egyptian government announced its intentions to construct its first nuclear power plant in 
the city of El-Dabaa.883 Also in 2010, Egypt contracted with South Korea’s Korea 
International Cooperation Agency to train its nuclear personnel. In 2011, Egypt 
announced plans to complete four nuclear power plants by 2025. Despite the domestic 
turbulence in 2013, the Egyptian government moved ahead in October with plans for a 
nuclear plant in El-Dabaa.884 In November, Egypt launched a tender to construct the first 
power station.885 Egypt continued discussions with Russia regarding assistance for 
Egypt’s nuclear program in April 2013 under Morsi and in November 2013 under the 
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interim government.886 Finally, in late 2013, Egypt sought bids to create the regulatory 
framework for its nuclear program and received bids from companies in Canada, France, 
Germany, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States.887 
While Egypt pursued nuclear power capabilities, it did not appear to increase its 
offensive ballistic missile capabilities.888 Rather, Egypt focused on missile defense. For 
example, the U.S. Military’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency reported to the U.S. 
Congress in 2009 that Egypt had requested 20 Harpoon Block II Anti-Ship Cruise 
Missiles and 4 Shipboard Command Launch Control Systems.889 
c. Nuclear Trends 
Egypt’s nuclear capabilities did not significantly change between 2004 and 2013. 
It continued to maintain a civilian nuclear program with a developed nuclear 
infrastructure, which included “a well-established administrative infrastructure and 
multiple nuclear facilities spread over several locations, including two research reactors 
and exploratory uranium-mining operations”890 Egypt pursued nuclear power beginning 
in 2006. The country made a renewed push for nuclear power in 2010. But, the country 
was far from breaking ground on a nuclear power plant as of late 2013. Egypt did not 
move forward with the acquisition of fissile material, a nuclear warhead, or a delivery 
vehicle. 
What drove Egypt’s nuclear behavior? Looking at the regional context, conflict 
and rivalry persisted. By the end of the period, Egypt along with other regional states 
were immersed in the aftermath of the Arab Uprising. Egypt’s regional alliances had 
shifted back and forth. Nevertheless, nuclear proliferation did not increase. This was the 
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case regardless of the party in power even though the Muslim Brotherhood embraced the 
idea that Egypt should acquire a nuclear deterrent. This outcome is counterintuitive. It 
would seem that given the challenges Egypt faced, it would have been more motivated to 
pursue a nuclear deterrent. While Egypt’s nuclear decision-making may have been 
influenced by its historic alliance with the United States, this relationship became rocky 
in 2011 over the perceived mistreatment of Mubarak. This nuclear restraint might serve 
as an example of the growing influence of the nonproliferation regime. Egypt was careful 
to demonstrate that it had nothing to hide from the IAEA in the early 2000s and it 
continued to be active in the NPT negotiations. 
2. Iran 
Conflict in Iran’s immediate neighborhood continued during this time period. The 
United States maintained a troop presence in Afghanistan through 2013 and Iraq until 
2011. In the Arab Uprising, Iran took sides backing Shia opposition groups and fighting 
to help its close ally, Bashar al-Assad stay in power in Syria. On the nuclear front, Iran 
pushed to advances its nuclear and missile capabilities wherever possible. While Iran had 
scaled back the military component of its nuclear program in 2003, the country pursued a 
balance between advancing the development of its nuclear program and seeking to avoid 
additional sanctions or a more forceful military response. 
a. Political Context 
Following the Second Gulf War, Iran ramped-up its asymmetric warfare efforts in 
the region. As in previous decades, the country utilized its asymmetric warfare 
capabilities to execute its foreign policy. Iran focused on confronting the United States – 
its greatest strategic threat – in neighboring countries Afghanistan and Iraq. It did not 
take long after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 for Iran to channel its available 
resources to counteract U.S. goals in Iraq. Iran’s objective, after decades of rivalry with 
its neighbor, was to ensure that whatever regime replaced Saddam Hussein was friendly 
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to Iran. The U.S. intelligence community assessed in early 2005 that Iran desired to both 
hinder U.S. efforts and to install a Shia-controlled government in Iraq.891 
In order to challenge the U.S. military, Iran employed the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps’ Qods Force, the security forces charged with conducting irregular warfare 
outside of Iran. Iran’s efforts included support to the Taliban in Afghanistan and Shia 
insurgents in Iraq in the form of weapons and training. Alireza Nader and Joya Laha 
explained that the United States “accused the Qods Force of providing Iraqi Shia 
insurgents with sophisticated explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), a highly lethal type 
of improvised explosive device, used against U.S. and coalition forces” and that “similar 
EFPs, along with other Iranian weapons, could have found their way into Taliban 
hands.”892 These weapons were more lethal than the insurgent elements would have used 
on their own. Iran began sponsoring Shia insurgents in Iraq, such as the Badr 
Organization, against U.S. and coalition forces. Basel Salloukh surmised that Iran’s 
successes in Iraq allowed it to alter the regional balance of power in its favor.893 
Second, tension mounted between Israel and Iran. In 2012, several attacks or 
planned attacks against Israeli diplomats or their families were attributed to Iran. An 
attack placing a magnetic bomb on a diplomatic vehicle was carried out in New Delhi 
resulting in injury to an Israeli diplomat’s wife and three Indian nationals.894 In addition, 
attacks were attempted or planned in Tbilisi, Georgia; Bangkok, Thailand; and Kenya.895 
The U.S. State Department noted that press reporting indicated the Qods Force was 
responsible for these operations.896  
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Third, rivalry and conflict characterized the relationship between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia. In 2011, the United States discovered a daring Qods Force plot that involved 
tasking Iranian-American Mansour Arbabsiar to hire a drug cartel member to assassinate 
the Saudi ambassador to the United States.897 The Iranian-American implicated in the 
plot confessed that he was acting on behalf of the Qods Force.898 The U.S. intelligence 
community assessed that the plot demonstrated that “some Iranian officials—probably 
including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—have changed their calculus and are now 
more willing to conduct an attack in the United States in response to real or perceived 
U.S. actions that threaten the regime.”899 Iran and the Gulf States found themselves on 
opposite sides throughout the Arab Uprisings. By 2012, Iran was aiding the Houthis in 
Yemen in their rebellion against the central government.900 In this conflict, Saudi Arabia 
and, sometimes, other Arab states supported the Yemeni government. In mid-2012, Iran 
was quick to support newly elected President Morsi, affiliated with Egypt’s Muslim 
Brotherhood, while Saudi Arabia supported the Mubarak and Sisi governments. 
Fourth, the year 2011 brought a serious threat to Iran’s operating base in the 
Levant as Arab Uprising protests erupted in Syria. Iran’s loss of access to Damascus 
would have signified a significant setback in the Levant, particularly Iran’s ability to 
threaten Israel. And Iran had signed a defense agreement with Syria in 2006. According 
to the U.S. State Department, “Iran provided extensive support, including weapons, 
funds, and training to assist the Assad regime.”901  
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Drawing on its long-standing ties in the Levant, Iran was able to project 
significant force. The U.S. State Department reported that “Iran viewed Syria as a crucial 
causeway in its weapons supply route to Lebanese Hezbollah” and described Iran’s 
operations in Syria as follows:  
Iran publicly admits to sending members of the IRGC to Syria in an 
advisory role. There is consistent media reporting that some of the troops 
are IRGC-QF members and that they have taken part in direct combat 
operations. While Tehran had denied that IRGC-QF personnel participate 
in combat operations, in 2014 it acknowledged the deaths in Syria of two 
senior officers (Brigadier Generals Abdullah Eskandari and Jamar 
Dariswali). Tehran claimed they were volunteers who lost their lives while 
protecting holy shrines near Damascus.902  
Further, Russia demonstrated its ability to serve as a strategic ally to Iran. Russia 
did not join the United States and other European states in condemning the Assad regime. 
This allowed Iran to continue with its efforts in Syria. 
In terms of other regional states, Iran and its neighbor Turkey generally 
maintained friendly relations. The two countries increased economic ties, focusing on 
natural gas and tourism. Plans were laid for a pipeline between Iran and Turkey. They 
also cooperated in combatting cross-border drug trafficking. Iran’s relationship with 
Turkey became substantially more difficult in 2011 as conflict broke out in Syria. Turkey 
supported the opposition forces seeking to oust the Assad regime from power. Among the 
Gulf States, Iran and Oman extended their economic ties as the two countries agreed to 
jointly develop the Kish cross-border gas field in 2008. Also, Kuwait received its first 
visit in 27 years from Iran in 2006. 
On the domestic front, Iran experienced significant turmoil during this time 
period. In June 2009, a protest movement, referred to as the “Green Movement,” emerged 
after the 2009 presidential election. Reformist presidential candidates Mir Hossain 
Musavi and Mehdi Karrubi lost the election to hardliner Mahmud Ahmadinenjad, the 
incumbent. Both Musavi and Karrubi alleged that the elections were fraudulent. Protests 
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against the election results occurred across Iran until the Iranian government retaliated. 
And the Iranian government was able to quell the uprising. Musavi and Karrubi then 
became leaders of an opposition movement that demanded more rights and greater 
democracy in Iran. 
At the next presidential election, Iranians voted a more moderate president, 
Hassan Ruhani, into power. He campaigned on a platform of improving both the 
economy and relations with the West. With the election of Ruhani, Iran was more open to 
a rapprochement with the West. In September 2013, Obama and Ruhani spoke on the 
phone. It was the first time that this had happened between U.S. and Iranian presidents 
since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. 
Overall, Iran saw its regional political power increase from 2004 to 2013. Iraq no 
longer posed a threat. And Iran increased support to Shia populations across the region. It 
was the Gulf States, led by Saudi Arabia, which stood as a counterweight to Iran. Of 
course, the great powers were not shy about confronting Iran either. 
b. Nuclear Program 
While Iran remained embroiled in regional conflicts, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and France, also known as the EU-3, focused on uncovering Iran’s nuclear 
development activities after the revelations in 2002 and 2003 regarding Iran’s program. 
The three European countries wished to demonstrate a multilateral approach to this 
nuclear challenge and took the lead in negotiations with Iran until 2005.903 In early 2004, 
the IAEA sought to acquire a complete picture as to Iran’s nuclear activities. For 
example, in January, it discovered that Iran had a P-2 centrifuge design rather than just 
knowledge of the P-1 centrifuge.904 The IAEA’s work led the agency to assess in 
November that Iran had made “substantial efforts over the past two decades to master an 
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independent nuclear fuel cycle.”905 It was becoming evident that Iran had sought to 
exploit a loophole in the NPT, as described by Wade Huntley, pursuit of fissile material 
production capabilities under the guise of peaceful applications.906 Under continued 
pressure, Iran agreed with Germany, the United Kingdom, and France in the November 
2004 Paris Agreement to suspend nuclear enrichment and conversion activities. The three 
European states had taken the first steps to find a diplomatic solution to the Iran nuclear 
crisis. 
In 2005, the United States joined Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and the 
IAEA in their efforts to resolve concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program. The European 
states persisted in their efforts to find a diplomatic solution. Nevertheless, Iran ultimately 
rejected their proposal in August and then indicated it would begin enriching uranium 
once again. Iran carried out uranium conversion at its Uranium Conversion Facility 
beginning in August 2005 and continued construction of the Iran Nuclear Research 
Reactor (IR-40) at Arak.907 Furthermore, the IAEA made worrying discoveries regarding 
a Green Salt Project, which had involved “the conversion of uranium dioxide into UF4 
(often referred to as green salt), as well as tests related to high explosives and the design 
of a missile re-entry vehicle, all of which could involve nuclear material.”908 The United 
States took unilateral steps against Iran by mid-2005. On June 29, 2005, Executive Order 
13382, signed by President George W. Bush, went into effect. It froze the assets of 
entities supporting proliferation.909 For Iran, the executive order named the Aerospace 
Industries Organization, the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, the Shahid Bakeri 
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Industrial Group, and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran.910 Iran was not referred to 
the United Nations (UN) Security Council, however, as Germany, the United Kingdom, 
France, and the United States waited for Russia and China to convince Iran to halt its 
proliferation efforts.911 
In 2006, Iran grew less cooperative. Until early 2006, Iran had complied with its 
agreement to submit reports and provide information to the IAEA.912 In January, 
however, Iran restarted its centrifuge enrichment efforts at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment 
Plant at Natanz, ending its voluntary adherence to the Additional Protocol.913 The IAEA 
monitored both the enrichment at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the conversion at 
the Uranium Conversion Facility.914 In April 2006, Iranian President Mahmud 
Ahmadinejad surprised the international community when he asserted that Iran was 
carrying out research on the P-2 centrifuge, which would result in a four-fold increase in 
the centrifuge’s capabilities.915 Iran also advised it had successfully enriched uranium. 
In response, great powers came together to dissuade Iran from continuing its 
nuclear efforts. The United States, Russia, and China joined Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and France to make another proposal. In the proposal, they offered light water 
reactors along with nuclear fuel and cooperation in the arenas of technology, 
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telecommunications, agriculture, and civil aviation.916 Iran rejected this proposal and 
then Ahmadinejad held a ceremony to officially open the Arak heavy water plant in 
August.917 In turn, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1696 in July and 
resolution 1737 in December. The former called for an end to uranium enrichment and 
served as the first legally binding action against the state; the latter put sanctions in place 
against businesses and individual people affiliated with Iran’s nuclear and missile 
programs.918 Resolution 1737 also forbade transfer to Iran of nuclear and missile 
technology.919 Iran continued enriching uranium and developing its nuclear program. 
While the great powers came together to take action in the UN Security Council, Russia 
and China stopped short of supporting sanctions. 
In 2007, Iran worked to advance its development of nuclear fuel. Iran worked to 
install centrifuge cascades at the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz and feed UF6 into the 
cascades.920 It also tested centrifuge machines at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant.921 The 
U.S. intelligence community observed that while Iran had made progress by installing the 
centrifuges, it had encountered many technical challenges in getting them to function.922 
Also, Iran continued uranium conversion at the Uranium Conversion Facility, 
construction of the IR-40 facility, and operation of its Heavy Water Production Plant.923 
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Iran found itself confronted by the UN Security Council, by the P5+1, and the 
United States, in a unilateral capacity. The UN Security Council approved resolutions 
1747 in March 2007, 1803 in March 2008, and 1835 in September 2008. The first two 
resolutions augmented proliferation-related sanctions against both people and 
organizations associated with Iran’s nuclear program and missile program.924 The third 
resolution underscored the demands of the first two.925 Furthermore, in June 2008, the 
P5+1 introduced another proposal to Iran. Of note, it added research and development for 
nuclear energy, nuclear energy assistance, and treating Iran’s nuclear program like those 
of other non-nuclear-weapons states.926 An agreement could not be reached, however. In 
October 2007, the United States put unilateral sanctions in place on three Iranian banks 
and companies associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. 
Meanwhile, the IAEA continued its efforts to clarify questions regarding Iran’s 
nuclear program and acknowledged Iran’s lack of cooperation. For example, the IAEA 
wrote in 2008 that Iran’s response focused on “deficiencies in form and format,” rather 
than the substance of the issue.927 The IAEA noted that between 2007 and 2010, Iran was 
not advising about construction decisions in a prompt manner to include plans regarding 
the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant and a new nuclear power plant at Darkhovin.928 
Iran persisted in its pattern of being less than forthcoming in regards to nuclear 
developments. In September 2009, Iran rushed to announce a second pilot enrichment 
facility, the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant near Qom, before a public revelation of the 
facility by the leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France including the 
fact that the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant was located on an Islamic Revolutionary 
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Guard Corps base.929 The IAEA assessed that construction had occurred between 2002 
and 2004 and it had restarted in 2006 along with work on nuclear weapons design.930 
The IAEA confirmed in late October 2009 that the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant could 
hold about 3,000 IR-1 centrifuges, based on Pakistan’s P-1 centrifuge design, but it could 
also use centrifuges that are more advanced.931 Furthermore, the IAEA Board of 
Governors reported in December 2015 that Iran had conducted research about a nuclear 
explosive device through computer modeling before 2004 and between 2005 and 
2009.932 
In October 2009, the P5+1 offered to facilitate a fuel swap for the U.S.-supplied 
Tehran Research Reactor as Iran anticipated it would require more fuel. In their proposal, 
Russia would help enrich the needed low enriched uranium and France would 
manufacture the fuel rods while the United States and the IAEA would assist with 
improving the Tehran Research Reactor’s operational and safety functions.933 The P5+1 
also offered financing for the fuel swap.934 While Iran initially accepted this offer, it was 
later rejected due to domestic opposition and Iran’s counterproposal was not acceptable 
to the P5+1.935 In November 2009, under pressure to cease work on the Fordow Fuel 
Enrichment Plant, Iran announced that it would build ten more such plants and it would 
examine how to enrich its own fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor.936 
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Seeking to apply greater pressure to Iran, the U.S. Treasury imposed additional 
sanctions focused on the Iranian banking system and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-
affiliated companies in October 2009 and February 2010. On July 1, 2010, the U.S. 
Congress passed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, 
which expanded the 1996 Iran Sanctions Act and particularly targeted the petroleum 
sector in Iran. This U.S. effort was hampered to some extent by Europe, however, as “the 
existence of numerous deals between European firms and Iran constrained many of the 
harsher U.S. measures that required sanctions against foreign firms dealing with Iran.”937 
Concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear activities persisted. According to the Arms 
Control Association, Iran started enriching uranium up to 20 percent in February 2010, 
allegedly for the Tehran Research Reactor; however, Turkey and Brazil brokered a fuel 
exchange for the Tehran Research Reactor known as the Tehran Declaration in May 
2010.938 The Arms Control Association noted, in the agreement, Turkey would serve as 
an intermediary for Iran’s fuel.939 The association’s summary continued by stating, while 
Iran agreed to this arrangement, France, Russia, and the United States did not agree as it 
did not address Iran’s enrichment activities, specifically continued uranium enrichment at 
the 20 percent level and acquisition of low enriched uranium.940 Kayhan Barzegar 
assessed that this agreement occurred as Turkey sought to replace the EU as an 
intermediary.941 After the Turkey-Brazil agreement, the United States won a crucial 
diplomatic victory when Russia and China agreed finally to support sanctions against Iran 
in May 2010, paving the way for coordinated movement in the UN Security Council.942 
Why did Russia and China finally agree to sanctions? History seemed to indicate they 
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were motivated out of self-interest. Max Fisher suggested that Russia agreed out of 
concern for a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, which would not be in Russia’s 
security interests.943 He added that Russia may have also seen economic benefits from 
sanctions against a competitor in the natural gas market and Russia may have wanted to 
be viewed as more cooperative on the world stage as well.944 Kayhan Barzegar wrote 
that Russia was playing a balancing act with the Iran issue. On one hand, Russia was 
interested in nuclear-related contracts for economic reasons.945 On the other hand, Russia 
viewed Iran’s nuclear program as a threat and wished to contain it.946 Fisher wrote that 
China might have succumbed to U.S. pressure rather than face U.S. action on China’s 
currency manipulation.947 Russian and Chinese officials indicated that they appreciated 
that the sanctions focused on nonproliferation and bringing Iran to negotiations.948 At its 
heart, Russia and China acknowledged with this agreement that pressure on Iran had to 
be strong enough to bring it to the negotiating table. 
In June 2010, the Security Council passed Resolution 1929 that expanded 
sanctions targeting the financial dealings of individuals and organizations associated with 
Iran’s nuclear program and missile program.949 The P5+1 and Iran held discussions in 
December 2010 and January 2011. They quickly came to a halt, however, after Iran 
insisted on an end to economic sanctions prior to the beginning of serious nuclear 
negotiations. 
Since 2006, Iran had increased its enrichment capabilities. In early 2011, U.S. 
intelligence reported that Iran had installed close to 5,000 centrifuges and produced over 
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3,000 kg of low enriched uranium.950 The IAEA reported in November 2011 that, since 
2007, Iran had produced 4922 kg of low enriched uranium hexafluoride.951 Furthermore, 
Iran had produced nearly 80 kg of uranium hexafluoride enriched up to 20 percent 
uranium-235, reportedly to be used by the Tehran Research Reactor from about 766 kg of 
the low enriched uranium hexafluoride.952 It also continued to construct the Fordow Fuel 
Enrichment Plant. 
New reports provided worrying assessments regarding Iran’s nuclear program. 
The U.S. intelligence community assessed in early 2011 that Iran had “the scientific, 
technical, and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons, making the 
central issue its political will to do so.”953 The IAEA’s November 2011 report included 
an annex with long-awaited information on the possible military scope of Iran’s nuclear 
program, which covered the period from late 2002 to November 2011. The report found 
multiple areas where Iran’s efforts since the late 1980s were consistent with developing a 
nuclear weapon.954 The U.S. intelligence community also judged that Iran was taking a 
cost-benefit approach to its pursuit of nuclear weapons.955 This provided hope that if the 
cost of Iran’s pursuit of developing its nuclear program were high enough, Iran would 
undertake serious nuclear negotiations with the P5+1. The members of the P5+1 would 
have to come together in order to increase the political and economic costs for Iran’s 
continued development of its nuclear program. 
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Russia and China acted separately from the United States, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and France in 2011. In July, Russia put forward a proposal to the P5+1 to end 
the Iranian nuclear crisis. The United States and Europe dismissed the proposal, however, 
as they believed it lifted sanctions too early in the negotiation process. After the 
November IAEA report came out, the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and 
France implemented additional sanctions against Iran unilaterally as Russia and China 
would not agree to new UN Security Council sanctions.956 
In 2012, the tide began to turn against Iran’s continued evasion of accountability. 
In early January 2012, Iran began uranium enrichment at its Qom facility.957 And the 
international community turned to focus on the Parchin Military Complex. In early 2012, 
the IAEA requested access to the complex, but Iran withheld access. Meanwhile, the 
Institute for Science and International Security flagged commercially available imagery 
indicating that Iran was conducting “clean-up, demolition, and reconstruction activities” 
at the complex.958 The combined refusal of access and suspected site cover-up was 
deeply troubling to both the IAEA and P5+1 members. 
Throughout 2012, however, it became apparent that the weight of combined 
sanctions against Iran was having a real affect.959 The U.S. intelligence community 
noted: 
Iran’s economy contracted in 2012 for the first time in more than two 
decades. Iran’s access to foreign exchange reserves held overseas has 
diminished, and preliminary data suggest that it suffered its first trade 
deficit in 14 years. Meanwhile, the rial reached an all-time low in late 
January, with the exchange rate falling from about 15,000 rials per dollar 
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at the beginning of 2012 to nearly 40,000 rials per dollar, and inflation and 
unemployment are growing.960 
According to the U.S. intelligence community, Iran’s conundrum came down to 
the question of how to avoid military or economic punishment while striving to improve 
nuclear and missile capabilities.961 
With Iran’s economic challenges as a backdrop, negotiations between the P5+1 
and Iran gained new momentum in 2012. The two sides met in April, May, and June, and 
by June, they had agreed on expert-level talks.962 The negotiations then stalled in July 
and the United States expanded sanctions once again against Iran in August through the 
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act.963 The European Union followed 
the U.S. lead and intensified its sanctions against Iran as well. 
Secret bilateral talks between the United States and Iran regarding Iran’s nuclear 
program occurred in March 2013.964 Then discussions ensued between the P5+1 in April 
2013. These negotiations paused as the new Ruhani administration came to power in 
June. In order to maintain the pressure against Iran, President Obama expanded sanctions 
once again through an executive order signed in June. The United States recognized that 
Iran continued to advance its nuclear program. The U.S. intelligence community judged 
that during 2013, Iran stockpiled low enriched uranium hexafluoride, put in place more 
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centrifuges in the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, worked on advanced centrifuge 
designs, and continued to build the IR-40 Heavy Water Research Reactor.965 
Following the election, U.S.-educated Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif led the 
Iranian negotiating team. After three rounds of talks in October and November 2013, the 
two sides signed the Joint Plan of Action. The Joint Plan of Action set the stage for a far-
reaching agreement for the Iranian nuclear crisis that would involve Iran limiting its 
nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief.966 The U.S. intelligence community 
subsequently assessed that the Joint Plan would “temporarily halt the expansion of its 
enrichment program, eliminate its production and stockpile of 20-percent enriched 
uranium in a form suitable for further enrichment, and provide additional transparency 
into its existing and planned nuclear facilities.”967 Chief U.S. nuclear negotiator Wendy 
Sherman acknowledged that “collaboration on sanctions” brought Iran to the table for 
negotiations.968 
In addition to developing its nuclear program from 2004 to 2013, Iran 
aggressively sought to build its missile program. U.S.-led sanctions against Iran during 
this period often targeted the missile program along with the nuclear program. The U.S. 
intelligence community noted that Iran saw its ballistic missile arsenal as a means to deter 
threats from regional states or the United States and to strike back if attacked.969   
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This period saw continued development of Iran’s missile and space programs. 
Iran tested a new medium-range ballistic missile in 2004, a modified Shahab-3 named the 
Ghadr-1 missile, with a range of 1,600 km, according to Michael Elleman.970 In early 
2008, Washington assessed that Iran continued to further develop ballistic missiles that 
could reach as far as Europe and North Africa.971 Peter Crail reported that Iran attempted 
its first satellite launch in August of that year.972 Furthermore, Elleman added that Iran 
test-fired the Sajjil, a medium-range ballistic missile with a range of 2,000 km, in 2008, 
and a modified version of the Sajjil, the Sajjil-2, in 2009.973  
Iran improved its satellite launch capability. In February 2009, Iran launched its 
first satellite into space using the Safir-2, according to Crail.974 He noted that Iran had 
attempted such a launch unsuccessfully in August 2008.975 Crail further reported that, in 
2011, Iran launched another satellite into space using the Safir-1B and concerns were 
raised that the satellite launch violated UN Security Council resolution 1929.976 
Furthermore, the U.S. intelligence community noted in early 2011 that Iran’s ballistic 
missiles were “inherently capable of delivering WMD, and if so armed, would fit into the 
same strategy” of projecting regional power and ensuring self-defense.977 
The United States also closely monitored Iran’s space program given the 
implications for ballistic missile capabilities. The U.S. intelligence community 
highlighted to congress that, in 2010, Iran exhibited a new design for the rocket engine of 
a space launch vehicle, the Simorgh—technology that could transfer to an 
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intercontinental ballistic missile.978 In January 2013, Iran claimed to have sent a monkey 
up into space and that it had survived. There were some questions, however, regarding 
whether the animal had perished or not.979 In December 2013, Iran announced that it had 
sent a second monkey into space.980 Overall, these efforts appeared to signal a serious 
space program and, while the Safir rocket carried relatively lightweight loads, the 
Simorgh space launch vehicle capable of carrying a heavier load caused greater 
concern.981 Space security expert Clay Moltz added that Iran’s space program was worth 
watching given the “potential of space technologies to be switched to delivery 
systems.”982 Overall, Iran made significant strides in developing its missile capabilities 
through 2013. 
c. Nuclear Trends 
Iran advanced its nuclear capabilities on all fronts during this time period. It 
furthered its ability to obtain fissile material, a nuclear warhead, and a delivery vehicle. 
By 2004, Iran had halted its coordinated weapons program, once elements of its 
clandestine program were revealed in the 2002 and 2003 timeframe. Both the U.S. 
intelligence community assessment and the IAEA reports noted that Iran had ended its 
structured nuclear weapons program in late 2003. However, Iran was determined to move 
forward while it seemed feasible to do so and was not easily deterred. The bargaining and 
negotiating that occurred between 2004 and 2013 with first Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and France and then the P5+1 are evidence of this. The U.S. intelligence 
community was clear that Iran sought to keep its options open to develop nuclear 
weapons in the future. What Iran continued to do after 2003 was to build and run its 
centrifuge capabilities, and thus its capability to enrich uranium, and further develop its 
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delivery systems. Also, the IAEA discovered that Iran had worked on a nuclear explosive 
device through computer modeling conducted before 2004 and between 2005 and 
2009.983 In addition, the discovery of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant at Qom and 
Iran’s refusal to grant access to the Parchin military complex left many unanswered 
questions regarding Iran’s intentions. 
Two shifts occurred during this time period. The first shift was in the 2005 to 
2006 time period as Iran sought to move forward again on nuclear weapon-related missile 
projects such as the work on the Shahab-3 to modify it to carry a high explosive and 
ended its cooperation with the IAEA. Then, by 2010, while Iran continued to work on 
projects related to nuclear technology, the IAEA assessed it was no longer working on 
nuclear weapons.984 
What drove Iranian nuclear behavior during this time period? In the regional 
context, Iran and Iraq had been locked in a relationship of conflict and rivalry. Now that 
Iraq no longer posed a threat, Iran and Saudi Arabia had become regional competitors. 
Iran likely realized that acquiring a nuclear weapon would allow it to catapult ahead of 
Saudi Arabia in terms of regional military capabilities. Also, Iran had long claimed a 
rivalry with Israel. While an Iranian nuclear weapon would not be an “Arab bomb,” it 
would allow Iran to stand up to Israel. Iran had begun its bomb project in reaction to an 
existential threat from Iraq. With the Iraqi threat gone, enough incentives remained for 
Iran to pursue a nuclear weapon. However, this was not the whole story. Iran did not 
charge ahead to develop its nuclear weapons program even though it may have had 
incentives to do so. 
Iran was not willing to continue to pursue a nuclear weapon at any cost. In 2008, 
the U.S. intelligence community reasoned that “convincing the Iranian leadership to 
forgo the eventual development of nuclear weapons will be difficult given the linkage 
many within the leadership see between nuclear weapons development and Iran’s key 
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national security and foreign policy objectives and given Iran’s considerable effort from 
the late 1980s to 2003 to develop such weapons.”985 The initiative of Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and France launched a possible diplomatic solution. The United States 
joined their efforts in 2005. The U.S.-led sanctions regime, ultimately supported by 
Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, brought Iran to the 
negotiating table in 2013. The great powers came together to place punishing sanctions 
on Iran. While the United States led the way pushing for a strict sanctions regime, it was 
Russia and China, motivated by self-interest, joining Germany, the United Kingdom, and 
France to support sanctions that caused Iran to come to the negotiating table. 
3. Iraq 
Iraq continued to be racked by domestic conflict following the Second Gulf War. 
Militarized factions fought on behalf of Iran, Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr, Saddam 
Hussein’s supporters, and Sunni Islamists such as Al-Qaeda in Iraq. The Iraqi Army and 
the U.S.-led coalition struggled to end the conflict and bring security and political 
stability to Iraq. Even though U.S. troops officially left in 2011, the internal conflict did 
not end with their withdrawal. Seeds scattered from the internal conflict in Iraq would 
eventually contribute to the civil war in Syria in 2011. Iran would also be in a strategic 
position to play an influential role in Iraq. On the nuclear front, after decades of pursuing 
nuclear weapons, Iraq no longer was. The 2004 Iraq Survey Group Report answered 
lingering questions regarding Saddam Hussein’s intentions and capabilities. The report 
found that intentions were present, but capabilities were absent. 
a. Political Context 
Following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, an insurgency took root in Iraq. It targeted 
the U.S.-led coalition and those seen to be aiding it. Those carrying out the attacks 
included the mostly Sunni Ba’ath Party officials and military, intelligence, and security 
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officers.986 On the other hand, Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr also turned and fought against 
U.S.-coalition members beginning in 2004. Sadr viewed the U.S.-led coalition as an 
occupying force and directed Shia militants to attack the international forces. In addition, 
the United States was concerned about foreign fighters coming to Iraq, especially through 
Syria, to attack coalition forces. For example, Jordanian-born Abu Musab al-Zarqawi led 
Al-Qaeda in Iraq against coalition forces. 
Iran’s involvement in the country, particularly Tehran’s efforts to gain influence 
with the Iraqi Shia, formed a sub-plot in Iraq’s security situation.987 In 2009, the U.S. 
intelligence community assessed that Iran’s primary objective was to ensure that Iraq did 
not present any sort of threat to Iran, either emanating from Iraq itself or the United 
States in Iraq.988 To accomplish this goal, Iran’s efforts had included: “using propaganda, 
providing humanitarian assistance, building commercial and economic ties, and 
supporting Shia elements fighting the coalition” along with providing “lethal support 
including weapons, funding, training, logistical and operational support, and intelligence 
training” to Shia militants.989 
Within the region, the new Iraqi government resumed a more traditional 
relationship with other states. Official relations resumed between Iraq and Syria in 2006 
after nearly a 25-year break. Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad visited Iraq in 
2008. The United Arab Emirates foreign minister also traveled to Iraq in 2008. King 
Abdullah of Jordan visited Baghdad in August 2008 and assigned an Ambassador there in 
October.990 To the north, trade relations continued between Turkey and Iraq involving oil 
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and other commodities. Turkey remained concerned regarding the use of northern Iraq as 
a safe haven by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, also known as the PKK, but Turkey began 
to improve its ties with the Kurdistan Regional Government in late 2008.991 
In terms of domestic politics, the U.S.-led coalition sought to ensure that Shia, 
Sunni, and Kurds felt adequately represented in Iraq’s new government. The Coalition 
Provisional Authority, headed by Paul Bremer, who had been appointed as a special 
envoy to Iraq by President George W. Bush in May 2003, handed executive authority 
over to an interim Iraqi government in mid-2004. Ayad Allawi, a Shia politician, and 
Barham Saleh, a Kurdish politician, led the interim government until proper elections 
could be held. In April 2005, Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, became president of Iraq and 
Ibrahim Jaafari, a Shia, became prime minister. In December, Iraqis went to the polls and 
elected members of parliament.992 Then Shia politician Nuri al-Maliki was asked to form 
a government in May 2006. 
Iraq’s Arab Sunnis no longer dominated the national government as they had 
under Hussein. The group responded by boycotting participation in the country’s nascent 
political institutions and processes and, thus, continued to feel sidelined. 
By 2006, the insurgency had become more sectarian in nature. The U.S.-led 
coalition sought ways to bring greater stability to the country. The coalition was able to 
turn the tide on the Sunni insurgency with the “Sunni Awakening” movement in 2007—
Sunni groups that turned against Al-Qaeda in Iraq and cooperated with the Iraqi 
government. The U.S. intelligence community assessed in early 2006, however, that the 
Sunni Awakening movement would not sway the most ardent Zarqawi fighters.993 
Zarqawi was killed in an airstrike in June. Then, in December 2006, Hussein was 
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executed by hanging. By early 2009, the Sunni insurgency, the threat from Al-Qaeda in 
Iraq, and the threat from Shia militants had begun to decrease.994 
Iraq’s political and security situation showed signs of improvement by 2009. 
Parliamentary elections were held in March 2010. The United States withdrew its combat 
forces in late 2010. Despite some disagreement among members of the U.S. 
administration regarding the timeline for ending the U.S. military presence in Iraq, the 
military drew down through December 2011 as the result of the U.S.-Iraq bilateral 
security agreement.995 
Following the U.S. withdrawal, the relationship between Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish 
populations remained strained. Tension persisted between Prime Minister Maliki and 
Kurdistan Regional Government President Masud Barzani as Barzani sought greater 
autonomy for the Kurdish region to include independent oil agreements. Maliki also 
purged high-level Sunni officials, such as Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, from 
government after the U.S. departure.996 Hashimi fled to Turkey and lived in exile there. 
As predicted by Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, rather than a common Iraqi 
identity, the trend was toward greater divisions along ethnic and sectarian lines.997 In 
2012, the U.S. intelligence community assessed that continuing poor relations between 
the political leadership of the three groups would lead to instability in Iraq.998 
In 2013, the civil unrest in Syria began to affect stability in Iraq. The U.S. 
intelligence community assessed that Al-Qaeda in Iraq attacks were occurring in Iraq at a 
rate of approximately 68 to 80 every month—a level not seen since the 2007 to 2008 
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timeframe.999 Furthermore, according to the U.S. intelligence community, the Syria war 
had led to an increase in Sunni extremists crossing back and forth between Syria and Iraq 
contributing to Al-Qaeda in Iraq conducting a greater number of prominent attacks.1000 
The United States and its allies had not been able to secure a more peaceful and stable 
Iraq. 
In terms of regional rivalry, the sea change in Iraq’s domestic political dynamics 
and the end of Iraq’s nuclear bluffing and hedging shifted the regional balance of power. 
The conflict dyad between Iran and Iraq came to an end. During this time period, Iraq 
became more aligned with Shia Iran and the Shia populations dispersed throughout the 
region serving as a potential counterweight to the region’s Sunni monarchies, primarily 
the Gulf States. But it would be wrong to assume that Iraq would always align with Iran. 
Sean Foley noted that “it is significant that Iraqi Shia clerics are Arab and therefore carry 
an authority among Gulf Arab Shia that is unmatched by their Iranian colleagues.”1001 
b. Nuclear Program 
Iraq had been a focus of proliferation concern for decades, but it no longer was 
after the Second Gulf War. The Iraq Survey Group, appointed to investigate Iraq’s 
nuclear program, finished its work and published the Duelfer Report in 2004. The report 
confirmed that Iraq had not had the nuclear capability that the U.S. administration 
believed it possessed. As discussed in the previous chapter, Saddam Hussein had not 
been able to reconstitute Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. 
As the decade progressed, Iraq seemed to further integrate itself into the 
nonproliferation regime. According to Alissa J. Rubin and Campbell Robertson of the 
New York Times, Iraq sold its yellowcake stockpile to Cameco of Canada in 2008.1002 In 
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addition, Iraq ratified the Additional Protocol in 2012 and the Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty in 2013. 
In 2009, Iraq sought to join the wave of countries in the Middle East interested in 
nuclear power by announcing that it had invited France to help the country construct a 
nuclear power plant.1003 The stated purpose for nuclear power plants was for electricity 
generation. In December 2010, the UN Security Council ended the oil-for-food program 
and the restrictions on programs for nuclear energy development. However, as of 2013, 
Iraq had not made any significant progress toward reaching this goal.  
In terms of delivery systems, the information examined here seems to indicate 
that Iraq did not increase its ballistic missile capabilities during this period. Furthermore, 
Iraq joined the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, which 
seeks to discourage ballistic missile production, in 2011.1004 
c. Nuclear Trends 
Iraq’s pursuit of nuclear weapons—fissile material, a nuclear warhead, or a 
delivery vehicle—did not increase during this time period. Rather, the country moved 
away from its past nuclear weapons program and further assimilated itself into the 
nonproliferation regime. 
What drove Iraq’s nuclear behavior during this time period? In the regional 
context, the rivalry between Iraq and Iran had decreased after the Second Gulf War due to 
the presence of a Shia-led government in Iraq and Iran’s increased influence in the 
country. The country no longer posed a threat to the Gulf States or Israel. At the 
international level, two wars had just been fought with Iraq’s alleged possession of 
nuclear weapons as a reason for the conflict. The great powers would not have looked 
kindly on Iraq’s leadership rekindling the issue. Furthermore, due to the United States’ 
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efforts from 1991 to 2003, little remained of Iraq’s program. External management 
seemed to continue to influence Iraq’s nuclear decision-making. 
4. Libya 
Libya sought to move from international pariah to respected state after renouncing 
its nuclear program and agreeing to restrict its missile capabilities. Libya’s relationship 
with the West improved as it dismantled its nuclear program. The fabric of the country 
quickly unraveled, however, with the onset of the Arab Uprising. Muammar Qaddafi was 
killed in 2011. By 2013, the United States and the United Kingdom, assisted by Russia, 
had removed the components of Libya’s nuclear program while, politically, the country 
remained unstable, dominated by militia. 
a. Political Context 
Libyan relations with the West continued to improve after Libya renounced its 
nuclear program in 2003. In 2004, the United States lifted economic sanctions and began 
to re-establish official relations with Libya. U.S. citizens were once again allowed to 
travel to Libya, the first time since 1981. In September 2004, the United States lifted its 
trade embargo against Libya allowing oil imports to resume. In 2005, U.S. restrictions on 
business dealings with Libya were lifted.1005 Full diplomatic relations with the United 
States were in place by mid-2006. The United States also removed Libya from the U.S. 
State Department’s State Sponsors of Terrorism list that year. Finally, the Iran-Libya 
Sanctions Act was changed to the Iran Sanctions Act in 2006, as it no longer applied to 
Libya. 
Libya seemed to be transitioning well from being a pariah state to having a greater 
role in regional leadership. At the beginning of 2008, Libya achieved a position on the 
UN Security Council. Then, in May 2008, Libya agreed to fund compensation for the 
victims of the past Libyan-sponsored airplane bombings over Scotland and Niger and 
discotheque bombing in Germany. This lead to the U.S. secretary of state meeting with 
Qaddafi in September 2008, marking the normalization of relations between the two 
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countries. And a U.S. ambassador to Libya was appointed in November 2008. In 2009, 
Qaddafi became the chairman of the African Union. Also, Qaddafi addressed the UN 
General Assembly on his first visit to the United States. And he took part in that year’s 
G8 Summit. 
By contrast, Qaddafi continued to have rocky regional relations. In 2007, Qaddafi 
chose not to attend the Arab League Summit in Riyadh as a protest, allegedly regarding a 
disagreement with Saudi Arabia. Then, in March 2008, Qaddafi lobbed criticism against 
Arab countries for not stopping the United States from invading Iraq in 2003. 
Political stability sharply decreased with the coming of the Arab Uprising. 
Protests reached Libya in February 2011. The relations that Qaddafi had been working to 
improve sharply deteriorated. Juxtaposed against the previous seven years, relations with 
the United States, Europe, and the Middle East declined quickly due to Qaddafi’s 
crackdown on Libyan protesters. The Arab League suspended Libya’s membership and a 
United Nations coalition began military operations to halt attacks on Libyan rebels. Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates aided the rebels. The UN Security Council 
authorized a no-fly zone, which was enforced by the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization.1006 Qaddafi wrote a letter to U.S. President Barack Obama asking him to 
end the military operations. Nevertheless, the international community was not 
dissuaded. Rebel forces had taken over the country by August and Qaddafi was killed on 
October 20. 
A weak central government, factional fighting, and instability persisted after 
Qaddafi’s death. The National Transitional Council claimed power and the country 
moved forward to choose a new government and elections were held in mid-2012. The 
U.S. intelligence community cautioned, “the interim government needs to assert its 
                                                 




authority without igniting divisions among Libya’s various stakeholders. It also needs to 
work toward disbanding and integrating the country’s various militias.”1007 
The United States was a victim of Libya’s internal chaos in 2012 when a militia 
attacked the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya on September 11. The U.S. ambassador 
to Libya, Christopher Stevens, was killed during this attack along with other consulate 
staff. 
As of 2013, Libya’s security situation remained complex. The U.S. intelligence 
community reported to congress that “the institutional vacuum caused by Qaddafi’s 
removal increased terrorist activity and gave rise to hundreds of well-armed regional 
militias, many of which played key roles in overthrowing the regime but now complicate 
Libya’s stability.”1008 Libya had started the period with high hopes for re-integration into 
the region and the international community. Nevertheless, Qaddafi’s successors were 
unsuccessful at unifying the country, much less becoming an influential player on the 
international scene. 
b. Nuclear Program 
Libya’s nuclear disarmament decision was deemed a remarkable nonproliferation 
success story.1009 And, guided by the United States and the United Kingdom, Libya 
continued to distance itself from its nuclear past. In 2004, Libya continued the 
disarmament it had committed to in late 2003. Director of Central Intelligence Porter J. 
Goss reported to Congress in early 2005 that Libya moved forward in cooperating with 
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the IAEA and relinquished the primary components of its nuclear weapons program.1010 
Sixteen kilograms of highly enriched uranium were removed from Tajura in March and 
downblended by Russia, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative.1011 Libya looked 
poorly, however, when, according to Michael Laufer, previously ordered centrifuge parts 
arrived in Libya in March 2004 on the cargo ship BBC China from the A.Q. Khan 
network.1012  
Due to its disarmament decision, Libya rose as a voice for regional 
nonproliferation. In January 2004, Libya ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In 
January 2005, Libya’s legislature called for a weapons-of-mass-destruction free zone in 
Africa and the Middle East.1013 In March 2005, Libya ratified the Treaty of Pelindaba, 
the African NWFZ Treaty. 
As Libya normalized its political relations with the West, the country was praised 
for its disarmament decision. The United States, in particular, publicly applauded Libya’s 
disarmament choice. At the May 2005, NPT Review Conference, the U.S. assistant 
secretary of state for arms control stated that “Libya has joined other states, including 
South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, that have wisely concluded that their 
security interests are best served by turning away from nuclear weapons . . . . This 
demonstrates that, in a world of strong nonproliferation norms, it is never too late to 
make the decision to become a fully compliant NPT state.”1014 
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Meanwhile, the IAEA worked to finish investigating Libya’s nuclear program. 
The IAEA had a number of questions in August 2004 regarding Libya’s “acquisition of 
UF6 uranium conversion technology and enrichment technology,” “the role of the 
clandestine supply network,” and “sources of contamination of some enrichment related 
equipment” and continued to inspect and review Libya’s program from 2004 through 
2007. The IAEA reported in 2008, that following its investigations beginning in 
September 2004, “the agency has concluded that Libya’s current capabilities are not 
suited for the design or manufacturing of nuclear weapon components. Nor has the 
Agency found any indications of work related to nuclear weapons development.”1015 
Thus, the IAEA highlighted Libya’s compliance since inspections began in 2004. 
Once it was in good standing with the international community, Libya moved 
forward with plans to develop a civilian nuclear program. Between 2006 and 2008, Libya 
signed nuclear cooperation agreements with Argentina, Canada, France, the Ukraine, and 
Russia.1016 The cooperative agreement with France included plans for a desalination 
plant.1017 Libya was particularly interested in nuclear power.1018 In 2008, Libya created 
the Nuclear Energy Corporation to advance the country’s nuclear power ambitions.1019 
In 2010, the Libyan Atomic Energy Institute had begun site selection and to establish the 
legal framework for nuclear power plant construction.1020 
Libya’s nuclear weapons program had been nearly completely dismantled by 
2009. Maria Rost Rublee noted that the last of Libya’s highly enriched uranium, and 
perhaps Qaddafi’s remaining leverage, was transported out of the country to Russia in 
late 2009.1021 Richard Spencer wrote in The Telegraph in September 2011 that Libyan 
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rebel forces discovered a cache of yellowcake uranium from Niger in an abandoned 
building.1022 As the yellowcake had not been further processed, it did not pose an 
immediate security threat and the IAEA announced it would visit the facility for 
safeguarding purposes once the security situation improved, according to Spencer.1023 As 
of 2013, according to the IAEA, Libya primarily maintained a 10MW IRT-1 research 
reactor, which was temporarily shutdown, at the site of the former Tajura Nuclear 
Research Center.1024 
Qaddafi was not fully satisfied with his gains from giving up the country’s 
nuclear capabilities. In June 2009, Qaddafi complained that he had not seen enough 
rewards result from Libya’s decision to relinquish its nuclear weapons program.1025 
In addition to ending its nuclear program, Libya agreed to restrict its missile 
capabilities. The U.S. Department of State noted that Libya had decided to adhere to the 
protocol of the Missile Technology Control Regime by December 2003.1026 Conforming 
to the regime meant missiles with a range over 300 km and a weapons payload over 500 
kg were banned. The U.S. State Department reported that by September 2004 Libya’s 
Scud C missiles were removed and Libya agreed to get rid of its Scud B missiles.1027 
Nevertheless, Nathan E. Busch and Joseph F. Pilat asserted that while Libya agreed to 
reduce the range and payload capacity of its Scud-B missiles, it still maintained some of 
its original stock of missiles in 2011.1028 Finally, like other countries in the region, Libya 
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began to look at missile defense. For example, in 2010, Libya expressed interest in a 
Russian air defense system, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative.1029  
c. Nuclear Trends 
During this time period, Libya dismantled its nuclear weapons program, joined 
nonproliferation regime treaties, and became more involved in the international 
community. While Libya expressed interest in nuclear power, it did not make significant 
progress on this front and did not approach mastering a complete nuclear fuel cycle. 
Overall, nuclear proliferation efforts in Libya sharply decreased during this time period. 
By dismantling its nuclear program, the country moved away from acquiring fissile 
material and a weapons design. The country also agreed to limit its ballistic missile 
capacity and thus reduced its delivery vehicle capabilities. 
Its compliance in the nonproliferation arena, however, did not save the Qaddafi 
regime from the effects of the 2011 Arab Uprising. It was pulled apart by both domestic 
and regional political forces as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates were 
quick to join the coalition against Qaddafi. By 2013, after Qaddafi’s death, warring 
militia groups dominated the domestic political and security scene. 
What drove Libya’s nuclear behavior during this time period? In the regional 
context, conflict and rivalry had persisted. In addition to the regional turmoil from 
conflicts in Iraq and the Levant, the Gulf States had quickly decided to aid the rebels at 
the time of the Arab Uprising in Libya. The Libyan government had few friends in the 
region. At the international level, secret negotiations between Libya, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States had brought Libya to its 2003 public disarmament 
announcement.1030 In 2004, it was the United States and the United Kingdom that 
continued to work with Libya to implement the decision. They were joined by the IAEA 
and Russia. Europe joined in and also ended sanctions against Libya. The great powers 
came together to continue influencing Libya’s behavior as part of an overall effort to end 
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Libya’s state sponsorship of terrorism and nuclear proliferation—an international 
management headache. They were the driving force behind this decrease. 
5. Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia emerged as a more powerful regional player following the Second 
Gulf War. As the United States withdrew from the region, Saudi Arabia sought to fill 
some of the vacuum to bolster its own security interests. In particular, its rivalry with Iran 
increased and Saudi Arabia looked to head off Iranian influence in the region. This led to 
much speculation as to whether Saudi Arabia would seek to acquire a nuclear deterrent 
due to the security competition between the two countries. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia’s 
nuclear capabilities changed little over the time period. By 2013, Saudi Arabia’s nuclear 
capabilities did not approach mastering a complete nuclear fuel cycle, which might be 
characterized as a nuclear hedge. 
a. Political Context 
The Second Gulf War altered the balance of power in the Middle East. In the new 
balance of power, Saudi Arabia played a more prominent role. Unlike the First Gulf War, 
Saudi Arabia did not publicly support the U.S.-led coalition in the Second Gulf War. 
Saudi Arabia, along with the Arab League, opposed the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Its 
neighbor Kuwait was the only Gulf state that supported the war. While Saudi Arabia did 
not have a good relationship with Iraq, it became very concerned about the country’s 
instability and the growing influence of Iran over Iraq following the invasion. Saudi 
Arabia watched as Iraq came to be dominated by Shia, more closely aligned with Iran, 
rather than by Sunni. In 2005, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal commented, 
“United States policy in Iraq is widening sectarian divisions to the point of effectively 
handing the country to Iran.”1031 He continued: “we fought a war together to keep Iran 
out of Iraq, now we are handing the whole country over to Iran without reason . . . Iraq is 
disintegrating.”1032 Furthermore, Saudi Arabia remained concerned about Iran’s 
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intentions regarding its nuclear program. The Saudi-Iran rivalry would come to a head in 
2011 with Iran’s attempt to orchestrate the assassination of the Saudi ambassador to the 
United States. Saudi Arabia now confronted two significant security challenges: the rise 
of Iran and its support for Shia political groups and the rise of Salafist terrorist groups 
like Al-Qaeda. 
In terms of regional conflicts, Saudi Arabia was against Lebanese Hezbollah in its 
2006 war against Israel. Also, Saudi Arabia continued its involvement with the 
Palestinian issue. The country supported the Mecca Agreement in February 2007 to 
repair Hamas–Fatah relations. Saudi Arabia strongly opposed Israel’s War on Gaza in 
2009 and continued to refuse to officially recognize Israel. 
Saudi Arabia remained frustrated with U.S. foreign policy in the region. When 
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice noted in 2006 that the conflict in Lebanon 
indicated “the birth pangs of a new Middle East,” Faisal responded that Saudi Arabia 
wanted “to go back to the old Middle East” and added that the new Middle East had 
“more problems and more disasters.”1033 
Saudi Arabia focused on its own domestic issues, given the presence of Al-Qaeda, 
a Salafist terrorist group, in the country. The U.S. intelligence community noted in early 
2008 that since 2003 Saudi Arabian forces had had success in “killing or capturing Al-
Qaeda’s original Saudi-based leadership and degrading its manpower, access to weapons, 
and operational capability.”1034 The intelligence community further noted, however, that 
Saudi Arabia continued to be “a source of recruits and finances for Iraq and Levant-based 
militants and Saudi extremists constitute the largest share of foreign fighters and suicide 
bombers in Iraq.”1035 Furthermore, in 2010, the U.S. intelligence community reported 
that Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula sought to conduct attacks in Yemen and Saudi 
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Arabia.1036 The country was indeed dealing with its own terrorist challenge, both in 
terms of being a terrorist target and a source for funding and recruits given the country’s 
historical support for Wahhabism, a version of Salafism. 
In late 2010, Saudi Arabia’s security challenges increased as the Arab Uprising 
spread from one country to another. Saudi Arabia had two interests related to the 
uprising: 1) in its rivalry with Iran, it did not wish to see Iran or Shia groups gain power 
and influence regionally; and 2) it wished to ensure that the Muslim Brotherhood did not 
gain power and influence regionally or domestically. The Saudi leadership feared the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s “blend of Islam and politics as well as its avowed embrace of 
democracy.”1037 These two interests drove Saudi Arabia’s actions from late 2010 
through 2013, the end of the time period. Salloukh wrote that Saudi leadership remained 
focused on three things: protecting the kingdom from the Arab Uprising, ensuring the 
continuation of its monarchy, and combatting Iran’s regional efforts.1038 The United 
Arab Emirates supported and assisted Saudi Arabia with its regional efforts. 
In response to the Arab Uprising, which began in Tunisia in December 2010, 
Saudi Arabia offered refuge to Tunisia’s president. Then, in February 2011, protests 
occurred in Doha, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia intervened. First, on May 14, 2011, Saudi 
Arabia and Bahrain declared closer security cooperation in the Riyadh Declaration to 
stem greater protests.1039 Second, on May 15, 2011, when it seemed that Bahrain’s 
security forces might be overpowered, Saudi Arabia helped subdue Shia protests and the 
United Arab Emirates helped reinforce Bahrain’s troops.1040 
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After the January 2011 protests in Yemen, Saudi Arabia sought to mediate the 
political outcome. The Gulf Cooperation Council, led by Saudi Arabia, helped negotiate a 
political settlement and the departure of President Ali Abdullah Saleh in November. 
Elections were held in early 2012. Of particular concern for Saudi Arabia was that the 
Shia rebels, the Huthis, did not take control of the country. 
In Syria, the regime accused Saudi Arabia of arming opposition forces in its civil 
war, which began in March 2011. The Saudi-Iranian rivalry clearly demonstrated itself in 
the Syrian conflict as Iran supported the government and Saudi Arabia supported the 
opposition. Salloukh noted that “Riyadh’s determination to reorient Syria away from ‘the 
axis of resistance’ toward the Saudi-U.S. camp developed into an overlapping regional-
international geopolitical contest pitting Saudi Arabia, the U.S., France, Turkey, Qatar, 
and Saad al-Hariri’s Future Movement against Iran, Russia, China, and Hezbollah.”1041 
As Saudi Arabia worked against Iran throughout the region, the stakes were particularly 
high in Syria given Syria’s close relationship with Iran. 
In Egypt, Saudi Arabia vehemently opposed the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to 
power and alleged U.S.-abandonment of its longtime ally Mubarak in 2011. Khoury 
wrote that the leadership of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were displeased 
with Hosni Mubarak stepping down from office and U.S. support for his departure, 
believing that the United States had abandoned its ally.1042 Saudi Arabia opted to offer 
financial incentives to Egyptian elites working against the Muslim Brotherhood and then 
partnered with the Egyptian military when they took over the government from the 
Muslim Brotherhood in 2013.1043 
In Libya, Saudi Arabia was quick to support opposition forces. Khoury noted that 
while Saudi Arabia and Qatar provided financial assistance to Libyan opposition groups, 
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Saudi Arabia focused on Wahhabi/Salafi groups and Qatar focused on political groups 
like the Muslim Brotherhood.1044 
At the close of 2013, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, with the exception of 
Yemen, remained a sub-region of relative stability in a tumultuous region. Saudi Arabian 
economic and defense capabilities had been sufficient to ward off conflict closer to home. 
But Iran had managed to keep Syria’s Assad in power. 
b. Nuclear Program 
In the midst of the regional turmoil following the Second Iraq War, Saudi Arabia 
announced its intent to build a nuclear power program for energy and desalination as part 
of a Gulf Cooperation Council effort in 2006. Saudi Arabia’s interest in developing its 
nuclear capabilities coincided with growing regional alarm regarding Iran’s nuclear 
program. The Sunday Times (London) quoted Prince Mohammed bin Nawaf bin 
Abdulaziz, Saudi Arabia’s Ambassador to the United Kingdom, in November 2013 as 
responding that “all options are available.”1045 In addition, Middle East expert Bruce 
Reidel has suggested that Saudi Arabia may have an agreement for Pakistan to provide a 
nuclear umbrella to shield Saudi Arabia.1046 
Saudi Arabia moved forward with its plans for nuclear power. In 2007, the IAEA 
and the Gulf Cooperation Council agreed to undertake a nuclear power feasibility study. 
Saudi Arabia signed a nuclear memorandum of understanding with the United States in 
2008 and nuclear cooperation agreements with France in 2011, Argentina in 2011, South 
Korea in 2011, and China in 2012.1047 In 2009, Saudi Arabia decided it would establish 
its own nuclear power program and set up the King Abdullah City for Atomic and 
                                                 
1044 Khoury, “The Arab Cold War Revisited: The Regional Impact of the Arab Uprising.” 
1045 Roger Boyes and Roland Watson, “Saudi Arabia Turns Up Heat on the West Over Possible Iran 
Nuclear Deal,” The Times, November 22, 2013, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/saudi-arabia-turns-up-
heat-on-the-west-over-possible-iran-nuclear-deal-sx6d77z2k06. 
1046 Bruce Riedel, “Saudi Arabia: Nervously Watching Pakistan,” Op-Ed (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution, January 28, 2008), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/saudi-arabia-nervously-
watching-pakistan/. 
1047 “Profile for Saudi Arabia—Nuclear,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, accessed April 19, 2016, 
http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/saudi-arabia/nuclear/. 
 240 
Renewable Energy.1048 In June 2011, the country announced that it planned to create a 
nuclear energy program and construct 16 nuclear power reactors within a timeline of 20 
years.1049 As of late 2013, Saudi Arabia was working on a research reactor that would be 
operated by the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy, however, no 
significant progress had been made on developing the country’s nuclear power 
program.1050 
Why did Saudi Arabia not make more progress on its nuclear program by 2013? 
Writing in 2010, Ibrahim Al-Marashi noted the paucity of “domestic physical resources 
and scientific infrastructure” in Saudi Arabia for a nuclear program even though the 
Kingdom had an abundance of financial resources.1051 Additional challenges consisted 
of the lack of experience of Saudi scientists in the nuclear field, the lack of nuclear 
infrastructure, and the lack of a developed legal framework for a nuclear program.1052 
The private sector viewed Saudi Arabia’s situation in a similar light. International energy 
companies surveying the regional market in this timeframe viewed Saudi Arabia as the 
only country, aside from the United Arab Emirates where a nuclear power plant was 
already under construction, which possibly would pursue nuclear power.1053 Given that 
little had been done to develop the legal framework for nuclear power, it did not seem 
that the Kingdom would realize this ambition in the near-term.1054 This seemed to 
indicate that Saudi Arabia placed a high value on the idea that it could buy a nuclear 
capability if it chose to, but had not prioritized the implementation of those ideas. 
Further, there was no evidence of any nuclear weapons assistance from Pakistan. Neither 
did Saudi Arabia acquire additional ballistic missiles that could be used as a delivery 
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vehicle. It served Saudi Arabia’s interests, however, that there was speculation regarding 
whether or not the country might acquire a nuclear weapon. 
Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia’s commitments to the nonproliferation regime 
increased during this time period. The country acceded to the Safeguards Agreement in 
2005, with a Small Quantities Protocol amendment. The agreement came into force in 
2009. Also, Saudi Arabia supported the idea of a weapons-of-mass-destruction free zone 
in the Middle East.1055 
c. Nuclear Trends 
Saudi Arabia’s interest in nuclear energy increased in the mid-2000s signaled by 
its announcement regarding nuclear power in 2006. This initiative occurred in the midst 
of increasing regional conflict and rivalry with Iran. In the regional context of Iran as a 
possible nuclear power, there was reason to be concerned about how Saudi Arabia would 
respond. Frederic Wehrey noted that “Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors have 
performed a delicate balancing act in their policies toward Iran, seeking to manage the 
nuclear threat through accommodation rather than confrontation, publicly voicing their 
disapproval of a U.S. strike, and making calls for WMD-free zone in the Gulf and the 
Middle East.”1056 
By late 2013, however, much work remained to break ground on a nuclear power 
plant. Little progress had been made on what might be characterized as a possible 
hedging strategy on the part of Saudi Arabia.1057 Overall, nuclear proliferation did not 
increase in Saudi Arabia from 2004 to 2013. The country had not made progress toward 
the acquisition of fissile material, weapons design, or a delivery vehicle. 
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What drove Saudi Arabia’s nuclear behavior during this time period? As 2013 
came to a close, the country remained mired in regional challenges and its rivalry with 
Iran was at a fever pitch. Saudi Arabia’s nuclear efforts on the ground from 2004 to 2013, 
however, did not match its regional angst. Saudi Arabia’s lack of a response in the 
nuclear realm seems to speak volumes regarding what the country perceived was an 
acceptable solution to its security concerns. Its ally, the United States, had focused 
heavily on curtailing regional nuclear proliferation since 1991. What sort of response 
would Saudi Arabia receive, if the United States discovered that Saudi Arabia sought to 
acquire nuclear weapons? Despite Saudi Arabia’s wealth, it focused on proxy warfare in 
its regional battlegrounds with Iran. If it did not have concerns regarding a response from 
its ally the United States, it is reasonable to think that Saudi Arabia may have been more 
aggressive in its pursuit of a nuclear weapon.  
6. Syria 
Syria faced heightened instability and conflict after the Second Gulf War. Al-
Qaeda in Iraq used the porous border between Iraq and Syria to fight U.S. troops. Syria 
also continued its conflict with Israel by supporting Hamas and Hezbollah. As Syria 
became more isolated in the region, it drew closer to Iran. In the midst of this conflict, 
Syria moved forward on a covert nuclear reactor. Israel assessed that the facility was for a 
weapons program and bombed it in 2007 after discussing the situation with the United 
States.1058 Following this attack on its suspected nuclear weapons facility, Syria made no 
further progress on its nuclear program. In 2011, civil war broke out in Syria following 
Arab Uprising protests. The country remained mired in conflict through 2013. 
a. Political Context 
Syria began this period playing its historical role of supporting Palestinian 
rejectionist groups against Israel with assistance from Iran.  Syria assessed it had gained 
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regional support following Hezbollah’s 2006 war with Israel.1059 Hezbollah had 
surpassed expectations in its ability to resist Israel. Following the war, Syria continued to 
support groups like Hamas, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine—General Command.1060 Syria supported Hamas in its 2008 to 
2009 conflict with Israel. Israel and Syria held periodic peace talks, the latest being in 
2010, which included an offer for a possible Israeli withdrawal from the Golan 
Heights.1061 
Syria’s regional political positions, however, hurt its economy. Unlike the First 
Gulf War in 1991, Syria did not support the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Syria took 
the position of opposing the United States. Raymond Hinnebusch noted that Syria paid an 
economic price for going against the United States in Iraq.1062 The resulting U.S. 
sanctions hurt the Syrian economy.1063 In addition, the 2005 death of Lebanese Prime 
Minister Rafiq Hariri was blamed on Syria. The Hariri incident damaged trade relations 
between Syria and the European Union.1064 Syria then strengthened its trade 
relationships with China, Iran, Turkey, and the Gulf States as the country opened itself up 
further to economic liberalization.1065 These changes, however, increased the economic 
gap between Syria’s rich and poor.1066 Meanwhile, Syria continued to use its 
“resistance” to Israel and opposition to the United States to bolster domestic support for 
the Syrian government despite “broad dissatisfaction with economic conditions, some 
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disappointment at the lack of political reforms, and quiet resentment by some Sunnis at 
domination by the Alawi minority.”1067 
In addition, Syria’s lack of border security with Iraq led to Islamist groups using 
Syria as a safe haven. The U.S. intelligence community noted that Syria served as the 
main transit point for foreign fighters traveling to Iraq.1068 Syria turned a blind eye to 
these groups crossing its border to travel back and forth to Iraq to fight against the 
military forces of the United States and its allies. Al-Qaeda in Iraq especially benefited 
from this sanctuary and freedom of movement.1069 These armed Islamist groups 
eventually turned against Syria during the Arab Uprising. 
Arab Uprising protests began in Syria in March 2011. Assad was not sympathetic 
to the protesters’ grievances, such as economic concerns, and responded with a show of 
force. Hinnebusch attributed the initiation of the uprising to overthrow the Assad regime 
to the government’s violent suppression of peaceful protest.1070 Furthermore, 
Hinnebusch assessed that the Sunni protesters in Syria were encouraged by similar 
uprisings in the region along with funding from Saudi Arabia and the exiled Muslim 
Brotherhood.1071 In November 2011, the Arab League suspended Syria’s membership 
due to its treatment of protesters. 
Al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi sent Abu Mohammed al-Julani to 
Syria in 2011 to form jihadi groups resulting in the creation of an Al-Qaeda branch in 
Syria—the Al-Nusra Front.1072 By 2012, Islamist Salafi groups seized on the turmoil in 
Syria and turned their networks developed during the fight against the United States and 
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its allies in Iraq against the Syrian regime.1073 Glenn Robinson noted “many of the 
fighters currently battling the Syrian regime honed their guerrilla skills in Iraq, learning 
urban combat techniques fighting Americans in Iraq from 2003 to 2007. Those who were 
not killed in Iraq made their way back to Syria (the largest entry point for foreign jihadis 
entering Iraq during that war), and have taken up arms against their own regime.”1074 
In 2013, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant was formed in Syria. As Gerges 
explains, 
Baghdadi called for an Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, which would 
see the merging of AQI and al-Nusra. Julani rejected the merger, a move 
backed by Al-Qaeda’s overall leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, to whom Julani 
pledged allegiance. An intra-jihadist war between IS and al-Nusra killed 
thousands of skilled fighters and exposed a fierce power struggle between 
Baghdadi and his former mentor—Zawahiri. For now, Islamic State has 
taken operational leadership of the global jihadist movement by default, 
eclipsing its parent organization.1075 
The conflict showed no signs of ending quickly. The U.S. intelligence community 
noted in early 2012 that both sides in the conflict had been uncompromising on whether 
Bashar al-Assad should leave or remain as president.1076 Further, the U.S. intelligence 
community assessed that “with Iran and Hezbollah backing the Assad regime, and the 
Gulf Cooperation Council states and Turkey actively opposing it,” the conflict had 
become regional.1077 On an international level, the United States, France, and Britain 
pushed for the UN Security Council to take action, but China and Russia obstructed their 
efforts.1078 Russia was also aiding the Assad regime directly.1079 
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As of early 2013, neither side had been able to make determinative progress in the 
conflict. Furthermore, the country had begun to fall apart. The U.S. intelligence 
community reported to Congress that an estimated 700,000 Syrians had left the country 
and 2.5 million Syrians were internally displaced and compounding the situation the 
country’s economy had suffered greatly due to the sanctions and conflict.1080 In fact, in 
2012, the economy reduced by 10 to 15 percent, causing the Syrian government to focus 
on security expenses rather than public goods like healthcare, food, and education.1081 
Salloukh concluded that “Syria’s swift transformation from a one-time regional player, 
commanding substantial influence in its immediate security environment, into terrain for 
geopolitical battles is one of the major geopolitical consequences of the Arab 
uprisings.”1082 
b. Nuclear Program 
In the midst of this regional conflict, Syria had begun building a secret nuclear 
reactor. Throughout the early 2000s, North Korea helped Syria to build a covert reactor at 
Dair Alzour. The U.S. intelligence community noted that as of 2005 information seemed 
to indicate that North Korea was working with Syria on the endeavor.1083 Conducive to 
hosting a nuclear reactor, the IAEA reported that the site had “a relatively stable 
geological platform on which to construct a heavy building, low population density in the 
area, close proximity to a river for the supply of cooling water, and the availability of 
services, including water and electricity.”1084 The U.S. intelligence community assessed 
that North Korea helped Syria with the reactor because it looked like the plutonium 
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power reactor at Yongbyon and utilized technology like that of North Korea.1085 Further, 
Washington asserted that North Korea assisted Syria with its nuclear program in return 
for financial remuneration.1086 
U.S. intelligence did not identify the facility until the 2005 to 2006 
timeframe.1087 It had noticed shipments occurring from North Korea to Syria in 2006, 
likely to the site.1088 By spring 2007, it became clear that Syria had begun building a 
nuclear reactor.1089 The construction, which had begun around 2001, was finished by 
summer of 2007.1090 The reactor was nearly operational by September 2007, but it had 
not been loaded with uranium fuel.1091 The reactor’s thermal power may have been 25 
MW or more, according to the IAEA.1092 The U.S. intelligence community noted that the 
reactor had no power lines or switching facilities for electricity production and was not 
really compatible with a research program.1093 Also, in 2007, Syria publicly announced 
that the country might pursue a nuclear power program for electricity and 
desalination.1094 
Prior to bombing the covert facility, Israel coordinated policy with the United 
States. Former U.S. President George W. Bush wrote in his memoirs that he received a 
call from Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert asking him to bomb the Syrian facility.1095 
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According to Bush, he was presented with three options by U.S. security officials: 1) a 
bombing attack on the facility as requested by Israel; 2) a covert raid that would destroy 
the building and entail U.S. personnel on the ground; or 3) a public denouncement of the 
nuclear reactor with allies, with a threat for military action if Syria did not close it.1096 
Further, the U.S. intelligence community was not able to verify the location of a site to 
convert plutonium into a form suitable for a weapon.1097 Given this missing piece of 
information confirming that Syria had a weapons program, Bush informed Olmert that he 
could not conduct the raid and would pursue a diplomatic response initially.1098 Olmert 
expressed his disappointment stating that a nuclear weapons program in Syria was an 
“existential” threat to Israel.1099 Subsequently, the Israeli Air Force bombed and 
destroyed the reactor in a secret raid on September 6, 2007, according to Office of the 
U.S. Director of National Intelligence information.1100 
U.S. intelligence noted that Israel’s attack damaged the facility beyond repair and 
Syria destroyed the rest of the building.1101 The IAEA reported that satellite imagery 
taken on October 24, 2007, showed extensive clearing and leveling had taken place at the 
site.1102 According to U.S. intelligence, Syria sought “to destroy the ruined reactor 
building and to remove all potentially incriminating nuclear-related equipment and 
structures.”1103 In addition, Washington reported that, after the bombing of the site, a 
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senior North Korean delegation traveled to Syria and met with Syrian officials working 
on the covert project.1104 
Syria allowed the IAEA to access the destroyed facility following the attack. In 
2008, Syria granted complete site access to the IAEA. The IAEA visited the site and 
Syrian officials reiterated that the location was not a military site with a nuclear 
purpose.1105 Furthermore, Syria took the position that “the unreliable and insufficient 
electricity supplies in the area, the limited availability of human resources in Syria and 
the unavailability of large quantities of treated water” made a nuclear endeavor 
impossible.1106 The IAEA reported, however, that the building’s “containment structure 
appears to have been similar in dimension and layout to that required for a biological 
shield for nuclear reactors, and the overall size of the building was sufficient to house the 
equipment needed for a nuclear reactor of the type alleged.”1107 The agency assessed that 
“the pumping capacity” was “adequate for a reactor of the size referred to in the 
allegation” and there was “sufficient electrical capacity to operate the pumping 
system.”1108 Finally, laboratory analysis “revealed a significant number of natural 
uranium particles” that were “anthropogenic, i.e., that the material was produced as a 
result of chemical processing” at the site.1109 
Syria was less than cooperative in providing additional information to the IAEA. 
As of May 2008, Syria had not provided the IAEA with requested documentation on the 
specifics of the bombed building nor granted permission to visit three other sites the 
IAEA expressed interest in visiting.1110 Separately, additional anthropogenic uranium 
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particles were found in 2008 and 2009 at Syria’s Miniature Neutron Source Reactor.1111 
In November 2009, Syria explained that the particles were from “previously unreported 
activities performed at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor related to the preparation of 
tens of grams of uranyl nitrate using yellowcake” produced at the Homs Phosphoric Acid 
Pilot Plant.1112 Also, in March 2010, the IAEA found a small, undeclared amount of 
uranyl nitrate at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor.1113 After obtaining additional 
information from Syria, the IAEA reported in 2011 that Syria’s statements about the 
particles found at Miniature Neutron Source Reactor were “not inconsistent with the 
Agency’s findings.”1114 
The IAEA’s findings in a May 2011 report seemed to refute Syria’s claims regarding the 
benign nature of the covert project. In May 2011, the IAEA reported that  
information subsequently provided to the Agency further alleged that the 
reactor was a gas cooled graphite moderated reactor, that it was not 
configured to produce electricity, that it had been built with the assistance 
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and that there were three 
other locations in Syria that were functionally related to the Dair Alzour 
site.1115  
The IAEA noted the similarities between the destroyed building and the 
dimensions of North Korea’s reactor at Yongbyon.1116 In its May 2011 report, however, 
the Agency revealed the following: 
 features of the destroyed building are comparable to those of gas cooled 
graphite moderated reactors of the type and size alleged; 
 prior to the bombing, the configuration of the infrastructure at the site, 
including its connections for cooling and treated water, was able to 
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support the operation of such a reactor and was not consistent with Syria’s 
claims regarding the purpose of the infrastructure; in addition, a number of 
other features of the site add to its suitability for the construction and 
operation of a nuclear reactor; 
 analysis of samples from the site indicates a connection to nuclear related 
activities; and 
 the features of the destroyed building and the site could not have served 
the purpose claimed by Syria.1117  
The IAEA finally concluded that the building at Dair Alzour “was very likely a 
nuclear reactor and should have been declared” to the IAEA, and it found Syria non-
compliant with its NPT obligations.1118 In June, the IAEA adopted a resolution finding 
Syria non-compliant with its Safeguards Agreement.1119 
As the country descended into conflict, IAEA access in Syria became limited. In 
August 2013, the IAEA noted that additional inspections could not take place due to 
Syria’s poor security situation.1120 Questions lingered, however, regarding a possible 
undeclared stockpile of uranium that would have been used to fuel the destroyed reactor 
at Dair Alzour.1121 
In terms of delivery systems, China, North Korea, Iran, and possibly Russia aided 
Syria with its missile program, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative.1122 For 
example, Iran provided Syria with the M-600 solid propellant missile in the mid-
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2000s.1123 As of early 2010, the U.S. intelligence community noted that Syria had “an 
active missile program, with some missiles that can reach 700 kilometers,” likely a 
reference to the Scud-D.1124 Finally, Syrian opposition forces succeeded in taking the 
Dair Alzour facility in February 2013 and may have captured a Syrian Scud-C missile 
stored there.1125 
c. Nuclear Trends 
By the end of 2013, while Syria maintained an active ballistic missile program, 
there was no indication that it was on its way to acquiring fissile material or a nuclear 
warhead. Its greatest advances were made before the 2007 bombing of its covert nuclear 
facility, if, as the various suspicious factors seemed to indicate, the purpose of the covert 
facility was to produce fissile material. Overall, there was a decrease in Syria’s nuclear 
capabilities over the period due to Israel’s attack on its covert facility. 
What drove Syria’s nuclear behavior? In the regional context, Syria was a small 
state surrounded by large threats. It sought to play a larger role in regional politics than 
its economic and military power would allow. Ellen Laipson wrote that Syria’s program 
should be seen in the context of “the enduring struggle to find a just solution to the Arab-
Israeli conflict and the need to balance Syria’s pride and self-image with the fact that it is 
surrounded by a number of larger and more powerful states.”1126 
The puzzle remains why Syria did not retaliate in any way or seek to rebuild after 
Israel’s attack on its program. Syria’s regime believed it could benefit from a nuclear 
program; however, it opted not to retaliate or rebuild when its program was destroyed. 
Neither did Iran defend Syria. The muted response from Syria may have had to do with 
two considerations. The first was the presence of the U.S.-led coalition in neighboring 
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Iraq. Furthermore, based on the memoirs of President Bush, it seemed the United States 
might have been more comfortable making a decision to attack the Syrian facility with 
additional information. The United States remained cautious given the results of the 2004 
Duelfer Report on Iraq’s nuclear history. Syria likely realized it had few good options. 
The second was that there seemed to be tacit agreement among the great powers that a 
covert nuclear reactor had no place in the region; the lack of an international response to 
the 2007 attack demonstrated the strength of that consensus. 
7. Turkey 
Turkey began to take a larger role in regional political affairs during this time 
period. It also confronted various regional threats. Turkey continued to deal with the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party insurgency—its greatest security threat. After the Arab 
Uprising, it also had to confront the challenges of the conflict in Syria. The conflict pitted 
Turkey against the Syrian regime as it stood against empowered Syrian Kurds and 
supported Islamist parties in the region, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Like 
other regional states, Turkey sought to advance its nuclear energy program. While Turkey 
made progress establishing the legal framework for a nuclear power program along with 
nuclear cooperation agreements, by 2013, it had not broken ground for a nuclear power 
plant. 
a. Political Context 
During this time period, Turkey expanded ties with the Middle East, focusing less 
on Europe.1127 Turkey and Egypt signed a free trade agreement in 2005 and discussed a 
gas pipeline. While Turkey and Syria did not traditionally have strong relations, these 
improved between 2009 and 2010, with an eye to bolstering trade.1128 Economic 
interests dominated Turkey’s relationship with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
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Emirates.1129 Turkey also maintained active trade relationships with both Libya and 
Iran.1130 Further, Turkey imported natural gas from Iran and citizens from Iran visited 
Turkey and vice-versa resulting in a strong tourist industry. Also, both countries shared 
concerns about border security due to the Kurdish issue. Iran was less than pleased, 
however, with the installation of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization missile defense 
facility in Turkey in September 2011. 
In Iraq, Turkey improved its relationship with the Kurds, but at the same time 
experienced friction in its relationship with Baghdad. For example, in October 2008, 
Kurdistan Regional Government President Barzani met with Turkish officials furthering 
relations between the Kurdistan Regional Government and Turkey.1131 This developing 
relationship at times concerned the Iraqi government. As of early 2013, Turkey continued 
to experience a strained relationship with the Iraqi government in Baghdad. Iraqi 
leadership was upset that Turkey had bypassed the government in Baghdad to open up a 
political and trade relationship directly with the Kurdistan Regional Government.1132 
Turkey historically enjoyed good relations with Israel, but experienced several 
downturns during this time period. Relations became strained with Israel over the visits 
of Hamas Leader Khaled Mashal to Turkey, which began in 2006. Tensions arose again 
during the 2008 to 2009 Gaza Conflict as Turkey sided with Hamas. Then, in 2010, Israel 
launched an attack against a Turkish ship carrying aid for the Palestinians. The ship’s 
voyage sought to break an Israeli blockade against the Hamas-ruled Palestinian territories 
with the purpose of preventing weapons shipments to Hamas. The attack resulted in the 
deaths of nine Turks. Consequently, Turkey and Israel severed relations. In September 
2012, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan expressed three conditions for the normalization 
of relations. They included a public apology by Israel for the incident, compensation for 
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the victims’ families, and an end to the Gaza blockade.1133 Israel did not comply with 
these demands and relations between the two countries remained icy. 
A number of Turkey’s regional relationships shifted after the 2011 Arab 
Uprisings. Turkey consistently sided with Islamist parties, such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood. During the uprising in Egypt, Turkey criticized Mubarak and supported the 
protesters.1134 Turkey immediately recognized the Muslim Brotherhood and their 
presidential candidate Morsi when the party came to power in 2012. After Morsi was 
removed from power in 2013, the relationship took a downturn. Turkey was more reticent 
about intervention in Libya due to its economic interests in the country and further 
outside interference in the region after the 2003 invasion of Iraq.1135 
Turkey turned against the Assad government in Syria in August 2011 to support 
the Syrian opposition. Howeve,r Crystal Ennis and Bessma Momani noted that “Turkey’s 
support for the Syrian opposition was a principled one, as Turkish economic investments 
in Syria and its relationship with the Assad government had been strong.”1136 In support 
of the opposition, Turkey allowed the Syrian National Council to base its headquarters in 
the country until late 2012 when the group transferred to Cairo.1137 Also, Turkey 
supported a no-fly zone in Syria. In 2012, Syria shot down a Turkish fighter jet. Turkey 
responded by taking the incident to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which in turn 
condemned Syria’s actions. 
On the domestic front, Turkey’s most significant domestic issue continued to be 
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party insurgency. As of early 2008, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
maintained around 1,000 to 2,000 fighters in Turkey, 3,000 to 3,500 fighters in northern 
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Iraq, and a couple of hundred in Iran and Syria.1138 In October 2011, with Turkey 
occupied in Syria, the insurgent group carried out one of its deadliest attacks against 
Turkish security forces.1139 Erdogan responded by increasing operations against the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party.1140 The combination of the security issues resulting from the 
Syria conflict and the domestic insurgency presented a significant challenge to the 
Turkish government. For example, the conflict in Syria led to a greater threat from 
Islamic extremists in Turkey—Turkey served as the primary gateway for foreign fighters 
to travel to Syria.1141 Furthermore, any gains by the Syrian Kurds in Syria contributed to 
Turkish fears of separatism by the Turkish Kurds.1142 In early 2013, the U.S. intelligence 
community reported that the Kurdistan Workers’ Party-related violence in Turkey had 
risen to its worst level in 10 years.1143 Erdogan responded by pursuing a peace deal with 
the insurgents during 2013. 
Finally, signs of domestic instability appeared at the end of the time period. 
Erdogan’s challenges were amplified when allegations of corruption were lodged against 
him in 2013 by affiliates of Fethullah Gulen, an influential Muslim cleric.1144 
Turkey’s regional influence increased over this time period. Turkey’s weight as a 
regional political and economic player influenced outcomes. It was not as dwarfed by an 
external power as in the previous time periods. Roy Kadarag and Andrea Bank surmise 
that it was “the immense loss of U.S. influence in the Middle East, especially after the 
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second Bush administration from 2005 to 2009, which has allowed the rise of influential 
regional players.”1145 
b. Nuclear Program 
Turkey continued its long pursuit of nuclear power. Turkey’s Justice and 
Development Party made a commitment when it came to power in 2002 to pursue nuclear 
power for the country. Turkey took up its nuclear power project again in 2004, 
conducting a feasibility study for plant locations. Turkey and the United States signed a 
nuclear cooperation agreement in June 2006, which went into force in 2008.1146 In 
August 2006, Turkey announced it would install three nuclear reactors by 2015.1147 
Turkey’s stated goal was “to meet growing energy requirements, reduce dependence on 
Russian natural gas and enable Turkey to export electricity to Europe.”1148 A bill was 
sent to the Turkish parliament in order to move the project forward by enabling the 
construction and operation of power facilities by both the private and public sectors.1149 
In 2007, the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority advised that reactors utilizing natural 
uranium or low enriched uranium could be constructed.1150 
Turkey began looking for a supplier for its nuclear power plants. The country 
turned to Russia and signed an intergovernmental agreement in May 2010 for Rosatom to 
build its first plant at Akkuyu with four nuclear reactors.1151 Russia would “build, own, 
and operate” the plant.1152 The agreement was ratified by both parliaments in July. 
Kibaroglu noted that the agreement was criticized domestically, however, as it did not 
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advance Turkey’s original goal of developing “indigenous scientific and technological 
advancement in the nuclear field.”1153 
The country continued to move forward working with international players in the 
field of nuclear power. Turkey signed nuclear cooperation agreements with South Korea 
and China in June 2010 and April 2012, respectively.1154 In January 2011, Turkish 
energy official Metin Kilci noted that Turkey had the goal of 20 reactors operating by 
2030.1155 In May 2013, Ankara granted negotiating rights for a second plant with four 
nuclear reactors to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries-AREVA on the Black Sea at Sinop.1156 
Japan and Turkey signed the intergovernmental agreement in October 2013. In November 
2013, the IAEA conducted a review in Turkey to determine the country’s readiness for a 
nuclear energy program.1157 The agency recommended that the government should finish 
“a national policy on nuclear energy, strengthening the regulatory body, and developing a 
national plan for human resource development.”1158 
As of late 2013, Turkey had several small research reactors and it continued to 
host tactical nuclear weapons due to its role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
Specifically, Turkey had two small research reactors, but only one functioning reactor. 
Turkey’s nuclear reactor, the TR-2, was shut down during a refurbishment process that 
began in 2011.1159 Construction had not yet begun on any nuclear reactors for its planned 
power plants. As of 2011, it hosted an estimated 60 to 70 tactical nuclear weapons at 
Incirlik Air Base.1160 There were questions, however, regarding whether Turkey has 
maintained the operational capability to deliver the weapons or whether that task would 
be reserved for U.S. forces. 
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Finally, in terms of delivery systems, the information examined here seemed to 
indicate that Turkey was focused primarily on acquiring a ballistic missile defense system 
during this period. In November 2013, Turkey asked the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization to “supply PAC-3 batteries to defend against missiles and long-range 
artillery from Syria,” especially Syria’s Scud-D missiles with a range of 700 
kilometers.1161 
c. Nuclear Trends 
During this time period, Turkey did not advance toward an indigenous nuclear 
weapons capability in terms of fissile material, a nuclear warhead, or a delivery vehicle. 
Turkey continued to express interest in developing nuclear power like other regional 
states. As of late 2013, Turkey’s nuclear power program was less developed than that of 
the United Arab Emirates, but more developed than countries like Saudi Arabia. Turkey 
had signed agreements in the past to construct nuclear power plants, but none had come 
to fruition. It remained to be seen whether Turkey’s agreements with Russia and Japan 
would produce a different result. Turkey made no indication that it might pursue a 
nuclear weapons program. 
What drove Turkey’s nuclear behavior? Turkey was under the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization’s nuclear umbrella. In the regional context, while turmoil from Syria 
and Iraq impacted the country, Turkey did not face a serious regional rival in the Middle 
East. If anything, its greatest threat emanated from a domestic conflict. Also, pursuit of a 
nuclear weapon would likely have jeopardized Turkey’s relations with the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization and the United States, the supplier of the tactical nuclear weapons on 
Turkey’s soil. While Turkey possessed the economic and military capabilities to support 
a nuclear program, the country did not move toward nuclear proliferation for these 
reasons. 
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8. United Arab Emirates 
The United Arab Emirates made the most progress on its nuclear energy program 
of all the regional states that announced plans for nuclear power in the mid-2000s. By late 
2013, construction had begun on the first power plant. But, the United Arab Emirates 
opted to forego the acquisition of a complete nuclear fuel cycle, joined numerous 
nonproliferation agreements and treaties, and did not seek to acquire a delivery vehicle. 
In short, while it moved forward on nuclear power, it further integrated itself into the 
nonproliferation regime. 
a. Political Context 
The United Arab Emirates continued to develop its military and economic power 
during this time period. It did so with the support of the United States, which guaranteed 
the United Arab Emirates’ security and provided direct investment.1162 
The United Arab Emirates maintained close ties with the other Gulf States, 
especially Saudi Arabia. The United Arab Emirates’ relationship with Iraq also slowly 
improved. The United Arab Emirates appointed an ambassador to Iraq in 2008, thus 
reestablishing relations after the Second Gulf War. Iran and the United Arab Emirates 
continued to have extensive economic ties with a large Iranian expatriate population in 
the United Arab Emirates, particularly in Dubai. Nevertheless, the United Arab Emirates 
remained concerned about the Iranian nuclear program. 
Finally, relations between the United Arab Emirates and Israel improved over this 
time period. Israel and the United Arab Emirates do not have formal relations with each 
other due to the unsettled Israeli-Palestinian issue. In 2009, however, Israel sought to 
build goodwill with the United Arab Emirates by backing its efforts to have the 
International Renewable Energy Agency based in Abu Dhabi.1163 This gesture was well 
received by the United Arab Emirates. Since then, Israeli officials have visited the United 
                                                 
1162 Foley, The Arab Gulf States, 140. 
1163 Diaa Hadid, “Israel to Open Diplomatic Office in United Arab Emirates,” New York Times, 
November 27, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/28/world/middleeast/israel-to-open-diplomatic-
office-in-united-arab-emirates.html. 
 261 
Arab Emirates to participate in International Renewable Energy Agency events, despite 
an official entry ban.1164 The inaugural visit by an Israeli minister occurred in 2010 with 
the visit of former Infrastructure Minister Uzi Landau.1165 Despite periodic 
disagreements between the two countries, the Emirati-Israeli relationship has been 
maintained over time due to agreement on issues of concern, such as the Iranian nuclear 
program.  
Regional dynamics shifted for the United Arab Emirates at the onset of the Arab 
Uprising in 2011. Due to internal stability concerns, the United Arab Emirates strongly 
opposed Islamist groups, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. A rift between the United 
Arab Emirates and Qatar emerged when the United Arab Emirates accused Qatar of 
sponsoring Islamist groups within the Gulf. Dubai’s police chief “accused the Muslim 
Brotherhood of conspiring, with financial help from Qatar, to assume power in a number 
of Gulf countries.”1166 Relations with Egypt deteriorated when Morsi and the Muslim 
Brotherhood came to power there in 2012.1167 Relations improved again after Morsi was 
removed in 2013 and the military returned to power. In Libya, the United Arab Emirates, 
along with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, supported anti-Qaddafi rebels.1168 In Syria, the 
United Arab Emirates joined Saudi Arabia to side with the Syrian opposition and the 
United Arab Emirates closed its embassy in Syria with the onset of the Syrian Civil War. 
In Bahrain, Emirati troops assisted Saudi Arabia in supporting the ruling family in March 
2011 when a Shia uprising occurred. 
As of late 2013, the United Arab Emirates continued to play an important role in 
the Gulf and the region, especially as it assisted Saudi Arabia with its security efforts. 
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Generally, where Saudi Arabia could be found working to further its regional security 
agenda, the United Arab Emirates could be found there as well. 
On the domestic front, the United Arab Emirates continued to advance significant 
building and investment projects, primarily in the two most powerful emirates—Abu 
Dhabi and Dubai. Abu Dhabi was known for its wealth, as it holds the majority of the 
country’s oil reserves, and for being more conservative. Dubai was known as an 
international business hub and as being more liberal and extravagant. Furthermore, the 
two emirates saw one another as competitors. Andrea Rugh writes that this tension 
between the two emirates “was manifest during the economic problems in Dubai in 2009 
to 2010. Due to their innate ‘tribal’ belief in the value of not showing off wealth except in 
measured ways, Abu Dhabi was very reluctant to bail Dubai out.”1169 
b. Nuclear Program 
The United Arab Emirates expressed interest in nuclear power along with its 
fellow Gulf Cooperation Council members in 2006. In 2007, it participated in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council-sponsored IAEA feasibility study. It became apparent in 2008, 
however, that the United Arab Emirates would pursue nuclear power on its own terms. 
The country moved quickly to establish a nuclear energy program with assistance from 
third countries.1170 A white paper released in April 2008 outlined the country’s nuclear 
energy policy and its commitment to peaceful nuclear energy.1171 The paper committed 
to: 1) “complete operational transparency,” 2) pursuit of the “highest standards of non-
proliferation,” 3) adherence to “the highest standards of safety and security,” 4) direct 
work with the IAEA, conforming to its standards, 5) development of nuclear power 
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capability assisted by foreign governments, firms, and expert organizations, and 6) focus 
on long-term sustainability in the nuclear power program.1172 
To guide the process of establishing this program, the United Arab Emirates 
founded the Nuclear Energy Program Implementation Organization and the Emirates 
Nuclear Energy Corporation.1173 
The United Arab Emirates solicited bids for its first nuclear reactors in June 
2008.1174 It signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States in January 
2009. The agreement came into force in December and was hailed as the “gold standard” 
for nuclear agreements. This signified that the agreement prohibited enrichment and 
reprocessing.1175 In April, the United Arab Emirates signed the Additional Protocol for 
its Safeguards Agreement. In August, the country entered into the IAEA Joint 
Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive 
Waste Management and the IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety. In October, the United 
Arab Emirates approved legislation “banning domestic enrichment and 
reprocessing.”1176 In December, the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation was officially 
launched. Also in December, the United Arab Emirates signed a deal with South Korea’s 
KEPCO to build four nuclear reactors. KEPCO was chosen as the most cost-effective 
offer with the most reliable schedule.1177 The stated timeline for the project was to have 
all four reactors operating by 2020.1178 In 2010, the Emirates Nuclear Energy 
Corporation established a Nuclear Safety Review Board and an International Advisory 
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Board. Former IAEA head Hans Blix chaired the latter organization. The groundbreaking 
for the first reactor occurred in March 2011. 
The nuclear power project progressed more slowly than originally planned, 
however. Industry experts highlighted a delay on nuclear power plans in the United Arab 
Emirates after the nuclear tragedy at the Fukushima plant as the country revised its plans 
and added additional safety measures.1179 
From 2004 to 2013, the United Arab Emirates signed a number of nuclear 
cooperation agreements in addition to its agreement with the United States. It signed a 
memorandum of understanding with the United Kingdom in 2008.1180 It signed an 
agreement with France in 2008, South Korea in 2009, Canada and Russia in 2012, and 
Argentina and Japan in 2013.1181 
The speed at which the United Arab Emirates nuclear energy program was 
implemented astonished nuclear experts. The World Nuclear Association observed that  
before the UAE implemented its nuclear power program from 2008, it was 
considered that such new programs would be developed sequentially and 
slowly. The UAE demonstrated that it is possible to proceed faster by 
doing a number of things in parallel, by using experienced expatriates 
initially and transitioning to local expertise over time, and by committing 
to an experienced reactor and power plant builder with a track record of 
on-time and on-budget performance.1182 
Beyond the efficient logistics behind the establishment of the United Arab 
Emirates’ nuclear energy program, there was a domestic side to the United Arab 
Emirates’ efforts. First, Mari Luomi notes that “there is no such thing as the United Arab 
Emirates’ nuclear program. Despite cooperation agreements, regulatory structures and 
nuclear diplomacy being handled at the federal level, the nuclear program was initiated 
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by Abu Dhabi and is set to remain so.”1183 Abu Dhabi is the richest and largest emirate. 
It had the economic means to roll out the program quickly and proficiently with the 
assistance of foreign expertise. Further, the nuclear energy program served as an example 
of the United Arab Emirates’ ambitions. For a country that, as of March 2013, prided 
itself on holding 110 world records, the country’s nuclear energy program could serve as 
another source of pride.1184 
The United Arab Emirates sits directly across the Persian Gulf from Iran. While 
the United Arab Emirates had the financial means to pursue a nuclear weapons program 
as a deterrent, the country had focused exclusively on NPT-sanctioned peaceful uses of 
nuclear technology. The country enjoyed a close relationship with the great powers—
particularly the United States and the United Kingdom due to historic ties. The United 
Arab Emirates has used its good standing in the international community to quickly and 
easily establish its nuclear energy infrastructure. It seemed to be the first among the 
region’s states that committed to the pursuit of nuclear energy programs in the mid-2000s 
to be able to reach this goal. 
In terms of delivery systems, the United Arab Emirates sought to acquire a missile 
defense system during this period. The U.S. military’s Defense Cooperation Security 
Agency reported in November 2012 it had advised Congress that the United Arab 
Emirates had requested 48 Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense missiles.1185 The 
agency also noted that the missile defense system would help thwart regional threats and 
reduce the country’s reliance on the U.S. military.1186 Iran’s previously discussed missile 
capabilities would seem to present a regional threat that this missile defense system could 
help mitigate.  
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c. Nuclear Trends 
The United Arab Emirates’ nuclear program falls short when measured against 
the definition of nuclear proliferation, progress toward weapons-relevant nuclear 
capabilities. The country has banned domestic enrichment and reprocessing and thus will 
not complete the nuclear fuel cycle. During this time period, the United Arab Emirates 
did not take steps toward acquiring fissile material, a nuclear warhead, or a delivery 
vehicle. The comparable ease with which the United Arab Emirates was able to establish 
a nuclear power program, and do so without international concern due to its “gold 
standard” nuclear agreement with the United States demonstrated a path for future 
seekers of nuclear energy to follow. Furthermore, the United Arab Emirates may have 
been able to alleviate some of its concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program by working 
to acquire a missile defense system. 
What drove the United Arab Emirates’ nuclear behavior? In the regional context, 
the United Arab Emirates remained concerned about the threat from Iran, a rising power 
in the Middle East. Nevertheless, the Emirates did not advance a nuclear weapons 
program despite having the finances to purchase such a capability. On the international 
level, the United Arab Emirates had long benefited from a close relationship with the 
United Kingdom and the United States. It carefully constructed a legal and regulatory 
framework that would allay worries the great powers might have in terms of the direction 
of its program. Given its financial resources, the United Arab Emirates could move 
quickly and efficiently to establish such a program. The United Arab Emirates’ program 
perhaps exemplifies the U.S. preference for a third country’s nuclear energy program. 
9. Analysis 
Two countries in the region were nuclear proliferators from 2004 to 2013—Syria 
and Iran. With North Korea’s aid, Syria completed a secret nuclear reactor in 2007. It was 
nearly operational when Israel destroyed the facility. While Iran ended its coordinated 
weapons program by 2004, it continued to build its enrichment and delivery systems. 
Furthermore, the IAEA reported that Iran had conducted computer modeling of a nuclear 
explosive device between 2005 and 2009. By 2010, however, the IAEA assessed that Iran 
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was no longer working on nuclear weapons. Finally, Iran entered into serious nuclear 
negotiations in 2013 with a P5+1 goal of preventing possible military applications of 
Iran’s nuclear program. 
Iraq and Libya, former outliers, stayed on the path of renouncing their nuclear 
programs and conforming to the standards of the nonproliferation regime. Also, 
numerous states in the region expressed interest in nuclear power in the mid-2000s, but 
by 2013, little progress had been made toward this ambition. The exception was the 
United Arab Emirates, which began construction of its first nuclear power plant in 2011. 
The country opted to legally ban domestic enrichment and reprocessing, however, 
eliminating the possibility that it could stockpile fissile material. 
Thus, by the end of the time period, with the end of Syria’s nuclear program, only 
Iran’s program remained. Further, it seemed that Iran’s nuclear weapons intentions had 
been constrained for the time being. No new efforts to launch a nuclear program were 
apparent in the region. What explains the overall decrease in regional nuclear 
proliferation, which is summarized in Table 3? Given the regional turmoil and a 
transition to a multipolar international system, it would have seemed likely that 
proliferation would have increased. 
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Table 3.   Summary of Regional Nuclear Trends from 2004 through 2013 
 
 
B. VARIATIONS IN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION BEHAVIOR: TESTING 
TWO THEORIES 
Which theory better explains nuclear behavior during this third time period? The 
first hypothesis based on Kenneth Waltz’s work is: Regional nuclear proliferation should 
increase during the third time period as a transition to a multipolar international system 
occurs and regional powers play more prominent roles. The second hypothesis based on 
Paul’s work is: Regional nuclear proliferation should increase during the third period 
due to a resurgence of regional conflict and rivalry. Proliferation is mitigated if a state 
receives security guarantees or finds a different deterrent. Is there a causal link between 
the transition to a multipolar international system and an increase in nuclear proliferation 
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or a causal link between regional conflict and rivalry and an increase in nuclear 
proliferation? What drove the regional nuclear proliferation trend? 
1. Testing Two Theories 
The hypotheses suggested that nuclear proliferation would increase during this 
time period. Instead, it decreased. The nuclear histories explored here demonstrated that 
in a multipolar system the great powers motivated by self-interest worked to halt regional 
nuclear proliferation efforts. In addition, multilateral efforts by Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and France to find a diplomatic solution to the Iran nuclear crisis seemed to 
provide an example of post-hegemonic cooperation. 
Following the Second Gulf War, the unipolar period with the United States as the 
sole superpower drew to an end and other great powers, such as China and Russia, rose to 
challenge the United States. Waltz warned of “the greater instability of a multipolar 
world.”1187 He noted that in a multipolar world, “the dangers are diffused, 
responsibilities unclear, and definition of vital interests easily obscured.”1188 This 
instability motivates states to safeguard their security. In the pursuit of security, nuclear 
weapons are viewed as the ultimate deterrent. It would thus stand to reason that nuclear 
proliferation would increase during this time period. The unlikely outcome here is that 
nuclear proliferation continued to decrease. The idea of linking decreased stability in a 
multipolar system with an increase in nuclear proliferation then becomes problematic as 
it does not take into account the mitigating factor of great power management of nuclear 
proliferation or the possibility of post-hegemonic cooperation in the context of the 
nonproliferation regime. 
What role might the global nonproliferation regime have played in the decrease of 
regional nuclear proliferation? Robert Keohane in After Hegemony: Cooperation and 
Discord in the World Political Economy argued international regimes created by a 
hegemon can be valuable and lead to collaboration between states even after hegemonic 
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decline.1189 Self-interest is the driving force behind regime formation and a regime’s 
most powerful members will shape it in ways that are important to those members.1190 In 
regards to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, which I define as the global network of 
treaties, policies, agreements, and organizations designed to prevent and counter nuclear 
proliferation, the United States as a superpower played a principal role in establishing 
many aspects of the regime. U.S. hegemonic security leadership was key to reinforcing 
and strengthening the regime in the unipolar period. The components of the 
nonproliferation regime include the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology 
Control Regime, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and the Proliferation 
Security Initiative, among others, in addition to the traditional elements of the regime 
such as the NPT, the IAEA, and the Safeguards system.1191 Furthermore, the United 
States required international cooperation to accomplish its goals. This regime facilitated 
cooperation around the issue of combatting nuclear proliferation, thereby contributing to 
the decrease in nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. 
In the multipolar period, the nonproliferation regime continued to help facilitate 
cooperation to combat the spread of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, examples of post-
hegemonic cooperation could be seen in the efforts of Germany, France, and the United 
Kingdom to negotiate an end to Iran’s nuclear weapons program in the early 2000s. This 
signaled the possible persistence of the nonproliferation regime into the future beyond the 
great power status of the regime’s principal founder. Cooperation against the spread of 
nuclear weapons occurred as new initiatives, agreements, and organizations have been 
added to the regime.1192 
Regional nuclear proliferation in the Middle East did not increase from 2004 to 
2013 despite the transition to a multipolar international system. While Iran and Syria 
sought to build covert nuclear capabilities during this time period, by 2013, Syria’s 
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program had ended and Iran’s appeared to be constrained. Both of these outcomes 
supported U.S. and great power interests in the region. The historical record points to the 
effects of the vigorous sanctions regime pushed forward by the United States and the 
rising great powers as the reason for Iran’s 2013 agreement to undertake serious 
negotiations. Like the cases of Iraq and Libya, it appeared to be a case of the United 
States in cooperation with other states making proliferation costly enough that Iran opted 
to relinquish its military program, at least for the time being.1193 This was the continued 
result of great power management of regional nuclear proliferation. Nevertheless, the 
initial negotiations began due to the efforts of Germany, France, and the United 
Kingdom. The initiative was not directed by the United States nor was Iran a security 
threat to any of the three countries. This leads to the possibility that in this post-
hegemonic period, cooperation to enforce standards of behavior delineated in the 
nonproliferation regime occurred.1194 It began a crucial dialogue that the United States, 
Russia, and China later joined. 
In regards to the Syrian nuclear program, U.S. President George W. Bush wrote in 
his memoirs that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert called him regarding the Syrian 
nuclear facility.1195 This call seemed to indicate that Israel looked to the United States as 
an external manager to handle the issue.1196 President Bush did not disagree that the 
issue should be addressed.1197 Furthermore, there was no public information indicating 
that the United States and other great powers condemned Israel’s actions. While there 
was no doubt of an ongoing regional rivalry between Syria and Israel, there was a 
stronger case to be made for the role of the United States as an external manager in the 
eventual outcome. This event still strongly fits into the narrative of external managers 
shaping regional nuclear proliferation trends.  
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In addition, the only country that began to build a nuclear power reactor, the 
United Arab Emirates, decided to enact a ban on domestic enrichment and reprocessing. 
Also, the United Arab Emirates signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United 
States that similarly restricted enrichment and reprocessing. Thus, it would not acquire a 
supply of plutonium as a byproduct of the fuel cycle. The United Arab Emirates’ program 
enjoyed support from allies such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. 
This was another area that the great powers influenced regional nuclear proliferation 
trends bolstered by the standards of behavior set forth by the nonproliferation regime. 
Why does the alternate hypothesis from Paul’s work not provide sufficient 
explanatory power? On balance, regional proliferation did not increase contrary to Paul’s 
hypothesis. Regional competition reached a fevered pitch as the rivalry between Iran and 
Saudi Arabia, arguably a conflict dyad, continued unabated and Arab states competed 
against one another in the “new Arab Cold War.” Conflict and instability increased 
throughout the region. By late 2013, Egypt, Libya, Iraq, and Syria were all dealing with 
significant domestic security challenges, the effects of which often spilled out into 
neighboring states. Turkey was also experiencing a peak in violence from the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party insurgency along with instability along its border with Syria. The only 
countries that remained relatively calm were the Gulf States. The increase in regional 
conflict and rivalry did not translate into an increase in nuclear proliferation because of 
ongoing great power external management of an issue, nonproliferation, that was deeply 
important to the United States and other great powers. The decrease also can be attributed 
to post-hegemonic cooperation to hold a NPT member accountable to the standards of the 
nonproliferation regime. 
2. Analyzing T.V. Paul’s Data 
This section examines the data Paul uses to support his theory. Unfortunately, the 
dataset that Paul references in his study, the Correlates of War data on militarized 
interstate disputes, ends in 2010, while this chapter’s time period ends in 2013. In 
addition, 2011 through 2013 proved to be a tumultuous time in the region’s history. This 
chapter uses the data available through 2010 and draws conclusions with caveats. Also, it 
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relies more heavily on the other indicators referenced by Paul—economic 
interdependence and regional organization. Overall, however, the region can still be 
classified as a high-conflict zone as described by Paul. 
a. Militarized Interstate Disputes 
First, the number of militarized interstate disputes occurring between 2004 and 
2010 in the region were as follows: Bahrain, 0; Egypt, 3; Iran, 21; Iraq, 10; Israel, 9; 
Jordan, 0; Kuwait, 0; Lebanon, 2; Libya, 0; Oman, 0; Qatar, 1; Saudi Arabia, 1; Syria, 6; 
Turkey, 10; United Arab Emirates, 1; and Yemen, 3.1198 The leading states with 
militarized interstate disputes for this period were Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, with Israel close 
behind. Once again, there were a number of states with more than five militarized 
interstate disputes in a twenty-year period. Looking at the regional total, there was an 
average of nearly 10 militarized interstate disputes per year. For 1991 to 2003, there had 
been an average of nearly 13 militarized interstate disputes per year. Thus, there was a 
slight reduction in the average number of militarized interstate disputes per year from 
2004 to 2010. Noticeably, this time span does not include the Arab Uprising. In terms of 
significant dyads, Iraq and Iran no longer continued to be rivals. Rather a rivalry emerged 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
b. Economic Interdependence 
According to Paul, economic issues do not play a high-level role in interstate 
relations in zones of high conflict, like the Middle East.1199 Economic interdependence is 
“measured in terms of trade among the regional states as a percentage of overall imports 
and exports.”1200 From 2004 to 2013, what was the nature of economic interdependence 
in the Middle East? 
In order to assess the economic interdependence of the region in its entirety from 
2004 to 2013, all regional states are included. They are Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, 
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Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab 
Emirates, and Yemen. This section examines regional trade data on import and export 
relationships between each state and the rest of the region, displayed in Figure 5 and 
Figure 6, using data from the International Monetary Fund.1201 This percentage is 
acquired using the total U.S. dollar amount of trade between each state and the rest of the 
regional states and the total U.S. dollar amount of trade between each state and the whole 
world. 
 
Figure 5.  Regional Trade Integration, 2004 to 2013: Exports1202 
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1202 Source: Data derived from International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics. 
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Regional export relationships from 2004 to 2013 averaged above 10 percent for 
Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, and the UAE. 
 
 
Figure 6.  Regional Trade Integration, 2004 to 2013: Imports1203 
Regional import relationships from 2004 to 2013 averaged above 10 percent for 
Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. 
During this time period, Syria’s economic interdependence increased, which 
reflects the events of the country study in the first section of this chapter. Overall, during 
this time period, there was an increase in terms of regional exports and imports. 
                                                 
1203 Source: Data derived from International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics. 
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c. Regional Organizations and Alliances 
In terms of regional interdependence for this time period, again, a survey of the 
regional organizations and alliances in the Middle East finds again that the states were 
not well integrated or deeply involved in regional alliances. Nevertheless, integration was 
improving in some sub-regions such as the Gulf. As noted previously, according to Paul, 
a state’s level of involvement correlates with whether they are in a zone of high, 
moderate, or low conflict.1204 In the latter, states are active members and become 
increasingly less so as the level of conflict increases.1205 
For this section, the regional organizations and alliances that were included had to 
meet the criteria of having existed between 2004 and 2013 and primarily involved 
regional states. The regional alliances that were in place for all or part of this period 
included: 1) the Arab League and its accompanying Treaty of Joint Defense and 
Economic Cooperation between the States of the Arab League; 2) the Council of Arab 
Economic Unity, supported by the Arab League; 3) the Gulf Cooperation Council; 4) the 
Economic Cooperation Organization; and 5) the Iran-Syria defense pact and military 
cooperation agreement. 
While the Arab League has a reputation for serving as a platform for rhetoric and 
grandstanding, during this time period, it played a greater role in regional affairs. First, it 
played an important role in bringing the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah to a 
close.1206 Second, it helped negotiate the Doha Agreement in 2008 to bring peace to 
Lebanon.1207 The League took several stands in regards to the 2011 Arab Uprising as 
well. First, it suspended Libya’s membership in early 2011 for its treatment of protesters. 
The organization came together again in late 2011 to suspend Syria’s membership for its 
treatment of protesters. But, Dakhlallah assessed that the League “has proven more 
effective at resolving relatively minor inter-regional disputes and internal crises than 
                                                 
1204 Paul, Power versus Prudence, 20–21. 
1205 Ibid. 
1206 Farah Dakhlallah, “The Arab League in Lebanon: 2005–2008,” Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs 25, no. 1 (March 1, 2012): 53–74, https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2011.646241. 
1207 Ibid. 
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dealing with large-scale extra-systemic conflicts or civil wars.”1208 It was individual 
states in the region that took military action regarding these issues. 
During this time, the Council of Arab Economic Unity oversaw the establishment 
of one new regional trade agreement and the expansion of another. In 2004, the Agadir 
Agreement setup a free-trade zone between Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, and Tunisia. Then, 
in 2009, Algeria joined the 17 countries that made up the Greater Arab Free-Trade Area. 
The Gulf Cooperation Council became a stronger force within the Middle East 
region from 2004 to 2013, especially toward the end of the timeframe. In May 2011, the 
Gulf Cooperation Council invited the two other monarchies in the region, Morocco and 
Jordan, to apply for membership, “creating a Gulf Cooperation Council +2 front that, for 
all intents and purposes, shores up the Gulf alliance by adding more advanced military 
skills and capabilities to their own fledgling, if very well-equipped, military forces.”1209 
Also, possible Gulf Cooperation Council membership for Yemen was intermittently 
discussed. Separately, the Gulf Cooperation Council played a key role in negotiating a 
political settlement and the departure of Yemen’s president in November 2011 following 
the eruption of conflict there. Finally, in December 2012, the Gulf Cooperation Council 
members signed a collective security agreement. 
During this time period, the accomplishments of the Economic Cooperation 
Organization, of which Iran and Turkey were members, were rather limited. Richard 
Pomfret writes that there was “little evidence of actual achievements or of significant 
commitment to the institution by Central Asian countries.”1210 Furthermore, while Iran 
led the founding of the Tehran-based Economic Cooperation Organization Trade 
Promotion Organization in 2009, Central Asia, its target audience as Iran sought to 
expand its reach eastward, responded with a “lukewarm” reception.1211 
                                                 
1208 Dakhlallah, “The League of Arab States and Regional Security: Towards an Arab Security 
Community?” 412. 
1209 Khoury, “The Arab Cold War Revisited: The Regional Impact of the Arab Uprising.” 
1210 Richard Pomfret, Regionalism in East Asia: Why Has It Flourished Since 2000 and How Far 
Will It Go? (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Company, 2010), 24. 
1211 Ibid. 
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Finally, Iran and Syria signaled their growing ties by signing the Iran-Syria 
defense pact in June 2006 and a military cooperation agreement in March 2007. While 
the text of the agreement has not been publicized, the accords seemed to formalize an 
already close security relationship. Iran did indeed come to the aid of the Syrian 
government following the onset of civil conflict in 2011. But in regards to nuclear issues, 
it did not react when Israel destroyed Syria’s reactor. 
In sum, several regional organizations seemed to strengthen over the period—the 
Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab League, and the Iran-Syria security agreements. Of 
note, this strengthening reinforced the region’s political fault lines. 
While the region can still be classified as a high-conflict zone based on Paul’s 
characterization of this phenomenon, the militarized interstate disputes data, economic 
interdependence, and regional alliances improved slightly over this time period, perhaps 
signaling a stronger regional system. For example, in Latin America and the Caribbean, a 
region that has instituted a NWFZ, the average number of militarized interstate disputes 
per year was 3.29.1212 From 2004 to 2013, three of the 33 countries that signed the 
Treaty of Tlatelolco experienced five or more militarized interstate disputes. They 
included Colombia with 9, Ecuador with 5, and Venezuela with 5.1213 
C. CONCLUSION 
By the end of 2013, regional nuclear proliferation had decreased again with the 
great powers driving that trend aided by the emergence of post-hegemonic cooperation by 
three European states. The evidence presented here indicated that the great powers would 
work to combat regional nuclear proliferation and deter its increase bolstered by a 
strengthened nonproliferation regime. This nuclear trend was a testament to the 
effectiveness of the tools, especially targeted economic sanctions, which the great powers 
                                                 
1212 Palmer et al., “The MID4 Data Set: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description.” 
1213 Ibid. 
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could wield to limit proliferation. It was continuing “evidence of the great power 
commitment to nonproliferation.”1214 
In addition, post-hegemonic cooperation in the context of the nonproliferation 
regime proved to be an important factor in this outcome. Germany, France, and the 
United Kingdom began a negotiation process with Iran in the early 2000s that converted 
to a larger initiative with the United States, Russia, and China joining in. Iran’s violations 
of its NPT commitments gave the three European states the authority on the international 
stage to undertake this independent effort. 
                                                 
1214 James Wirtz and Peter Lavoy, “Introduction,” in Over the Horizon Proliferation Threats, ed. 
James Wirtz and Peter Lavoy (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2012), 5. 
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V. EXTERNAL MANAGEMENT AND THE 
NONPROLIFERATION REGIME 
The introduction of this dissertation discussed nuclear proliferation trends in 
world regions. It questioned the cause of these trends. What caused a region to 
nuclearize, defined as nuclear weapons spread or horizontal proliferation, or 
denuclearize? To parallel the Middle East region, one would expect regional conflict and 
rivalry to drive nuclear proliferation under bipolarity. This would be due to the high level 
of superpower competition that blunted the effectiveness of external management efforts 
and, thus, regional rivals had greater freedom to proliferate. In the unipolar period, one 
would anticipate that the United States, as the sole superpower, would drive nuclear 
proliferation trends. As the external manager, it had more leeway to implement a 
nonproliferation agenda, to include strengthening the nonproliferation regime, and greater 
resources to dedicate to this task. In the multipolar period, one would expect great power 
competition or cooperation facilitated by a strengthened nonproliferation regime to drive 
regional trends. I found that similar trends could be identified in a number of other 
regions. 
This research finding points to an interesting relationship between competition in 
the international system and regional nuclear proliferation trends. From 1973 to 2003, a 
time period that covers the bipolar and unipolar periods, increased competition in the 
international system often led to increased nuclear proliferation at the regional level. 
Decreased competition in the international system often led to decreased nuclear 
proliferation at the regional level. Figure 7 illustrates this relationship. 
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Figure 7.  Determinants of Regional Nuclear Proliferation Trends in the Bipolar 
and Unipolar Periods 
By the end of the third time period in 2013, representative of the multipolar 
period, horizontal nuclear proliferation seemed to be largely contained. While 
competition or cooperation between the great powers shaped regional proliferation 
outcomes in this final period, the nonproliferation regime continued to help limit 
proliferation despite the reduction of U.S. influence. In the Middle East, the role of the 
EU-3—Germany, the United Kingdom, and France—in the initiation of Iran negotiations 
in the early 2000s provides a case in point. The three periods taken together illustrate the 
critical role of external managers in limiting nuclear proliferation spread and how the 
nonproliferation regime, a key tool for external managers, served as an important bulwark 
against nuclear proliferation in these management efforts. 
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This analytical chapter covers the following linked topics. First, I review my 
research findings in regards to the Middle East. Second, I discuss the theoretical 
implications of this research. Third, I examine each of the world’s other main regions to 
highlight how the theoretical framework might explain nuclear proliferation trends over 
time in these geographic areas. And, fourth, in my conclusion, I highlight the importance 
of these findings to the field of nuclear proliferation studies. 
A. DRIVERS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION TRENDS IN THE MIDDLE 
EAST 
I approached the puzzle of divergent proliferation trends by selecting two theories 
from the scholarly literature on nuclear proliferation. The first theory used concepts from 
Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics to analyze the extent to which the 
superpowers or great powers acted as international managers, limiting the nuclear 
ambitions of regional states. The second theory examined the role of regional security 
dynamics on nuclear proliferation described by T.V. Paul in Power Versus Prudence, 
which suggests that states respond to regional threats, not superpower preferences, when 
it comes to their proliferation policies. I asked if one theory could account for variations 
over time in the Middle East and if one theory could explain specific periods better than 
the other. An overview of my hypotheses contrasted with the empirical evidence is 
presented in Table 4. A downward pointing arrow () signifies a decrease in regional 
nuclear proliferation and an upward pointing arrow () signifies an increase in regional 























Two of the three hypotheses based on Paul’s work correlate with the empirical 
evidence. Nevertheless, over the course of my research I found that the hypotheses based 
on Paul’s work should have predicted an increase in nuclear proliferation in all three 
periods due to the unflagging nature of the intensity of conflict. I predicted in my 
hypothesis that conflict and rivalry in the Middle East would diminish in the unipolar 
period, but it did not. An overview of my hypotheses with this revision contrasted with 
the empirical evidence is presented in Table 5. 
Table 5.   Revised T.V. Paul Hypotheses Contrasted with Empirical Evidence 

















Examining the revised hypotheses, a pattern emerged between the predictions 
drawn from Waltz’s writings and the empirical evidence uncovered in the three preceding 
chapters. In fact, what occurred was the exact opposite of what was predicted. This 
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appeared to point to a possible systemic reason for the results. Examining the empirical 
evidence, I found that external managers drove nuclear proliferation trends, but these 
efforts could be blunted or limited by superpower competition in the international system. 
Regional conflict and rivalry seemed to play a determinative role in proliferation trends 
when external management efforts were suppressed or constrained. I found that the 
regional security environment explained why nuclear proliferation increased in the 
bipolar period and that external management explained why nuclear proliferation 
decreased in the Middle East in the unipolar and multipolar periods. 
Given the high levels of conflict and rivalry in the Middle East region, it would 
seem that the regional security environment would drive proliferation trends throughout 
the three time periods. I found, however, that the regional security environment played a 
less important role in proliferation outcomes in the second and third time periods. While 
nuclear proliferation increased in the bipolar period, it decreased in the unipolar and 
multipolar periods. External managers, especially the United States, played critical roles 
in determining whether nuclear proliferation ambitions translated to a nuclearization or 
denuclearization trend. The Middle East nuclear trends are summarized in Table 6. A 
plus (+) signifies an increase, a minus (-) means a decrease, and a zero (0) equals no 
change, i.e., no increase or decrease. “RR” stands for regional conflict and rivalry and 



















Egypt - (EM) 0 0 
Iran + (RR) + (RR) + (RR) 
Iraq + (RR) - (EM) - (EM) 
Libya + (RR) - (EM) - (EM) 
Saudi 
Arabia 
+ (RR) 0 0 
Syria 0 + (RR) - (EM) 




0 0 0 
 
1. First Time Period: 1973 to 1990 
At the height of regional conflict and rivalry during the period from 1973 to 1990, 
the superpowers agreed on the point that nuclear weapons proliferation should not occur, 
but regional states had the space to pursue nuclear weapons under the noses of the 
superpowers. There were four reasons for this: rogue nuclear suppliers or lack of control 
over the nuclear supply chain; a lack of knowledge or awareness of proliferation 
activities; a lack of cooperation among external managers; and, regional foreign policy 
concerns that took priority over nuclear proliferation issues. 
Despite the uptick in regional nuclear proliferation, there were successes in the 
realm of nonproliferation. Egypt turned away from a nuclear weapons program to a 
nuclear hedge in response to superpower pressure. China began to respond to U.S. 
concerns regarding its support for Iran’s nuclear program by 1990. Libya signed the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and a Safeguards Agreement. Saudi Arabia 
joined the NPT. Nevertheless, Iran, Iraq, and Libya seemed to advance their respective 
nuclear weapons programs undeterred. 
During this period, the United States began to work to strengthen the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime to fill perceived gaps in the NPT. The U.S. government initiated 
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the founding of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 1975 after India’s nuclear test.1215 It also 
worked to establish the Missile Technology Control Regime in 1987.1216 
2. Second Time Period: 1991 to 2003 
By 1991, the fierce Iran-Iraq War had come to an end, but regional conflict and 
rivalry persisted. Iraq and Iran continued to be each other’s worst enemies. Iraq 
reinforced the illusion that it maintained a nuclear weapons program after the First Gulf 
War and its aftermath. Iran used asymmetric warfare to execute its regional foreign 
policy agenda. The Levant remained riddled with conflict. 
Nevertheless, nuclear proliferation began to decrease over this time period with an 
international system presided over by a sole superpower. The First Gulf War, led by the 
United States, and the following dismantlement work resulted in the end of Iraq’s nuclear 
program. Iraq’s overall nuclear capabilities decreased sharply over the time period. The 
United States became aware of Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and began to increase 
pressure on Iran’s suppliers. These suppliers primarily consisted of China, Russia, and 
Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan network. Libya also relied heavily on the A.Q. Khan network to 
build its program, but suffered under U.S. sanctions related to Libya’s pursuit of nuclear 
weapons and acts of state-sponsored terrorism. Libya reportedly began reaching out to 
the United States in 1999 regarding ending its nuclear weapons program. Libya publicly 
stated it was ending the program in late 2003. 
In a unipolar setting, the sole superpower set nuclear nonproliferation as a very 
high priority. In fact, it was the stated rationale for the Second Gulf War. The United 
States wielded its political, economic, and military power to restrict nuclear proliferation. 
These efforts created a less permissive environment for would-be proliferators than had 
existed in the bipolar era. The United States eliminated some of the operational space for 
nuclear weapons acquisition that had previously existed. Thus, superpower management 
                                                 
1215 William Burr, “Declassified Documents Show Henry Kissinger’s Major Role in the 1974 
Initiative that Created the Nuclear Suppliers Group,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 
(The George Washington University, April 21, 2014), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb467/. 
1216 Savita Pande, “Missile Technology Control Regime: Impact Assessment,” Strategic Analysis 23, 
no. 6 (September 1, 1999): 924, https://doi.org/10.1080/09700169908455096. 
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seemed to play the key role in the regional trend toward decreased nuclear proliferation 
during this period. 
The United States also strengthened the nonproliferation regime. The Nuclear 
Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime, established in the bipolar 
period, increased in membership and effectiveness. The United States launched the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction initiative in the early 1990s, which resulted in a significant 
reduction of nuclear material and technology in Europe and Central Asia. In 1993, the 
administration of U.S. President Bill Clinton began work to craft a replacement for the 
Cold War-era Coordinating Committee For Multilateral Export Controls, otherwise 
known as COCOM, which resulted in the creation of the Wassenaar Arrangement.1217 
The United States supported the 1997 creation of the Additional Protocol for the NPT as 
a response to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) challenges of 
monitoring compliance in Iraq and North Korea. The Proliferation Security Initiative, 
focused on interdiction, was launched by the United States in May 2003 following an 
incident involving North Korea.1218 U.S. President George W. Bush pitched the idea of 
what would become United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1540 in a 
September 2003 speech.1219 
3. Third Time Period: 2004 to 2013 
The Middle East region continued to be filled with conflict. The Second Gulf War 
created regional instability. Most regional states had opposed the war and were wary of 
the destabilizing effect that it might have. In particular, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey 
were concerned about how the conflict would shape security dynamics. 
                                                 
1217 Richard F. Grimmett, “Military Technology and Conventional Weapons Export Controls: The 
Wassenaar Arrangement” (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2006), 
2, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA456447. 
1218 “Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),” Nuclear Threat Initiative, accessed July 30, 2017, 
http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/proliferation-security-initiative-psi/. 
1219 Tanya Ogilvie-White, “UN Security Council Resolution 1540: Origins, Status, and Future 
Prospects,” in International Cooperation on WMD Nonproliferation, ed. Jeffrey W. Knopf (Athens, GA: 
University of Georgia Press, 2016), 141. 
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While regional conflict persisted throughout the period, regional security 
dynamics had completely shifted by 2013. Iraq and Iran, no longer sworn enemies, had 
grown closer and Iran now wielded more influence over its neighbor. Saudi Arabia and 
the Gulf States expressed heightened concern regarding Iran’s nuclear aspirations and 
regional activities. Saudi Arabia replaced Iraq in a conflict dyad with Iran. By 2013, 
Egypt, Iraq, and Syria had receded in regional geopolitics. Each was absorbed in 
resolving its own domestic crisis. Saudi Arabia, supported by the United Arab Emirates, 
and Iran, Turkey, and Israel dominated regional security dynamics. 
Despite the regional upheaval, nuclear proliferation showed another downward 
trend. The United States and the United Kingdom worked with Libya to dismantle its 
nuclear program. Israel destroyed Syria’s nuclear reactor in 2007, according to U.S. 
intelligence.1220 The United Kingdom, France, and Germany launched nuclear 
negotiations with Iran without U.S. involvement. The United States joined the initiative 
in 2006 along with Russia and China. This group, the P5+1, increased the political and 
economic pressure against Iran until it agreed to come to the negotiating table in 2013. 
In a nascent multipolar system, nuclear proliferation appeared to decrease. The 
United States and other great powers found ways to cooperate as external managers and 
the guidelines established as part of an expanded nonproliferation regime provided the 
lanes in the road as to what “acceptable” nuclear activity entailed. Iran presents a clear 
case of a country that would likely have acquired nuclear weapons already if external 
managers had not blocked its efforts. In past periods, China had provided dual-use 
nuclear technology to Iran, but U.S. political pressure had moved it away from 
conducting these business transactions. In past periods, the United States often had taken 
the lead in nuclear negotiations with regional states, sounding the alarm regarding nuclear 
activities that it deemed illicit, but three European countries assumed this role with Iran 
in the early to mid-2000s. This effort might be viewed as an example of major actors in 
the international system initiating effective nonproliferation measures. 
                                                 
1220 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Background Briefing with Senior U.S. Officials 
on Syria’s Covert Nuclear Reactor and North Korea’s Involvement,” 3. 
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I found that nuclear proliferation decreased during the unipolar and multipolar 
periods in the Middle East. This occurred despite the fact that the Middle East remained a 
high-conflict region. The primary vehicles used by the United States to combat nuclear 
proliferation were unilateral initiatives such as economic sanctions and the 
nonproliferation regime broadly defined. The transition from a bipolar period to a 
unipolar period strengthened the U.S. hand as an external manager to combat nuclear 
proliferation. The United States as the sole superpower was less constrained, allowing it 
to better reinforce the regime and punish outliers, closing perceived gaps in the 
nonproliferation regime. This strengthening had the effect of better establishing 
internationally recognized standards of behavior for nuclear-related activity. This finding 
points to the importance of the mechanisms to “manage” nuclear proliferation found in 
the nonproliferation regime—a regime that the United States played a key role in 
establishing. Whether this downward trend will continue in a multipolar setting, given 
multipolarity’s fairly recent emergence, remains to be seen. 
4. The Preponderant Role of the External Manager  
The story that emerges throughout the three time periods is about the important 
role of the external manager(s) in shaping nuclear proliferation trends. Regional conflict 
and rivalry drove states to proliferate, but superpower or great power management 
constrained those efforts. Absent external management efforts, there likely would have 
been more nuclear weapons in the region. Unchecked, there was a strong likelihood that 
Iraq and Iran would have acquired nuclear weapons. Neither was it out of the question 
that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates might have been more motivated to 
acquire nuclear weapons from a willing supplier. 
Conflict and rivalry did push regional states toward nuclear weapons 
proliferation, but the United States ultimately led the way in limiting proliferation joined 
by other great powers in a now-multipolar international system. Countries such as Russia 
and the United Kingdom did seek to limit nuclear proliferation during the first and second 
time periods, but the freedom of the United States to maneuver in the unipolar 
international system allowed the superpower to push forward its nonproliferation agenda 
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in a way that would not have been possible in a bipolar system, with high levels of 
superpower competition. Furthermore, the United States seemed to wield more influence 
over other great powers, such as Russia and China, in the unipolar period than under 
bipolarity. 
The findings of this dissertation highlight the importance of external managers in 
shaping nuclear proliferation outcomes in the Middle East. But can any of these findings 
elucidate nuclear proliferation trends in other regions? The same dynamics that applied to 
superpower management of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East may pertain to the 
management of other world regions. 
B. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
In this dissertation, I tested two theories of nuclear proliferation through three 
empirically rich case studies to determine which theory best explained regional nuclear 
trends over time. Neo-realists predicted an increase in nuclear proliferation after the Cold 
War.1221 Kenneth Waltz noted that proliferation would likely increase as the 
international system transitioned from bipolarity to multipolarity.1222 Benjamin Frankel 
claimed “bipolarity inhibits the spread of nuclear weapons while multipolarity induces 
their proliferation.”1223 He also asserted that the nonproliferation regime might be a 
casualty of bipolarity’s end.1224 These predictions did not come to pass. My research on 
the Middle East found that the opposite occurred. 
While Waltz did not explicitly state what effect unipolarity would have on nuclear 
proliferation, I found that unipolarity led to a decrease in nuclear proliferation in the 
Middle East. Thus, a key finding is that in the unipolar period, a time period of greater 
                                                 
1221 Frankel, “The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation”; 
Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War”; Stephen Van Evera, “Primed 
for Peace: Europe after the Cold War,” International Security 15, no. 3 (1990): 7–57, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2538906. 
1222 Kenneth N. Waltz and Scott D. Sagan, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, First Edition 
(New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1995). 
1223 Frankel, “The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” 37. 
1224 Ibid., 64. 
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instability in the international system, nuclear proliferation decreased. And during a time 
period of greater stability in the international system, the bipolar period, nuclear 
proliferation increased. Finally, during the multipolar period, another period of instability 
in the international system, other great powers collaborated with the United States to 
constrain regional nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. 
After the end of the Cold War, structural realists observed that proliferation 
decreased during the bipolar period and stated it would increase afterward. Superpower 
guarantees would erode and lead to greater insecurity for client states, thus motivating 
nuclear proliferation.1225 In the Middle East, one of the world’s high-conflict regions, 
nuclear proliferation increased during the bipolar period and decreased in a unipolar and 
multipolar setting. External management outside a bipolar setting seemed to be more 
effective in controlling nuclear proliferation. What explains this discrepancy? 
I found that increased superpower competition in the international system blunted 
the effectiveness of external management efforts against nuclear proliferation. Systemic 
factors seemed to drive nuclear proliferation trends. They just did not work in the way 
that Waltz, Frankel, and others predicted that they would. The regional nuclear 
proliferation trend was more likely to be toward increased proliferation if there was 
greater competition at the systemic level. The regional nuclear proliferation trend was 
more likely to be toward a decrease if there was less competition at the systemic level, 
i.e., the unipolar period, allowing the global hegemon to manage nuclear concerns 
without having to weigh other foreign policy considerations to the extent that would be 
required in a bipolar system or to dedicate unreasonably large political and economic 
resources to achieving its nonproliferation goals. 
Finally, structural realism predicted an increase in nuclear proliferation during the 
multipolar period. But, this did not occur in the Middle East. Rather, external managers 
came together to limit nuclear proliferation aided by a nonproliferation regime that had 
been strengthened by the global hegemon during the unipolar period. I find that a liberal 
institutionalist argument regarding regimes applies in the case of the nonproliferation 
                                                 
1225 Ibid., 37. 
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regime. Robert Keohane argues that a global hegemon can create a regime in order to 
serve its interests and this regime’s utility can outlast the time period in which the 
founding state remains the hegemon.1226 In this case, the nonproliferation regime was 
created by the United States to serve a security need. As Zachary Davis notes, the 
nonproliferation regime serves the self-interest of many other states as well.1227 The 
nonproliferation regime was a key tool used to manage nuclear proliferation. It has been 
strengthened over time, particularly by the efforts of the United States. Nevertheless, the 
nuclear nonproliferation regime could be weakened in the future. A weakened regime 
would mean that the increased great power competition might provide space once again 
for regional states to pursue nuclear weapons programs, and nuclear proliferation might 
increase again in some world regions due to regional conflict and rivalry. 
Another important finding from my research is that different theories can best 
explain nuclear proliferation trends in different time periods. Regional conflict and 
rivalry drove nuclear proliferation trends in the bipolar period, external management 
drove trends in the unipolar period, and the nonproliferation regime played an 
increasingly important role in the multipolar period. 
C. SYSTEMIC EFFECTS ON NUCLEAR TRENDS AT THE REGIONAL 
LEVEL 
Returning to the role of systemic factors at the regional level, what systemic 
factors bear on nuclear proliferation in other world regions? Does the same pattern found 
in the Middle East exhibit itself in other world regions? Did bipolarity constrain 
superpower management efforts and was a unipolar environment more conducive to 
effective superpower management by the global hegemon, the United States? Under 
multipolarity, does increased competition in the international system limit external 
management efforts as it did in the bipolar period? Does the nonproliferation regime, 
which was strengthened by the United States in the unipolar period, play a role in 
managing nuclear proliferation in the multipolar period? Does the regime facilitate 
                                                 
1226 Keohane, After Hegemony, 100. 
1227 Davis, “The Realist Nuclear Regime,” 88. 
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cooperation? Are other great powers, such as Russia and China, cooperating with the 
United States to hold other states to the standards of behavior of the nonproliferation 
regime, even if only out of self-interest? 
In this section, I briefly examine regional nuclear proliferation trends around the 
globe in a bipolar setting, a unipolar setting, and a multipolar setting and attempt to 
determine the relevance of my findings from the Middle East for these other regions. This 
analysis is not meant to be comprehensive, but instead illustrative, aiming primarily to 
test the strengths and weaknesses of the conceptual findings from the Middle East against 
proliferation trends elsewhere in the world. The timeframes examined are the same as for 
the studies on the Middle East: 1973 to 1990, 1991 to 2003, and 2004 to 2013. Like the 
previous research chapters, the focus is on horizontal nuclear proliferation or proliferation 
spread rather than vertical proliferation. The world regions are divided as follows: Africa, 
Central Asia, Europe, Latin America, Northeast Asia, South Asia, South Pacific, and 
Southeast Asia. Regional states are included if they had at one time pursued nuclear 
weapons, acquired a nuclear weapons capability, or might have pursued nuclear weapons. 
A brief analysis of the findings is included at the end of each section. The chapter ends 
with concluding remarks. An overview of my findings on horizontal nuclear proliferation 
trends at the regional level is presented in Table 7. A plus (+) signifies an increase in 
horizontal proliferation, a minus (-) means a decrease, and a zero (0) equals no change, 
i.e., no increase or decrease. As above, “RR” stands for regional conflict and rivalry and 
“EM” stands for external management. I have added another variable here to describe 
those regions that came together to form nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) in a 
bottom-up fashion in reaction to the history of superpower nuclear weapons activities in 
their regions. For this variable, “I” stands for identity. 
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Middle East + (RR) - (EM) - (EM) 
Africa + (RR) - (EM) - (I) 
Central Asia 0* - (I) - (I) 
Europe 0* - (I) - (I) 
Latin America - (RR) - (EM) 0 
Northeast Asia - (EM) + (RR) + (RR) 
South Asia + (RR) + (RR) 0 
South Pacific - (EM) - (I) 0 
Southeast Asia - (I) - (I) 0 
*The relevant states were a part of the Soviet Union. 
 
1. The Bipolar Period: 1973 to 1990 
In the bipolar period, regional conflict and rivalry levels drove nuclear 
proliferation trends in a majority of world regions. Regional conflict and rivalry drove an 
increase in proliferation in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. In Africa and South 
Asia, like the Middle East, rogue nuclear suppliers, a lack of knowledge regarding 
proliferation activities, a lack of cooperation by external managers, and regional foreign 
policy concerns that trumped nuclear proliferation worries shaped this outcome. 
Lowered regional tensions drove a decrease in nuclear proliferation in Latin 
America. A regional history of competition between the nuclear-armed superpowers in 
Vietnam accompanied by peaceful and cooperative relations in Southeast Asia seemed to 
pave the way for the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to propose a 
NWFZ in the mid-1980s. External management efforts by the United States led to a 
downward nuclear proliferation trend in Northeast Asia and the South Pacific. 
a. Africa 
In Africa, nuclear proliferation increased during the bipolar period due to the 
regional security environment. From 1973 to 1990, two states in Africa, Algeria and 
Libya, advanced their nuclear capabilities and one state, South Africa, developed nuclear 
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weapons. For the purposes of this dissertation, Egypt and Libya were covered in the case 
studies on the Middle East and here I discuss the programs of Algeria and South Africa. 
Algeria’s nuclear history began in the 1960s. Starting when Algeria was still a 
French colony, the French carried out seventeen nuclear weapons tests in Algeria from 
1960 to 1966.1228 After gaining independence in 1962, Algeria became a member of the 
IAEA in 1963. It began to develop its own nuclear program in the early 1980s. The 
country had sought to obtain nuclear research reactors from the United States and 
Western European suppliers without success. In the case of the United States, the 
superpower had insisted that in order for the United States to provide the reactors, 
Algeria would have to sign the NPT and accept IAEA Safeguards.1229 Algeria refused. 
The country appeared to want to keep its options open for a nuclear weapons program. 
The country then turned to more willing suppliers. In 1985, Argentina’s INVAP 
agreed to provide Algeria with its first research reactor, reactor fuel (uranium enriched up 
to 20 percent), and a pilot fuel-fabrication plant.1230 Construction on the 1MW(e) pool-
type Nur reactor began in 1987 and it went critical in 1989.1231 The country signed a 
nuclear cooperation agreement with China in 1983 for the Es Salam research reactor. 
China agreed to provide a heavy water research reactor, heavy water, and fuel.1232 
Construction began on the reactor in 1988. In terms of delivery systems, Algeria did not 
acquire any ballistic missiles. 
The regional security environment served as the motivation for Algeria’s nuclear 
efforts. Algeria’s neighbor Libya was pursuing nuclear weapons and Egypt did not 
completely devote itself to a civilian nuclear program until the early 1980s. Morocco and 
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Algeria had rocky relations throughout most of the period. Nuclear hedging would 
demonstrate Algeria’s capacity to compete with its neighbors. 
South Africa was the only country known to have developed nuclear weapons in 
Africa. Also, it was the only country in the world known to have built nuclear weapons 
and then relinquished them.1233 South Africa established its Atomic Energy Board in 
1948 and proceeded to develop a nuclear program relying primarily on suppliers from 
Western Europe.1234 The country’s leadership claimed the program was for peaceful 
purposes. 
South Africa’s nuclear weapons program began around 1973 when scientists 
started to work on the design for a weapon.1235 South African President F.W. De Klerk 
claimed that the decision to acquire a nuclear deterrent was made as the Soviet Union 
expanded into southern Africa in this timeframe.1236 South Africa prepared a nuclear test 
site in the Kalahari, which was discovered by the Soviet Union in 1977, according to 
Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar.1237 Murrey Marder and Don Oberdorfer reported 
that the Soviet Union and the United States assisted by France, the United Kingdom, and 
West Germany confronted South Africa regarding the site and received a promise it 
would not build a nuclear explosive device and no nuclear testing would occur in South 
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Africa.1238 South Africa was aware of what the implications would be, allowing an 
economic embargo against South Africa to go forward, if it did not comply.1239 
According to U.S. intelligence, South Africa’s Prime Minister John Vorster temporarily 
halted the program.1240 
After the 1977 event, South Africa took a more opaque approach to its nuclear 
activities. The Central Intelligence Agency referred to it as “calculated ambiguity” and 
defined it as “intimating that it has the capability to produce nuclear weapons while 
disavowing any interest in doing so.”1241 The government acknowledged in its 
deterrence strategy in 1993 that “if the situation in southern Africa were to deteriorate 
seriously, a confidential indication of the deterrent capability would be given to one or 
more of the major powers, for example the United States, in an attempt to persuade them 
to intervene.”1242 
South Africa continued to advance its program. In 1979, the U.S. Vela satellite 
captured a double flash in the South Atlantic—a possible test of a nuclear device, 
according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative.1243 Allegations regarding a nuclear weapons 
test were denied.1244 By 1983, the Central Intelligence Agency had assessed that South 
Africa either possessed nuclear weapons or had the means to assembly them quickly.1245 
South Africa eventually acknowledged that seven nuclear devices were planned and six 
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devices were completed.1246 With the end of the Cold War approaching and Soviet 
regional influence waning, South Africa’s president F.W. De Klerk led an effort to end 
the country’s nuclear weapons program in 1989.1247 South Africa began to dismantle its 
nuclear program. 
In terms of delivery systems, South Africa began a ballistic missile program in the 
mid-1970s, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative.1248 Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and 
Rajkumar wrote that the country worked to build a medium-range ballistic missile in the 
1980s, disguising its efforts as a space program.1249 They noted that the United States 
began to scrutinize South Africa’s ballistic missile program in the late 1980s, but South 
Africa continued to develop its missile program.1250 
South Africa’s nuclear behavior during this time period was shaped by systemic 
and regional factors. South Africa confronted a security threat from neighboring states. 
Behind that threat, however, loomed the Soviet Union. South Africa faced off against 
encroaching Soviet influence in southern Africa in the mid-1970s, particularly in the 
form of Soviet-backed Cuban troops from 1975 to 1989 in Angola’s civil war.1251 South 
Africa stood alone as it opposed these Soviet-supported elements. The United States and 
the international community opposed South Africa’s apartheid policy and sought to 
maintain pressure on South Africa to end the policy, withholding any support. 
Building nuclear weapons was a self-help mechanism for an isolated state. While 
South Africa seemed to believe that possibly the United States would come to its aid in a 
crisis, based on De Klerk’s 1993 revelation regarding South Africa’s nuclear strategy, 
South Africa did not possess any assurances of superpower security guarantees. The shift 
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in the international system led to a reduction of the regional threat and prompted South 
Africa to reconsider its nuclear weapons program. Nevertheless, South Africa’s ballistic 
missile program remained intact. 
The regional security environment drove the nuclear choices of Algeria and South 
Africa during the bipolar period. The same issues that plagued the Middle East also 
affected nuclear proliferation trends in Africa. These included a lack of control over the 
nuclear supply chain, a lack of awareness regarding proliferation activities, a lack of 
cooperation or coordination on nuclear issues, and regional foreign policy issues that 
trumped nuclear proliferation concerns. 
b. Central Asia 
The Central Asian country considered in this analysis is Kazakhstan – the only 
regional state that both had and gave up strategic nuclear weapons after the Cold 
War.1252 During the bipolar period, Kazakhstan was still a part of the Soviet Union. 
Nevertheless, it is worth considering what the state experienced during this period as it 
provides the context for future nuclear policy decisions. 
Central Asia was home to extensive nuclear testing, nuclear warheads, and 
nuclear-capable missiles. The Soviet Union conducted 456 nuclear tests in Kazakhstan at 
the Semipalatinsk test site between 1949 and 1989.1253 Kazakhstan also hosted a large 
arsenal of the Soviet Union’s nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles.1254 
By the late 1980s, concerns began to arise regarding health effects from the 
radioactive fallout from Soviet nuclear tests. In 1989, a team of Soviet and Kazakh 
officials began to study health problems in the Semipalatinsk, but understated the impact 
of the radioactive fallout.1255 After the fall of the Soviet Union, the country would have 
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security concerns that might provide a rationale for maintaining its nuclear capabilities. 
The after-effects of the nuclear testing shaped national thinking regarding the utility of 
nuclear weapons. 
c. Europe 
Belarus and the Ukraine, a part of the Soviet Union during the bipolar period, are 
included here as they were the only states in Europe to inherit nuclear weapons 
capabilities after the Cold War. This background provides a context for the 
denuclearization that occurred in the unipolar period. 
The Ukraine hosted a significant Soviet-era nuclear arsenal and production 
facilities, especially for delivery systems. It included nearly 2,000 nuclear warheads, at 
least 2,500 tactical nuclear weapons, over 175 intercontinental ballistic missiles, and 44 
strategic bombers with 55 air-launched cruise missiles.1256 After the end of the Soviet 
Union, only the nuclear stockpiles of the United States and Russia surpassed Ukraine’s 
stockpile, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative.1257 
Under the Soviet Union, the Ukraine also developed its nuclear power 
infrastructure. Construction on the Chernobyl power plant, Ukraine’s first, began in 1970 
and it started operating in 1977.1258 Disaster struck in April 1986 when the core of one of 
the reactors exploded releasing radioactive material into the air. By the end of 1989, 
Ukraine had 12 nuclear power reactors in operation.1259 The Chernobyl accident led to a 
halt in nuclear power development beginning in 1990 and continuing until the mid-
1990s.1260 
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Belarus hosted a smaller nuclear arsenal when it was a part of the Soviet Union. It 
included nuclear-armed ballistic missiles and tactical nuclear weapons.1261 At the end of 
the Cold War, Belarus possessed 81 single-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles and 
725 tactical nuclear weapons.1262 Belarus also inherited a significant stock of highly 
enriched uranium from the Soviet Union for use with a nuclear research reactor.1263 The 
Sosny Science and Technology Center held this material.1264 
Both the Ukraine and Belarus inherited significant nuclear capabilities from the 
Soviet Union. As the Cold War ended and those states gained their independence, it was 
an open question as to how their nuclear arsenals might be handled. 
d. Latin America 
In Latin America, nuclear proliferation increased before yielding to 
nonproliferation accords as regional rivalry decreased. Argentina’s nuclear program 
began in the 1950s. The country started to aggressively advance its nuclear program in 
the 1960s. In addition, Argentina opted to sign, but not ratify the 1967 NWFZ treaty for 
Latin America, the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Paul notes that its efforts resulted in the 
construction of three nuclear power plants along with several unsafeguarded facilities – 
one for uranium enrichment, which could produce up to 20 percent-enriched uranium; 
another for reprocessing; another for fuel fabrication; and another for heavy-water 
processing.1265 Argentina seemed to be motivated to establish itself as a regional power, 
especially in its military competition with Brazil.1266 It was also possibly spurred by its 
loss to the United Kingdom in the 1982 Falklands War. 
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The United States closely monitored Argentina’s nuclear program as it advanced. 
A 1982 U.S. intelligence report highlighted U.S. objectives and concerns. The report 
noted that U.S. pressure on Argentina regarding its nuclear program during the 1970s 
caused deterioration in relations between the two countries.1267 It discussed the challenge 
of attaining the U.S. objective of “full regional adherence to the Treaty of Tlatelolco – 
while ruling out the peaceful nuclear explosives development to which Argentina and 
Brazil claim a right.”1268 It expressed the worry that Argentina and Brazil would become 
nuclear suppliers with export guidelines below the standards of the London Suppliers 
Group – the predecessor to the Nuclear Suppliers Group – possibly multiplying 
proliferation concerns.1269 Nevertheless, by the mid-1980s, there was speculation that, if 
Argentina chose to, it was only several years away from building a nuclear weapon. U.S. 
intelligence assessed that Argentina could possibly acquire a nuclear weapon by 1987 and 
have a delivery system ready in the 1990s.1270 Despite U.S. awareness of Argentina’s 
program and superpower efforts to dissuade proliferation, progress continued. 
Nevertheless, the United States was cautious not to pressure Argentina too hard. 
The United States was aware that Argentina was the largest trading partner of the Soviet 
Union in Latin America.1271 The Soviet Union had sided with Argentina in the Falklands 
War, but the United States wished to build better ties with the Southern Cone.1272 
Relations began to improve between Brazil and Argentina in the mid-1980s. 
Argentina realized that the nature of its nuclear program obstructed its economic interests 
with its neighbor Brazil and internationally.1273 The nuclear dynamic began to shift. The 
                                                 
1267 Director of Central Intelligence, “Nuclear Proliferation Trends through 1987,” National 
Intelligence Estimate, July 27, 1982, 22–23, 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb423/docs/4.%20%20nuke%20prolif%20trends%20thru%2087.pdf. 
1268 Ibid., 23. 
1269 Ibid., 23. 
1270 Ibid., 22. 
1271 Rachel Schmidt, “U.S. and Soviet Relations with Argentina: Obstacles and Opportunities for the 
U.S. Army” (Santa Monica, CA.: RAND Corporation, 1989), v–vii, 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/notes/2009/N2916.pdf. 
1272 Ibid., vi. 
1273 Paul, Power versus Prudence, 106. 
 304 
two countries made overtures to one another regarding the peaceful nature of their 
nuclear programs. They made a declaration regarding the peaceful purposes of their 
nuclear programs in 1985 and began site visits to one another’s nuclear facilities in 1987. 
By the late 1980s, Argentina appeared to have definitively distanced itself from its 
previous nuclear proliferation efforts. 
Argentina also developed several missile programs. In the 1970s, Argentina’s 
Condor I missile program aimed to produce short-range ballistic missiles with a range of 
150 km, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative.1274 This report further notes that, 
after the Falklands War, Argentina moved ahead with the Condor II program, seeking to 
produce a missile with a range of 1,000 km and suppliers from European states provided 
the various parts for both programs.1275  
As the 1980s drew to a close, Argentina faced increasing pressure from the United 
States regarding its missile program. The United States especially had grown concerned 
about the Condor II program’s connections to the Middle East. U.S. President Ronald 
Reagan issued a directive to restrict the transfer of nuclear capable missiles in 1982 and 
used it to target Argentina’s suppliers in Western Europe.1276 Argentina’s program also 
became the focus of the Missile Technology Control Regime, formed in 1987.1277 
Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga noted that the United States, as a regime 
member, pressured Argentina to end its program.1278 The Central Intelligence Agency 
reported in November 1991 that, after 1988, the United States and its partners in the 
Missile Technology Control Regime worked to stymie any further acquisition of missile 
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technology by Argentina.1279 The Agency assessed that Argentina’s leadership sought to 
dismantle the program in order to improve bilateral relations with the United States.1280 
Argentina eventually canceled the program in August 1990.1281 Improved regional 
relations provide the best answer as to why Argentina terminated its nuclear weapons 
program, but superpower management provides the best explanation as to why Argentina 
halted the Condor II program. 
Brazil began its nuclear pursuits at the time of the Atoms for Peace program in the 
mid-1950s. Brazil was driven by its desire for regional hegemony and rivalry with 
Argentina.1282 Like Argentina, the country focused heavily on developing its nuclear 
program from the 1960s until around 1990. Brazil signed the regional NWFZ treaty in 
1967 and ratified it in 1968, but believed it still retained the right to conduct peaceful 
nuclear explosions, according to U.S. intelligence.1283 In 1975, Brazil signed a 
contentious nuclear agreement with West Germany that would give Brazil the technology 
for a complete nuclear fuel cycle, according to Paul.1284 The agreement, which was not 
completely fulfilled, entailed Brazil’s acquisition of a reprocessing plant, a uranium 
enrichment plant, two nuclear power reactors, and an experimental laboratory for 
reprocessing irradiated nuclear fuel.1285 Mitchell Reiss noted that Brazil also began a 
secret parallel military nuclear program in the mid-1970s, which came to light about ten 
years later.1286 On the military side, Brazil sought to achieve the ability to enrich 
uranium. The military was interested in developing a nuclear-powered submarine, but the 
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same technology could also be used to acquire fissile material for a possible bomb, 
according to Reiss.1287 
Brazil’s efforts achieved results. The country built a first nuclear power reactor, 
Angra I, that began operating in 1982 and began construction on a second reactor, Angra 
II.1288 Construction for a third nuclear power reactor, Angra III, began in 1984, but the 
work was suspended in 1986.1289 In 1986, it was revealed that Brazil’s military was 
building a test site for an underground nuclear test and, in 1987, Brazil’s president 
announced that it had successfully enriched uranium, according to Reiss.1290 But, these 
nuclear achievements occurred as Argentina and Brazil were moving forward with 
confidence-building measures that would serve as a foundation for the Brazilian-
Argentine Center for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials—a bilateral nuclear 
agreement. 
In tandem with its nuclear program, Brazil had moved forward on a missile 
program. U.S. intelligence assessed that, in 1982, plans reportedly were in place to 
develop ballistic missiles to carry nuclear weapons.1291 In December 1985, Brazil was 
working on the Sonda IV, with a possible range of 600 km, and a space launch vehicle in 
competition with Argentina’s program, according to U.S. intelligence.1292 Further, the 
United States was concerned that Brazil’s work on a satellite launch vehicle could result 
in the acquisition of technology for a ballistic missile to carry nuclear weapons.1293 
The United States had been monitoring Brazil’s nuclear program. Without 
damaging bilateral relations, how might the superpower pressure Brazil in order to 
discourage a peaceful nuclear explosion and ensure that Brazil did not become a nuclear 
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exporter outside of the Nuclear Suppliers Group?1294 Like Argentina, Brazil had reacted 
poorly in the past to diplomatic pressure over its nuclear program.1295 Analysis from a 
1985 U.S. intelligence assessment illuminated Washington’s external management 
strategy in regards to Brazil and other nuclear threshold states. It noted that Brazil’s 
“refusal to place its indigenous nuclear activities—on which it is apparently 
concentrating current efforts—under full-scope safeguards” made it “difficult for the 
United States—or any other nation—to have a major impact on its nuclear policies.”1296 
This underscores the idea that the United States saw the nonproliferation regime as a 
critical tool in its effort to combat nuclear proliferation worldwide, but in the mid-1980s 
it did not have all of the tools required to further pressure states like Brazil. 
Brazil eventually came to Washington’s desired position for the country’s nuclear 
program on its own. By 1990, Brazil’s improved relations with Argentina driven by the 
process of establishing a regional nuclear agreement began to have an effect. Paul noted 
that Brazil saw its regional interests better served by renouncing its nuclear weapons 
program.1297 After the military’s secret program came to light and a new civilian 
president came to power in March 1990, Brazil ended its military nuclear program in 
September.1298 The end of Brazil’s rivalry with Argentina resulted in a decrease in 
regional nuclear proliferation. 
In regards to Brazil’s missile program, the United States was able to use the same 
management tools with Brazil that it had used with Argentina. It began with the Nuclear 
Capable Missile Technology Transfer Policy in 1982 followed by the Missile Technology 
Control Regime in 1987.1299 Nevertheless, by late 1990, Brazil still had not relinquished 
its ballistic missile and space program. 
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Argentina and Brazil took steps to move away from military applications for their 
nuclear programs in the mid-1980s, culminating with an end to both programs in 1990. 
While both countries had recently transitioned away from military rule, Paul points out 
that “the move toward nuclear rapprochement had already begun under military 
rulers.”1300 Their decision-making is best explained by the fact that there was a reduction 
in rivalry between the two countries. Furthermore, superpower management best explains 
Argentina’s decision to end its Condor II ballistic missile program in 1990. On balance, 
however, an improved regional security environment best explains the biggest changes—
two countries turning away from pursuing nuclear weapons capabilities. 
e. Northeast Asia 
In Northeast Asia, this section finds that nuclear proliferation decreased from 
1973 to 1990 due to external management. The United States was able to effectively 
manage regional nuclear proliferation efforts, in large part due to extended deterrence, 
and prevented nuclear spread during this period. This section highlights that North Korea, 
South Korea and Taiwan all initially pursued nuclear weapons programs while Japan 
developed a sophisticated nuclear power industry. Ballistic missile proliferation across 
the region remained a concern. Nevertheless, South Korea and Taiwan halted their efforts 
to obtain nuclear weapons and Japan did not attempt to acquire them despite its 
technological capabilities. Only North Korea seemed to pursue a nuclear weapons 
capability by the end of the period. 
Following World War II, the establishment of its peace constitution and its entry 
into the NPT in 1976, Japan took advantage of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology 
and developed an expansive nuclear power industry. Japan began operating the first of 
several fuel fabrication facilities in 1972 and a pilot reprocessing plant in 1977.1301 Japan 
even had developed the technology to produce its own nuclear power reactors by the late 
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1970s, which would allow it to become an exporter of nuclear power technology.1302 
Despite Japan’s well-developed nuclear power capabilities, it did not pursue nuclear 
weapons capabilities, although its fuel cycle pursuit raised some concerns about a hedge 
capability, according to Katsuhisa Furukawa.1303 
In terms of delivery systems, in February 1970, Japan launched a satellite from a 
solid-fuel rocket.1304 Clay Moltz noted that “with this flight, Japan became the first 
Asian nation to join the space age” and, in addition, it was carried out using indigenous 
technology.1305 After this satellite launch, Japan began to rapidly develop rockets for its 
space program.1306 The concern remained that Japan might one day use this rocket 
technology to build long-range missiles. Both the country’s nuclear history and its 
security agreement with the United States seemed to motivate it to follow a general path 
of nonproliferation support. For example, Japan helped to establish the Missile 
Technology Control Regime in 1987. 
Taiwan became interested in nuclear technology with the launching of the Atoms 
for Peace program and it signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States 
in 1955. It began to develop its nuclear capabilities in earnest in the late 1960s as a result 
of its rivalry with Beijing. Taiwan was home to Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist Party, 
opposed to communist rule in China, beginning in 1949. In 1964, Beijing conducted its 
first nuclear test. Taiwan signed the NPT as the Republic of China in 1968. According to 
U.S. intelligence, in 1969, Canada agreed to provide Taiwan with a heavy-water 
moderated 40MW research reactor with natural uranium fuel suitable for producing 
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plutonium.1307 David Albright and Corey Gray wrote that, in the early 1970s, Taiwan 
began to build a fuel fabrication plant, a reprocessing capability, and a plutonium 
chemistry laboratory and to buy uranium from South Africa.1308 U.S. intelligence judged 
in 1972 that Taiwan sought the capability to build and test a nuclear weapon.1309 This 
nuclear development occurred despite U.S. security guarantees for Taiwan. 
In the mid-1970s, the United States began to pressure Taiwan to restrict its 
nuclear program, according to William Burr.1310 By 1976, IAEA inspectors had found 
inconsistencies between Taiwan’s declarations and their findings in Taiwan’s Institute for 
Nuclear Energy Research.1311 The United States and the IAEA intensified their efforts to 
restrict Taiwan’s nuclear efforts. Due to U.S. pressure, Taiwan shut down its research 
reactor and relinquished the fuel elements, dismantled its reprocessing facilities, and 
returned U.S.-origin plutonium, according to Albright and Gray.1312 In addition, Taiwan 
announced plans to adapt the reactor so it would produce less plutonium, and, in 1985, it 
began the process of shipping its spent fuel to the United States.1313 In a final effort to 
move its nuclear program forward, Taiwan worked to launch a hot cell facility in 1987, 
according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative.1314 The report noted that the United States 
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quickly moved to pressure Taiwan to dismantle the facility and it complied in 1988.1315 
Taiwan seemed to abandon its program completely after this event.1316 
In regards to nuclear energy, Taiwan set-up a nuclear power infrastructure, 
operating six nuclear power reactors that came online in the 1970s and 1980s.1317 Given 
prior concerns regarding Taiwan’s nuclear activities, Taiwan’s nuclear power 
development continued to be scrutinized. Taiwan did not acquire a full nuclear fuel cycle. 
In terms of delivery systems, the country possessed short-range ballistic missiles 
developed in the 1970s.1318 The United States, however, successfully pressured Taiwan 
to end the development of the Tien Ma or Sky Horse missile, a missile with a possible 
range of close to 1000 km, in the early 1980s, according to Dinshaw Mistry.1319 
Taiwan’s regional rivalry with China motivated it to pursue nuclear weapons, but 
pressure from the United States and the IAEA resulted in an end to Taiwan’s nuclear 
weapons program.1320 In addition, the United States could offer extended deterrence to 
Taiwan, mitigating some of its security concerns. External management led to a decrease 
in Taiwan’s nuclear proliferation efforts by the end of the period—both in terms of its 
nuclear technology and delivery systems. 
South Korea expressed interest in nuclear technology around the time of the U.S.-
led Atoms for Peace initiative and signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with the 
United States in 1956. The country joined the IAEA in 1957 and established the Korean 
Atomic Energy Research Institute in 1959.1321 South Korea began to pursue a nuclear 
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weapons program in the early 1970s, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, due to 
concern over regional threats, particularly those emanating from North Korea, and 
worries regarding a withdrawal of U.S. troops.1322 The program began with work in the 
nuclear power industry and the country’s first three nuclear power plants began operating 
in the late 1970s.1323 U.S. intelligence reported that South Korea’s leadership expanded 
nuclear weapons efforts and approved secret work on a design for nuclear weapons in 
1974, a program called Project 890.1324 Washington noted that South Korea began 
negotiations to acquire a fuel-fabrication facility from Belgium, a heavy-water research 
reactor from Canada, and a reprocessing facility from France.1325 This occurred before 
the United States announced the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea. 
The United States became concerned regarding South Korea’s nuclear program in 
the mid-1970s. After India’s peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974, however, the United 
States increased its efforts to stop other states, such as South Korea, from acquiring the 
ability to produce plutonium from a nuclear power reactor, which could be used for a 
weapon. According to the U.S. Department of State, the United States began discussions 
with Canada about halting the sale of the heavy-water research reactor to South Korea, 
even though the deal was almost complete.1326 U.S. intelligence noted that once Canada 
agreed with the U.S. position, the two countries were able to persuade South Korea to 
drop its plans for the reprocessing facility and fuel-fabrication laboratory.1327 The United 
States and South Korea signed the 1974 Korea-U.S. Atomic Energy Agreement, a “123  
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Agreement,” which prohibited uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing.1328 
South Korea signed the NPT in April 1975, which placed additional constraints on its 
nuclear program, committing the country to the treaty’s Safeguards Agreement. 
U.S. intelligence reported that South Korea continued to look for ways to advance 
its nuclear program, opting to try to develop its own reactor and heavy-water production 
facility along with the military aspects of the program.1329 The same report noted that, by 
1976, South Korea’s leadership suspended Project 890.1330 In 1982, however, South 
Korea conducted laboratory experiments in which “a 5-pin mini fuel assembly (mini-
assembly) containing about 2.5 kg of DU [depleted uranium] had been irradiated for 82 
days in the TRIGA III research reactor” reportedly to “study the separation of uranium 
and plutonium,” according to the IAEA.1331 The IAEA later assessed that South Korea 
would have been able to obtain small quantities of pure plutonium through these 
experiments.1332 The test was not declared to the IAEA, but it was carried out in a 
facility under safeguards.1333 In addition, the mini fuel assembly was reported incorrectly 
to the IAEA as an “unirradiated fuel assembly”1334 South Korea claimed that these tests 
were undertaken without the government’s knowledge.1335 Following this incident, 
concerns regarding South Korea’s nuclear program appeared to subside. 
Regarding South Korea’s nuclear power industry, the country quickly expanded 
its capabilities during this period. Between 1978 and 1989, nine nuclear power reactors 
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began operating in the country.1336 They were managed by the Korea Electric Power 
Company, known as KEPCO. 
In terms of delivery systems, South Korea worked to develop a missile arsenal in 
response to the North Korean missile threat. It was constrained, however, by a 1972 
agreement with the United States, which limited the range of its missiles to 180 km with 
a 500 kg payload in exchange for U.S. technology, according to the Nuclear Threat 
Initiative.1337 During this period, South Korea developed the NHK-1 and the NHK-2, 
short-range ballistic missiles that fell within the agreed upon parameters.1338  
Despite the fact that the United States had stationed nuclear weapons in South 
Korea, the country pursued a nuclear weapons program in the bipolar period. 
Nevertheless, U.S. efforts successfully constrained South Korea’s nuclear weapons 
program and missile development. The United States was able to exert control over South 
Korea’s nuclear suppliers, the superpower was aware of South Korea’s proliferation 
activities, and it did not face a difficult tradeoff between foreign policy priorities as it 
sought to limit South Korea’s program. The superpower could offer extended deterrence 
in order to provide security assurances as South Korea faced regional threats. 
North Korea’s nuclear program began in the 1950s after the Korean War—a war 
where North Korea, primarily backed by China and the Soviet Union, fought against 
South Korea, chiefly supported by the United States. The Soviet Union was closely 
involved with the beginning of North Korea’s nuclear program. The superpower gave 
assistance to include training North Korea’s physicists and technicians and providing an 
IRT-2000 research reactor as North Korea established its nuclear complex at Yongbyon, 
according to U.S. intelligence.1339 China also provided some aid.1340 In 1977, North 
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Korea signed a Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and the Soviet Union, which 
covered the research reactor. In 1983, U.S. intelligence did not believe that North Korea 
posed a proliferation threat.1341 
The country expanded its nuclear program in the 1980s, however, as it pursued a 
complete nuclear fuel cycle and bomb technology, according to the Nuclear Threat 
Initiative.1342 Meanwhile, South Korea was experiencing increased economic growth and 
prosperity and still seemed to be considering a nuclear weapons program.1343 Under 
pressure from the Soviet Union, North Korea joined the NPT in 1985.1344 The Soviet 
Union had made joining the NPT a condition for its sale of light water reactors to North 
Korea. U.S. intelligence reported that North Korea completed a 5 MW(e) nuclear reactor, 
which could yield plutonium for a nuclear weapon, in 1986.1345 With this achievement, 
North Korea began building a 50 MW(e) nuclear reactor in the mid-1980s. U.S. 
intelligence shifted its North Korea assessment by the late 1980s. The Central 
Intelligence Agency assessed in 1987 that the country could be developing nuclear 
weapons.1346 IAEA testing would later find that North Korea reprocessed plutonium 
illicitly in 1989 and 1990.1347 As the Cold War drew to a close, the Soviet Union began 
to reduce its assistance to North Korea.1348 And it was not clear that North Korea could 
advance its nuclear program on its own. 
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In terms of delivery systems, North Korea had been a ballistic missile proliferator 
and exporter since the 1980s.1349 Joshua Pollack noted that North Korea provided 
missiles to Egypt, Iran, Libya, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen during this 
period.1350 North Korea’s capabilities started with tactical missiles in the early stages of 
its missile development and progressed to longer-range missiles initially aided by the 
Soviet Union and China, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative.1351 The U.S. 
Department of Defense asserted that North Korea and Egypt collaborated closely on 
Scud-B missile development through reverse-engineering efforts in the early to mid-
1980s.1352 Further, the Nuclear Threat Initiative noted that, in the mid- to late 1980s, 
North Korea began to develop its version of the Scud-C missile.1353 The report also 
asserted that, by the late 1980s, North Korea had begun to develop and test the Nodong 
missile, an intermediate-range ballistic missile.1354 By the end of the period, North Korea 
had built a robust missile program. 
The regional security environment seemed to motivate North Korea’s 
proliferation. Due to Russian and Chinese support, the United States did not have the 
same leverage to rein in North Korea’s nuclear and missile efforts. The United States also 
did not seem to be aware of North Korean nuclear intentions until the late 1980s. Until 
then, South Korea and Taiwan had appeared to pose greater proliferation threats. 
North Korea, South Korea, and Taiwan all pursued nuclear weapons programs 
between 1973 and 1990. But, South Korea ended its program in 1975 and Taiwan ended 
its program in 1988 following U.S. pressure to do so combined with U.S. extended 
deterrence commitments. As regional threats persisted, superpower management of the 
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region best explained the reduction. In contrast with other world regions, the United 
States experienced greater success in constraining nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia 
in this period. By 1990, of the three countries, only North Korea remained a significant 
concern. 
f. South Asia 
In South Asia, nuclear proliferation increased between 1973 and 1990 due to not 
only conflict and rivalry between India and Pakistan, but also between India and China. 
India began its nuclear efforts in the 1950s with the Atoms for Peace program. Beginning 
in the 1960s, India developed an extensive nuclear power program. Motivated by military 
rival China’s nuclear advancements and a conflict-ridden relationship with Pakistan, 
India used plutonium, from a research reactor acquired from Canada, to conduct a 
“peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974.1355 
The international community had been taken by surprise by the nuclear test. This 
explosion underscored the lack of control over the nuclear supply chain. William Burr 
noted that this event prompted the United States to initiate the establishment of the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group in 1975.1356 Also, in trying to determine why the 1974 
explosion had taken the U.S. intelligence community by surprise, a report assessed that 
the issue of proliferation had not been given a high enough priority by the U.S. 
government.1357 
In addition, the Soviet Union’s close relationship with India benefited the latter’s 
nuclear program. The Soviet Union made a deal with India in 1976 to provide heavy 
water as India was developing its nuclear program seemingly on the heels of the 1974 
explosion.1358 William Potter asserted that a lack of response to India’s 1974 explosion 
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and Soviet willingness to provide heavy water surprised the United States and its 
allies.1359 According to U.S. intelligence, by the mid- to late 1980s, India appeared to 
have a nuclear weapons capability.1360 
In terms of delivery systems, India had a sophisticated ballistic missile program 
and worked to develop long-range ballistic missile capabilities. This included an 
advanced space program established in the 1960s. By 1980, India had launched a 
satellite.1361 During the 1980s, India developed the liquid-fueled Prithvi, a short-range 
ballistic missile, and the solid-fueled Agni, a medium-range ballistic missile, according to 
the Nuclear Threat Initiative.1362 
Pakistan launched its nuclear program in the 1950s and began pursuing nuclear 
weapons after suffering defeat in its 1971 war with India. Its leadership famously 
committed to “eat grass” rather than forego nuclear weapons.1363 The United States 
expressed concern regarding Pakistan’s nuclear program from its beginning and 
monitored the program’s progress. It also monitored China’s nuclear assistance to 
Pakistan, according to Burr.1364 While the United States pressured its ally Pakistan in 
order to constrain its nuclear program, it met with little success. The U.S. Embassy in 
Islamabad noted in a 1979 cable that “no unilateral or multilateral pressure that USG and 
its friends can mount will persuade Pakistan to forego its efforts to achieve a nuclear 
explosive capability.”1365 
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China and A.Q. Khan aided Pakistan’s nuclear efforts. David Albright noted that 
A.Q. Khan began working to advance Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program in the mid-
1970s.1366 He brought the plans for the more efficient Zippe centrifuge from the 
Netherlands to Pakistan in 1974 and developed a network to acquire the required 
materials for nuclear weapons, according to Jeremy Bernstein.1367 China provided 
designs for a nuclear weapon along with highly enriched uranium, while A.Q. Khan’s 
work enabled Pakistan to build a gas centrifuge plant.1368 By 1984, Pakistan had 
acquired nuclear weapons, according to Albright.1369 Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and 
Rajkumar asserted that Pakistan had constructed the cores for several nuclear weapons by 
the end of the period in 1990.1370 
Why was Pakistan able to move forward with its nuclear program despite U.S. 
vigilance and its alliance with the United States? Pakistan had two factors in its favor. 
First, Pakistan was arguably the greatest benefactor from two suppliers for a number of 
aspiring nuclear proliferators in the 1980s—China and A.Q. Khan. While both suppliers 
may have had financial motivations for assisting in the Middle East, the rationale for 
assisting Pakistan was driven by hard-nosed security concerns and, in the case of A.Q. 
Khan, nationalism. Second, the United States was also constrained in the pressure that it 
could apply given Pakistan’s role in assisting U.S. efforts against the Soviets in 
Afghanistan. In 1985, the Central Intelligence Agency judged that Pakistan’s leader 
Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq believed that the critical nature of Pakistan’s support to U.S. 
policy in Afghanistan permitted Pakistan to clandestinely pursue nuclear weapons 
                                                 
1366 Albright, Peddling Peril, 30. 
1367 Jeremy Bernstein, One Physicist’s Guide to Nuclear Weapons: A Global Perspective (Bristol, 
United Kingdom: IOP Publishing, 2016), 6–3. 
1368 Albright, Peddling Peril, 9; William Burr, “China May Have Helped Pakistan Nuclear Weapons 
Design, Newly Declassified Intelligence Indicates,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 
(George Washington University, April 23, 2013), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb423/. 
1369 Albright, Peddling Peril, 9. 
1370 Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals, 245. 
 320 
technology without risking the loss of U.S. aid.1371 As in the Middle East, external 
management of nuclear proliferation was less effective in an environment of heightened 
competition in the international system. 
In terms of delivery systems, Pakistan’s missile development program had grown 
in tandem with its nuclear program. It started a space agency in the early 1960s.1372 In 
the late 1980s, Pakistan tested its Hatf-1 and Hatf-2 solid-fueled short-range ballistic 
missiles, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative.1373 Further, China and North Korea 
provided assistance to Pakistan’s missile program. Nevertheless, Cirincione, Wolfsthal, 
and Rajkumar noted that Pakistan likely would have used F-16 fighter jets, provided by 
the United States in the bipolar period, as a delivery vehicle for a nuclear weapon.1374 
While both India and Pakistan tested nuclear devices in May 1998, they seemed to 
have essentially achieved their nuclear weapons capabilities in the 1980s, according to 
the information examined here. The same difficulties that applied to superpower 
management of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East from 1973 to 1990 appeared to 
pertain to managing the efforts of Pakistan and India. The United States was aware that 
both countries were interested in pursuing nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the Cold War 
environment, characterized in this region by lack of control over the nuclear supply chain 
and superpower competition, allowed these regional rivals to acquire a nuclear capability 
under the nose of the superpowers. 
g. South Pacific 
In the South Pacific, nuclear proliferation decreased due to external management 
between 1973 and 1990. Australia seemed to have desired to acquire nuclear weapons 
initially due to the pursuit of this capability by other powers such as France, Italy, and 
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West Germany in the 1950s, according to Jim Walsh.1375 The country also had been 
bombed by Japan in World War II and had feared an invasion.1376 Walsh wrote that 
Australia negotiated on and off again with the United Kingdom in the 1950s and early 
1960s for nuclear warheads and the British government appeared willing to share.1377 
Nevertheless, the United Kingdom hesitated due to the constraints placed on Britain’s 
nuclear technology by the McMahon Act, or the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which 
controlled the sharing of U.S. nuclear technology with third countries.1378 Walsh asserted 
that the most serious and domestically unified Australian request to the United Kingdom 
for nuclear warheads in 1961 resulted in a similar response noting this limitation.1379 
In the mid-1960s and early 1970s, Australia’s primary motivation appeared to be 
the threat from China after China’s first nuclear test in 1964.1380 The test prompted 
Australia to pursue the nuclear issue once again and the country sought an indigenous 
nuclear capability, according to Walsh.1381 The United States, however, soon began to 
pressure Australia to integrate itself into the nonproliferation regime. Walsh noted that 
the United States asked Australia to subject its civilian nuclear program to IAEA 
safeguards in 1966.1382 In 1968, the United States reached out to Australia regarding the 
signing of the NPT. According to the U.S. State Department, Australia pushed back hard 
and provided many reasons for not signing the treaty.1383 The United States persisted, 
however, and Australia eventually signed the treaty in 1970 and ratified it in 1973 with 
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the understanding that it could count on extended deterrence from the United States.1384 
Walsh surmises “the ratification of the NPT marked a turning point, a decisive step away 
from nuclear weapons.”1385 According to Wayne Reynolds and John Simpson, U.S. 
pressure played the key role in bringing the Australian pursuit of nuclear weapons to an 
end.1386 
The region as a whole played a significant role in the history of nuclear weapons. 
The United States, the United Kingdom, and France all conducted nuclear tests in the 
South Pacific region. The United Kingdom carried out nuclear tests in Australia and on 
Christmas Island with the United States. The United States conducted the first test in the 
region at the Bikini atoll in 1946 and continued testing through the early 1960s. The 
French conducted their first test in the mid-1960s and their last test in 1996. In addition to 
concerns regarding nuclear testing, the region was wary of nuclear waste dumping. 
After Australia’s nuclear weapons ambitions came to an end, regional states 
joined together to form a NWFZ in 1985 and the Treaty of Rarotonga entered into force 
in 1986. The regional states decided to include a prohibition against nuclear weapons 
testing in this treaty.1387 In this sense, the region used the nonproliferation regime, in the 
form of creating a NWFZ, as a defense mechanism against regional nuclear activities by 
nuclear weapon states. Furthermore, New Zealand took the additional step of prohibiting 
all nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered ships from entering the country’s ports in 
1987.1388 The United States responded with frustration at its ally’s anti-nuclear policy, 
resulting in a rift between the two countries. Despite U.S. pressure, New Zealand opted to 
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remain “nuclear-free” as it saw this path as the best way to safeguard its own 
security.1389 
Australia’s end to its nuclear ambitions signaled a decrease in regional nuclear 
proliferation. Like the downward proliferation trend in Northeast Asia, U.S. external 
management drove this decrease. Through diplomatic negotiations and political pressure, 
one of the superpowers, the United States, succeeded in moving its ally, Australia, to take 
definitive steps away from a nuclear weapons program. While New Zealand embraced a 
nuclear-free identity, the country had not seriously pursued a nuclear weapons option like 
Australia. Thus, external management played a greater role in moving the region away 
from nuclear weapons pursuits during this period. 
h. Southeast Asia 
In Southeast Asia, nuclear proliferation decreased from 1973 to 1990. External 
managers monitored the nuclear power programs of Indonesia and Vietnam for possible 
nuclear program expansion, while regional states began to lay the groundwork for a 
NWFZ. The creation of a NWFZ was motivated by a reaction to superpower competition 
in the region, especially the Vietnam War.1390 
Indonesia considered a nuclear weapons program in the 1960s, but was unable to 
advance its nuclear capability. U.S. diplomats assessed that the public statements by 
Indonesia’s leadership exaggerated the country’s nuclear capabilities.1391 In addition, 
they noted that the Soviet Union and China had demonstrated a lack of interest in 
providing more than very limited support to Indonesia.1392 Nevertheless, the country 
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acquired the most developed nuclear infrastructure in the region. Indonesia built three 
research reactors among other nuclear-related facilities.1393 Any efforts toward a nuclear 
weapon ended in 1967 with a change in power, according to the Nuclear Threat 
Initiative.1394 Indonesia signed the NPT in 1970 and ratified it in 1979. In addition, it 
expressed an interest in nuclear power beginning in the late 1980s.1395 Vietnam also 
developed limited nuclear capabilities. The country has had a nuclear research reactor 
since 1963.1396 But, Vietnam joined the NPT in 1982.1397 
Members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, a regional cooperation 
organization, discussed the idea of a regional NWFZ in the early 1970s and put forward a 
formal proposal in the mid-1980s.1398 These states publicly signaled their intent to keep 
nuclear weapons out of the region in support of economic and security interests. This 
NWFZ was unique as it was developed in the context of a regional cooperation 
organization. It was like other regions, however, as the motive for the treaty’s creation 
stemmed from a regional history and identity marked by superpower competition. 
i. Analysis 
An increase or decrease in regional conflict and rivalry drove nuclear proliferation 
trends in four world regions between 1973 and 1990. External management drove nuclear 
proliferation trends in two world regions. More horizontal nuclear proliferation occurred 
in this time period than in the unipolar or multipolar periods. 
The bipolar period was characterized by intense superpower competition that 
constrained external management of nuclear proliferation in several world regions, to 
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include Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and South Asia. These were regions 
where U.S. competition with the Soviet Union contributed to a lack of control over the 
nuclear supply chain and a lack of information on secret nuclear proliferation activities. 
Nuclear proliferation concerns were sometimes less of a priority than other foreign policy 
concerns, primarily when superpower competition exhibited itself in the region. Thus, 
superpowers balanced nuclear proliferation concerns against their larger goals within the 
superpower competition, and proliferation concerns sometimes lost. 
During this period, the United States used the nonproliferation regime as a tool to 
try to limit nuclear spread and initiated the creation of additional nonproliferation 
organizations such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control 
Regime. A U.S. National Security Council document from 1977 illustrates this approach. 
The countries of proliferation concern at that time were listed as Taiwan, South Africa, 
India, South Korea, Israel, Argentina, and Pakistan.1399 They were categorized as states 
that posed a “serious near-term risk of acquiring nuclear weapons, or the fuel cycle 
facilities needed for a weapons option.”1400 This study indicated the United States was 
concerned by those states that did not have a bilateral agreement backing-up the IAEA 
agreement, did not have full scope safeguards, and had not committed to forego 
conducting peaceful nuclear explosions.1401 
The weaknesses of the original components of the nonproliferation regime, the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and IAEA Safeguards, became apparent as some states 
pursued clandestine nuclear weapons programs. U.S.-led initiatives such as the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime were designed to fill gaps 
and loopholes that states had exploited in their secret programs. 
The United States did not face the same management limits in Northeast Asia, 
except with North Korea, and the South Pacific. External management played the most 
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important role in halting the nuclear programs of Taiwan and South Korea in Northeast 
Asia and Australia in the South Pacific. The trends in these regions more closely align 
with Kenneth Waltz’s idea of superpower management under bipolarity whereby client 
states respond to superpower pressure to limit or end nuclear proliferation. 
Further, this period was characterized by the use of NWFZ treaties as a defensive 
mechanism by some regions. Regions where nuclear testing had occurred, such as the 
South Pacific, were motivated to limit nuclear testing and prohibit the dumping of nuclear 
waste in the regions. They sought to use a NWFZ to shield themselves from nuclear-
related activities. The South Pacific NWFZ Treaty opened for signature in 1985 and 
entered into force in 1986. In these cases, the NWFZ initiatives took root in the region 
after nuclear weapons efforts by regional states had come to an end. 
2. The Unipolar Period: 1991 to 2003 
In the unipolar period, external management by the global hegemon, the United 
States, drove nuclear nonproliferation trends in several regions. Regional nuclear 
proliferation decreased or did not increase in most regions during this period. Nuclear 
proliferation decreased in the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, Europe, Latin America, the 
South Pacific, and Southeast Asia. Nuclear proliferation increased in Northeast Asia and 
South Asia. In addition, the African NWFZ treaty was opened for signature in 1996, and the 
Southeast Asian NWFZ treaty was opened for signature in 1995 and ratified in 1997. 
a. Africa 
In Africa, nuclear proliferation decreased due to external management. In terms of 
those African countries that also make-up a part of the Middle East, as discussed 
previously, Egypt’s nuclear capabilities did not change in this time period and Libya 
decided to dismantle its nuclear weapons program at the very end of the period. 
Algeria moved forward with its nuclear ambitions unchecked in the early 1990s as 
its neighbor Libya continued to pursue nuclear weapons. The pilot fuel-fabrication plant 
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provided by Argentina’s INVAP was nearly completed by 1991.1402 A second research 
reactor, the Es Salam reactor built with China’s assistance, went critical in 1992, 
according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies.1403 The institute also noted 
that the Es Salam site also hosted facilities for waste-storage, isotope-production, and 
hot-cell laboratories.1404 International suspicion was aroused in 1991, however, when it 
was noted that the Es Salam site had suspiciously large cooling towers for the size of the 
reactor, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative.1405 In addition, Algeria had not yet 
joined the NPT, the buildings at the site were not safeguarded, and there was heavy 
security around the facility.1406 The United States with its European partners moved 
quickly to limit Algeria’s project. William Burr noted that the United States was able to 
obtain better information from China regarding its assistance to Algeria.1407 As a result, 
Algeria brought the reactor under IAEA safeguards and joined the NPT in 1995 and the 
Treaty of Pelindaba in 1997.1408 
South Africa’s nuclear capabilities continued to decrease during this period, 
primarily its ballistic missile program. South Africa had announced the end of its nuclear 
program in the bipolar period after the Soviet threat ended and, by 1991, the country’s 
nuclear weapons program was dismantled and it joined the NPT, according to Paul.1409 
Nevertheless, as Henry Sokolski noted the country continued to move forward with its 
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ballistic missile program—a program that could have produced an intercontinental 
ballistic missile.1410 
As an external manger, the United States placed economic sanctions on South 
Africa for importing missile technology and the resulting noncompliance with the Missile 
Technology Control Regime.1411 South Africa pushed back on U.S. sanctions. The 
subsequent negotiations with the United States, emphasizing the economic benefits of 
ending the ballistic missile program, led to South Africa’s renunciation of the program in 
1993.1412 In 1995, South Africa joined the Missile Technology Control Regime. It 
appeared that without U.S. intervention, South Africa would have continued to advance 
its missile program. Lingering concerns about its knowledge of nuclear technology 
combined with an advanced ballistic missile program would have proved worrisome. 
Algeria’s decision to end its suspected nuclear program and South Africa’s 
decision to end its ballistic missile program are best explained by superpower 
management of the region. It is not clear that South Africa would have agreed to end its 
missile program without U.S. pressure. It also seems that Algeria would have continued 
to quickly advance its nuclear capabilities given similar activities undertaken by its rival 
Libya. 
b. Central Asia 
In Central Asia, the region’s Cold War history made it more responsive to 
external management efforts to reduce or eliminate proliferation concerns. Kazakhstan 
enthusiastically embraced regional nonproliferation initiatives.1413 The Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty and the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction program initiated by U.S. 
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Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar in 1991 served as key management tools.1414 
U.S. diplomatic and economic resources complemented the program.1415 U.S. efforts 
were complemented by multilateral initiatives such as the Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty, the Lisbon Protocol, and the Almaty Agreement, which moved Europe’s Belarus 
and Ukraine and Central Asia’s Kazakhstan toward denuclearization. 
In Central Asia, Kazakhstan inherited a large arsenal of nuclear weapons with the 
fall of the Soviet Union. Of the former Soviet Bloc countries, only Russia and Ukraine 
had more.1416 After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan closed the 
Semipalatinsk test site in 1991. With incentives provided by the United States, 
Kazakhstan acceded to the NPT in 1994 after signing the Budapest Memorandum. Russia 
received all of Kazakhstan’s nuclear warheads by 1995.1417 Also, the United States 
worked with Kazakhstan to greatly reduce its stockpile of highly enriched uranium 
through the 2000s.1418 
While it was in Russia’s best interest to reduce nuclear capabilities of surrounding 
states, it was not a foregone conclusion that the newly independent states would 
relinquish them.1419 For example, a U.S. Embassy Almaty cable noted in 1992 the view 
of some in Kazakhstan that “nuclear weapons could enhance the country’s security or 
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status.”1420 And these were security concerns that have been validated by subsequent 
history, i.e., Russia’s 2014 interference in the Ukraine. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan chose 
to give-up its nuclear weapons arsenal. 
Two factors may have made it easier for this region to decide to denuclearize with 
U.S. support and eventually form a NWFZ. First, the region had been negatively 
impacted by radioactive fallout from nuclear testing. These memories persisted beyond 
Soviet times. There were also fears that the region might be used for tactical nuclear 
weapon storage.1421 Second, interactions between U.S. officials and regional officials 
may have demonstrated a different way of thinking about nuclear proliferation. Glory 
Duffy notes that “the United States introduced U.S. concerns about nonproliferation – 
which in many ways reflected the concerns of the international community – into 
decision-making processes in the NIS.”1422 Regional states began to work together in 
1997 for the creation of the Central Asian NWFZ treaty. Also, between gaining 
independence and 1995 these same regional states ratified the NPT. 
U.S. denuclearization initiatives could not have been successful without strong 
regional support. The region’s history during the Cold War motivated these states to 
pursue denuclearization and begin the process of forming a new identity through a 
NWFZ. 
c. Europe 
In Europe, Ukraine and Belarus had played important roles in the Soviet Union’s 
nuclear weapons program. The United States and the Nunn-Lugar Program similarly 
played a critical role in the denuclearization trend, however, the region’s history and 
search for a new post-Cold War identity allowed the United States to be effective. 
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Once Ukraine became independent, it hesitated to give up its large nuclear 
stockpile of nuclear weapons. In 1992, Ukraine had suspended the withdrawal of its 
nuclear weapons following a rise in tensions with its relationship with Russia over issues 
such as Crimea, according to U.S. intelligence.1423 The United States moved forward in 
1993 to work out an agreement with Russia and Ukraine for Ukraine to denuclearize. 
Ukraine agreed to relinquish its nuclear weapons in 1994. This decision was formalized 
in the Budapest Memorandums, agreements signed with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the 
Ukraine.1424 The agreements were among Russia, the United Kingdom, the United 
States, and each newly independent state. The signatories agreed to respect the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of these new states and refrain from any threat of 
nuclear attack or economic coercion.1425 With these assurances, Ukraine acceded to the 
NPT in 1994 as a non-nuclear weapon state. It also joined the Missile Technology 
Control Regime in 1998. By 1996, Ukraine’s nuclear warheads had been sent back to 
Russia, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative.1426 The report also noted that, by 
2002, Ukraine’s nuclear-capable missiles and bombers had been dismantled or 
destroyed.1427 Nikolai Sokov asserts that Ukraine’s desire to integrate into the West 
drove its nuclear decisions during this time.1428 
One relic of the Cold War that the Ukraine did maintain was its nuclear power 
industry. It continued to rely on and develop nuclear energy. While the Ukraine had 
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halted its nuclear power program after the 1986 Chernobyl accident, by the mid-1990s, 
the country signaled its willingness to move forward again.1429 
Belarus also participated in Cooperative Threat Reduction. The nuclear-armed 
ballistic missiles and tactical nuclear weapons that it had hosted were returned to Russia 
as part of the program. In 1993, Belarus acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon 
state. Belarus maintained a stockpile of highly enriched uranium, however, provided by 
the Soviet Union during the Cold War for its nuclear research reactor.1430 This was only 
partially removed.1431 Belarus maintained a closer relationship with Russia than 
Ukraine.1432 Thus, it may have been less hesitant to relinquish its nuclear capabilities. 
Nuclear spread in Europe decreased due to the elimination or transfer of nuclear 
weapons and material and delivery systems in states that had been allied with or a part of 
the former Soviet Union.1433 Paul Walker noted that between Belarus, Ukraine, and 
Kazakhstan, there had been over 2,300 warheads and 361 missiles.1434 The desire to 
move away from its Cold War past filled with the threat of nuclear war allowed external 
efforts to be effective. Working with Russia, European allies, and the former Soviet 
states, the United States as external manager provided financial incentives and 
organizational support for denuclearization. 
d. Latin America 
Nuclear proliferation decreased due to external management in Latin America 
from 1991 to 2003. Argentina and Brazil had renounced nuclear weapons in the prior 
bipolar period. The Brazilian-Argentine Center for Accounting and Control of Nuclear 
Materials was established in 1991 to verify their peaceful intent. Furthermore, Argentina 
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and Brazil signed the Quadripartite Agreement with the IAEA in 1991 that would apply 
safeguards to the countries’ programs. Both countries, however, held fast to their ballistic 
missile programs. In contrast to the previous period, external management drove this 
downward trend. 
In Argentina, the United States used both bilateral and multilateral means to 
pressure the country to end its Condor II program. The superpower had been especially 
concerned about the program’s links to Egypt and Iraq. At the bilateral level, U.S. 
officials raised the topic of ending the program in meetings with the country’s president, 
according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative.1435 At the multilateral level, Argentina’s 
program was targeted by the Missile Technology Control Regime, established in 
1987.1436 Argentina announced that it would end the Condor II program in mid-1991. 
After the end of the Condor II program, Argentina further integrated itself into the 
nonproliferation regime. In 1992, the country signaled it would ensure its exports 
complied with Missile Technology Control Regime rules.1437 It joined the regime in 
1993. Subsequently, Argentina joined the region’s NWFZ treaty and the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group in 1994 and the NPT in 1995. 
Brazil was subjected to similar U.S. tactics and pressure to persuade it to give up 
its advanced ballistic missile program. Savita Pande noted that U.S. pressure “linked to 
the availability of economic aid, in the form of investment and technology.”1438 In a 
multilateral context, Brazil became a focus of the Missile Technology Control 
Regime.1439 Brazil agreed to give up its missile program in late 1994. 
Brazil also integrated itself into the nonproliferation regime at the beginning of 
the period. It joined the regional NWFZ treaty in 1991, the Missile Technology Control 
Regime in 1995, the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 1996, and the NPT in 1998. 
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While Argentina and Brazil had moved forward to end their nuclear programs in 
the 1980s, there was no parallel effort with the ballistic missile programs. Seemingly, 
they would have preferred to maintain their missile programs. Rather, it appeared that 
U.S. political pressure and accompanying economic incentives along with pressure from 
the Missile Technology Control Regime motivated Argentina and Brazil to bring these 
programs to a close. For example, the regime compelled Argentina’s European missile 
suppliers, such as France, Italy, and West Germany, to end their support for the Condor II 
program, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative.1440 
e. Northeast Asia 
In Northeast Asia, nuclear proliferation did not decrease despite vigorous external 
management efforts. These endeavors included the U.S.-North Korean bilateral nuclear 
agreement, the Agreed Framework, and the multilateral Korean Peninsula Energy 
Development Organization, which implemented the nuclear agreement. The United 
States also continued to provide extended deterrence to its regional allies. And, unlike 
Pakistan and India, it was not clear that North Korea, the regional program of highest 
concern, had acquired a nuclear weapons capability. North Korea’s nuclear program had 
not been a strong security focus for the United States during the bipolar period, but this 
changed in the unipolar period. 
Japan continued to develop its nuclear power industry and its nuclear power 
reactors produced a stockpile of plutonium. Due to growing international concern 
regarding a possible nuclear hedge, in the early 1990s, Japan committed to provide more 
insight into its stockpile levels through annual reports and a commitment to reduce this 
stockpile, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative.1441 In the mid-1990s, Japan began 
to look at ways to maximize its use of fuel and how to reprocess used fuel, previously 
done in Europe.1442 In 1997, Japan began operating a commercial uranium enrichment 
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plant.1443 In 2002, Japan took measures to increase its domestic use of nuclear power in 
order to reduce the country’s overall greenhouse gas production.1444 Japan also began to 
explore exporting nuclear power technology in this period.1445 
In terms of delivery systems, the Nuclear Threat Initiative noted that Japan 
launched the M-5 rocket in 1995 that used technology that could be utilized for an 
intercontinental ballistic missile.1446 Nevertheless, there was no indication that Japan 
intended to do so. Rather, North Korea’s 1998 test of a Taepodong-1 missile motivated 
Japan to begin investigating possible missile defense options with the United States, 
according to Masako Toki.1447 Toki further noted that, in December 2003, Japan’s 
government approved the establishment of a ballistic missile defense system.1448 
Taiwan did not pursue nuclear weapons capabilities in the unipolar period, but, in 
the mid-1990s, Taiwan began developing more advanced missiles in response to Chinese 
security developments, according to Arthur Ding.1449 In particular, the Taiwan Strait 
Crisis in 1995 to 1996, resulting in an escalation of tensions between the United States 
and China, motivated Taiwan to improve its missile capabilities.1450 This crisis prompted 
public statements by politicians regarding the possibility of resurrecting Taiwan’s nuclear 
program, but no concrete actions were taken.1451 Subsequent to the Taiwan Strait Crisis, 
Taiwan invested in U.S. missile defense capabilities, according to the Nuclear Threat 
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Initiative.1452 The report also noted that Taiwan sought to improve its indigenous short-
range ballistic missile capability. Taiwan restarted the Tien Ma solid-fueled missile 
program it had ended in the 1980s.1453 It tested the Tien Chi missile in 1997 and the 
Hsiung Feng III anti-ship missile in 1998—both solid-fueled missiles.1454 Nevertheless, 
Taiwan did not appear to move beyond short-range ballistic missiles. In terms of nuclear 
power, Taiwan began building two more nuclear power reactors in 1999, but they had not 
been completed by the end of the period.1455 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States worked to denuclearize and to 
de-escalate tensions on the Korean peninsula. As part of negotiations with North and 
South Korea, the United States removed its nuclear weapons from South Korea in 1991 
and the two Koreas signed the “Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula” in January 1992.1456 The United States would now provide nuclear deterrence 
from afar. Unlike the bilateral inspection regime between Argentina and Brazil, however, 
this one was not successfully implemented. Nevertheless, South Korea continued to 
support U.S. efforts to constrain North Korea’s nuclear and missile activities throughout 
the period. South Korea played a critical role in implementing the Agreed Framework, 
especially through its role with the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. 
And, in 2003, South Korea served as a key member of the Six-Party Talks. 
Nevertheless, one suspicious incident occurred. According to the IAEA, in 2000, 
South Korea used atomic vapor laser isotope separation to enrich 200 mg of uranium, and 
the country reported the experiments to the IAEA several years later.1457 The IAEA 
reported that around 10 tests involving uranium were carried out using the laser 
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technology between 1993 and 2000.1458 This gave cause for the United States and the 
IAEA to continue to carefully scrutinize South Korea’s program. South Korea complied 
with the IAEA and did not seem to undertake further nuclear-weapons related activities 
in this period. 
After North Korea’s Taepodong-1 missile test in 1998, South Korea became 
alarmed by the gap in missile capabilities between the two countries, according to 
Moltz.1459 South Korea decided to advance its space program, particularly its satellite 
and rocket programs.1460 Jonathan Pollack and Mitchell Resiss noted that South Korea 
also lobbied the United States to expand the range of missile that it was allowed to build 
to 300 km.1461 By 2000, South Korea’s space program had progressed enough that it 
could advance plans for a space launch vehicle.1462 In 2001, South Korea was granted 
membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime, which also allowed the country 
to access additional missile technology.1463 This regime limited its members to ballistic 
missiles with a range of 300 km and a payload of 500 kg. The United States and South 
Korea renegotiated their bilateral agreement in order to accommodate South Korean 
development of missile ranges and payloads permitted by the regime.1464 
South Korea had a sophisticated and well-developed nuclear power industry and 
relied heavily on nuclear power to satisfy its energy requirements. During this period, 
nine additional nuclear power reactors entered into operation.1465 In regard to the 
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country’s overall fuel cycle, however, it remained limited by the 1974 Korea-U.S. 
Atomic Energy Agreement that prohibited uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing.1466 
South Korea did not advance its nuclear capabilities in a significant way that 
would demonstrate pursuit of a nuclear weapons program, but the undeclared 
experiments served as a reminder of South Korea’s nuclear endeavors during the bipolar 
period and of the need to closely monitor the country’s nuclear program. 
In North Korea, it appeared that the United States might be able to limit or even 
halt nuclear proliferation. Despite U.S. efforts, however, North Korea advanced its 
nuclear program. The decade began with North Korea appearing to cooperate with 
inspection efforts. The United States had removed its nuclear weapons from South Korea 
as North Korea had insisted that it would not consent to IAEA inspections of its nuclear 
facilities until this was done.1467 After North Korea and South Korea signed the “Joint 
Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” banning the enrichment of 
uranium and reprocessing of plutonium, North Korea signed an IAEA Safeguards 
Agreement and provided its required declaration of facilities.1468 The IAEA began 
inspections in May 1992. Albright noted that IAEA testing found that North Korea had 
reprocessed plutonium illicitly in 1991 (and 1989 and 1990).1469 
North Korea never fully cooperated, however, with IAEA inspectors. Leon Sigal 
wrote that, in November 1992, North Korea refused to provide samples of the spent fuel 
rods to the IAEA.1470 In February 1993, North Korea did not allow the IAEA to visit two 
nuclear waste sites, according to the Arms Control Association.1471 In March, North 
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Korea advised that it would leave the NPT in 90 days, but halted the withdrawal process 
just short of it being implemented.1472 Sigal noted that, in August, IAEA inspections 
showed that two of three cells at a hot cell access point had been disturbed or broken.1473 
In October, North Korea suspended its consultation with the IAEA. In December, North 
Korea agreed to IAEA inspections at its nuclear sites, but restricted access in the research 
reactor and reprocessing plant, according to Sigal.1474 Furthermore, he noted that, in 
January 1994, North Korea refused to agree to the IAEA’s inspection list, and, in March, 
North Korea blocked access at a hot cell by not permitting inspectors to take smear 
samples.1475 He added that it obstructed routine inspections and fuel rod analysis and, in 
May, North Korea announced it would begin removing spent fuel from its reactor.1476 In 
June, North Korea withdrew from its IAEA membership, but the Safeguards Agreement 
remained in place.1477 
In June 1994, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter went to North Korea and laid 
the groundwork for negotiations between the United States and North Korea, which 
would lead to the October 1994 Agreed Framework. The Agreed Framework represented 
significant progress toward containing North Korea’s nuclear program. Under the 
agreement, North Korea agreed to freeze operation and construction of its nuclear 
reactors, dismantle the reactors, and store the spent fuel.1478 For its part, the United 
States agreed to build two light-water reactors on a credit basis from South Korea for 
power generation and heavy heating oil until the reactors were completed.1479 Under the 
agreement, North Korea would have twenty years to pay back the money borrowed from 
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South Korea. Both parties moved forward to implement the 1994 Agreed Framework. 
The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, founded by the United States, 
South Korea, and Japan—and later joined by European partners—administered the 
agreement for the light-water reactors and the fuel oil. In December 2001, the U.S. 
intelligence community reported that North Korea’s spent fuel rods had been safely 
stored.1480 The canning of the spent fuel was supervised by the U.S. Department of 
Energy. Between November 1994 and December 2002, the IAEA monitored the agreed 
upon freeze of North Korea’s nuclear reactor.1481 This was the closest that the United 
States, as an external manager, came to halting North Korea’s nuclear program. 
North Korea’s nuclear capability, however, was already significant and its 
intentions to acquire a weapon did not appear to waver. According to U.S. intelligence, 
North Korea had already generated sufficient plutonium for a minimum of one nuclear 
weapon prior to the 1994 agreement.1482 In addition, according to David Sanger, in 1997 
or 1998, North Korea reportedly decided to advance a project to build a nuclear weapon 
from highly enriched uranium using centrifuges provided by Pakistan.1483 
In terms of a delivery system, North Korea continued to advance its ballistic 
missile program in the 1990s following the 1994 nuclear agreement, which did not 
restrict missiles. The United States worked to constrain North Korea’s missile 
development, especially by pressuring it to join the Missile Technology Control Regime. 
After a 1998 intermediate-range ballistic missile test, which failed to launch a satellite 
due to the failure of the rocket’s third stage, North Korea agreed to a freeze on long-range 
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missile testing in 1999.1484 North Korea observed the testing moratorium pending talks 
with the United States regarding North Korea’s missile program. The talks did not 
materialize, however, due to the end of U.S. President Bill Clinton’s time in office. 
The administration of U.S. President George W. Bush took a more confrontational 
approach to North Korea’s nuclear and missile program when it came into office in 2001. 
This included labeling North Korea a part of an “axis of evil” along with Iran and Iraq in 
the 2002 State of the Union address. In December 2001, the U.S. intelligence community 
reported that North Korea sought to acquire equipment related to centrifuges and uranium 
feed and withdrawal systems.1485 The intelligence community was certain by mid-20002 
that the country was working to build a centrifuge facility.1486 
Tensions increased between the United States and North Korea. In October, 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly traveled to 
North Korea, reporting afterward that North Korea had admitted to a secret uranium 
enrichment program, a violation of the Agreed Framework, according to the Council on 
Foreign Relations.1487 North Korea contested the accusations. The Korean Peninsula 
Energy Development Organization ended its heavy fuel oil shipments to North 
Korea.1488 On December 9, the U.S. Navy intercepted Scud missiles en route from North 
Korea to Yemen, according to Gittings, Goldenberg, and Whitaker.1489 Without an 
international agreement that made the shipment illegal, the United States had to allow it 
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to continue on to its destination. This incident provided the incentive for the creation of 
the Proliferation Security Initiative by the United States, according to the Nuclear Threat 
Initiative.1490 On December 12, North Korea declared that it would resume the operation 
of its nuclear reactor and it expelled the IAEA inspectors.1491 In early 2003, the IAEA 
Board of Governors condemned North Korea’s actions and North Korea responded by 
withdrawing from the NPT and taking out the canned fuel.1492 In February, the IAEA 
referred the country to the UN Security Council.1493 
Initial negotiations between the United States, China, and North Korea began in 
April 2003. The Six-Party Talks, adding Russia, South Korea, and Japan, were launched 
in August 2003 to negotiate an end to this second nuclear crisis. North Korea 
demonstrated how much and how quickly it was willing to escalate the nuclear issue. It 
asserted in August that it might “transfer” or “demonstrate” its nuclear weapons, 
according to U.S. intelligence.1494 U.S. intelligence noted that, in October, North Korea 
claimed that it had reprocessed all of the previously safeguarded fuel rods and that it 
threatened to reprocess spent fuel in the future once the nuclear reactor produced more 
plutonium.1495 In December, North Korea backed down, saying it would not carry out 
these activities in exchange for “rewards,” according to U.S. intelligence.1496 
From 1990 to 2003, North Korea appeared to be halting its nuclear weapons 
advancements with the 1994 Agreed Framework. But North Korea never fully complied 
and by the late 1990s it seemed to be pursuing centrifuge equipment for uranium 
enrichment. If the 1994 agreement would have held, North Korea might have joined the 
ranks of Iraq and Libya, which denuclearized during the unipolar period. This region 
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could have experienced a decrease in nuclear proliferation like the Middle East. North 
Korea’s nuclear activities, however, did motivate the United States to refine the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime by adding the Proliferation Security Initiative in May 2003.1497 
Northeast Asia remained a region characterized by high levels of conflict and 
rivalry. The closest that the United States came to halting North Korea’s nuclear 
advancement was through the 1994 Agreed Framework in which the U.S. Department of 
Energy canned the plutonium North Korea had already generated, which halted the 
reactor’s plutonium production. The United States used similar strategies and tactics as it 
had in other regions to get North Korea to give up its nuclear program, but it was not 
successful in the way it was in other regions such as the Middle East. 
The difference between North Korea and Libya or Iraq in the unipolar period may 
have been that the United States did not have as much leverage over North Korea. With 
two nuclear weapon states as neighbors that at one time or another had allied with North 
Korea, the United States may have been more cautious about its approach. Thus, the 
support of regional actors may have been more relevant for both crafting and 
implementing an agreement in the regional security environment. These actors would 
include: Russia, China, South Korea, and Japan.1498 
f. South Asia 
In South Asia, nuclear proliferation increased due to regional conflict and rivalry. 
As discussed previously, both India and Pakistan had the ability to produce nuclear 
weapons by the end of the Cold War. In January 1992, Central Intelligence Agency 
Director Robert Gates testified to Congress that both Pakistan and India had nuclear 
weapons and ballistic missile programs along with the capacity to assemble nuclear 
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weapons quickly that could be delivered by military aircraft.1499 The two states 
conducted multiple underground nuclear weapons tests in 1998. 
India continued to expand its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile capabilities. It 
did not sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiated in 1996 and then tested five 
nuclear weapons in May 1998.1500 India’s nuclear weapons program remained under 
civilian control, however, and the country established a “no first use” nuclear weapons 
policy. After the 1998 tests, the United States imposed sanctions on India. It lifted these 
sanctions after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda, however, as the 
superpower needed India’s cooperation in combatting terrorism.1501 India remained 
outside of the NPT, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty. 
In regard to delivery systems, India obtained missile technology from Western 
Europe and Russia, according to U.S. intelligence.1502 Nevertheless, Clay Moltz noted 
that the demise of the Soviet Union had a negative effect on India’s space program as it 
became harder for India to obtain “critical hardware and experience” from Russia and 
Russia was more sensitive to U.S. pressure to comply with the Missile Technology 
Control Regime.1503 Daniel Sneider reported that, in one case, U.S. pressure on Russia to 
comply with Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines caused Russia to cancel a 
deal to provide cryogenic engine technology to India in 1993.1504 
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Nevertheless, India gradually expanded the breadth of its ballistic missile 
capabilities. In 1991, India launched the Sagarika program to develop a submarine-
launched short-range ballistic missile, according to Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and 
Rajkumar.1505 They noted that India temporarily halted the Agni I medium-range 
ballistic missile program in 1994 due to U.S. pressure, but restarted the program in 1998 
and began working on the Agni II medium-range ballistic missile.1506 In addition, India 
tested the Agni II medium-range ballistic missile in 1999 and 2001, conducted a 
successful flight test of the Dhanush sea to surface missile in 2001, and tested the Privthi 
II short-range ballistic missile in 2001, according to Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and 
Rajkumar.1507 India’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile activities motivated Pakistan 
to advance its capabilities as well. 
Pakistan increased its nuclear weapons capabilities throughout the period. 
Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar noted that, after the Soviets exited Afghanistan, the 
United States began to pressure Pakistan regarding its nuclear program, restricting U.S. 
aid and military sales to the country in the early 1990s.1508 In response, they asserted that 
Pakistan froze its production of weapons-grade uranium, but advanced other aspects of its 
program such as production of low enriched uranium and plutonium throughout the 
1990s.1509 
Pakistan was able to find suppliers for both its nuclear weapons program and 
ballistic missile program. In addition to assistance from the A.Q. Khan network, China 
continued to assist Pakistan with developing its nuclear weapons program and ballistic 
missile program through the mid-1990s, according to U.S. intelligence.1510 Washington 
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noted that North Korea aided Pakistan’s missile program as well.1511 According to U.S. 
intelligence, China agreed in 1996 to end its support to nuclear facilities in Pakistan that 
were not under IAEA Safeguards.1512 Pakistan then relied on other countries to be 
nuclear suppliers, primarily countries in Western Europe, according to U.S. 
intelligence.1513 
Pakistan did not integrate itself into the nonproliferation regime and worked to 
establish itself as a nuclear weapon state. Foreshadowing the country’s nuclear weapons 
tests in 1998, Pakistan refused to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiated in 
1996 and conducted underground nuclear weapons tests. It tested five nuclear devices in 
May 1998 following India’s five tests.1514 The United States imposed sanctions on 
Pakistan. These sanctions along with other nuclear-related sanctions implemented in 
1979 were removed in 2001 as Pakistan cooperated with the United States’ post-9/11 
counterterrorism efforts.1515 Like India, Pakistan remained outside of the NPT, the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. 
In terms of delivery systems, Pakistan quickly advanced its missile capabilities in 
the late 1990s. Pakistan tested two short-range ballistic missiles – the Hatf III in 1997 and 
the Hatf IV or Shaheen I in 1999, according to Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar.1516 
They further noted that Pakistan increased production of the Hatf IV in 2001.1517 
Pakistan tested several medium-range ballistic missiles as well. They included the Ghauri 
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I, tested in 1998, the Ghauri II, tested in 1999, and the Ghauri III, tested in 2000, 
according to Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar.1518 
According to Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar, Pakistan relied on China and 
North Korea for missile assistance until the mid-1990s, but as assistance from China 
became more limited, Pakistan turned to North Korea.1519 In addition, they noted that 
suspicions that North Korean missile technology at this time “was provided in return for 
Pakistan’s assistance with gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment technology” persist in 
regards to Pakistan’s Ghauri missile capabilities.1520 
India and Pakistan had acquired a nuclear weapons capability in the bipolar 
period, and they expanded these capabilities in the unipolar period. Meanwhile, the 
countries eschewed the nonproliferation regime while benefiting from the United States 
lifting nuclear-related sanctions following the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the 
United States. The latter provided another example of U.S. foreign policy prioritizing 
some security issues over nonproliferation concerns. 
g. South Pacific 
Nuclear proliferation decreased between 1991 and 2003. Australia had given up 
its nuclear weapons program in the bipolar period and no other country had sought to 
develop a nuclear weapons program since then. Australia continued to rely on U.S. 
extended deterrence commitments. During this period, moreover, the reach of the 
nonproliferation regime expanded in the South Pacific. 
First, the region gained additional adherents to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free 
Zone treaty. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France had all conducted 
nuclear testing in the region beginning in 1946 with the United States. Michael Hamel-
Green noted that, consequently, “regional concerns focused on radioactive fallout and 
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associated legacies” from nuclear testing.1521 France conducted its final nuclear weapons 
test in early 1996. Following this test, France and the United Kingdom signed and ratified 
the protocols of the region’s NWFZ treaty, which applied the treaty to their territories and 
activities in the region.1522 The United States signed, but did not ratify the protocols.1523 
Second, spurred by Australia’s history as a testing ground for nuclear weapons, 
Australia played an important role in the creation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
Australia helped move the treaty forward for signature and ratification.1524 In 1996, the 
treaty was opened for signature. Also, in 1996, the Canberra Report, initiated by the 
Australian government, recommended that the NPT-sanctioned nuclear weapon states 
begin to take steps to get rid of their nuclear weapons.1525 
These initiatives helped solidify the idea that the region stood in opposition to the 
development and use of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, they were regional endeavors, not 
created at the urging of the superpower. The region’s history and identity was the key 
driver in the downward proliferation trend. 
h. Southeast Asia 
Nuclear proliferation decreased in Southeast Asia during this period. While no 
country in Southeast Asia had a nuclear weapons program, two regional trends occurred. 
First, regional states integrated themselves more fully into the nonproliferation regime by 
forming a NWFZ. Second, several states—Indonesia, Myanmar, and Vietnam—
expressed an interest in developing nuclear energy capabilities, but not weapons. 
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As tensions between the superpowers decreased with the end of the Cold War, 
Southeast Asia was able to advance a NWFZ. Hamel-Green noted that “it was only after 
Russia and the United States withdrew from their respective military bases in Vietnam 
and the Philippines that ASEAN was able to proceed with a full-fledged NWFZ.”1526 A 
motivation for developing this zone was also related to Cold War superpower conflicts. 
Hamel-Green continued that forming this zone “was based on their concerns about 
potential nuclear conflicts involving NWS bases in the region, including Soviet use of 
Vietnamese ports at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang and U.S. bases in the Philippines.”1527 
ASEAN members negotiated the treaty. In 1995, the treaty opened for signature and, in 
1997, it entered into force. The nuclear weapon states did not sign this treaty, however, 
due to the restrictions it would place on the transit of nuclear weapons through the region, 
according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative.1528 
In terms of membership in other nonproliferation agreements, the actions of key 
regional states were mixed. Indonesia signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 
1996, but did not ratify it at the time, and agreed to the Additional Protocol in 1999.1529 
Myanmar joined the NPT in 1992, the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in 1995, 
and the Small Quantities Protocol in 1995.1530 The country signed the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty in 1996, but did not ratify it at the time.1531 Vietnam took the same 
approach to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and signed it in 1996, but did not ratify 
it then.1532  
Indonesia, Myanmar, and Vietnam began to examine the development of nuclear 
power in the mid-1990s. Indonesia conducted a feasibility study for nuclear power in 
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1996 and began planning for a nuclear power reactor in 2001.1533 Myanmar expressed an 
interest in nuclear power in 1995 and signed an agreement with Russia for a 10MW 
research reactor in 2001, but the deal later fell apart.1534 Vietnam also began to express 
an interest in nuclear power in 1995, but the country did not make further progress on this 
project during the unipolar period.1535 Thus, while several regional states indicated that 
they wished to acquire nuclear power capabilities, little progress was made. 
Overall, the region’s history motivated its move toward nonproliferation. The 
implementation of the NWFZ demonstrated that the region had made turning away from 
nuclear weapons a part of its identity. 
i. Analysis 
The unipolar period was characterized by the absence of superpower competition 
and generally decreased nuclear proliferation. The exceptions were Northeast Asia and, 
to some extent, South Asia. Limiting nuclear proliferation was a high priority for the sole 
superpower, although not in every region, given the conflict between nuclear 
nonproliferation and combatting terrorism in Afghanistan and South Asia after the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. In other areas, with the end of the Cold War, the 
United States had more resources – both economic and political – to pressure states 
regarding their proliferation activities. External management of regional nuclear 
proliferation was more effective. It involved tightening control over the nuclear supply 
chain and improving awareness of nuclear proliferation activities. 
As part of this improved effectiveness, U.S.-led nonproliferation initiatives gained 
traction such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime 
throughout the 1990s. Also, new initiatives were introduced such as Cooperative Threat 
Reduction, a U.S.-sponsored initiative focused on the states of the former Soviet Union, 
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and the NPT Additional Protocol, established due to inspection challenges faced by the 
IAEA in Iraq and North Korea in the early 1990s.1536 
As an external manager, the United States was aware of both the benefits and the 
shortcomings of the nonproliferation regime. In 1992, as Director of Central Intelligence, 
Robert Gates cited the importance of “international agreements and organizations like the 
Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the IAEA” but 
acknowledged their limitations.1537 He noted “some countries will never find it in their 
interest to join. And membership is no guarantee of good behavior, because some 
countries only join to acquire trade, technology, and other benefits and have little 
intention of enforcing the regulations.”1538 Thus, political and economic tools, which the 
United States had at its disposal also played an important role in driving the decrease in 
nuclear proliferation. 
Regions with histories of superpower competition in a nuclear context drove a 
downward proliferation trend in other regions. The NWFZ treaties could be seen as an 
effort to limit the nuclear activities of nuclear weapon states and turn away from a Cold 
War past. This occurred in several regions during the unipolar period to include Central 
Asia, Europe, the South Pacific, and Southeast Asia. 
3. The Multipolar Period: 2004 to 2013 
Looking at both intentions and capabilities, horizontal nuclear proliferation 
continued to decrease, or at a minimum did not increase in most world regions from 2004 
to 2013. The exception was Northeast Asia due to North Korea’s program. The United 
States sought to assure its allies in Northeast Asia that it would contain the North Korean 
threat. Only Iran remained as a major proliferation concern in the Middle East by the end 
                                                 
1536 “Status of the Additional Protocol,” International Atomic Energy Agency, June 11, 2015, 
https://www.iaea.org/safeguards/safeguards-legal-framework/additional-protocol/status-of-additional-
protocol. 
1537 The Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Regulatory Improvement Act of 
1992, Hearings Before the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, 




of the period. Nuclear negotiations with Iran began in late 2013 that seemed to be 
undertaken in a serious manner by all parties. Signaling a permanent commitment to not 
acquire nuclear weapons, the NWFZ Treaty for Central Asia opened for signature in 2006 
and the NWFZ treaties for Africa and Central Asia both entered into force in 2009. 
a. Africa 
In the multipolar period, nuclear proliferation decreased in Africa. Algeria and 
South Africa, the countries that previously had a suspicious nuclear program and an 
actual nuclear weapons program respectively, did not advance nuclear weapons 
capabilities. Libya, covered in the chapters on the Middle East, dismantled its nuclear 
weapons program. Importantly, the Treaty of Pelindaba entered into force in 2009. This 
endeavor was driven by a history of French nuclear testing and South Africa’s previous 
program.1539 
Algeria took steps to develop nuclear power. The country signed cooperation 
agreements with the United States, Russia, France, Argentina, and South Africa.1540 
Russia, in particular, worked with Algeria to develop plans for nuclear power.1541 
Algeria also created a Nuclear Engineering Institute to bolster national knowledge in the 
nuclear arena.1542 As of 2013, Algeria hoped to have completed its first nuclear power 
plant by 2025.1543 But, the country appeared to stay within the bounds it had agreed to in 
the unipolar period. 
South Africa continued to develop nuclear-related industries, but it did not pursue 
nuclear weapons capabilities. It produced and exported nuclear materials and 
technologies and retained large stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, according to the 
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Nuclear Threat Initiative.1544 The country, however, moved toward using low enriched 
uranium in its reactors, rather than highly enriched uranium, beginning in 2008.1545 
South Africa also worked to expand its nuclear power capabilities. It signed a nuclear 
cooperation agreement with the United States in 2009 and advanced a nuclear partnership 
with Russia in 2013.1546 
In terms of delivery systems, the country possessed short-range ballistic missiles, 
according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative.1547 The report added that South Africa had the 
technical ability to develop a long-range ballistic missile, but it chose not to do so.1548 
After moving away from nuclear proliferation in the bipolar period, Algeria and 
South Africa appeared to remain committed to this course. While regional conflict had 
diminished in southern Africa, North Africa had become turbulent due to the Arab 
Uprising. Nevertheless, neither state pursued a nuclear weapons capability. The 
Pelindaba Treaty’s entry into force in 2009 underscored a regional commitment to 
nonproliferation as regional states forged a new identity and demonstrated decreased 
nuclear proliferation. 
b. Central Asia 
Nuclear proliferation decreased in Central Asia from 2004 to 2013. There was no 
indication that any of the region’s states sought to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. 
Central Asia solidified its nuclear free intentions and identity by signing a NWFZ treaty. 
After progress by the region’s five states toward a NWFZ in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, the Central Asian NWFZ treaty was signed by the region’s states in 2006 
and went into force in 2009.1549 In a nod to the region’s history with nuclear weapons 
testing, one of the requirements of the NWFZ was that all of its members comply with 
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the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.1550 It also required states to agree to comprehensive 
safeguards and the Additional Protocol.1551 
Kazakhstan rid itself of all of its Cold War-era strategic nuclear weapons as part 
of Cooperative Threat Reduction during the previous period. From 2004 to 2013, it 
expanded its nuclear-related industry, but gave no indication that it sought to acquire 
nuclear weapons. Beginning in the early 2000s, Kazakhstan expanded its uranium 
production and became the top producer globally in 2009.1552 It also signed various 
nuclear cooperation agreements in the mid- to late 2000s. These included agreements 
with Russia and China in 2006, with Canada and Japan in 2007, with France in 2008, 
with India in 2009, and with South Korea in 2010.1553 The agreements with Russia and 
South Korea involved Kazakhstan’s acquisition of nuclear power reactors.1554 Plans 
were delayed, however, and construction had not begun on the power reactors by 2013. 
In terms of delivery systems, Kazakhstan maintained short-range ballistic missiles 
that it inherited from the Soviet Union, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative.1555 
The country launched a space program in 2007; however, it did not demonstrate any 
interest in missile proliferation.1556 
The implementation of the NWFZ signaled regional intentions to continue 
moving away from nuclear proliferation. In reaction to the region’s nuclear history, the 
states had come together to implement a NWFZ. 
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Nuclear proliferation continued to decrease in the multipolar period in Europe up 
to 2013. Ukraine and Belarus had relinquished nuclear weapons capabilities in the 
unipolar period. Efforts to encourage denuclearization in Ukraine continued from 2004 to 
2013. In 2005, the country ratified the Additional Protocol. Working with the U.S. 
Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration, the Ukraine switched 
the research reactor at the Kiev Institute for Nuclear Research to run on low enriched 
uranium from highly enriched uranium in 2008.1557 In 2010, the Ukrainian government 
agreed to export all of its highly enriched uranium to Russia and this effort was 
completed in 2012.1558 
 Ukraine continued to rely on nuclear power to fulfill its energy needs. By 2005, 
Ukraine had 15 nuclear power reactors in operation with the operation of 11 of the 
reactors dating back to the 1980s.1559 This included two new nuclear power reactors that 
became operational in 2005.1560 Ukraine also maintained plans for 13 new power 
reactors as old ones were decommissioned.1561 In addition, Ukraine was working to 
reduce its dependence on Russia for nuclear fuel and services.1562 Thus, in 2005, the 
European Union and Ukraine signed a nuclear cooperation agreement to strengthen its 
energy ties with Europe.1563 
In terms of Ukraine’s delivery systems, the country possessed short-range ballistic 
missiles that remained from the time of the Cold War, according to the Nuclear Threat 
Initiative.1564 There was still some cooperation between Russia and Ukraine in terms of 
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missile production due to the facilities that remained in Ukraine from the Cold War.1565 
The report noted that Ukraine showed no effort, however, to produce long-range, solid-
fuel missiles for military purposes even though the Yuzhmash plant continued to produce 
liquid-fueled rockets for satellite launch.1566 
Belarus cooperated with Russia to improve its nuclear power capabilities. Belarus 
worked to build a nuclear power plant beginning in the mid-2000s.1567 The plant would 
consist of two reactors and would be financed by Russia with Russia also handling fuel 
reprocessing.1568 The construction of the first nuclear power reactor began in 2013.1569 
At the end of the period, however, these facilities were not operational. In terms of 
delivery systems, Belarus did not have the infrastructure to produce missiles, but it did 
cooperate with Russia to support its missile and space programs, according to the Nuclear 
Threat Initiative.1570 It was not a member of the Missile Technology Control 
Regime.1571 
Neither Ukraine nor Belarus made progress toward acquiring a nuclear weapons 
capability during the recent multipolar period. In fact, Ukraine continued to work to 
reduce its nuclear capabilities by removing all highly enriched uranium from the country 
in partnership with the United States and Russia.1572 This downward trend continued to 
be driven by the region’s Cold War history and its interest in forging a new identity. 
d. Latin America 
Nuclear weapons capabilities did not increase or decrease in Latin America 
during the multipolar period. Argentina started a space program. Argentina and Brazil 
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developed their respective nuclear power industries and explored nuclear-powered 
submarine technology, however, there were no indications that either country would 
restart a nuclear weapons program. 
Argentina advanced nuclear and missile technology in several areas during the 
multipolar period. The country further developed its nuclear power industry and began to 
provide power plant reactors and services.1573 By the end of the period, the country had 
plans for three more nuclear reactors.1574 Also, beginning in 2008, Argentina’s research 
reactors operated only on low enriched uranium.1575 In 2010, Argentina signed a nuclear 
cooperation agreement with Russia.1576 That same year, Argentina announced that it 
would develop nuclear propulsion to power the Navy’s ships and/or submarines, a 
technology that its neighbor Brazil had been working on for some time.1577 
In terms of technology for delivery systems, in 2007, Argentina decided to begin 
developing a space program and pursue the ability to launch satellites.1578 Nevertheless, 
it did not have ballistic missile capabilities, according to the Nuclear Threat 
Initiative.1579 
Brazil continued to develop its nuclear power industry, albeit slowly, along with 
capabilities in other areas of nuclear technology, particularly nuclear submarines. In 
2006, Brazil announced plans to build a third nuclear power plant, the Angra 3, and four 
additional nuclear power plants.1580 Construction began on Angra 3 in 2010, but the 
project was plagued by delays related to corruption and financing.1581 Nevertheless, the 
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country already possessed the capabilities to achieve a complete nuclear fuel cycle, 
according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative.1582 In addition, Brazil was working to develop 
a nuclear submarine that would likely be fueled by low enriched uranium.1583 Finally, 
Brazil dedicated significant resources to developing the Alcantara launch site and 
launchers for its space program, but did not make significant progress in this 
endeavor.1584 
Otherwise, Argentina and Brazil continued to have a cooperative relationship on 
nuclear issues. For example, they collaborated on a project involving two research 
reactors in 2013.1585 In the multipolar period, it did not appear that regional nuclear 
proliferation would increase in Latin America. 
e. Northeast Asia 
Nuclear proliferation increased in Northeast Asia from 2004 to 2013 as North 
Korea conducted multiple nuclear weapons tests. By the end of the period, the world had 
gained another nuclear weapon state that was not sanctioned by the NPT. Seemingly in 
response and despite extended deterrence commitments from the United States, Japan 
advanced its space program and South Korea and Taiwan sought to expand the range of 
their missiles. Based on the information examined here, there was no indication, 
however, that these neighbors of North Korea might pursue nuclear weapons. 
While Japan did not possess ballistic missiles, it developed sophisticated missile 
defense capabilities beginning in the early 2000s and advanced its space program since 
the mid-2000s seemingly in response to North Korean missile threats, according to the 
Nuclear Threat Initiative.1586 Moltz noted that Japan added a military component to its 
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space efforts in 2008.1587 Finally, Japan retained full fuel cycle capabilities and an 
extensive and well-developed nuclear power program. Thus, Japan was viewed as 
possessing a latent nuclear capability.1588 
Taiwan continued to develop its ballistic missile program, but did not seek to 
advance its nuclear weapons capability. Taiwan developed and tested the Yun Feng 
missile, a cruise missile with a range of 1200 km, according to the Nuclear Threat 
Initiative.1589 The report added that Taiwian further developed variants of the Hsuing 
Feng cruise missile with a range of 600 km.1590 As of late 2013, Taiwan continued its 
development efforts, but the Nuclear Threat Initiative noted that the country had not 
deployed a missile with a range greater than 1000 km.1591 With the support of the United 
States, Taiwan also acquired missile defense systems, according to the Nuclear Threat 
Initiative.1592 And Taiwan claimed to comply with Missile Technology Control Regime 
export guidelines.1593 Nevertheless, Taiwan’s efforts to increase the range of its missiles 
led to concerns regarding its future intentions. Taiwan expert Arthur Ding noted, “U.S. 
observers generally do not believe that Taiwan’s conventional missiles alone can deter 
China, they believe that Taiwan might be creating a more promising nuclear option by 
first developing delivery systems commonly associated with nuclear weapons.”1594 
Nevertheless, Taiwan made little progress on developing its nuclear power 
industry. It worked to further construction on the two nuclear reactors that it had begun in 
1999, as these reactors still had not become operational by the end of the period.1595 In 
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addition, in 2009, Taiwan investigated the possibility of building six additional nuclear 
power reactors, but had not yet made significant progress on this plan.1596 
South Korea improved its missile capabilities during this period, especially 
following North Korea’s 2006 nuclear weapons test, and its nuclear power capabilities. 
While South Korea continued to urge North Korea to observe the 1992 Joint Declaration 
on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, it also advanced its missile program, 
according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative.1597 The report further noted that, after 2011, 
South Korea sought to obtain missiles with a range of 800 to 1000 km and this effort was 
noted and addressed by the United States.1598 Following negotiations, the United States 
agreed to a range of 800 km in 2012, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative.1599 The 
report concluded that, in 2012 and 2013, South Korea also worked to develop ship-to-
land cruise and ballistic missiles, but it did not move beyond obtaining short-range 
ballistic missiles.1600 
South Korea also developed its space program. South Korea sought to launch a 
satellite into orbit in 2009 and 2010, but was not successful.1601 In 2013, South Korea 
finally launched a satellite into orbit using a liquid-fueled Angara booster first stage 
rocket obtained from Russia paired with a South Korean second stage and satellite. While 
this demonstrated South Korea was improving its missile launch capabilities, it still had 
not shown the ability to manufacture boosters like the Angara, and, thus, enable it to 
develop long-range ballistic missiles, according to Choe San-hun.1602 Moltz assessed that 
South Korea began to advance the military applications for its space program in the mid-
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2000s, such as launching a satellite for military communications.1603 South Korea’s 
increasing missile capabilities have been a cause for concern given the potential for them 
to be used as a delivery system, if the country were able to acquire a full fuel cycle and a 
nuclear weapon design, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative.1604 
South Korea maintained a well-established nuclear power infrastructure and 
exported nuclear power technology through Korea Electric Power Company or KEPCO. 
During this period, five nuclear power reactors became operational and construction 
began on three more in South Korea.1605 Despite South Korea’s advanced nuclear fuel 
cycle capabilities, by the end of the period, the United States had not lifted the ban on 
reprocessing of spent fuel meaning that the country did not possess a complete nuclear 
fuel cycle, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative.1606 Rather, the United States 
expressed its continued commitment to South Korea’s security. 
However, nuclear proliferation continued to increase in North Korea throughout 
the period. All the while, North Korea was being pressured to halt its nuclear and missile 
activities. Two more rounds of Six-Party Talks occurred in 2004, with China taking a 
leading role, but the negotiations ground to a halt in 2005 and, according to the Nuclear 
Threat Initiative, North Korea extracted plutonium from its 5MW(e) reactor again.1607 
An initial agreement was reached in September 2005 after restarting the talks in July.1608 
In the agreement, North Korea said it would stop its nuclear program and consent to 
monitoring by the IAEA.1609 The other side agreed to economic assistance and that steps 
would be taken to resolve the long-standing regional security conflicts with South Korea 
and Japan.1610 The agreement did not move forward, however, as North Korea rejected 
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the agreement once the United States froze North Korea’s bank accounts based in third 
countries, according to the Council on Foreign Relations.1611 Regional tensions remained 
high and, in October 2006, North Korea executed its first nuclear weapons test. Wade 
Huntley noted that China grew irritated with North Korea over this test, particularly given 
China’s role in the Six-Party Talks.1612 
Alternating progress in nuclear negotiations and nuclear weapons development 
continued. Nuclear negotiations with North Korea restarted in December 2006 and, by 
early 2007, the country consented to take steps that would halt its nuclear program and 
bring more transparency regarding its previous nuclear activities. In mid-2007, North 
Korea began dismantling its Yongbyon nuclear facility in exchange for sanctions relief 
promised in the talks.1613 The Council on Foreign Relations noted that North Korea 
restarted its nuclear program, however, at the end of 2008 due to disagreements related to 
the monitoring of its program.1614 The IAEA reported that it had not been able to 
conduct its safeguarding efforts in a complete manner since 1994.1615 Further, the agency 
had been unable to carry out any safeguard measures from late 2002 through mid-2007 
and between 2009 and 2013.1616 
North Korea escalated its nuclear and missile testing in the late 2000s. In May 
2009, the country tested another nuclear device. The U.S. intelligence community noted 
that the tests “strengthened our assessment that North Korea has produced nuclear 
weapons.”1617 North Korea revealed a uranium enrichment facility in November 2010. 
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The U.S. intelligence community noted that the details in this revelation reinforced the 
idea that North Korea had been building up this capability for “an extended period of 
time.”1618 From 2011 to 2013, the United States and other members of the Six-Party 
Talks worked to convince North Korea to return to the negotiating table. Then, North 
Korea announced a third nuclear test on 12 February 2013.1619 The IAEA reported that, 
in April 2013, North Korea stated that it would restart its nuclear efforts, including its 
uranium enrichment facility and the production reactor it had shut down in 2007.1620  
North Korea’s missile capabilities advanced to testing a purported intermediate-
range ballistic missile, the Taepodong 2, in 2006, according to the Nuclear Threat 
Initiative.1621 Norimitsu Onishi and David E. Sanger reported that the test failed after 42 
seconds, however, while the rocket was in its first stage.1622 North Korea placed a 
satellite into Low Earth Orbit with a Taepodong 2 space launch vehicle in December 
2012. By late 2013, North Korea had publicly exhibited a mock-up of a road-mobile 
intercontinental ballistic missile on two different occasions. While missile experts 
questioned whether North Korea was capable of producing such a missile or ever would, 
at a minimum, it signaled the country’s intentions.1623 The U.S. intelligence community 
assessed that North Korea sought to acquire missiles capable of reaching the United 
States.1624 The question remained how long it would take North Korea to achieve that 
goal if it did not halt its activities. 
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During the multipolar period, China played a key role in advancing multilateral 
negotiations—the Six-Party Talks—to constrain North Korea. This initiative inched 
forward from 2003 to 2009. North Korea’s indigenous nuclear and ballistic missile 
capabilities made monitoring and stopping North Korea’s activities particularly difficult. 
North Korea continued its nuclear efforts through the end of 2013 by which time it had 
conducted three nuclear weapons tests and had made significant advances on a long-
range ballistic missile. While multilateral efforts brought Iran to the negotiating table and 
resulted in serious nuclear negotiations by late 2013, the outcome was not the same for 
North Korea. Why was this? 
North Korea and Iran were similar in several ways. Both North Korea and Iran 
had been driven by perceived regional security threats. They both viewed themselves in 
conflict with the United States. Also, North Korea and Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile 
programs had become largely indigenous. 
The United States and other great powers found additional challenges in 
confronting North Korea. North Korea’s status as an insular, economically 
disadvantaged, totalitarian state—unit level differences—compounded the 
counterproliferation challenge. U.S. economic and political tools for pressuring North 
Korea did not seem as effective as they had been with Iran. It appeared to have less 
leverage. In addition, North Korea’s closed nature meant that it was hard to acquire 
information as to what was actually occurring. Also, as Moltz notes, this foreign policy 
challenge might have required more coordination with great powers China and Russia to 
more effectively pressure North Korea.1625 That being said, China and Russia seemed 
less willing to cooperate on North Korea than Iran. Great power competition at the 
system level might help explain this. 
In addition, by the multipolar period, based on the information examined in the 
section on the unipolar period, North Korea was already close to acquiring a nuclear 
weapon and its nuclear program was more advanced than Iran’s program. Nuclear 
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proliferation expert Wade Huntley noted that when “a country’s nuclear weapons 
program approaches fruition, its capacity to begin wielding nuclear threats can erode the 
attractiveness of a negotiated settlement.”1626 On an international level, the dismal fact 
has been that no country has ever given up nuclear weapons unilaterally except for South 
Africa. And the high levels of conflict and rivalry persisting in Northeast Asia provided 
little hope that North Korea would agree to unilateral disarmament. These facts made the 
period of the 1990s, when North Korea’s plutonium had been canned, appear in an even 
more favorable light. 
In 2004, Jonathan Pollack and Mitchell Reiss noted that “Northeast Asia 
encompasses four of the world’s six largest armies and (including the United States) three 
declared nuclear weapons states, as well as an undeclared nuclear power in North 
Korea.”1627 Furthermore, as Moltz notes, adding in the significant civilian nuclear power 
programs of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, the region primarily consists of nuclear 
weapon states and threshold states.1628 These complex security dynamics continued to 
shape the nuclear proliferation trends in the region. 
f. South Asia 
Nuclear proliferation did not increase in South Asia from 2004 to 2013. In this 
period, concerns within the international community regarding nuclear proliferation in 
South Asia centered more on vertical proliferation. India and Pakistan continued to 
expand their nuclear weapons capabilities. By the end of the period, both countries likely 
possessed over 100 nuclear weapons each, according to the Arms Control 
Association.1629 
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In addition to its nuclear weapons program, India expanded its nuclear power 
industry, relying on nuclear power to meet its energy needs.1630 During this period, three 
nuclear power reactors became operational and one was nearing completion.1631 India 
began construction on five more nuclear power reactors and laid plans for more.1632 
India also worked to expand its missile capabilities as it developed a strategic 
triad as outlined by the Nuclear Threat Initiative. According to the report, India 
conducted the initial test of the submarine-launched ballistic missile, the Sagarika, in 
2008.1633 The report added that India tested the Shaurya solid-fueled missile several 
times after 2008.1634 Furthermore, India successfully tested the Agni III in 2011 and 
tested the Agni V intercontinental ballistic missile, its first such missile, in 2012 and 
2013.1635 India announced it would develop the Agni VI intercontinental ballistic missile 
in 2012.1636 It successfully tested the Dhanush sea-to-surface missile in 2013.1637 In 
terms of India’s space program, Moltz noted that the country created an aerospace 
command in 2008 in order to involve the Indian military in its space program.1638 
Overall, India significantly advanced its missile capabilities, demonstrating its 
sophisticated use of missile technology. 
Finally, India sought to move away from its pariah status in regards to its nuclear 
weapons program. The country sought to integrate itself further into the nonproliferation 
regime, but in a way that would normalize its status as a nuclear weapon state. In July 
2005, the United States took a key step that allowed India to begin normalizing its 
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nuclear situation as President George W. Bush moved to end the U.S. suspension on 
nuclear trade with India.1639 India and the United States signed an agreement for nuclear 
cooperation in 2008 and India was permitted to conduct trade with members of the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group.1640 This opened the way for nuclear cooperation agreements 
with other states, including: Argentina, Canada, France, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, South 
Korea, Russia, and the United Kingdom.1641 It entered into a tailored IAEA Safeguards 
Agreement in 2009.1642 India, however, remained outside of the NPT and the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, but it sought membership in the international export 
control regimes.1643 This normalization was perceived as an acceptance of India’s 
nuclear program by some NPT non-nuclear weapon states and inequitable treatment for 
those who chose to forego nuclear weapons. Overall, India continued to advance its 
nuclear and missile capabilities. 
Pakistan improved its nuclear power capabilities and ballistic missile capabilities 
during this period, while working to enhance its control over nuclear materials after the 
discovery of the A.Q. Khan network. In terms of the country’s nuclear power industry, 
one nuclear power reactor became operational during this period and construction began 
on two more reactors, these latter two financed by China.1644 Questions ensued regarding 
legality of the assistance by China since China had joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 
2004 and its members were not to have nuclear dealings with Pakistan.1645 The World 
Nuclear Association noted that China had “deepened cooperation [with Pakistan] since 
the international U.S.-led concessions to India in 2008.”1646 Otherwise, Pakistan brought 
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its nuclear power reactors and nuclear research reactors under tailored IAEA 
safeguards.1647  
In terms of delivery systems, the country conducted a series of missile tests 
concurrently with India in the early to mid-2000s, as outlined by the Nuclear Threat 
Initiative.1648 According to the report, they included tests of the Hatf-III and the Hatf-IV, 
short-range ballistic missiles, and the Hatf-V and the Hatf-VI, medium-range ballistic 
missiles.1649 Then, in 2013, Pakistan tested two tactical ballistic missiles, the Hatf-II and 
the Hatf-IX.1650 As of 2013, Pakistan possessed tactical missiles, short-range ballistic 
missiles, and medium-range ballistic missiles. In addition, Pakistan did not join the 
Missile Technology Control Regime, but continued with foreign missile sales, according 
to the Nuclear Threat Initiative.1651  
Following the unraveling of the A.Q. Khan network in the 2003 to 2004 
timeframe, Pakistan worked to better secure its nuclear materials. The Nuclear Threat 
Initiative noted that the country sought to more strictly enforce controls on nuclear and 
missile exports along the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile 
Technology Control Regime.1652 The report also noted that, beginning in the mid-2000s, 
the international community also raised concerns regarding the security of nuclear 
facilities from Taliban-affiliated groups.1653 
During this period, India and Pakistan worked to create even more sophisticated 
nuclear and missile programs while seeking to normalize their programs in the eyes of the 
international community. What was notable was that they moved closer to adhering to 
several sets of nonproliferation regime guidelines, namely the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
and the Missile Technology Control Regime and both countries agreed to tailored IAEA 
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safeguards. This demonstrated the role that the nonproliferation regime played in 
establishing the guidelines for acceptable nuclear activities. Nevertheless, the 
nonproliferation regime did not constrain regional vertical proliferation. 
g. South Pacific 
Nuclear proliferation in the South Pacific region did not increase or decrease from 
2004 to 2013. Australia, the one country that had pursued a nuclear weapons program in 
the past, did not seek to pursue nuclear weapons capabilities of any kind. Australia did 
not have any long-range ballistic missiles and did not seek to acquire them, according to 
the Nuclear Threat Initiative.1654 The United States continued to provide security 
assurances to its ally. 
The country did sign several nuclear cooperation agreements. In 2009, Australia 
signed an agreement with Indonesia, South Korea, and Vietnam.1655 Australia and the 
United Arab Emirates signed an agreement for nuclear cooperation, ostensibly related to 
Australia’s uranium supply, in 2012.1656 Australia possessed almost one third of the 
world’s uranium reserves.1657 The country continued to provide uranium exports to NPT-
sanctioned nuclear weapon states.1658 Regional states remained integrated into the 
nonproliferation regime. 
h. Southeast Asia 
Nuclear proliferation did not increase or decrease in Southeast Asia in this period. 
Nevertheless, the international community monitored regional efforts to increase nuclear 
power capabilities or any sign of interest in nuclear weapons. Vietnam and Indonesia 
worked to develop their respective nuclear power industries, but, as of the end of the 
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period, neither country had begun construction on a nuclear power reactor.1659 
Allegations surfaced in 2010, however, that Myanmar was secretly pursuing a nuclear 
weapons program in collaboration with North Korea.1660 Myanmar denied the report. 
Following intense scrutiny by the United States, Myanmar signed the IAEA’s Additional 
Protocol in 2013. Overall, the regional states that signed the Southeast Asian NWFZ in 
the 1990s appeared to continue to pursue only peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Like 
the South Pacific, regional states remained integrated into the nonproliferation regime. 
i. Analysis 
The recent multipolar period was characterized by an increase in great power 
competition and either a decrease or no change in nuclear spread in most world regions. 
The exception was North Korea within Northeast Asia. Increased great power 
competition should have resulted in an increase in nuclear proliferation across the world’s 
regions. The nonproliferation regime, however, helped facilitate cooperation among the 
great powers and delineate appropriate nuclear behavior in order to contain nuclear 
spread.  
The nonproliferation regime also continued to expand. UN Security Council 
resolution 1540 was adopted in 2004 following the disruption of the A.Q. Khan network. 
It required members to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction and means to 
deliver them, particularly to non-state actors.1661 The Proliferation Security Initiative was 
initiated in 2003 following an incident in which, according to John Gittings, Suzanne 
Goldenberg, and Brian Whitaker, the U.S. Navy did not have the legal authority to 
disrupt an illicit December 2002 shipment of Scud missiles from North Korea to 
Yemen.1662 It consisted of a series of bilateral initiatives between the United States and 
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other states willing to commit to interdiction against illicit transfers of weapons of mass 
destruction and their delivery systems.1663 
The nonproliferation regime also continued to expand in the form of NWFZs. The 
Central Asian NWFZ treaty opened for signature in 2006 and went into force in 2009 and 
the African NWFZ treaty entered into force in 2009. Finally, Cooperative Threat 
Reduction continued in a number of the states that made up the former Soviet Union. 
In terms of multilateral cooperation by great powers in this period, the EU-3, 
consisting of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, initiated nuclear negotiations 
with Iran in the Middle East and China took a leading role in the Six-Party Talks with 
North Korea over its nuclear program. While each of these great powers undoubtedly had 
self-serving reasons for fulfilling these roles, these actions show a break from the past, 
particularly compared to China’s and Germany’s prior roles as suppliers of nuclear 
technology in the bipolar period, as discussed in previous sections. 
While increasing competition by the great powers in the multipolar period might 
have led to less effective external management of regional nuclear proliferation, the 
nonproliferation regime facilitated great power cooperation in management endeavors in 
most regions. Bolstered by a strengthened nonproliferation regime, great powers beyond 
just the United States, took the initiative to manage nuclear issues. 
D. CONCLUSION 
My research on the Middle East showed, first, that increased competition at the 
systemic level in the bipolar period resulted in less effective external management of 
nuclear proliferation. Thus, regional nuclear proliferation increased. Second, my case 
studies showed that decreased competition at the systemic level in the unipolar period 
resulted in more effective external management of nuclear proliferation. Thus, regional 
nuclear proliferation in the Middle East decreased. Third, my findings indicated that 
despite increased competition at the systemic level in the recent multipolar period, 
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external managers, aided by a strengthened nonproliferation regime that facilitated 
cooperation, continued to successfully manage regional nuclear proliferation and regional 
nuclear proliferation decreased. 
In this chapter, I compared my findings on the Middle East with nuclear 
proliferation trends in the world’s other regions—Africa, Central Asia, Europe, Latin 
America, Northeast Asia, South Asia, the South Pacific, and Southeast Asia. My findings 
on the Middle East helped explain nuclear proliferation trends in Africa, Latin America, 
and South Asia during the bipolar period. They also shed light on nuclear trends in 
Africa, Central Asia, Europe, and Latin America in the unipolar period. 
This analysis chapter demonstrates three findings regarding the causes of 
proliferation. First, certain regions appear to be better explained by some theories than 
others. For example, external management was more effective in the bipolar period in 
both Northeast Asia and the South Pacific. In both of these regions, the United States was 
able to pressure allies into giving up their nuclear weapons programs and provide security 
assurances through extended deterrence. This behavior corresponds with what Kenneth 
Waltz might have predicted—superpowers managing the nuclear proliferation activities 
of client states and thus suppressing regional proliferation. 
Second, external management has played perhaps the most important role in 
determining regional nuclear proliferation trends over time. But, external management 
does not explain why regional states might decide to pursue nuclear weapons. Examining 
levels of conflict and rivalry at the regional level can often provide a more satisfactory 
answer as to why a state might seek to increase nuclear capabilities. Whether that 
regional state continued to proliferate or not, however, often depended on the 
effectiveness of external management efforts. And, in these cases, the level of 
superpower competition either rendered external management more or less effective.  
Third, the nonproliferation regime, broadly defined, has become increasingly 
important as a mechanism for helping to manage regional nuclear proliferation. The 
nonproliferation regime was strengthened by the United States and other actors, 
especially Western European countries, over time and helped drive a decrease in nuclear 
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proliferation in multiple world regions in the unipolar period. It continued to help 
facilitate cooperation and delineate appropriate nuclear behavior in the multipolar period. 
It would seem that the problems that plagued the effectiveness of superpower 
management in the bipolar period might also impede management effectiveness in the 
multipolar period. These were: lack of control over nuclear suppliers, less awareness of 
proliferation activities, less coordination by external managers, and regional foreign 
policy priorities that trumped nuclear proliferation concerns. A strengthened 
nonproliferation regime, however, seems to have helped maintain management 
effectiveness in several world regions. Nevertheless, NWFZs prove to be an exception, 
appearing to be driven by regional-level forces. 
In the next chapter, the conclusion, I turn to a discussion of what these findings 
mean for future regional proliferation concerns, policy, and research. What are the 
implications for the role of external managers and the role of the nonproliferation regime 
in ensuring that nuclear proliferation does not increase in the future as great powers rise 
to meet the global hegemon in a multipolar international system? 
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Recent studies on the “second nuclear age” have suggested that the regional 
security environment has been the main driver of nuclear dynamics as the end of 
bipolarity weakened superpower constraints on regional states.1664 Ashley Tellis writes 
that the end of the Soviet Union resulted in an erosion of “the tacit cooperation between 
the superpowers, which had helped constrain the rise of new nuclear weapon states” and 
“with the decay of these disciplining benefits of bipolarity, the number of countries 
acquiring or demonstrating nuclear capabilities slowly increased.”1665 
My research, by contrast, found that while the superpowers intended to limit 
nuclear proliferation during the Cold War, nuclear proliferation actually flourished from 
1973 to 1990 driven by regional conflict and rivalry. Further, the intense competition 
between the superpowers in the international system, which was supposed to have 
constrained nuclear proliferation, instead fostered an environment conducive to increased 
nuclear proliferation due to a lack of control over nuclear suppliers, a lack of awareness 
of proliferation activities, a lack of cooperation by external managers, and certain foreign 
policy issues eclipsing nuclear proliferation concerns. Of the three periods I studied, my 
findings indicate that the bipolar period – contrary to mainstream arguments – was the 
most conducive to regional nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. This also appeared to 
be the case in Africa, Latin America, and South Asia. Between 1973 and 1990, India, 
Pakistan, and South Africa all acquired nuclear weapons. Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North 
Korea also advanced their nuclear weapons programs throughout this period. In addition, 
Saudi Arabia acquired intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Argentina and Brazil made 
significant progress in their nuclear programs before beginning a joint effort to end these 
programs. The nuclear rollback that did occur in Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa was 
self-initiated, not from superpower pressure.  
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 There were success stories that reflected the traditional neo-realist narrative 
regarding Cold War-era regional nuclear proliferation. Nuclear proliferation appeared to 
decrease due to superpower management in Northeast Asia and the South Pacific. 
Nuclear weapons programs were brought to an end in Australia, Egypt, South Korea, and 
Taiwan due to superpower efforts, or as it is referred to in this dissertation, external 
management. All of these states had clear security reasons to seek nuclear weapons, but 
superpower influence, primarily U.S. influence, appeared to be the cause of the end of 
their programs. Australia, South Korea, and Taiwan were all U.S. allies and Egypt 
became one following the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict. These cases, however, are in the 
minority. Several other states chose to renounce their nuclear weapons programs—
Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa—but it seems that they themselves initiated this 
process. It did not appear to be due to the effects of constraints imposed by the 
superpowers, contrary to mainstream arguments. 
Despite the predictions of structural theorists, global nuclear nonproliferation 
efforts appeared to benefit from the end of the Cold War. Within the Middle East, the 
trend was toward a decrease in nuclear proliferation. In many world regions, the trend 
also seemed to deemphasize nuclear weapons. The exceptions were Northeast Asia and 
South Asia. The number of regional states pursuing nuclear weapons slowly decreased. 
From 1991 to 2003, multiple states either ended nuclear weapons programs (in the case 
of Iraq, forcibly) or reduced their nuclear weapons capabilities. The nuclear weapons 
programs in Iraq and Libya came to an end. Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa ended 
their ballistic missile programs. Algeria reined in its suspicious nuclear efforts. Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine voluntarily gave up the nuclear weapons capabilities they 
had inherited from the Soviet Union. Regions formed and implemented nuclear-weapon-
free zones (NWFZs). By the end of 2003, it was primarily Iran and North Korea that 
remained of high concern to the international community as potential proliferators. This 
was a clear decrease from 1991. The United States as the sole superpower had taken on 
the cause of denuclearization as one of its top priorities following the end of the Cold 
War and global nonproliferation was the winner. As the global hegemon, it was the 
architect and driving force behind these endeavors. 
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What does the role of external management mean for realist outlooks at both the 
system level and the regional level? Nuclear proliferation challenges at the regional level 
have been handled by the superpowers or great powers due to the distribution of 
capabilities among the units in the international system. They have the capacity to 
intervene and manage proliferation issues because of these capabilities. Waltz notes that 
these management tasks fall to the great powers as they are “agents of great 
capability.”1666 In addition, regional nuclear proliferation has been viewed as not just a 
regional threat, but also as a global threat. Thus, managing these threats mitigates security 
concerns for the great powers as well. But a unique feature of managing proliferation in 
the new multipolar era has been the willingness of great powers (thus far) to assist in 
nonproliferation efforts across Cold War “bloc” lines. That is, states have been willing to 
support international nonproliferation norms (born in the bipolar era) even against their 
narrow self-interested relations with certain proliferators today. 
In addition to the overall decrease in potential proliferators, a strengthened 
nonproliferation regime provided evidence of U.S. efforts. Jeffrey Knopf writes that 
“many of the global [nonproliferation] efforts resulted from a U.S. initiative, and it is 
hard to imagine them coming into being in the absence of U.S. leadership.”1667 During 
the bipolar period, the United States recognized the weaknesses of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as regional nuclear proliferation bloomed. It began to try 
and fill some of the perceived gaps and loopholes by initiating the establishment of the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. In the unipolar 
period, the United States instigated Cooperative Threat Reduction, the Wassenaar 
Arrangement, United Nations Security Council 1540, and the Proliferation Security 
Initiative. It also supported the establishment of the Additional Protocol among other 
bilateral and multilateral initiatives. Underscoring the critical role of U.S. leadership, 
Knopf found in his recent edited volume, International Cooperation on WMD 
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Nonproliferation, that the factors that best explained this cooperation were a combination 
of state self-interest and U.S. leadership.1668 
In a multipolar setting, nuclear proliferation decreased in the Middle East. In other 
world regions, the nuclear proliferation trend appeared to be similar. The exception was 
Northeast Asia. And, the especially hard cases—Iran and North Korea—remained. Both 
countries had advanced nuclear weapons programs. External management by the United 
States during the unipolar period had come close to reining in both programs, but the 
global hegemon had not been completely successful in either case. The United States 
would also discover that North Korea had begun aiding Syria, an ally of Iran, to establish 
a possible nuclear weapons program. In this time, other great powers began to function 
more as external managers. Three European states—Germany, France, and the United 
Kingdom—initiated nuclear negotiations with Iran. China took a leading role in 
negotiations with North Korea. This would have been unthinkable in the bipolar period 
when the United States was occupied with trying to block countries like West Germany 
and China from providing nuclear technology to various regional states. This was 
because U.S. efforts to stem proliferation, particularly in the unipolar period, helped 
define what was acceptable and unacceptable nuclear behavior. Outliers, such as Iran and 
North Korea, were marginalized and punished. Countries that eventually complied with 
accepted proliferation guidelines, as Libya did, were praised. With the nonproliferation 
regime more strongly established in the multipolar period, other states took a leadership 
role in enforcing these established guidelines. 
The findings of this dissertation, however, may provide a cautionary warning. 
What happens if the nuclear nonproliferation regime, which has helped to facilitate great 
power cooperation and to control the spread of nuclear weapons and associated 
technology nuclear spread, becomes weaker? What if its capacity to influence nuclear 
proliferation-related activities erodes? What happens if this occurs during a time of 
intense competition in the international system, an environment that is seemingly more 
conducive to nuclear spread? Would external managers once again face a lack of control 
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over the nuclear supply chain, a lack of awareness of regional proliferation activities, a 
lack of coordination or cooperation by external managers, and an increase in regional 
foreign policy issues that might take priority over nuclear proliferation concerns? Or 
would the management mechanisms for controlling nuclear proliferation hold? 
Thus, what are the implications of this dissertation’s findings in regards to 
external management and the role of the nonproliferation regime in the future? In 
particular, what does this mean for U.S. policy, given the country’s long history of 
working to control nuclear spread? What other avenues of research might help further our 
understanding of regional nuclear proliferation? The rest of this chapter is dedicated to 
answering these questions. 
A. FUTURE REGIONAL PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES 
If heightened competition in the international system resulted in increased nuclear 
proliferation in the past, policymakers cannot take the current state of decreased 
proliferation for granted. Decreased regional nuclear proliferation seemed to be driven by 
the advantages enjoyed by the United States as the global hegemon. While other NPT 
members have not always agreed with the U.S. approach to combatting nuclear 
proliferation, it has been the state that tackled the issue of proliferation most aggressively 
using the full range of options available to a superpower. Without U.S. efforts, it is likely 
that there would have been more nuclear powers than there are today. 
Nevertheless, there would seem to be a real danger that increased competition in a 
multipolar setting may result in less effective external management. The same factors that 
caused increased nuclear proliferation under bipolarity may also characterize 
multipolarity. The nuclear nonproliferation regime may become weaker without the 
driving force of U.S. hegemony. Powers such as Russia and China historically have had a 
less stringent view on nuclear proliferation activities than the United States. For example, 
Russia and China have seemed more willing to accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons 
state. Thus, the nonproliferation regime helps facilitate cooperation around the issue of 
nuclear proliferation, making it more than the sum of its parts. But it would not stand on 
its own without the voluntary support of the great powers. 
 380 
This suggests two approaches that may provide the best path for limiting nuclear 
spread. The first approach is strengthening nonproliferation cooperation among the great 
powers and the second approach is continuing to improve the nonproliferation regime by 
closing gaps or loopholes that become apparent over time. Admittedly, there is overlap 
between them as the nonproliferation regime has provided a forum for great power 
cooperation. If such measures are not taken, there would seem to be increased danger that 
those countries that find themselves in the crosshairs of great power competition, such as 
India and Pakistan, might regain the operational space to pursue nuclear weapons. Likely 
candidates for increased nuclear proliferation might be those states that have chafed 
under U.S. hegemony, are less integrated into the nonproliferation regime or face a 
threatening regional security environment. 
Considering the four factors previously discussed that contributed to increasing 
regional proliferation in the bipolar period, improving external management would 
involve: 1) improved mechanisms for controlling the nuclear supply chain; 2) focused 
effort by external managers to cooperate to limit nuclear proliferation; 3) continued close 
vigilance of nuclear proliferation activities; and 4) a consensus among great powers as to 
when a country’s drive to acquire nuclear weapons has reached a threshold where 
addressing the proliferation issue should take precedence over other policy concerns. The 
nonproliferation regime has proved to be a mechanism to help with these tasks. How 
might external managers aided by the nonproliferation regime confront nascent 
challenges posed by Iran and North Korea? 
1. The Middle East 
In the Middle East, the most pressing issue is the implementation of the Iranian 
nuclear agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Some proliferation experts 
such as David Albright remain skeptical of the effectiveness of the agreement for curbing 
Iranian nuclear weapons proliferation, while other experts such as Paul Kerr are 
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optimistic about the plan’s prospects.1669 If past proves to be prologue, Iran’s nuclear 
intentions and actions will need to remain under close scrutiny for the foreseeable future. 
The effectiveness of the agreement will depend on how it is implemented and enforced. 
Great power cooperation and the nonproliferation regime have important roles to play. 
In addition to increasing Iran’s breakout time for nuclear weapons, the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action allows for greater insight into Iran’s nuclear activities 
through International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring and provides the 
guidelines for Iran’s nuclear behavior as agreed to by the great powers. The U.S. 
intelligence community noted in May 2017 that the agreement “enhanced the 
transparency of Iran’s nuclear activities, mainly through improved access by the IAEA 
and its investigative authorities under the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive 
Safeguards Agreement.”1670 The negotiation process and the eventual agreement ensured 
that great power managers remained focused on this proliferation issue, that Iran’s 
program would be closely scrutinized, and that there was a level of consensus regarding 
great power expectations for Iran’s nuclear behavior. In addition, the IAEA and the 
Additional Protocol, critical elements of the nonproliferation regime, play an important 
role in the agreement’s enforcement. External managers and the nonproliferation regime 
appear to be constraining Iran’s nuclear aspirations. 
Second, what is the possibility for a NWFZ in the Middle East? The controversy 
surrounding Israel’s alleged nuclear weapons program makes it difficult to imagine a 
region-wide NWFZ. Thinking along the lines of T.V. Paul’s assertion regarding 
economic integration and regional denuclearization, might a sub-region of the Middle 
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East that is more peaceful, prosperous, and stable form a NWFZ? The Gulf States 
makeup a sub-region that traditionally has been more integrated than the rest of this 
geographic area—politically, economically, and militarily. The Gulf Cooperation Council 
provides the organizational structure for their joint efforts. One might see a parallel here 
between the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
whose members signed the Treaty of Bangkok. If the Gulf Cooperation Council were to 
expand in the future, such as with the proposed additions of Morocco and Jordan, perhaps 
the NWFZ could expand as well. 
In terms of nuclear advances already underway in this sub-region, the United 
Arab Emirates is the only Gulf state that has begun construction of a nuclear power plant. 
The first of four nuclear reactors is due to be completed in 2017 in the emirate of Abu 
Dhabi. In addition, the emirate of Dubai has led the way on the country’s satellite 
programs. The United Arab Emirates launched its own satellite, DubaiSat-1, into space in 
2009.1671 In 2015, the emirate of Dubai also announced plans for a space program with a 
goal of a mission to Mars.1672 Given the 123 nuclear agreement with the United States in 
place for the United Arab Emirates’ nuclear power program, however, there is less 
concern over the country’s space program than Iran’s space program in terms of its 
possible diversion for the purposes of nuclear weapons delivery. 
This sub-region has also served as a counterweight to Iran. Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates, and the other Gulf states remain as likely partners for the United 
States. In many ways, their success today is due to U.S. support. The United States saved 
Kuwait from Iraq’s aggression in 1991 and then removed the Iraqi threat in 2003. Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait prompted the Gulf States to spend billions of dollars on defense 
technology, with the United States serving as a primary supplier. The combination of an 
upward trend in the growth of the Gulf economies and their purchase of defense 
equipment has helped make Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates regional 
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powerhouses. This development trajectory of the sub-region may also provide an 
incentive for the states to form a NWFZ. The fact that the United Arab Emirates has 
quietly allowed Israeli officials to visit the country as part of their work with the Abu-
Dhabi based International Renewable Energy Agency may signal some openness to a 
gradual shift in the region’s long-standing security dynamic. With the perception of a 
reduced regional threat, the Gulf States may see the establishment of an NWFZ as the 
crowning achievement of a wealthy and prosperous sub-region within the Middle East. 
Nevertheless, the recent July 2017 passage of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons may relieve pressure on regional states to form a NWFZ. Regional states like 
Iran and Saudi Arabia that signed the agreement may claim that they have already 
committed to a nuclear-free environment and that a regional NWFZ is not necessary. 
2. Northeast Asia 
Northeast Asia seemed to remain the regional outlier throughout the three periods 
studied here. The region experienced a denuclearization trend during the bipolar period 
and it did not respond to vigorous external management efforts to affect a continued 
decrease in nuclear proliferation during the unipolar and multipolar periods. In fact, this 
region seemed to align more closely with a traditional neorealist view of proliferation 
trends in the Cold War era in which the superpowers managed client states and 
constrained nuclear proliferation efforts. Throughout the three time periods, the United 
States provided extended deterrence to its regional allies. 
There appear to be two lines of thinking in policy circles when it comes to the 
current North Korea nuclear crisis. The first one is that a North Korean nuclear weapons 
program can never be legitimized in any way and the country must rollback its program. 
North Korea’s history of exporting its missile, and likely nuclear technology in the case 
of Syria, discussed in the previous chapter, makes normalizing North Korea’s nuclear 
status in any way seem very risky. North Korea has contributed to significant missile 
proliferation in third countries and, if it were to build up a greater nuclear arsenal, it 
would not be hard to imagine a scenario where North Korea exported technology or 
material related to building a nuclear weapons program. Given the country’s 
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impoverished state, it certainly has the financial motivation to do so. In this sense, North 
Korea seems to pose two threats. The first one is the security risk posed by the existence 
of another nuclear weapons state. And there seems to be a growing consensus among 
external managers, even China, that North Korea poses a significant threat to regional 
stability.1673 The second concern is a possible threat to the denuclearization effort 
worldwide.1674 North Korea has proven to be a nuclear supplier difficult to constrain. 
The second way of thinking is that North Korea’s nuclear weapons capabilities 
are now a matter of fact and any policy formulated to address the North Korean crisis 
must acknowledge this. Looking back at the history of nuclear proliferation, once a 
country has acquired an indigenous nuclear weapons program and remains steeped in a 
high-threat regional security environment, it has only on one occasion (South Africa) 
given the program up. And North Korea’s nuclear program is of great value to the 
regime. In fact, the regime may perceive a link between its survival and the nuclear 
weapons program. The history of other “rogue” states with nuclear weapons programs, 
Libya and Iraq, may reinforce this idea. U.S. intelligence noted in May 2017 that “we 
have long assessed that Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities are intended for deterrence, 
international prestige, and coercive diplomacy.”1675 
Regardless of the eventual nonproliferation goals for North Korea, the first 
requirement is to gain leverage to pressure North Korea to stop advancing its nuclear 
weapons capabilities and there does not seem to be a way to advance this goal without 
involving Russia and China. External managers working together to pressure Iran 
resulted in the country coming to the negotiating table in 2013. The United States helped 
lead the way on the Iranian negotiations by implementing punishing economic sanctions. 
When those sanctions were also embraced by China and Russia, Iran began to be more 
open to negotiations. Economic sanctions, especially secondary sanctions, pushed Iran to 
                                                 
1673 Celia Hatton, “Is China Ready to Abandon North Korea?” BBC News, April 12, 2013, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-22062589. 
1674 Wade L. Huntley, “The Korean Conundrum: A Regional Answer to the Nuclear Crisis,” Global 
Dialogue 8, no. 1 (2006): 95. 
1675 Director of National Intelligence, “Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of 
the U.S. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2017,” 7. 
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the point where Iran judged it was in its greater interest to negotiate rather than continue 
pursuing its nuclear program. What are the equivalent levers to pressure North Korea and 
what role should external managers and the nonproliferation regime play? 
Fortunately, there seems to be a convergence between strategies to begin to 
address the crisis. In a multipolar setting, if more traditional neo-realist explanations help 
explain nuclear trends in Northeast Asia, North Korea should respond best to pressure 
from Russia and China, given their past and current patron-client relationships. If an 
explanation based on the role of external management and nonproliferation help elucidate 
nuclear trends in the region, North Korea may respond to a multilateral approach that 
makes use of the mechanisms established in the nonproliferation regime. Either way, 
China and Russia should play a central role in addressing this crisis. Regional experts 
have advocated a multilateral approach since at least the early to mid-2000s.1676 
In the former approach, China and Russia should be responsible for reining in 
North Korea. In the latter approach, cooperation among the great powers, especially the 
United States, Russia, and China would be critical for negotiating a settlement along with 
North Korea’s re-integration into the nonproliferation regime. External managers can 
improve control over nuclear supply issues, better monitor North Korea’s nuclear 
activities, and improve cooperation among the great powers as there would seem to be no 
lasting solution to this problem without the involvement of China and Russia. The 
eventual outcome of the North Korean nuclear crisis and the path taken to reach that 
result will signal how nuclear proliferation will be managed in a multipolar setting. 
3. Nuclear Power 
Renewed interest in nuclear power sparked concern that this interest represented a 
form of nuclear hedging. So far, however, nuclear power announcements have been slow 
to translate into concrete results. In the Middle East, construction on only one nuclear 
power plant has begun, and it is in the wealthy United Arab Emirates. Several Gulf States 
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opted not to pursue nuclear power after the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Of the eleven 
countries that expressed interest in nuclear power in the mid-2000s, five countries either 
decided against pursuing nuclear power or made no significant progress toward reaching 
that goal. Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar opted against developing nuclear power. Syria and 
Yemen have suffered from civil strife. Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the 
United Arab Emirates continued to advance nuclear power plans. The United Arab 
Emirates planned to have its first power reactor, which was being built by South Korea, 
completed during 2017. As of August 2017, however, no construction had begun on 
nuclear power plants in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, or Turkey. Nevertheless, all four 
countries were working toward that eventual goal. If nuclear power plans were to 
advance, it would be in the interest of the United States and other great powers to 
negotiate the equivalent of the United Arab Emirates’ “gold standard” 123 nuclear 
agreement. 
On a global scale, nuclear power projects seem to cost more to complete and take 
longer to finish than planned.1677 State commitment to financing nuclear power, either by 
the state itself or a sponsoring state, has seemed to be necessary. Even with state 
financing, the future of nuclear power remains unclear. Russia appears to be active as a 
nuclear power supplier in the Middle East region and has signed a number of nuclear 
cooperation agreements in the 2000s. Nuclear supplier agreements, however, have a long 
history of falling through or not being completed. For example, in November 2015, Egypt 
signed an agreement with Russia for four nuclear power reactors.1678 Russia committed 
to finance and build the reactors.1679 But there has been little sign of forward momentum 
on this project. As Henry Sokolski notes it is “market economics, more than any other 
force, that has kept most states from starting or completing these programs.”1680 
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Incidents like Westinghouse’s March 2017 bankruptcy do little to alleviate these 
concerns.1681 
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In terms of policy implications, the findings from this dissertation indicate that 
policymakers seeking ways to continue to limit nuclear spread should focus on 
encouraging international cooperation between the great powers on nuclear proliferation, 
despite the transition to a multipolar system, and finding ways to strengthen the 
nonproliferation regime. James Russell also highlights the importance of “outside 
powers” in managing nuclear proliferation issues.1682 Nuclear spread was constrained in 
the Middle East and seemingly in other world regions due to vigorous external 
management efforts by the superpowers, particularly the United States. Dedicated effort 
to this cause at multiple levels of the U.S. government contributed significantly to the 
current trend of decreased nuclear proliferation. U.S. security interests are best served by 
continued pursuit of controlling nuclear spread and participation in the nonproliferation 
regime. 
Despite the U.S. tendency to go it alone in finding solutions to nuclear 
proliferation challenges in the past, in a multipolar setting, it may best serve the 
overarching goal of constraining nuclear proliferation for the United States to more often 
support a multilateral process. The nonproliferation regime in its current form is not 
without imperfections and it can still be improved upon. Nevertheless, it has been a 
critical tool in bringing states together to address nuclear proliferation challenges. The 
United States has been a leader in creating bilateral and multilateral mechanisms to 
manage nuclear proliferation challenges. This expertise will be required if the 
nonproliferation regime is to continue to effectively address future nuclear proliferation 
challenges. 
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In a multipolar system, cooperating with great powers in this endeavor will be 
necessary. External managers should rely on traditional tools of statecraft such as 
economic sanctions, political pressure, and diplomatic negotiations utilized in 
coordination with other great powers for maximum effectiveness. The United States, 
Russia, China, and leading states in Europe—Germany, France, and the United 
Kingdom—should cooperate in the arena of nuclear nonproliferation even if competition 
is occurring in other areas. 
In a multipolar setting, external management may prove to be more difficult as 
great powers rise to meet the hegemon resulting in increased competition in the 
international system. As in the bipolar period, this competition has the potential to create 
an environment more conducive to nuclear spread. The advantage that external managers 
have in the multipolar setting is that the nonproliferation regime has evolved into a more 
sophisticated tool for managing nuclear proliferation. It provides a forum to address 
nuclear proliferation issues along with guidelines as to acceptable nuclear behavior. Great 
power support for the nonproliferation regime will ensure that the usefulness of this 
management tool will not fade over time. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
The findings of this dissertation point to four avenues for possible future research. 
First, applying my framework to other world regions in the analysis chapter appeared to 
produce results similar to my dissertation. Nevertheless, one cannot thoroughly cover in a 
matter of pages what has been investigated at length in three dissertation chapters. Thus, 
it would be useful to conduct studies on the rest of the world’s regions that parallel this 
dissertation on the Middle East. Are there factors that it might have missed in each 
regional overview? Applying my framework in an in-depth manner to a different region 
would contribute to the understanding of regional nuclear proliferation. 
This study also has highlighted the unique security environment in Northeast 
Asia. My review of regional nuclear trends suggested that nuclear proliferation decreased 
during the bipolar period in Northeast Asia, but did not decrease in successive periods 
despite vigorous efforts by external managers. Northeast Asia was the only region that 
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seemed to follow this proliferation trend. What insights might be gained by examining 
the roles of the regional security environment and external management in driving 
nuclear proliferation trends in Northeast Asia? What made the difference in this region? 
Was it the relatively permissive role of China? Was there another security dynamic at 
play at either the system level or regional level? As some theories seem to explain 
nuclear behavior in one region better than another, perhaps a distinct theory would shed 
light on Northeast Asian nuclear dynamics. 
 Another topic for possible further research is the role of external management 
and the nonproliferation regime in managing vertical proliferation. My research focused 
on nuclear spread rather than on vertical proliferation. External managers seem to have 
been less successful in limiting vertical proliferation. Outside of the United States and 
Russia, which have reduced nuclear weapons stockpiles through bilateral agreements, the 
global proliferation trend seems to be toward an increase in stockpiles of nuclear 
weapons, fissile materials, and nuclear weapons capabilities. The remaining nuclear 
weapon states—whether NPT-sanctioned or not—continue to see great value in nuclear 
weapons, especially for deterrence.1683 Such a study might investigate what factors seem 
to drive vertical proliferation and what role external managers might play in these 
proliferation trends. 
Finally, one could take a similar approach to this study—examining regional 
nuclear proliferation over a series of decades—but investigate a state-level theory. 
Perhaps this could involve examining the idea of national identity, building on the work 
done by Jacque Hymans, Peter Lavoy, and Jack Snyder, referenced in the introductory 
chapter. It might ask if national identity contributes to regional identity and what affect a 
possible regional identity might have on nuclear proliferation trends. This might be 
particularly helpful in explaining nuclear behavior in the regions that have embraced 
nuclear-weapon-free zones. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
This dissertation’s findings are different than what I had envisioned they would be 
as I drafted the proposal. When I started out, I thought I would likely be writing a 
dissertation about how regional conflict and rivalry drove nuclear proliferation trends 
over time. Instead, in researching the drivers for Middle East nuclear trends, I found 
evidence that external management efforts rather than increasing or decreasing levels of 
conflict and rivalry drove these trends. Regional states faced real security challenges and 
viewed nuclear weapons as a possible deterrent from surrounding threats. Nevertheless, 
nuclear proliferation continued to decrease over time in the Middle East region. 
I found that despite frustrations at times from allies with how the United States 
pursued its goal of limiting nuclear proliferation, the United States worked constantly to 
halt nuclear spread. Now declassified documents from the Cold War showed U.S. angst 
over the exploitation of NPT loopholes by regional states and policy discussions 
regarding how to thwart the development of nuclear weapons programs. Reports 
requested by the U.S. Congress from the U.S. intelligence community every six months 
from the mid-1990s through the early 2000s assured U.S. policymakers that the U.S. 
security apparatus was focused on pressing global proliferation concerns. This focus 
continued through the third timeframe of my dissertation: 2004 through 2013. 
As I studied the proliferation history in each period, I found that more often than 
not the United States found a way to constrain aspiring proliferators. The tools it used to 
manage nuclear proliferation included economic sanctions, diplomatic negotiations, 
political pressure, and, at least one time, military force. The United States came to 
realize, however, that it needed the cooperation of other states, particularly nuclear 
suppliers, if it was to achieve its nonproliferation goals. This was best achieved through 
bilateral agreements, multilateral agreements, and organizations dedicated to combatting 
proliferation. Thus, beginning with the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 1975, the 
nonproliferation regime began to evolve, growing into its current form. There is evidence 
to indicate that this nonproliferation regime has helped facilitate great power cooperation 
against nuclear proliferation that might not have occurred otherwise and suggests that the 
nonproliferation regime will continue to play an important role in facilitating 
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nonproliferation cooperation and helping external managers to limit nuclear spread. 
Further, given the outsized U.S. role in creating the nonproliferation regime and 
managing nuclear proliferation, the United States should not shrink from active 
participation and management of the regime in the future. The most critical proliferation 
challenges most often have been tackled with U.S. leadership. A possible measure of 
future progress in the regime might be the initiation of innovative and effective 
nonproliferation measures by other major actors in the multipolar system. 
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